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No 30

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Journal of Parapolitics

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February 1996



If you receive this issue in time, you will notice the announcement of a Lobster readers' meeting on the Scott Inquiry in Leeds on 24 February 1996. This was organised at short notice but if successful will be followed later in the spring/summer by the long promised meeting on Gladio/the coming general election smears/MI5 etc..

Apologies (again) for the delay with this issue but certain matters concerning Lobster have to be sorted out. These should be resolved shortly. An amusing aspect of this area was spotted by one of my subscribers. He noticed that Robin Ramsay, in a move worthy of Stalin at the height of his hysterical, paranoid campaign against Trotsky, had deleted my name from the list of back issues in his version of Lobster. Apparently, I had not written a single article for Lobster. Such is the silliness of his actions.

Readers may have noticed some strange typos in Nick Toczek's article, 'Look what's eating the Greens', in the last issue. Unfortunately, after the article was scanned in, I failed to spot the various mistakes which crept in. My apologies to Nick. These were corrected in later editions.

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£2.50 (inc p&p)

Lobster subscriptions (for four issues):
£8.00 (inc p&p)

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Editorial

THE SCOTT INQUIRY: FINANCING THE ARMS TRADE

The Scott Inquiry has been the most thorough investigation to date of Britain's arms trade. It has investigated in depth the prosecution of the three directors of the Midlands-based machine tool manufacturer, Matrix Churchill, and the changes in government guidelines concerning the sale of arms and defence related equipment to Iraq. The report is highly damaging to the government, severely critical of civil servants and government departments. Underlying all the specific criticisms are political and ethical questions concerning the sale of arms to a particularly murderous regime.

Steve Dorril

While the Scott Inquiry deserves praise for its doggedness and pursuit of civil servants and ministers, there is one main criticism which can be levelled at it. The Inquiry has singularly failed to make any attempt at investigating the flow of money which backed the sales of arms and defence related material to Iraq.

According to Gerald James, former managing director of Astra Holdings, the financial aspects of the trade with Iraq encouraged arms exports to continue there long after the end of the war with Iran. 'The deals went on because people were getting so much commission on them. If Scott looked at how the deals were financed, he would get far more of the story.' As far as I, and other researchers, are aware, Scott did not interview any of the key City people who were known to have been heavily involved in this area and crucial to its success.

What is apparent from studying the available evidence is that there was a relatively small group of MoD civil servants, politicians, intelligence personnel, industrialists, financiers, bankers and arms manufacturers who knew each other and operated through loosely-knit dining groups, such as the 'Savoy Mafia' and the Parlour Club, and were intimately involved in promoting the trade in arms to the Middle East.

What particularly characterises this area is the degree of secrecy which took place. Secrecy is normal practice for the intelligence agencies which were deeply involved in the arms trade with Iraq but added to this was the secrecy of the banking transactions without which the trade could not have prospered. This went beyond normal banking arrangements to the extent that some senior executives had little idea of what was taking place within their own banks. The financiers, who supplied the loans to make the deals possible, needed excellent contacts with government, either directly or through intelligence agencies, to ensure that the products they were financing would obtain export licenses.

This, of course, makes it extremely difficult to research and what follows has been pieced together from own files, the public record and contact with fellow researchers and people with knowledge of the Iraqgate affair including Richard Norton-Taylor (*The Guardian*), Richard Donkin (*Financial Times*), Tim Kelsey (*The Independent*, now *Sunday Times*), Kevin Cahill (formerly *Business Age*), Nick Glynn (researcher for Hayes and Boulton), Paul Henderson (Matrix Churchill), Paul Grecian (Ordtec), Christopher Cowley (Space Research Corporation), Gerald James (Astra Holdings), and Piers Dudgeon, Tim Laxton

(member of the accountants to Astra) and Ben Jackson of the World Development Movement with whom I exchanged information. I strongly recommend the WDM book *Gunrunner's Gold: How the Public's Money Finances Arm Sales*, which was published in late 1995. I would also like to thank Jim Sinclair and the Co-operative Bank for their genuine interest.

Britain is the world's third largest arms exporter with a trade worth £3 billion a year, more than some countries entire gross national product. The industry represents 11 per cent of all manufacturing production (1993 figure) and soaks up nearly half of all government expenditure on research and development. The 1992 Central Statistical Office figures showed that Britain ran a visible trade surplus in only one area - oil-exporting countries which buy large quantities of arms from the UK defence industry (this was particularly true of Iraq).

The arms industry thus enjoys a privileged position within the whole economy and because of this arms deals are one of the sensitive areas on which Whitehall refuses to open up. While in office, defence minister Alan Clark told the Commons that it had been the 'practice of successive administrations not to provide information about arms exports as it relates to specific countries'.

One specific country was Iraq which was as one Foreign Office paper put it - 'The Big Prize'. Throughout the 1980s UK banks signed a number of credit lines with Iraq designed to help finance UK exports there, though they were to claim in their defence that this did not knowingly include provision for arms.

Arms sales had been pretty evenly matched between Iran and Iraq but following the outbreak of hostilities between these two countries, the United States, in particular, was concerned about the threat of a fundamentalist Islamic Iran which appeared to be gaining the upper hand in the war. In order to redress the balance and to position Saddam Hussein as the policeman of the Middle East, the US and then Britain began to 'tilt' towards Iraq. Adam Butler, the minister for defence procurement in 1984, told the Scott Inquiry that 'The tilt was undoubtedly stronger towards Iraq - the fact is that something like ten times as much defence equipment had been exported to Iraq than to Iran since the outbreak of the war.'

The eight-year Iran-Iraq conflict provided huge business opportunities for the arms manufacturers and their financiers around the world. Estimates suggest that Iraq spent around \$100 billion (£67 billion) on the war

effort. Clearing and merchant bankers, accountants, lawyers and industrialists all earned large fees in the process. Most arms sales involved large commissions being paid along the way, especially on deals which are sensitive or contravene international guidelines, which is another reason for the secrecy to be found in this area.

Special guidelines introduced unilaterally by the British Government as part of a policy of impartiality in December 1984, stipulated that no 'lethal equipment' should be supplied to either side in the Iran-Iraq war. There was, needless to say, no precise definition of this term. One Foreign Office official believed that it referred to equipment 'designed and likely to kill'. This was judged 'case-by-case' and was later applied in the light of the politically-determined priority of the 'tilt to Iraq'.

The guidelines introduced to the House of Commons by Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, in October 1985 reinforced the 'consistent refusal to supply lethal equipment to either side'.

- (i) We should maintain our consistent refusal to supply any lethal equipment to either side.
- (ii) Subject to that overriding consideration, we should attempt to fulfil existing contracts and obligations.
- (iii) We should not, in future, approve orders for any defence equipment which, in our view, would significantly enhance the capability of either conflict.
- (iv) In line with this policy, we should continue to scrutinise rigorously all applications for export licences for the supply of defence equipment to Iran and Iraq.'

Guideline (iii) had been drafted deliberately in order, Howe told the Prime Minister, to 'retain a modicum of flexibility'. The guidelines, which were not law, were for Alan Barrett, an official in the MoD's Defence Export Services Secretariat, 'a convenient tool. You can use them as you want to, you don't use them when you don't want to, and all the time you change the guidelines.'

The unannounced change to the Howe guidelines, which made their interpretation even more flexible, was made in late December 1988 by Clark at the DTI, Lord Trefgarne at the MoD and William Waldegrave, minister of state at the Foreign Office. '(iii)' now read: 'We should not in future approve orders for any defence

equipment which, in our view, would be of direct and significant assistance to either country in the conduct of offensive operations in breach of the ceasefire'. On 10 November 1989, Mrs Thatcher told the House of Commons: 'Supplies of British defence equipment to Iraq and Iran continue to be governed by the guidelines introduced in 1985'.

According to figures compiled by the World Development Movement (WDM), which exposed the unlawful funding of the Pergau Dam project, the underwriting of arms sales to Third World countries costs the British taxpayer nearly £1 million per day in losses and subsidised interest rates.

More than £5 million of public money is pledged every day to underpin arms sales through a system known as export credit guarantees. These act as a safety net for British companies selling abroad and, ultimately, the Banks which back them. If the foreign country does not pay the manufacturer, the government and taxpayer pick up the bill. It is estimated by the WDM that, in 1994, of the annual £1 billion paid out in claims by the ECGD, arms sales accounted for £254 million, with a further £68 million spent on providing subsidised interest rates. Operating with the general secretiveness which characterises this area, a precise breakdown of the claims is not released by the government.

The most significant foreign debtor in recent years has been Iraq, which refused to pay its bills after the Gulf War. It still owes £652 million for military and civilian goods. Jordan owes £255 million specifically for arms, some of which may have found their way to Baghdad. Jordan was known as 'front' destination for arms which eventually reached Iraq by way of false end-user certificates.

The Foreign Office defended its position on the level of defence sales to Iraq on the basis that they only reached £222 million for the period 1985 to 1990 out of a total of £10 billion spent by Saddam Hussein. Scott, however, queried the figure pointing out that this did not include equipment such as machine tools.

In 1989, the MoD sent a paper by Colonel Richard Glazebrook, the official responsible for monitoring the arms traffic and machine tools, to Lord Trefgarne, then minister of defence procurement, alerting the government 'to the way in which UK Ltd.' is helping Iraq, often unwilling but sometimes not, to set up a major indigenous arms industry'. Taken individually the document said, many of the items were relatively innocuous. Put together, however, they could represent a 'significant

enhancement' to Iraq's ability to resume the war with Iran - prohibited under the publicly-stated guidelines.

More importantly, the Foreign Office figure did not include the supply of goods via Jordan, which saw a series of special arms deals with Britain during Mrs Thatcher's terms in office. Former defence minister, Alan Clark, told Scott that 'more than half the material purchased by Iraq was actually consigned to Jordan'.

The importance of the Jordanian connection was revealed through the long patient probing of Labour MP, Jim Cousins, who through a series of questions to ministers discovered that exports to Jordan in the relevant categories were three or four times higher during the eighties than they had been in the seventies. For the most part, this could be accounted for by inflation but one category rose from £318.5 million to £581.5 million in the 1980s. Cousins believes that this was a reference to 'arms and ammunition for military purposes'.

Four government organisations, which worked closely with the major banks, were at the heart of the aid, trade and arms supply programme and many of the key players involved came from trade, finance and defence circles. The four were: International Military Services, the Defence Exports Services Organisation, the British Overseas Trade Board and the Overseas Projects Board.

International Military Services (IMS), originally known as Millbank Technical Services, was set up as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Ministry of Defence in 1974 under a Labour government to work with the Crown Agents, which offered 'financial, professional and procurement services to developing countries'. IMS was to secure and discharge export contracts for UK defence equipment 'in the interests of the Government and of industry'. Subsidiaries worked in Iran, India and Saudi Arabia.

The Chair of IMS from 1974 to 1985 was Sir John Cuckney, who was also Chair of the Crown Agents. During the same period Cuckney was deputy Chair of Midland Bank whose special unit for financing arms sales, Midland International Trade Services, had regular access to the MoD and the ECGD. According to the WDM, during the eighties the Midland was the financier of number of IMS transactions, often with ECGD support.

A senior officer with the Security Service (MI5) during the fifties where he was responsible for training Peter Wright of

Spycatcher fame, Sir John quickly developed a background in banking and the City. On leaving MI5 in 1958 he joined the Standard Industrial group, a stockbroking offshoot of the Cowdray empire. Three years later, he became a director of another Cowdray offshoot, Lazard Brothers, and looked set for an orthodox City banking career. In 1968, Cuckney took the unusual step of resigning to form the Anglo-Eastern Bank, which specialised in trade finance between Britain and the Middle East.

Increasingly, Cuckney was seen by the City as something of a maverick but he found favour with Whitehall and in 1974 the government sent him to sort out the Crown Agents, a relic of the Empire which had become entangled in an international fraud scandal. The City rumour mill continued to be fascinated by his involvement with IMS, responsible for overseas arms sales, which became a spectacular success under his chairmanship with large sales of Chieftain tanks and Rapier missiles to Iran under the Shah.

In 1986, IMS formed its own finance organisation, the IMS Export Finance House which enabled companies to obtain insurance for arms deals which the government's own ECGD would not cover. IMS later concluded contractual relations between Britain and the Iraqi ministry of defence to perform 'certain technical and military services to the Iraqi armed forces'.

In the eighties, Cuckney became vice-Chair of Tube Investments, the firm which sold Matrix Churchill to the Iraqis, and also Chair of the government-owned venture capital group 3i, which was the largest shareholder in the British munitions group Astra Holdings. In 1989, he astonished the City by heading up a hostile £7 billion break-up bid for GEC.

IMS ceased trading in 1991 and was gradually wound down.

The Defence Services Export Organisation (DESO) and its administrative arm, the Defence Export Sales Secretariat (DESS) had been set up by the Labour Government in 1966 to boost the export sales of British-made defence equipment. It is directly responsible for government-to-government memoranda of understanding on major defence sales and it takes the lead on sales negotiations and the administration of related contracts. It also provides advice and support to British firms to help secure the sale.

The DESO receives secret intelligence material derived largely from

communication intercepts of foreign defence deals made by GCHQ. The DESO then forwards a sanitised version of this material to major British arms manufacturers for use in undercutting foreign bids (the huge £20 billion sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia - the Al Yamanah deal - is one example of this). The manufacturers are then dependent on the government together with non-government financial institutions to fund the deals.

The DESO provides staff in London and overseas, including Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Kuwait, where Britain has big defence deals. An MoD department, the DESO is partly staffed by executives seconded from industry.

Seventeen people have been seconded from the private sector to the DESO since 1979, mostly from British Aerospace (BAe). (Sir) James Blyth, its head from 1981 to 1985, later became managing director of Plessey, a firm heavily involved in the defence field, and then a director of BAe. He was followed as its head by (Sir) Colin Chandler (1985-89), whose previous post as group marketing director of BAe was taken over by David Hastie, also later seconded to the MOD for one year. Hastie attended the Baghdad Arms Fair in the spring of 1989 in order to lobby for the sale of Hawk jets built by BAe. That year, Chandler left the MoD to become chief executive of one of Britain's top arms companies, Vickers. Chandler's direct rapport with the Saudi Defence Minister, Prince Sultan, helped clinch the Al Yamanah deal for Britain.

Since 1979, five banks have been represented at the DESO in the post of International Finance Adviser - Midland (1990-91), Samuel Montague (owned by Midland Bank), Lloyds (1983-85), Grindlays (1988-1990) and Morgan Grenfell (1986-1988).

Encouragement for the export of British-made defence material to Iraq was made easier, as testimony to the Scott Inquiry revealed, by the fact that members of the DESO were also on the working group at the MoD which looked at dubious export licence applications. As former defence procurement minister, Adam Butler, told the Inquiry, the key group policing the guidelines was overwhelmed by officials whose main interest was to export defence equipment. Regional marketing directors from the DESO represented the arms companies on the group and constantly sought to interpret the guidelines in such a way so that exports of defence related equipment were allowed. This was made even easier by the presence of key industrialists within the DESO.

Robin Fellgett, a Treasury official, told the Scott Inquiry that MoD arms salesmen were 'gung-ho to support the export of military equipment to Iraq and almost everywhere else'.

The British Overseas Trade Board (BOTB) and the Overseas Projects Board were both set up by the Department of Trade and Industry to help formulate and direct overseas aid policy on large construction projects. The Boards had members drawn from the civil service, including a mixture of senior officials from the DTI and the Foreign Office, industry, commerce and representatives from Britain's largest banks including Rothschilds and Samuel Montagu, part of Midland Bank.

None of the deals and the financial backing for them from the banks could have been possible without the support of the government through the Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) which, in co-operation with the banks, underwrote the trade by guaranteeing payment of debt if countries such as Iraq failed to settle on time. In effect, the banks could not lose.

Once again, it was highly secretive, partly because the department had access to sensitive intelligence based on GCHQ monitoring of arms deals. The ECGD had its own arms unit, PD7 and documents relating to Iraq were kept particularly secure with access to them strictly controlled.

In the five years to 1985, when the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe announced Britain's impartiality between Iran and Iraq, the government provided Saddam with £2,388 million in credits; for the years 1980 to 1990 the figure rose to £3,517 million. Britain's export credit exposure to Iran was much less with no medium-term trade credits being issued in the 1980s.

An official at the ECGD, David Briars, said at the trial of the Matrix Churchill directors that a decision was taken in 1987 - before the end of the Iraq-Iran war when official policy was to ban defence-related exports - for the department to allocate 20 per cent of its cover to exports to Iraq to 'defence business'. As the Guardian journalist Richard Norton Taylor has written: 'The ECGD was already busy underwriting trade with Iraq. Banks arranged finance without asking what their money was paying for.' During 1987, Clark signed an agreement to lend Iraq £200 million to buy British goods, including computers, for the Iraqi armed forces.

In the five years to 1989 President Hussein had spent \$14.2 billion on hi-tech imports from Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the United States. The war with Iran had left debts of \$80 billion. Oil revenues were squandered on the drive to become a great regional power. As Iraq's annual income was drastically cut by the declining oil income, Western ambassadors in Baghdad found that the constant refrain was the need for extra credits. They were warned that old debts would not be paid and new orders would go elsewhere if they were not forthcoming. Each government was dealt with separately, a continuation of the policy of divide and rule which Saddam successively exploited.

Britain's strong trading position had been achieved in part by extending credit throughout the war. Britain was being slightly favoured as a result. Nonetheless, London decided in 1990 to give Iraq further credit only to the amount required to service existing debts, though this was still a large sum. As the figures show from the ECGD evidence to the Commons Trade and Industry Select Committee, in November 1991, at the time of the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam had been forwarded medium term export credits worth £1,140 million, though the Iraqis had not taken up £265 million of that largess.

By May 1990, of the £3.5 billion staked on Saddam over the decade, there were outstanding debts of £1 billion. It was this money that the DTI feared would be at risk if the interest by the Customs and Excise in the affairs of Matrix Churchill went too far.

In July 1990, on the day that Customs investigators made a 'routine visit' to the Matrix Churchill factory in Coventry, the DTI minister Nicholas Ridley wrote to the Prime Minister concerning the ECGD's 'large exposure on that market'. He warned that the exposure is '£1 billion' (a figure later reduced to £940 million). Iraqi default of credit lines would 'clearly be extremely serious for ECGD and would have implications for the Public Sector Borrowing requirement.' On 27 July, the Government sanctioned the export to Iraq of Matrix Churchill technology which it knew could be used to make missiles.

The ECGD warned the 1991 Select Committee that 'at this stage, it is difficult to forecast to what extent claims payments will be recovered, and what therefore the eventual net loss might be. It would be prudent, however, to assume that recovery will be a difficult and extended process.' By the start of 1994, ECGD had paid out £521 million post-Gulf War claims with at last another £130 million still to be paid out. As WDM pointed out, this is more than the net cost to Britain of fighting the Gulf war.

MIDLAND BANK

In late 1988, Christopher Cowley, a metallurgist with Dr Gerald Bull's Space Research Corporation which was responsible for the 'Supergun', was staying at the Al-Rasheed hotel in Baghdad where he met an 'Englishman' who introduced himself as working for one of the London clearing banks - Midland. Two sources have confirmed that the man was Stephan Kock.

Kock apparently said that he was there for 'Trade. Setting up deals, financial packages, loans, that sort of thing. I'm actually talking about a loan worth something like a quarter of a billion dollars.'

Cowley asked: 'How can a major bank possibly do business with a country that reneges on its debts as much as Iraq does? Won't you eventually go bankrupt, piling up bad debts on top of bad debts?'

'Oh no,' Kock said airily. 'We do everything possible to finance business between this country [Iraq] and the UK.'

Cowley thought this rather masochistic.

'Not in the least. You see, before we advance monies to a company, we always insist on any funds being covered by the HM Government's Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD).'

'I see. So the British taxpayer is underwriting the risk?'

'Yes. That's how ECGD works. We can't lose. After 90 days, if the Iraqis haven't coughed up, the company gets paid instead by the British Government. Either way we recover our loan, plus interest of course. It's beautiful.'

Cowley soon discovered that Kock was a military specialist. 'We do mostly arms, though other things as well. Suppose Dr Bull had a client who needed funding, we could arrange it always providing we had the necessary approval.' Approval came through its government connections - the International Military Services (MoD) and the Joint Intelligence Committee in the Cabinet Office - 'We have a good contact on that. Previously worked for the Midland as well as IMS.'

'We're pretty hush-hush', Kock continued. Many people even in the bank don't know about us, and that includes senior executives.' He acknowledged that the whole thing operated on the old-boy network. 'Our people have military or intelligence backgrounds, and if we need to talk to the Government, we go right to the top.'

This was confirmed by a deal with Malaya worth £1 billion. 'Maggie signed the contract herself, though MITS put it together working with the MoD.'

The Midland Bank, according to the *Financial Times*, was 'the most enthusiastic of all the banks in its pursuit of defence export financing'. According to the journalist most versed in this area, David Hellier, 'Central to the funding of many British export sales to Iraq was one of our best-known financial institutions, Midland Bank'. US journalist Kenneth Timmerman in his book, *The Death Lobby*, claims that it was involved in the flourishing trade with Iraq, financing 'some of Saddam's earliest weapons purchases in the West'.

The Midland Bank's international trade organisation, Midland International Trade Services (MITS) began life as the London American Finance Corporation which in the early 1980s had faced mounting losses. In 1982, Midland's chief executive, Geoffrey Taylor, initiated a restructuring programme whereby the 25 per cent minority stake held by Finance for Industry, later called 3i, was bought out.

Within the Midland group, the *Financial Times* has reported that MITS was a long-standing source of controversy because of 'its unorthodox management style, its disproportionate large losses and the general secretiveness which surrounded it'. It was regarded by people in the rest of Midland 'as a melting pot of colourful, exciting and at times downright odd banking practices'.

It was, in the phrase of some Midland executives, a 'bank within a bank'. While the clearing bank itself was highly centralised and tightly controlled, Midland's non-banking subsidiaries had been 'kept on a loose rein'. However, the hands-off style of management in the international area proved particularly damaging and losses at MITS involving deals in Italy and the United States continued to mount and in the late 1980s recorded a loss of more than £42m. The *Financial Times* recognised that 'Midland's nagging problem over the past decade or more has been that it generates less profit for every pound of capital than its main rivals'. Which is presumably a reason why the bank went into the Arms arena in a big way. After a run of lean years, the Midland was bought up by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank.

In 1978, the former head of the Civil Service, Lord Armstrong of Sanderstead, who was Midland's Chair from 1975 to 1980, recruited Sir John Cuckney as a non-

executive director of the bank where he remained until 1988. In 1983, Sir John became Chair of International Military Sales (IMS).

In 1984 Midland Bank established its special unit to handle defence finance and sales, the highly secretive Defence Equipment Finance Department (DEFD). IMS was one of its clients. According to Campbell Dunford, a former trade finance director at Midland, the unit's formation was part of a deliberate strategy to compete more intensively with Morgan Grenfell in the defence finance market.

Used to arrange finance for UK defence exports, the DEFD was formed, according to the *Financial Times*, 'to exploit the aggressive arms sales policies of the British government under Lady Thatcher, especially to the Middle East and Asia, and partly to build Midland's links with a UK weapons industry that was coming under growing pressure from abroad'. It was to build links with the rapidly growing domestic arms and munitions manufacturers.

The defence sales unit was highly secretive and its existence was unknown to some senior managers. Geoffrey Taylor, the Bank's chief executive when the unit was formed, insisted that he knew nothing about it. The climate of secrecy fostered the belief, to quote one former senior executive, that as a matter of rule 'there were some things you didn't ask questions about'.

In line with this general secrecy, the unit employed what one senior manager called 'exotic consultants', often with military or intelligence backgrounds, as consultants. These experienced military veterans were engaged for their extensive personal defence contacts and knowledge of the products. They were used to make initial approaches and introductions, and to describe the sort of services the bank could offer. None had any financial experience which the Midland's rival in this area, Morgan Grenfell, regarded as a sign of naiveté rather than sophistication.

Among those employed as consultants were:

* Robin Hogg who had been the vice-admiral in charge of naval operational requirements during the Falklands war. In 1986, Hogg was involved in Global 86, a promotional tour of the Third World for British defence contractors organised by the MoD's Defence Export Sales Organisation (DESO).

* Brigadier John Shrimpton, formerly assistant military deputy of the DESO before joining the bank.

* Stephan Kock, former member of the Rhodesian special forces with links to the Intelligence Services (see Lobster 27 for background on Kock).

At its height, the DEFD's clients included Plessey, Astra Holdings and GEC. Plessey confirmed to the *Financial Times* that during the 1980s it was among several UK companies to which the Midland unit had proved 'helpful' though it refused to comment beyond that.

The Defence Equipment Finance Department was finally disbanded in 1990.

The Midland Bank provided government-guaranteed export credits totalling £870 million over a four-year period to 1989. While Midland officials deny directly financing defence deals, former bank officials have acknowledged that defence firms did gain contracts in Iraq throughout the eighties, but only on projects supported by the Government. 'Mr Iraq', Graham Towler, who was head of the Iraq team inside the Midlands defence export finance department, privately told researcher Nick Glynn that Midland's defence was 'laughable'. Towler, who is now with Credit Lyonnaise, is an adviser to Michael Heseltine at the DTI.

In its evidence to the Supergun Inquiry by the Commons Select Committee, Midland revealed that of the loans the ECGD had earmarked for Iraq 'up to 20 per cent of the earlier guaranteed credits' involved "'soft" military equipment, such as communications equipment'. Other UK equipment sold to Iraq included mortar-locating radar, communications equipment and protective clothing for bomb disposal teams - the so-called 'non-offensive' items. But as Hellier has argued, the Midland 'must have been aware' that anything Iraq acquired would end up being used for the military effort. Not only that but the word 'earlier' used in its evidence evidently referred to the period when Iraq was at war with Iran.

Midland has not given a breakdown of its Iraqi trade.

* It won a tender to provide £250 million in credits for Iraq over the five years to the invasion of Kuwait, when Saddam Hussein was engaged in a massive military expansion.

* Midland acted as the lead bank for financing some of the more sensitive Middle East countries. As Gerald James has alleged Morgan Grenfell was also heavily involved. The Bank was the lead lender in the £275 million defence package to Jordan,

arranged by the IMS, in 1988. Midland's MITS joined in with the deal involving GEC, Plessey and Astra.

King Hussein of Jordan, had arranged the order for electronic warfare equipment, anti-aircraft installations and other military hardware with Mrs Thatcher in 1985. Jordan was to see a 200 per cent plus increase in aid to it after 1980. In the four years after 1985, £125 million-worth of weapons could be accounted for as having been delivered directly to Jordan's defence force. Weapons bought with the remaining £150 million appear to have gone missing. However, not all went unaccounted for; some was later found to have been used against coalition forces during Desert Storm.

It was widely known that British defence equipment supplied to Jordan was being passed on to Iraq. In 1985 the intelligence services were asked to monitor arms shipments diverted to Iraq via Jordan.

Paul Grecian, managing director of Ordtec, a Reading-based company that exported defence technology to Iraq via Jordan, has said that he had no trouble getting finance for deals that his firm arranged with Jordan. He said that although there was a general acceptance in the industry that Jordan was a regular conduit for channelling arms to Iraq, the banks never raised the issue of where the goods might end up.

Ordtec's bankers were Lloyds in Oxford Street and they used the Lloyds International documentary credits section for their requirements. According to Grecian, the applications to the bank were largely 'cosmetic', written so as not to alert Lloyds to the true nature of the contracts. 'No questions were asked' and there were no problems for 'discreet projects'. Grecian was unaware that the banks engaged in any follow up investigation of the contracts. They displayed, Grecian recalled, 'a general naiveté'.

According to the *Financial Times*, in 1986 Lloyds was also the lead lender for a ECGD-backed £150 million line of credit for military factories and equipment in Egypt. This was later linked to missile projections which, according to WDM, may have been supporting Iraq's own missile programme.

When Christopher Cowley, a metallurgist employed by Gerald Bull's Space Research Corporation, which was involved in designing the 'Supergun', visited an arms depot in Amman in Jordan, in January 1988, he discovered that warehouses had extremely large amounts of weapons and ammunition. He found that the pallets for the shells were marked MoD RO [Royal Ordnance], clearly of British manufacture. In September 1990, a month after the

invasion of Kuwait, the Government approved the sale of Royal Ordnance shells to Jordan which, according to the man at the MoD who was monitoring the arms traffic, Colonel Glazebrook, were likely to have been passed on to Iraq. Following the advance into Iraq during the Gulf war, a British officer took a photograph of an Iraqi gun position, the picture widely circulated in the British media showed a lid for mortar bombs marked, MoD RO. This remains a highly controversial subject.

* The last credit line extended to Iraq, a £250 million facility, was raised in April 1990 by Midland, not many months after Saddam shocked the world by gassing his own people (this is believed to be different to the one mentioned above). The Financial Times reporting the deal, said that it was signed 'despite the differences between Baghdad and London over repeated Iraqi attempts to procure technology for military industries'.

* In February 1992, Gerald James, former Chair of Astra, alleged that the Midland Bank had been behind the financing of the Supergun order. James said that he had recently obtained copies of a Midland Bank \$60 million letter of credit for Iraq which, he said, related to the sale of defence equipment from the United States. The matter remains open.

Midland Bank officials giving evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee investigating the Supergun project denied knowingly financing sensitive arms sales to Iraq. In written evidence submitted to the Committee, which was published on 12 February 1992, the Bank stated that its officials had studied a representative sample of all their letters of credit. This sample did not, said the Bank, leave any 'reason to suppose that we have advised or confirmed any letter of credit relating to any component of a Supergun'.

Paul Foot in *Private Eye* responded with the claim that the Scott Inquiry had been told of a letter of credit which shows that the Swiss subsidiary of the Bank's defence finance department (DEFD) was involved in a deal relating to parts of the Supergun ordered from the Swiss engineering company, Von Roll. Given the secrecy which existed in the DEFD and the lack of knowledge within the Bank about its activities it would not be unsurprising if both accounts were not in fact correct.

* Former DEFD consultant, Stephan Kock told the Committee investigating the Supergun project that he had advised the Midland Bank on defence matters. One important area was Malaysia. While not

straying into the Scott Inquiry remit, this aspect does reveal something of the nature of the Midland's interest in arms and finance.

In 1988, a team led by Bank officials and Stephan Kock from the Midland's defence department, DEFD, together with MoD personnel, including a small delegation from the SAS, travelled to Malaysia in expectation of a visit by Mrs Thatcher to sign the highly controversial £1 billion defence deal, which included the £234 million aid to build the Pergau Dam. The signing was preceded by Mrs Thatcher's speech in which she included a couple of paragraphs about Midland's proposed role in the financing. She also alluded to the defence package as being an entirely UK operation headed up by the Midland Bank.

The deal was surprising. A clause in the secret memorandum of understanding with Malaysian government does not mention the ECGD but instead proposes using private banks. 'The United Kingdom will assist in the arrangement of financial facilities to be provided by a United Kingdom bank or a group of United Kingdom Banks and the United Kingdom Government will ensure that the interest to be charged will be at concessionary rates.' Senior Whitehall sources told the *Guardian* that this indicated a breach of normal practice - and was unusual in guaranteeing to subsidise commercial bank loans. Similar concessionary arrangements appeared to have been made for British allies in Oman, Brunei and Saudi Arabia.

However, despite Mrs Thatcher's references to the bank, Midland denies any involvement in the Pergau project and 'any financing to Malaysia to support the British defence export sales'.

As can be expected from the general secrecy which characterised Midland activities in this area, the Bank adopts the minimum legal requirements concerning export licences, stating in a standard letter to customers only that it provides 'financial support for the export of selected defence equipment for which her Majesty's Government has issued an export licence'.

ASTRA

In 1980, Gerald James took on the small fireworks producer Astra (recently in the headlines through the accusations against another non-executive director, Jonathan Aitken, by James) with a stagnant turnover of less than a million pounds and over the next nine years converted it into one of Britain's major independent explosive makers. By 1987, he had won a corner for

his company in both the cartelised British munitions market and in the much more competitive American market.

Until 1986, Astra's bankers had been Barclays and Bank of Boston but early in that year Astra acquired a small electronics/security firm, MFA International by guaranteeing its overdraft. During discussions with MFA's bankers Midland, the manager of the Maidstone branch recommended to Astra Chair James a part-time consultant/adviser to the Midland Bank's defence sales department, DEFD, Stephan Kock. Mystery man Kock joined Astra Holdings in October as a non-executive director. With his apparently leading position in the secret and very active Midland's arms department, he looked like an ideal candidate. Midland subsequently guaranteed Astra's overdraft to enable it to buy into other companies, one being BMARC which already used Midland as its bankers.

Kock would later play a highly disruptive and covert role within Astra. He would also report to the security services without informing his board. Supergun designer Gerald Bull told his colleague, Christopher Cowley, that Kock 'works for the Midland Bank arms department, but he's also part of MI5 like Cuckney'.

As part of Astra's expansion it began to take on the propellant cartel of ICI, Bofors, Nobel, whose bankers were Arbuthnot Latham. When Astra purchased the Belgian propellant manufacturer Pouders Reunies de Belgique (PRB), which had extensive links to the MoD, the man to encourage the deal was Sir John Cuckney, who played an influential role in the company as Chair, since 1987, of one of its largest shareholders, 3i. Cuckney knew about PRB because International Military Sales, of which he was Chair, had worked with the Belgian company in the past. Astra management decided to fund the acquisition by seeking new funds from its shareholders. Three of its largest investors being 3i, Clerical and Medical and the Prudential which happily subscribed to the plan.

Herve de Carmoy, formerly head of Midland's International arm, was in contact with Kock and partly responsible for selling PRB to Astra as chief executive of SGB (Societe Generale de Belgique), a post which he inherited in July 1988. PRB's owner, the Belgian company Gecham (a subsidiary of SGB) was advised on the sale of PRB to Astra by SG Warburg, led by Adrian Haxby, later head of corporate finance for Warburg in Paris.

Astra management soon discovered that its Belgian subsidiary had contracted in

1988 to supply propellant for Bull's Project Babylon (the Supergun) which was being illegally trans-shipped from Jordan to Iraq disguised as a consignment of chocolate. The deal which would be worth £30 million was backed by the Belgian equivalent of the British ECGD. The advance payment was made by a letter of credit drawn on the Central Bank of Jordan but it originated in Iraq and ultimately in Atlanta with Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL).

Astra almost collapsed after acquiring PRB when it also found out that its new subsidiary did not have the orders which it had promised. This resulted in Astra's financial difficulties becoming acute. When Astra ran into financial problems after the PRB deal, Stephan Kock tried to recruit to the board another former Midland man, Campbell Dunford, an expert in trade finance. Kock worked throughout the 1980s as a defence consultant to Midland. He was still being paid after being fined £650 following a shooting incident in January 1990.

According to the February 1992 minutes of the House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee on Exports to Iraq, both Barclays and National Westminster were involved in lending to Iraq as part of the ECGD lines of credit during the 1980s, including portions earmarked for military sales. Barclays says that it was not involved in supporting export deals to Iraq in the five years up to 1994.

BNL

When on 4 August 1989, the FBI raided and sealed the Atlanta branch offices of the Italian-owned Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) they discovered hidden records of the huge Iraqi loans made available to arms manufacturers and machine tool makers.

Three years earlier, the Atlanta BNL branch which was three-quarters owned by the Italian Treasury, had struck up a close relationship with the military authorities in Baghdad and lent out cheap loans to anyone who wanted credit for supplying weapons or defence-related equipment to Iraq. Through its funding of Matrix Churchill, the branch, which only had a staff of nineteen, was at the centre of the Iraqgate scandal in the United States and Britain.

As many as six multi-million dollar transfers per day left Atlanta and, in all, 2,500 export credits were dispatched to banks in areas where the Iraqis were making specific purchases for defence equipment.

The surface commissions charged on these export credits amounted to a meagre 0.2 per cent, in a market where 15 per cent might have been the norm for a poor credit risk.

With its ownership of the Technology and Development Group (TDG) based in west London, Iraq made Britain a centre of its military procurement network, which operated through more than fifty undercover front companies and agents in Europe and the United States. TDG was owned by the Baghdad-based Al-Arabi Trading Co. which had been trying to buy up British engineering companies for sophisticated weapons production since 1987. Al Arabi held its account in Paris at the United Arab Bank.

That year, the Iraqis expressed an interest in organising the purchase of the Coventry-based firm Matrix Churchill and its sales and service subsidiary in Ohio and contacted the parent company, Tube Investments (TI), to inquire about the possibility. Sir John Cuckney, appointed deputy Chair in 1985 and a non-executive director of TI at the time of sale, said later that there had been nothing unusual about selling Matrix to an Iraqi company. The price had been a good one and hundreds of jobs had been saved, though Paul Henderson believed it had been 'for nothing. Or at most £2.5 million'. The deal had been partly financed by the Atlanta branch of BNL.

In 1987, Matrix won a contract worth £19 million to supply Iraq with 150 specialist computer-numerically-controlled CNC lathes worth £19 million which were used to manufacture 80mm, 122 mm and 155 mm shells.

The Chair of Matrix Churchill's parent company, TMG, was Dr Safa Al Habobi, whose covert role was to buy arms for Iraq. On the recommendation of Habobi, an American banker, Paul von Wedel, visited Matrix's factory as an executive of BNL's Atlanta branch. In 1988, von Wedel offered Matrix unlimited loans at a unprecedented quarter of 1 per cent a year interest.

Matrix's managing director, Paul Henderson, was initially sceptical about the offer and consulted the company's bankers, Lloyds Bank in Birmingham, which charged Matrix 1 per cent on a confirmed irrevocable letter of credit. The Lloyds manager advised him: 'There's nothing wrong with Banca Lavoro. It's one of the biggest banks in Italy, owned by the government. As for the rates, we can't match them. Can't come close. You should take them while they are available.' On that advice, Matrix went ahead with a trial loan of £2 million at the new rate. It was

highly successful and as Henderson admitted, bank guarantees were not to prove a problem for Matrix. The problem for Henderson was that on all the deals a percentage was creamed off by the Iraqi owners as commission and expenses.

During the 1988, the 'diabolical financial genius' manager of the BNL Atlanta branch, Christopher Drogoul, discussed the financing of the Iraqi arms programme with London-based Iraqi businessmen who had been using Iraqi and other banks in London. In October, Drogoul helped arrange a \$300 million deal with an Iraqi banking official, Sadiq Hassan Taha, to finance the construction in Iraq of the Badush dam, but the money went instead to the nearby Saad-16 missile and nuclear site. Machine tools for the site were provided by Matrix Churchill. According to the Independent's banking sources, whilst in London, Taha 'met several British bankers'. In 1989, Taha sought permission for the Bank of England to set up a London based trade bank.

Dr Habobi introduced Matrix to one of the world's biggest arms manufacturers, the Chilean Carlos Cardeon, who specialised in designing and producing lethal cluster bombs. The plan was to build a whole production line for the Iraqi armed forces which needed the machine-tool skills of Matrix Churchill. Cardeon was being paid in oil by the Iraqis. A financing arrangement was worked out by the financial managers whereby a British bank would extend credit to Cardeon. The credit would be backed by the British government's Export Credit Guarantee Department. Paul Henderson has confirmed that the bank was Lloyds through its Trade and Project Finance department and Lloyds International department which arranged the credit line.

According to Paul Grecian of Ordtec, who was offered access to it for credit, the Birmingham branch of Lloyds, which was used by Matrix Churchill, had on deposit £20 million from the Iraq central bank, Rafidain. Based on the research of Christopher Cowley, the ultimate origin of this money would almost certainly have been the Atlanta branch of BNL.

Earlier credit for Matrix had been organised through the First Dresdner bank in West Germany. When, in September 1989, news reached officials in the ECGD that the United States authorities were investigating the activities of the Atlanta BNL branch and that indictments might be brought against its manager, Christopher Drogoul, and the technical head of the Ohio branch of Matrix Churchill, Paul Henderson, a civil servant reminded his officials that 'there were Iraqi directors on the board of Matrix. The banks involved in the credit

for this business between Iraq and Matrix are Lloyds, Dresdner Bank and [underlined twice] BNL.'

When the BNL Atlanta offices were raided, Matrix was forced to seek an alternative source of funds for its contracts. By the end of 1989, funds were provided through the West Deutsche Landesbank in Dusseldorf.

Onesale, for an Iraqi contract with Cardeon, was given the green light by the DTI on 19 July 1990, four days before the invasion of Kuwait.

BNL Atlanta financed other companies that supplied military useful technology and more to Iraq.

* The Gateshead company, Flexible Manufacturing Technology (FMT), a subsidiary of Vickers, tendered in 1988 for a £5 million project to build a factory for building specialised equipment to supply the Iraqi army with mobile rocket-launch system similar to the MRLS (Multiple Rocket Launcher System) used by the coalition forces during the Gulf War.

The order had been placed by the Iraqi military through Matrix Churchill. Funding for the missile project was initially arranged by a third party through the BNL Atlanta branch. Later, it was transferred to the Central Bank of Iraq when Washington froze part of BNL's lending after discovering that the branch had financed millions of dollars worth of illegal exports to Iraq.

* Caselle was a mysterious international tobacco giant, with an office in Britain but based in Luxembourg. It also traded in weapons across the world enjoying a close relationship with western intelligence agencies and has been suspected of being a 'front company'.

In 1986 Casalee acted as intermediary for a £112.5 million shipment to Iraq of 9 million anti-personnel mines, which would explode when stepped upon. These were made by the Valsellan Italian company, a subsidiary of Fiat. The contract was paid for by BNL. The deal involved issuing false end-user certificates with the mines being shipped to Iraq via Singapore.

THE SUPERGUN

As part of the Iraqi Project Babylon, which was being set up by Gerald Bull's Space Research Corporation, the Belgian military research company which sent sophisticated technology to Iraq, in July 1988, Sheffield Forgemasters won a contract worth £7 million for the manufacture of the 1,000

mm tube assembly - the Supergun. The early Commons Select Committee on the Supergun failed to discover who provided finance for Project Babylon though at one stage the Committee heard from Forgemasters that 'some money for parts was deposited by the Iraqis in a Lloyds account' [this may refer to Grecian's claims about the Iraqi account in the Birmingham branch of Lloyds]. A director of Forgemasters, Stuart Twentyman Graham, was also a director of the merchant bank Aitken Hume.

The other specialist metals manufacturer involved in the Supergun deal was Walter Somers which was owned by the financial services conglomerate with industrial interests, Eagle Trust plc. Its boss had been since September 1989 David James, Chair of Somers whose financial advisers were also Aitken Hume. Gerald James believes that Schroders Bank was likewise involved in financing Forgemaster and Somers deals.

Later research available following the Iraqgate scandal in the United States revealed that the source of the cash for the Supergun project was, according to Christopher Cowley, Bull's right-hand man, 'almost certainly the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Atlanta, Georgia' [this would also fit in with the Birmingham Lloyds account].

Since 1988, \$629 million in cash had been gradually moved by the Atlanta BNL branch to the Iraqi central Rafidain bank in the form of a straight line of credit. The enormous loan was guaranteed by the Rafidain bank itself, a dubious arrangement since the reason it needed cash in the first place was that its coffers were practically empty. Nevertheless, the cash served its purpose, which was to act as a fund for paying foreign suppliers on deals where dedicated letters of credit would be inappropriate and export credit guarantees were unavailable. It was by this means, Cowley concluded, that the Supergun was financed.

In the case of Walter Somers, cash deposits large enough to cover the entire contract for the 350mm test model were made into a special bank account. Then, as the manufacturing passed a series of stages (reported to the bank by a Lloyd's inspector) staged payments were triggered. This had been essential ever since the Forgemaster's financial director, Philip Barrett, had made enquiries at his company's own bankers, the Bank of Scotland, about Rafidain's creditworthiness. They had, Cowley was told, reportedly laughed at him.

The Iraqi central bank's credit rating was regarded as so abysmal that reputable banks and manufacturers around the world would not deal with it unless cash was transferred in advance. In the case of the

Supergun orders, that is precisely what happened, with the source being BNL.

When Bull formed a joint company with the Iraqi Technology Development Group in London, called Canira, which spawned an off-shoot, SRC Composites, they intended buying the Irish company Lear Fan in May 1989 for £3 million, eighty-five percent of which was Iraqi money. Cowley was certain that it originated with BNL. The deal was eventually blocked by the Foreign Office.

On 6 November 1989, the CIA sent a report on BNL and Matrix Churchill to the State Department and the National Security Council in Washington. Two days later, President Bush and his secretary of state, James Baker, approved \$1 billion of government loan guarantees for US farm exports to Iraq despite doubts about the country's general creditworthiness and the evidence that the credits, linked to an Agriculture Department's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) food aid programme, were being misused by BNL to raise loans for Iraqi arms-related sales. This was to become the subject of a major scandal.

Congressman Henry Gonzalez, Chair of the House Banking Committee, led the investigation into the Bush administrations secret support for Saddam Hussein's regime through the extension until 1990 of US loan guarantees worth billions of dollars, via the CCC and the Export-Import Bank, and the licensing by the Commerce Department of American military related but not weapons technology and equipment sales to Iraq. One of Gonzalez's investigators said: 'It was all money, it was greed. The US government knew, the British government knew, that Iraq was spending 50 per cent of GNP on arms procurement. Did they care about stopping it? No it was competition with the Germans.'

In 1991, officials of the Atlanta BNL branch were arrested, the indictment alleging a fraud involving \$4.5 billion in unauthorised loans to Iraq. In May 1992, Christopher Drogoul unexpectedly pleaded guilty to 347 charges of conspiracy and fraud after maintaining his innocence for more than a year. He later changed his plea back and was sentenced to twenty months imprisonment, which he had already served on remand. An investigation by the Italian Senate found that the bank's officials in Rome and New York were aware of BNL Atlanta's Iraqi dealings, as, it suggested, were Bush administration officials.

An immunity from prosecution in the United States was granted to Matrix Churchill's Paul Henderson in return for testimony in relation to the BNL scandal.

Dennis Kane, an investigator with Senator Gonzalez on the banking Committee investigation of BNL, revealed that records of payments were discovered inside the Atlanta branch which were made directly from the branch into an account held by Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in Luxembourg of the Serodine Corporation, the ultimate holding company of Bull's SRC. The reason for the payments was not established.

An example of the cross-directorship which was common to this area is provided by Alfred Hartman, a Swiss banker and director of Rothschild, who was also on the board of both BNL and BCCI.

Senator John Kerry's Congressional Committee inquiry into BCCI alleged that BCCI was used to facilitate arms sales to Iraq. Documents before the Committee detailed BCCI loans to BNL. The Independent newspaper disclosed that BCCI was also used as a channel by the British and American secret intelligence services for money to issue thousands of letters of credit to Saddam Hussein's suppliers. The Bank of England knew of BCCI's closeness to Iraq, referring to it as 'the special relationship'.

According to Paul Grecian of Ordtec, during the mid-eighties when everything was 'loose and not tightened up', the manufacturers dealing with Iraq and Iran 'made a bee-line for BCCI'. The reason being that they found the bank 'extremely flexible' in considering their requests for credit on the contracts presented to them.

Grecian had been involved with the Scottish-based company Allivane which supplied munitions to both Iran and Iraq. It had several BCCI accounts. In 1987, the company signed over two letters of credit generated by an Iranian contract against debts. It also had accounts at the Midland Bank and with the Spanish bank, Banco Exterior, which in April 1988 took the company into receivership.

* * * * *

Commenting on the material which was released from the Matrix Churchill trial, which partially revealed the network of officials, bankers and industrialists which were at the heart of the Iraqgate scandal, *Guardian* columnist, Hugo Young, wrote: 'They reveal something of the ultimate corruption that systematic secrecy can engender: the recklessness of those occupying a world where "commercial confidence" or "national security" have suffered for so long to keep it quiet.'

In the Public Interest
Gerald James
(Little Brown, 1996)
ISBN 0 316 87719 0 - £18.99

Since reading Gerald James' account of his own involvement in Iraqgate, as chairman of Astra, I feel for the first time that I am beginning to get a grip of what it is all about and why it is so important.

But what makes this book important isn't just that James clarifies, without at all simplifying, Iraqgate and provides an invaluable separate chronology of the key events. Or that he uses his own experiences to look at the implications beyond the supply of parts for the supergun or nuclear weapons for Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War. It is that this is an insider's critical view of the parapolitics in the UK.

In one sense it is the latest in a slowly growing genre of biographies by figures fitted up by the secret state - a successor to Colin Wallace, Fred Holroyd or Gary Murray. But James's political history, city career, and then role as the chair of rapidly expanding explosives company close to the centre of UK defence exports industry make him uniquely placed to describe the UK's parapolitical solar plexus, where secret state, City, permanent government and Conservative Politics meet.

After military service James worked for twenty years as an accountant with various city banks before, in 1981, organising the purchase of Astra, a small firework company with a turnover of £1m pounds. In the course of the next ten years through a series of takeovers (including BMARC, PRB, Accudyne and Walters) he turned Astra into a major armaments manufacture with a turnover of £100m with major operations in the USA, Canada and Belgium.

He could not have done this without substantial encouragement from the government and the secret state. But that encouragement, if not reluctant, was at least cautious. Astra was allowed to grow sufficiently to compete with, the eventually privatised, Royal Ordnance. But it was not allowed to seriously challenge it. At best it became a plausibly deniable and expendable vehicle for difficult aspects of a covert arms trade. And as such, as it grew it became increasingly manipulated by the secret state.

Tensions grew between a dedicated chairman and the intelligence services' carefully placed non-executive director - Stephan Kock. As the political ramifications of the supergun, and failure of the government to keep the lid on it, became

increasingly clear then Kock with the connivance of the main institutional shareholders led by 3i whose chair - Sir John Cuckney - is a major figure in British Intelligence, moved to take over the board and eventually place Astra in the hands of a receiver.

The story that James tells is infused with the smell of boardroom leather and cordite. It is a story well told, because it is not hampered with too much unnecessary detail, winging self pity and justification. And, most importantly, it has not been rendered incomprehensible by a timid publisher with nervous lawyers.

James personal story and boardroom saga is set in the context of some incisive analysis of the broader picture of the Thatcher governments' covert arms dealing strategy in which she also had a direct financial interest through her embarrassingly awful son Mark. James' analysis is of course retrospective, driven by his need to know why he and the company he had built up and some of his friends were crushed by a government and secret state to which they had loyal supporters. My only worry about some of his analysis of the role of the intelligence services in all of this was his reliance on one book to help provide the background. Steve Dorril's *Silent Conspiracy* is of course an excellent book, but his reliance on it (of 79 references it figures in fourteen, Dorril and Ramsay's *Smear* is referenced five times and Lobster once) made me careful to check that some apparent revelations were not prompted by it, rather than personal experience.

Stripped down to the barest essentials James' analysis of the situation is that under Thatcher the British government pursued a secret and unsuccessful strategy aimed at generating billions of pounds through covert overseas arms deals. This trade was managed by what James' calls "The Cabal". This Cabal was a consortium of "secret state and City interests, made up of businessmen (including major manufacturers), powerful civil servants and intelligence officers from MI5 and MI6 ... administered from Whitehall's Cabinet Office by the Cabinet Intelligence Unit and Joint Intelligence Committee". When the Iran/Iraq war ended Saddam Hussein and others reneged on their debts and "Britain's net overseas assets were pillaged to plug the gap and finance sweeteners of aid and arms contracts with Malaysia and other arms markets". The only winners were to be a small number of agents and facilitators including most spectacularly Mark Thatcher. With Margaret Thatcher out of office the Major government's characteristically cack-handed attempt to kick over the traces of this economic and potential political disaster lead to more

and more politically significant sacrifices. The Scott report may yield more sacrifices but even so, contends James, it was set up to miss the avoid the most damaging kernel at the heart of the Iraqgate scandal.

Was it naive of James to expect anything other than what happened to him and his friends? This is not as easy a question to answer as you might think. Had James been a simple accountant who had stumbled accidentally upon a firework company - instead of a bakers or a tailors - in which to exercise his late-flowering entrepreneurial ambitions the answer would have been obvious. But this wasn't the case. James had been mixing with spooks and the ultra-right for all his years as corporate accountant. He had been a member of Tory Action and an ally of its founder GK Young. He had joined Unison, the private army not the modern day trade union. Very early in the transformation of Astra into an armament company he had found it London office space with Brian Crozier and the Institute for the Study of Conflict.

In the end it wasn't naiveté that was responsible for James' downfall but his failure to understand, in time, just how potentially damaging Iraqgate was to some of the most powerful political interests. Always on the periphery of the inner sanctum of the secret state, by the time he was in a position to even begin to appreciate the scale of the corruption and the damage his inquiries on behalf of ASTRA had already caused, the iron shutters had come down. He had been transformed from "one of us" to "one of them" without realising it. A difficult and panicky damage limitation exercise had begun which would leave ministers high and dry and would certainly offer no protection to company directors, especially those who had themselves begun to ask difficult questions.

James' response to the government's damage limitation exercise which left him increasingly exposed was hard nosed, vigorous, aggressive and anything but naive. He came out fighting and this book - its revelations and critique - is a critical part of that response. Action against James' would now be extremely damaging.

The only safe strategy for the government is to marginalise and ignore James' and his experiences. This, like so much of their response to Iraqgate, is now a high risk strategy born of necessity. Cynically speaking the odds may still be in their favour and much will depend on the competence of the opposition's response to Scott. But if there was an iota of justice in this world then James' defection will be infinitely more damaging than that of Emma Nicholson.

Mike Hughes

The Right Honourable Sir Richard Scott, The Vice-Chancellor, Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions, Volumes 1-5, London, HMSO, February 1996.

'The power which speaks of disinformation does not believe itself to be absolutely faultless, but knows that it can attribute to any precise criticism the excessive insignificance which characterises disinformation; with the result that it will never have to admit to any particular fault.' - Guy Debord, Comments on the Society of the Spectacle.

I managed to read Scott's Report in a long twelve hour session on the night of publication, interrupted by swigs of whiskey and a catnap. Was it worth it? Undoubtedly, yes. Any student of British politics and the secret state will need to read it. The soundbites which we have had in the media clearly do not do justice to the Report.

The Report, however, does indeed suffer from the Judge's arcane language in which the use of double negatives make for uneasy reading. The overlong sentences and paragraphs can add to the confusion and obscurity with no clear, precise line for the average reader to make sense of the arguments. It seems to me that the Judge has decided to be scrupulously fair to everyone while allowing the reader to draw their own conclusions; the technique being to allow Ministers and officials enough rope to hang themselves, which they do repeatedly. The problem is that he has also allowed them enough rope to escape the trenchant criticisms which litter volume. The result is that on first appearance the Report seems bland with its edge blunted. Some of that would appear to be attempts from Government to tone down the criticisms.

It is also true that the Report is too big, including too many obscure, irrelevant inquiries and some legal arguments which would have been better placed in an appendix. It is also clear that, while Scott has the measure of the civil servants and is refreshingly commonsensical in his disassembling of the 'Yes Minister!' ethos, he is naive in his dealings with the security services. Not everything is to be explained by documents and he should have been more wary of their responses.

Interestingly, a number of MI6 agents in the arms industry, such as Matrix Churchill's Paul Henderson in particular, are criticised by Scott for not being fully frank or for giving misleading dates for contact with MI6 officers. That may be entirely correct but is interesting that MI6's word is general accepted uncritically, as is Henderson's former friend and colleague, Mark Gutteridge, whose intelligence report of 30 November 1987 first revealed that Iraq was buying machine tools for armaments. The reason this is of interest is the story which appeared in the Financial Times two days before the Scott Report was released. The story - 'machine tool company knowingly deceived UK government on military exports', which was sympathetic towards Gutteridge, had been fed into the paper by MI6. Those journalists on the paper who had direct knowledge of Iraqgate were, it appears, deliberately bypassed. The following day the Independent (14.2.96) ran a counter story from the Henderson camp based on CIA documents which showed that the government knew of nuclear sales. This particular little sideshow is one that will continue.

Despite the above, the Report is a devastating indictment of secrecy. If read in its totality, which is clearly what Scott wants us to do, then the picture which emerges is of a state machinery which, while always fearful of public reaction, works overtime to ensure that decisions are made away from democratic scrutiny. Parliament is a ghost institution

which barely rates a mention. The key concept is 'presentation'. Officials are engaged in an endless round of disinformation.

Scott's Report removes the emperor's clothes. Too many commentators, who have clearly not read the Report, have resorted to the banal duality of conspiracy and cock-up while not seeing the obvious which is that Whitehall, itself, is a conspiracy which engages in continual cock-ups, concealed by presentation.

There is not the time to do a full review of the Report but one area which did strike me is the almost off-screen presence of the United States. Scott writes that 'opposition from Washington to defence-related exports to Iran had no counterpart for exports to Iraq' (D1.15). A senior official in the MoD commented in February 1984, 'US policy seems to be predicted on the assumption that it is only Iranian intransigence that is preventing an early end to the war. Do we support this analysis? (D1.33)'

As he admitted, the 'tilt' towards Iraq had begun at the beginning of the Iran/Iraq war, 'despite our declared policy of neutrality'. Another official admitted to Scott that sales to Iraq were running 20 to 30 times more than Iraq (D1.35). In a footnote it is revealed that in 1981 the Prime Minister had instructed that 'neutrality' should be interpreted as 'flexibly as possible in the case of Iraq'. This was even made clear to the Iraqi Deputy Minister, Tariq Aziz, when he visited Mrs Thatcher in December 1985. The briefing note for her read: 'UK policy poses no threat to Iraq, which is extremely well armed (in part by ourselves) but bears heavily on Iran' (D2.3). Mrs Thatcher told Aziz that 'we had terminated the supply of weapons to Iran and even the supply of items which might possibly have a military application' (D2.4).

But not so much that either side should win, especially Iran. The MoD view was that 'non' lethal defence sales ought to continue to be permitted at least to an extent necessary to maintain the defensive ability of either side to prevent the other from winning the war' (D1.56).

Unfortunately, because of the terms of reference (basically relating to the post-1985 period) and Scott's lack of interest in foreign policy, the foreign policy consensus in promoting Saddam Hussein as the policeman of the Middle East, while at the same time bleeding Iran to death, is not illuminated. This is a great shame because, had he done so, we might have a clearer picture of what happened after 1985.

Another area, in fact related to the above, which deserves greater research is Allivane. Frank Machon is not trusted by some journalists but Scott takes him on board and the testimony of former Allivane personnel confirms at least some of what he has been claiming. Allivane was exporting vast quantities of ammunition to Iraq and Iran and that is confirmed by Scott's limited investigation (it wasn't really in his terms of reference to cover Iran). The Allivane scandal smells and there is a distinct impression given that the company was being protected.

There are, it appears to me, distinct parallels with the Warren Commission. As people begin to delve deeper into the Scott Inquiry, the government line will begin to crumble. And I'm sure that other Iraqgate buffs can't wait for the CD-Rom which will be out shortly with all the documents and transcripts to the Report. I can see the students already lining up with their PhD proposals based on Scott. It will run and run.

Stephen Dorril, 16 February 1996.

Julian Putkowski, historian and researcher for the BBC series *The Monocled Mutineer* publishes the fourth part in his series on 'A2' and for the first time shed light on the work of a field agent.



Continued from Pt.3: Pte. Gray, A2's field agent, had been ineffective in gathering information about subversion in Scotland. Shortly after 12 September 1919, he was recalled to London. He was ordered to resume spying within the Army

Those Nasty Crawling Things: A2 and the Labour Movement

Gray's task in London involved investigating discontent in the ranks of 710th Company, Royal Army Service Corps. It was a task which had been prompted by a memorandum from Winston Churchill to the A2 commander, Lt. Colonel Ralph Isham: "The men are anxious to be demobilised but Col. Warren, who is in charge is, they say, interested in the manufacture of motor cars and will not facilitate them... some are so angry they would not hesitate to resort to anything however drastic." (1) The 150 soldiers of this motor transport unit were mainly billeted in Gower Street and Holborn. Its headquarters were in Broad Street with depots in Curlew Street, Grays Inn Road and Camden Town.

Gray's effort was to be the last which entailed undercover work within a military unit and he appears to have drafted an unusually critical estimate of the situation - possibly because of his own service experience in motor transport. He reported: "There seems very little work for the men to do... The men are indignant at the delay in demobilisation and being unemployed. The food is most unsatisfactory, and having partaken of a meal personally, I consider that the complaint in that direction justifiable, the quantity is so very much below the usual Army ration, that I am inclined to suspect a 'leakage'... Further irritation results from the unpopularity of Sgt. Maj. Stannard, he being regarded as a bully & tyrant rather than a disciplinarian... On the whole the men are 'fed up', but no effort or desire is on foot for any combined trouble... a suggestion is made that there are too many officers for such a small number of men, and of this the men speak disrespectfully." (2)

As always, Gray managed to spot a potential subversive. However, he was distinctly more indulgent towards the man than he had been with the Petersfield Post Office van driver: "One individual drinking in the canteen during the evening, wants to 'blow everybody to Hell', but he is not regarded seriously by anyone; his remarks being made quite audibly between the intermittent uplifting of his pint-pot and only bringing forth the laughter and ridicule of his comrades". (3)

As for Colonel Warren, Gray insisted there was no evidence to support the men's allegations but Warren was removed or rather "seconded" from the army a fortnight later. (4)

The next stage in Gray's career as an A2 spy took him back to Glasgow and his activities thereafter closely reflected the Army's role in combating both industrial unrest and Irish Nationalists. The former was dramatically tested when a national

rail strike broke out on 26 September. The railwaymen were aggravated by their employers' intention to reduce wages. Isham, incensed and elated, wrote: "I am strongly of the opinion that the country is behind the Government in their stand against the railwaymen and this is the psychological moment to fight the labour extremists to the finish." (5)

Two days before the railwaymen struck, Gray joined the Govan Branch of the BSP. He assured Isham: "I am 'well in' with the right sort of people. Confidences are being exchanged and I shall be in possession of really valuable information at any moment. The 'canny Scots' are extremely cautious, and my time has been fully occupied in winning their confidences." (6)

Of the radicals he encountered, Gray wrote: "The worst element here seems to be amongst the BSP (Govan Branch) who are directly concerned with the Sinn Fein movement, and are of the most revolutionary type... 'Comrade' Tom Kennedy of the National Socialist Party has been carrying on a seemingly successful campaign against 'direct action' & 'extreme activities'; his meetings being well attended. Capt. White is spoken of in various quarters, but I have not yet met him." (7)

Hardly likely to have impressed A2 with such generalisations, Gray modified his initial expression of optimism by explaining: "I am somewhat disappointed at the reluctance on the part of certain rebels here to divulge their plans. They are ever on the alert to guard against the possibility of their anticipations leaking out, and they are no doubt submitting me (sub-consciously) to a test of 'reliability' and 'trustworthiness'. I am coming through their 'test' satisfactorily, and look for disclosures of real facts concerning their rebellious deeds." (8)

On the basis of reports that he was to file during the fortnight he was to remain in Glasgow, it is possible to believe that Gray never did pass his probably apocryphal 'test'. It is true that he attended the Govan and Tradeston branches of the BSP, reporting on their sympathies with Sinn Fein. His reports were also punctuated with references to veteran socialists like James McBride (Tradeston BSP), Jack Leckie (Secretary, Clyde Workers' Committee), J.D.M. McDougall (International Union of Ex-Servicemen) and he even referred to historically more celebrated figures like William Gallacher. However, Gray's rather eccentric modus operandi goes a good way to explain why he never managed to wheedle his way into the confidences of political activists. It also terminated his career as a spy in Scotland.

What passed for Gray's Scottish elegy took the form of a report by Corporal J. Swinburn, serving with the Military Police in Glasgow. Writing to Major Robert Ross, the Assistant Provost Marshal, Glasgow on 29 September, Swinburn stated: "On the afternoon of the 28th instant I was on special duty in plain clothes accompanied by L/Cpl. Magan, MFP [i.e. Military Foot Police], also in plain clothes, on Glasgow Green. I there saw a man who is known to me as Mr R. Gray, a special enquiry agent from G.H.Q., Great Britain. He was accompanied by a female who was engaged in telling fortunes for money. They were displaying a chart which read 'Gypsy Gray, from Great Yarmouth, the World's Greatest Character Delineator, Let me tell you what your face reveals, Character from face 6d.'. I called the attention of two Civil Police Constables. On his observing me doing so he came to me and asked me where he had seen me. I replied probably in Frederick Street. The Civil Police gave him notice to pick up his apparatus and leave the Green threatening that if this was not done he would detain them both in the Police Station. Gray carried out the orders of the Police. About 20.00 o'clock on the same evening I was in the MFP Hdqts, in plain clothes. Gray came in. He recognised me from the afternoon. He came over to me and said 'My wife hardly knows how to thank you for what you did this afternoon'. He then realised that I was a Military Policeman and without saying anything more left the building." (9)

The Headquarters, Scottish Command seized on Swinburn's report and associated correspondence to send a forceful letter of complaint to Major W. Torr, Intelligence Section, GHQ, Great Britain. The text not only condemned Gray's amateurish methods but incidentally revealed that Scottish Command had already established an army espionage network in the Glasgow area to spy on civilians. Of Gray, the correspondent ([J.J.] Ottowell) wrote: "I personally cannot understand why such Intelligence Agents are sent into a district where an Intelligence Organisation already exists, without some notification being received here. The man in question from what I can hear is totally unsuited to the work and even if this were not so he may probably be covering ground already covered. He has I understand in his possession railway warrants which will give Trade Unions Intelligence Branch all the information they require as to his movements and reasons for being in Scotland and I consider such persons not only a nuisance but a positive danger." (10)

Even had A2 accepted Ottowell's criticism, it did not prevent the Gray's re-deployment elsewhere. By 18 October Gray was sniffing for subversives in Bradford, where local Iron-moulders were on strike for better wages and municipal elections were pending. As was his practice, Gray began by buying socialist literature, this time from the "Reform Bookstall". (11) He

dismissed the local BSP as lacking popularity and being unimportant but the comparatively numerous, active local ILP were another matter. (12)

However, Bradford ILP had decided to make common cause with the BSP by suspending independent activity and support Labour and Socialist candidates in the elections. Initially, Gray tried to find out as much as he could about the activities of the iron-moulders. Much of what he gleaned from eavesdropping on conversations between the strikers, their supporters and folk affected by the dispute was little more than what featured in the local press. Thus, Gray reported the unstartling news that: "Strikers are as determined as ever to hold out, although they expect their union funds will soon give out. They are experiencing considerable hardship, especially in cases where the men have families." (13)

To find out the feelings of non-strikers rendered unemployed as a consequence of the strike, Gray snooped around queues at the Labour Exchange. He reported: "There was plenty of grumbling, but the men seem bent on looking for employment in a selfish endeavour, rather than displaying any organised attempt at discontent." (14) Of plans by the local Amalgamated Society of Engineers to support and extend the iron-moulders, Gray could find out little, principally because they refused to allow him into a members-only meeting on 23 October. (15)

Gray's failed to discover subversives in these enquiries. But his luck improved when he encountered, "a man named Ryan, who is treasurer of a local branch of the Woolcombers' Association" and an "influential supporter of the ILP". (16) The verbatim text of the spy's report about Ryan is important for it reveals what Gray considered to be, "distinct views and ideas of a revolutionary nature": "In the Labour world of Bradford to-day we are making a combined effort to overthrow capitalism. All unions and political labour parties, no matter under what title they exist, so long as they hold labour principles, are going to put up a big fight. We find that many of the smaller of our organisations are lacking in funds, and I have suggested to them a scheme which I acted upon with success a little while ago. Our funds were deposited at the Yorkshire Penny bank, and our activities were limited according to our credit balance. Eventually I received a tip from a private banking firm (The firm's name was not mentioned) that we could have large over-drafts if we transferred our account to them. Of course you know the Alien element is very large & influential in this town, and they have other interests than those of a purely commercial nature." (17)

Ryan continued: "In this city we hope to form a great International Brotherhood as it were and at this Municipal Election, Labour will triumph, with the result that

the workers will have our Socialist & Labour views so greatly infused into them that there will be no doubt as top the result of the Parliamentary Election to come. We shall have to 'kid' to the workers a great deal to gain our ends, and although we shall have to say many things contrary to law. we'll have to risk it."

As for finance, Ryan maintained: "Funds are continually flowing in, and the appeal for money has been made so consistently that the workers look upon it as a regular thing and give liberally. At a private meeting I attended today we made an appeal for the Iron-moulders on strike, and raised a large amount. We are also making special collections at the election meetings on their behalf, which brings good results. The amount of silver given is surprising, and this will bring about just what we want, by helping the Iron-moulders and encouraging them, to stick it out." (18)

Unfortunately, there is no indication of the political weight which A2 attached to Gray's estimate of Ryan's "revolutionary" views. However, Gray amplified his political critique of Bradford's extremist fringe in his unimaginative report about the election candidates: "My experience of extremists here is that they are still busily engaged in 'working' for the election on behalf of the Labour Candidates. They attend the meetings both of the Labour candidates & others, but do not show any activities of note." (19)

He dismissed most of the Labour candidates as "respectable", except for four whom he classified as "extremists": "Mrs L. Carling, (Supported by the Co-operative society; & holding Socialist & Bolshevik views). E. O'Neill (supported by the Irish element, a decided revolutionist, & in sympathy with the Sinn Fein movement). G.R. Carter (supported by the ASE, a "Direct Actionist", connected also with the ILP). W. Hirst (supported by Trade Unionists)." (20)

Gray's sojourn in Bradford came to an end on 3 November, with the simultaneous despatch of two messages to A2. The first, from Gray, was a letter in which he reported extremists' disapproval of Jerome K. Jerome's articulation of "sensible and sober" ideas at a Labour rally in Bradford's St. George's Hall on 2 November. The meeting had ended with the "Red Flag" being sung by a few of the audience, "leaving the last 2 lines unsung". Gray concluded, "I have not up to the present found any direct activities of a Bolshevik nature." (21) The second message, a telegram, came from the director of Bradford YMCA, at whose establishment Gray had been staying. His suspicions aroused by Gray's behaviour, the director had to be assured that A2 could vouch for the spy as a bona fide employee. Yet again, Gray's cover had been blown. (22)

Ignoring this further example of Gray's patent inability to conceal his covert identity, A2 then ordered him to spy on the activities of George Hardy. George Hardy, originally from Hull, had been a pre-war activist and leading member of the Industrial Workers of the World. Hardy had successfully enrolled US longshoremen plying the Great Lakes and helped develop the IWW's Marine Transport Workers overseas branches. Jailed with dozens of fellow Wobblies after the notorious Chicago show-trial of 1918, Hardy was in South Wales trying to arouse public sympathy and secure funding for the IWW's battle in US courts. (23)

Gray established himself in Abertillery at least a week before Hardy was scheduled to speak at the local Tillery Institute. On 9 November Gray was in the audience of around fifty people who attended Hardy's lecture on, "Class War in the United States". After an opening hymn, Hardy explained that he was on an official visit to raise money to secure tobacco and other comforts for imprisoned IWW members. He also vilified the judge and those who had suborned the Chicago trial jury and spoke of the US detective agencies who employed gunmen to break up workers' meetings.

At the end of the meeting, Gray greeted as a "comrade" by Hardy and grilled the IWW leader about his plans and the names and addresses of Welsh supporters. (24) Thereafter, Gray followed Hardy around as he contacted the nearby "Rose Hayworth" and "The Grey" collieries and learned from Hardy's local host that his IWW visitor was going to Pontypool. (25) Accordingly, Gray went to Pontypool - but could not find Hardy. Nor, in spite of repeated visits to Pontypool did Gray pick up Hardy's trail again. (26) Conceding failure, Gray explained: "I found the workers extremely 'clannish' and had to be very guarded so as not to arouse suspicion." (27) Given his lamentable past performance, it seems more likely that Gray had been identified as a government spy and fallen victim to a false trail laid by his quarry.

Re-assigned to London, Gray spent the final week of November in jail. More accurately, he was re-incarnated as Rifleman Arthur C. Johnson of the King's Royal Rifle Corps and incarcerated with sixty prisoners in the Military Detention Barracks, Marylebone Road. The briefing which preceded Gray's infiltration has not been preserved but it appears most likely that the Military Police (rather than A2) were interested in finding out how army deserters managed to remain on the run.

Gray's prison letters therefore include anecdotes about the manner in which

deserters got money from casual work in fairgrounds, London's street markets and by fooling the Labour Exchange. More specifically, he explained how deserters got meals from an establishment on the, "East side of King's Cross passenger station, 3 or 4 doors down the side street from the public house, and near a barbers shop". (28) He also drew A2's attention to the apparently brisk trade in selling Army discharge papers to deserters and Army travel vouchers. (29)

Gray also filed criticisms about the Detention Centre, complaining about filth, graffiti and poor internal security. (30) This promptly resulted in a whirlwind inspection of the establishment by officers and an RSM from the Military Police and a clean-up. Gray may have been gratified by the results of his efforts but it also resulted in his real status being communicated to fellow prisoners, probably by discomfited Detention Centre staff. Gray told A2: "This afternoon, one prisoner had been inside the cell with another man, but observing me he said 'I'm sorry Corporal but I went into the wrong cell. I was in my shirtsleeves at the time, and no rank was in evidence... there was no N.C.O. in charge at the time.'" (31)

Gray left prison around 28 November and spent what was to be the final month of his career as an A2 spy in Leeds. His reports, never notable for their incisiveness, developed a meandering quality as he voiced complaints about the poor quality of accommodation at Leeds' YMCA; comments about scabs who black-legged during the recent railwaymen's strike; the rowdy behaviour of "females of an undesirable type", soldiers and civilian hooligans in Chapeltown; rumours of demonstrations and disloyalty voiced by ex-servicemen. (32)

Then, on 14 December he attended a "Hands off Russia" Socialist Labour Party meeting at the Manor Road Picture House. After a rousing speech by Willy Paul, who advocated the setting up of soviet government in Britain and explained how to persuade soldiers about the justice of the workers' cause, Gray was introduced by one of the SLP to a mysterious Russian. Of the Russian, Gray wrote: "About 5ft 11, very slight fair moustache, broad shoulders, well built, weighs about 14 stone, fair hair, wears 'trilby' hat and soft collar, rather a happy, pleasing countenance. This Russian has been in Leeds for 7 months, living under the name of John Roberts - well known to local Socialists as 'Big Johnnie'. He is here clandestinely, and an effort is being made to get him out of the country. A sum of £80 has already been raised amongst local 'rebels' on his behalf. He is at present staying with Willie Manders, (a local socialist...)... 'Big Johnnie is without a passport & is anxious to return to Russia.

The object in assisting him is that he may convey some message (verbal or otherwise) to the Soviet in Russia. He speaks English very poorly & appears to have only a slight knowledge of our language." (33)

This report provoked unsuccessful attempts to arrest "Big Johnnie". (34) The police raided the Clarion Institute, Leeds, intimidating members and making Gray's work more difficult. He complained: "Conversations are carried on in a whisper or undertone... I am impressed at the reluctance of the 'rebel' class here to disclose or mention the names of each other, and each time that I have been introduced to a member, the phrase used is: 'this is another of our comrades who is a good worker'. It is perhaps well to mention that no one here has asked my name, & further that I have not disclosed it up to the present." (35) It never seems to have occurred to Gray that the most likely reason for this behaviour is that members suspected him to be a government spy.

Gray's final reports to A2 included unconsciously telling remarks about publications associated with diametrically opposite ends of the political spectrum. The first concerned right-wing "National Propaganda" pamphlets: "Upwards of two thousand of these are (& have been) used as waste paper in a fried-fish shop in Lower Head Row Leeds. In my presence, a customer jokingly enquired if the proprietor was getting paid for distributing the leaflets, the answer was - 'no, we got them amongst other stuff from a wholesale waste-paper merchant.'" (36)

The second referred to the Gray's encounter in Tate's Temperance Hotel with S.V. Bracher on 20 December. One of the "Daily Herald" editorial staff, Bracher told Gray that the newspaper, "could not altogether champion the cause of the extremist element". Bracher explained: "Our best advertisers take into great consideration the policy of the paper itself. Of course there are plenty to-day who think we are not sufficiently extreme, and that's brought about much opposition from the more advanced section of the Labour Party. We still get stuff submitted for publication from all sorts of queer quarters, but of course we can't really publish it." (37)

A week later, Gray was demobilised from Army and his correspondence was filed for posterity by Ralph Isham.

In the war against the people who were regarded as political subversives by the Army and Basil Thomson's Directorate of Intelligence, Gray had been a footsoldier, a nobody. When he managed to remain incognito, most of what he reported was trivial and his appreciation of matters political can only be termed crappy. It is also often difficult to avoid the conclusion

that Gray simply concocted yarns which he felt contained what Isham wanted to read. However, Gray's scribbles about counterfeit conspiracies were not valueless. He was paid for his efforts and if his yarns were elasticated to accommodate inexactitudes it was of little consequence to A2. Isham and his fellow officers selected what they wanted to recycle as authoritative reports which would justify their continued employment, identify "the enemy within" and serve to distinguish the "them" from the "us".

The decision-making process which enabled Gray's A2 superiors to identify and collate reports about the targets of their attention was quite bureaucratic. Thus, senior military officers and civil servants in the War Office and Home Office were kept busy. Collated summaries of spies' reports, re-collated and summarised were embodied in a brief survey for circulation to senior politicians. Bigotry and banality were blended into pure prose, laced with alarming warnings of subversive activities and served up for consumption by the Cabinet.

These surveys, like the Directorate of Intelligence' "Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom" were not only produced to justify jobs and departmental expenditure. Many explicitly sought to influence government policy in much the same manner as lobbying by employers' organisations and remain quite revealing about the simplistic ideology of Britain's spymasters. For example, shortly after poaching Isham and Byrne from A2, Sir Basil Thomson advocated legislation to purge Britain of anti-patriotic pamphleteers and recipients of "alien money": "Ever since Edmund Burke's day, and before, we have had our home-grown revolutionary. At one time we knew him as pro-Bonaparte, at another pro-Communard; then as pro-Boer, pro-Indian, pro-Egyptian, and later as pro-German, in fact as pro anybody by whom it could be shown that his country was in the wrong. In moments of crisis you would find him as a passive resister, conscientious objector or pacifist. The same persons are found in all these movements, and it is natural now to find them conspiring secretly with the Soviet Government in Russia. But besides these there is a secret international organisation directed and subsidised by Lenin's Government for the direct purpose of using the local home-grown revolutionary as an instrument for overthrowing the State." (38)

In his memoirs, disparaging "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion", Thomson could afford to be more explicit: "It was quite natural that when the Bolsheviks came to power and it was seen that nearly all the people's commissaries were Jews, so obvious a fulfilment of the Protocols should not pass unnoticed. It was useless to point out that 'protocols or no protocols', it was inevitable in a country like Russia, when the dregs of the population had boiled up

to the top, a preponderance of Jews would be found among the scum: people would have it the first part of this sinister programme had been realised." (39)

Thomson's anti-semitism was not merely an echo of Winston Churchill's contemporary obsession with the "tyrannic government of these Jew Commissars" and "A world wide state under Jewish domination". (40) Their sentiments were also shared by the A2 commander, Ralph Isham. For example, in early 1919 Isham suggested to Sir George Makgill that, "German Jews, holding Citizenship of the United States" might be funding Britain's "Internal enemies". Isham explained: "There are a number of politicians of strong influence who, by reason of being Irish are intensely anti-British. By certain means these Jews and politicians are brought together. Their anti-British sentiments are common ground. The Jews have the money and the necessary business connections. The politicians vouch for the Jews and manipulate to get them passports." (41)

Atavistic anti-semitism was common enough in post-First World War Britain and was expressed in the enthusiastic contribution to the emergence of British Fascism by secret service personnel like Maxwell Knight, James McGuirk Hughes and Ormonde Winter. However, there were a more enduring legacies. The 1919 Red Scare, which A2 played a significant role in creating, assisted Basil Thomson to built up his short-lived Directorate of Intelligence and sustained hostility towards any democratisation of the British Army.

The part-manufactured tales of inflated covert subsidies from Moscow had another, rather paradoxical effect. It stimulated interest by the extra-parliamentary British Left in securing financial support from Bolshevik Russia. Sustained throughout the Cold War, organisations like the Communist Party of Great Britain became slavishly dependent on covert financial support from Moscow. (42) In turn, British Intelligence cited Soviet-funded subversion as a justification for enhanced subsidies from the Treasury and a sustained silence about operations which abused the rights of those whose taxes paid for the secret state.

The archives of post-Cold War Russia are now sufficiently open for historians to begin to draw up estimates of the extent to which Lenin and his political heirs funded the British Left. In the USA, Yale University allows researchers access to Isham's records of A2's operations but Britain's Ministry of Defence still withholds related files from critical scrutiny. The material collected by A2 and the Directorate of Intelligence ought to have been deposited in the Public Records Office, Kew in a series of files identified as AIR 2 (Code B) and AIR 20, Code 98 - Bolsheviks, Revolutionaries and Undesirables. However, not a single item has been filed

under these codes. Pressed for an explanation, Ms Celeste Bramble, on behalf of the Ministry of Defence has concluded: "The absence of records suggests that had there been any, they have not unfortunately 'survived the passage of time'." (43)

Given the hog-whimperingly pathetic performance of A2's intelligence gathering, it's reasonable to assume that the secret files which escaped the MOD shredder were consumed by shame.

Notes:

1. Isham Papers: 2/16. Memo: W. [i.e. Winston Churchill] to Isham, 15.9.19.
2. & 3. Isham Papers: 1/13. Report: Gray to A2, 17.9.19.
4. Col. T.R.P. Warren was appointed Resident Magistrate, North Tipperary, Oct. 1919 - Dec. 1920. He later became Chief Constable of Buckinghamshire. Who Was Who.
5. Isham Papers: 2/16. Memo: Isham, 29.9.19.
6. Isham Papers: 1/13. Report: Gray to A2, Wed. [i.e. 24.9.19].
7. Capt. Jack White, ex-British Army, helped James Connolly train the Irish Citizen Army; Isham Papers: 1/13. Report: Gray to A2, 25.9.19.
8. Isham Papers: 1/13. Report: Gray to A2, 26.9.19.
9. Isham Papers: 1/10. Report: Swinburn to Ross, 29.9.19 encl. in Letter: Ross to Provost Marshal, G.B., 29.9.19; Letter: Harrison to Ross, 6.10.19, encl. in Letter: Ross to DPM, Scottish Command, 6.10.19. In August, the manager of Glasgow Central YMCA, suspicious of Gray's odd behaviour, had reported the latter to the AFM.
10. Isham Papers: 1/5. Letter: Ottowell to Torr, 10.10.19.
11. Isham Papers: 1/10. Report: Gray to A2, 18.9.19.
12. Ibid., Report: Gray to A2, 20.9.19.
- 13 & 14. Ibid., Report: Gray to A2, 21.10.19.
15. Ibid. Report: Gray to A2, 24.10.19.
16. Ibid. Report: Gray to A2, 25.10.19.
- 17 & 18. Ibid.
19. Ibid. Report: Gray to A2, 30.10.19.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid. Report: Gray to A2, 3.11.19.
22. Ibid. Telegram: Bradford YMCA to A2, 3.11.19.
23. Isham Papers: 1/11-13. Report: Gray to A2, 11.11.19.
24. Ibid. Report: Gray to A2, 10.11.19.
25. Ibid. Report: Gray to A2, 11.11.19.
26. Ibid. Reports: Gray to A2, 13-16.11.19.
27. Ibid. Report: Gray to A2, 16.11.19.
28. Ibid. Report: Gray to A2, 22-26.11.19.
29. Ibid. Report: Gray to A2, 24.11.19.
30. Ibid. Report: Gray to A2, 22.11.19.
31. Ibid. Report: Gray to A2, 22.11.19. The prisoner's reference to Corporal acknowledged that all Military Police were ranked at least as NCO's.
32. Ibid. Report: Gray to A2, 11.12.19.
33. Ibid. Report: Gray to A2, 15.12.19.
34. Ibid. Report: Gray to A2, 16-19.12.19. See also, Report: Gray to A2, 19.12.19.
35. Ibid. Report: Gray to A2, 16.12.19.
36. Ibid. Report: Gray to A2, 19.12.19.
37. Ibid. Report: Gray to A2, 21.12.19.
38. PRO Kew, CAB 24/97 CP544: DOI Special Report No.14: "Revolutionaries and the need for Legislation", 2.2.20, pp. 3-4.
39. Thomson, B., *Queer People* (Constable: London: 1921), p. 285.
40. Ponting, C., *Churchill* (Sinclair Stevenson: London: 1994), p. 230.
41. Isham Papers: 2/16. Letter: Isham to Makgill, n.d. (circa 16.3.19); Memo: "They are beginning to realise in France that it is the Jews who want war, for war brings Bolshevism and Jews always hope to profit by chaos." (Isham), 18.4.19. Ibid., see also: Letter: S.M."9" (Capt. S. Parkes, A2) to F— (Isham), n.d. (circa May 1919); Isham Papers: 2/14. Letter: Lucas to Isham, "I think we can go a long way if we if we not squeamish about exposing such ideologies as Communism and Judaism", 1.3.48. During World War Two Lucas was Director of Plans, Ministry of Home Security.
42. Finance of subversion by non-statutory agencies of both sides makes accurate comparison of intelligence expenditure impossible and takes little account of its effectiveness. However, given the war-ravaged state of Russia, there is little doubt that Bolshevik funding of British Reds was beggared by Whitehall's funding of military and intelligence operations against the Red Army.
43. Letter: Bramble to Putkowski, 3.6.94

* Isham Papers refers to extracts from the British Intelligence Papers in the Ralph Heyward Isham Collection, Yale University Library, Connecticut, USA. The assistance of Yale University Library and their permission to quote directly from the material are gratefully acknowledged.

Steve Dorril lists this season's catch of intelligence and security offers and agents from the press.



Spooks

Ex-Chief, Sir Colin McColl, appointed non-executive director of the Scottish American Investment Company (S.T. 21.1.96).
Michael Oatley, former Divisional head of Counter-Terrorism and instigator of the peace corridor for the current peace process in N. Ireland, later worked for Kroll Associates, now with CIEX.
MI6 officers: Robert Andrew Fulton, Counsellor FCO since 1992.
Ian Forbes McGredie (OBE), Counsellor New York (UKMIS) since 1992.
Paul John Ritchie, 1st Sec. NY (UKMIS) 1991.
David Curran, 1st Sec. (chancery) NY (UKMIS) 1992.
Richard Billing Dearlove (OBE), Liaison Officer, Counsellor Washington 1991. (Thanks to 'Babe' for information.)

The following have diplomatic listings (1993) strongly suggestive of an intelligence role:

Mark Allen, Counsellor Amman since 1990.
Christopher Best, 2nd later 1st Sec. FCO since 1989.
Jonathan Betts (OBE), Consul Munich since 1988.
Alexander Bergne (OBE), Counsellor FCO since 1985.
Terence Bevan, 1st Sec. FCO since 1992.
Camilla Blair, 3rd later 2nd Sec. Prague since 1991.
John Buck, 1st Sec. FCO since 1992.
Rupert Bowen (LVO), 1st Sec. Windhoek since 1990.
George Busby, 1st Sec. FCO since 1991.
Desmond Cecil, Counsellor FCO since 1989.
Ian Chalmers (OBE) Counsellor FCO since 1987.
Timothy Clifton, 1st Sec. FCO since 1990.
John Corringham, 1st Sec. FCO since 1988.
Ian Farrington, 2nd later 1st Sec. FCO since 1991.
Brian Finch, 1st Sec. FCO since 1989.
Simon Gass, 1st Sec. FCO since 1987.
Keith Gosling (OBE) 1st Sec. FCO since 1990.
Graham Hand, 1st Sec. FCO since 1990.
Julian Harston, Counsellor (UN UKMIS Geneva - cover post) since 1991. Anthony Hawkes (OBE) Counsellor Nairobi since 1990.
Simon Heathcote (OBE), 1st Sec. FCO since 1991 - our man in Argentina during Falklands.
Roger Horrell (OBE), 1st Sec. later Counsellor FCO since 1980.
Adrian Kirkpatrick-Smith, 1st Sec. FCO since 1991.
Richard Meredith, 2nd later 1st Sec. FCO since 1989.
Tony Millson, 1st Sec. FCO since 1991 - our man in Kuwait during invasion (thanks to Roger Faligot).
Fiona Moore, 1st Sec. (chancery) Athens since 1991.
Craig Murray, 1st Sec. FCO since 1990.
Christopher Pagett (OBE), 1st Sec. FCO since 1991.

Anthony Paice, 1st Sec. FCO since 1990.
Alison Philips (OBE), 1st Sec. FCO since 1990.
John Raine, 1st Sec. FCO since 1991.
Peter Redshaw, Counsellor FCO since 1992.
Michael Roberts, 1st Sec. FCO since 1991.
Robert Scarlett, 1st Sec. later Counsellor FCO since 1985.
Philip Shott, 1st Sec. FCO since 1991.
Timothy Simmons, 2nd later 1st Sec. FCO since 1988.
Keith Sloan, 1st Sec. Phnon Penh since 1992.
Geoffrey Tantum (OBE), Counsellor FCO since 1988.
John Venning, 1st Sec. FCO since 1991.
Martin Webb-Brown, 1st Sec. FCO since 1991.

Rosemary Sharpe, 1st Sec. (Economic) Berlin, was outed by Der Spiegel (D.T. 30.1.96) as the resident MI6 officer who had paid at least £28,000 for military hardware and information about Russian military equipment to three BND agents. Sounds a bit desperate paying that much to an apparently allied agency.

Michael Reynolds, Counsellor Berlin since 1990, formerly Oxbridge recruiter in later seventies/early eighties (see The Cherwell, 13.2.81). On same lines, is anything known about John Stoye (Magdalen College), P. Pulzer (Christchurch) and Wilfred Knapp (St Catherines).

Autobiographical piece from Kenneth Benton (Journal of Contemporary History, July 1995) covering the period 1937 to 1943 in MI6. Retired in 1968, later worked for Institute for the Study of Conflict and writing appalling right-wing thrillers. Michael Wrigley (obit. D.T. 17.1.95), important hardline but imaginative MI6 officer in South East Asia (1951-71). Letter from Ann Forbes-Robertson (I. magazine, 25.3.95) who worked for Capt. Frank Foley in Berlin before the war. Followed on from article on Foley ('The Saviour', I. 11.3.95 & S.T. 26.2.95) which detailed his role while an MI6 officer in helping Jews to escape Germany in the thirties.

Margaret Bray, Personnel Officer MI6 (1948-60). Gerald Cruickshank ~MI6 - forties/fifties. Both personal information from 'Wheat'.
Arthur Martin, paranoid MI6/5 molehunter (obit. G. 2.2.96).

Cecil Hugh Williamson, runs the Witchcraft Research Centre. During the war his expertise was called upon by MI6 to find out why the Nazis were fascinated by the occult (O. 30.7.95). It is indeed a fascinating area. Kurt Josten, curator of Old Ashmolean Museum for the History of Science, (obit. I. 12.94) suggests that the attempt on Hitler's life (20.7.44) was based on an astrological prediction. Josten and his successor

Sherwood Taylor were apparently interested in alchemy and attempted to use a nuclear reactor at Harwell to arrange a test, turning lead into gold. Failed, of course (letters, I. 20.7.94).

Article on George Blake's son (D.E. 12.8.95) who worked in Army Intelligence. Hannah Prus (aka Melenia Glowalka, Princes of Battenburg and Lady Isabella Granville), who was ordered by a Judge to repay £500,000 which a late tycoon had lavished on her, claimed to have worked with MI6 in Poland during the war (D.M. & D.T. 10.3.95).

Kenneth Mathews, writer and broadcaster, especially on Greece after the war, had been recruited to the Joint Broadcasting Committee (an MI6/Section D front body) before the outbreak of WW2 (obit. I. 31.1.95).

Lord Erskine of Rerrick (obits. D.T. & G. 9.6.95) MI6 asset, see Lobster 29.

Giles Playfair, stage historian and ex-British Security Co-ordination, New York (obit. D.T. 24.1.96).

Alaistair Macdonald (obits. D.T. 20.3.95 & G. 30.3.95) worked with the SOE and then with MI6 in Austria and Germany.

Alan Hare (obits. D.T. 14.4.95 & I. 13.4.95) SOE and then MI6 officer in Albania, retired 1961, Deputy Chair the Economist (1985-89).

Sir James Scott-Hopkins (I. 14.3.95), Military Intelligence, working with MI6 after the war and remaining an MI6 asset, recruited by Menzies, while serving as a Conservative MP (1959-1979).

Victor Verce (obit. D.T. 3.3.95). Russian who worked for SOE in Yugoslavia and then joined the 'Foreign Office' after the war translating.

Colonel Noel Wild (obit. D.T. 14.6.95). Deception specialist in WW2 with A Force, extreme right-winger who later worked with MI6 and the MoD advising on aspects of Communist subversion.

Rev. Halsey Colchester (obit. I. 1.2.95) ran MI6 Personnel Department. On his retirement in 1972 became a priest.

Charles Gardiner, born Israel Gold in Austria, (obits. D.T. 13.3.95 & T. 17.2.95). Ex-SOE then Intelligence Officer in Austria, Korea, Berlin, spent twelve years in Kenya as adviser to the vice president.

John Bruce-Lockhart (obits. T. & D.T. 10.5.95 & I. 13.5.95), influential and respected senior MI6 officer, left in 1965. Played a leading role in 'Gladio'.

The 'Fifth Man', John Cairncross, who worked for MI6 for a period, died (obits. D.T. 9 & 11.10.95, T. & G. 11.10.95, I. 15.10.95). The only snippet of new information was that he had been regularly meeting with Stella Remington to pore over old files.

Despite being the first book to truly open up MI6, Tom Bower's 'The Perfect English Spy: Sir Dick White and the Secret War 1935-90' (Heinemann, 1995) doesn't actually contain that many new names. Still, it is a

very impressive achievement and should be praised, even if there are factual mistakes on just about every page (I am not the only person to notice them. Peter E. Newell pointed out the absurd suggestion that the Ukrainian and Russian emigre groups worked together, p. 204. In reality, they hated each other's guts. Certainly enough to go around assassinating each other.) Although, seemingly, a little rushed in execution Bower's book contains enough gems to make every British spook watcher happy.

Dora Edwards (White's secretary)

Brigadier Eric Greer (transcription service)

Freddie Stockwell (Cairo, station chief)

Ian Critchett (deputy, Cairo)

Arthur Crouchley (Northern Area Controller)

Bill Steadman (counter-intelligence specialist)

John Howe

John Christie (Arabist)

Harry Hale (Arabist)

Desmond Harney (P17)

Jeff Douglas (Bahrain)

Ben Johnson (interrogator)

Edward Cox (solicitor)

Neville Robinson (MI5)

Jack Beauman (Rhodesia)

Stewart Mackenzie (Western hemisphere)

Jim Parker (Lagos)

Kenneth Sloane (Pretoria)

Anthony Bishop (Moscow)

Robert Snelling (handling Poles)

Gerald Warner, Intelligence and Security Co-ordinator in the Cabinet Office, received a KCMG in the Queen's Birthday Honours List (G. 17.6.95). A new Co-ordinator is about to be appointed.

New Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee is Colin Budd, chief political adviser to Leon Brittan.

Roger Bridgland Bone (Joint Intelligence Committee), assistant Under-Sec. of State (Transnational issues), Washington 1991.

Peter James Torry (JIC), Counsellor Washington 1989.

Stephen Pattison (JIC), 1st Sec. (chancery) Washington 1989.

Anyone know anything about the Cambridge Research and Advisory Group, alleged to me to have been an MI6 front? Lord Woolton and Lord Home involved? Anything on Marshalls Travel Agency, having recently been outed in the latest revelations about Robert Maxwell? Also the International Travel Service. Anyone come across some interesting looking translation firms, staffed by emigres, from the fifties?

Stephen Lander, a rather non-descript insider and counter-terrorism expert, to take over from Stella Remington as director-general (T, I. & G. 24.11.95).

Ensnconced on the fourth floor in Room 408 of the British Embassy in Washington is MI5's liaison department. It comprises a

Security Liaison Officer (in 1990 Elizabeth Manningham-Buller was backed by Dawn Bonner, later HB Ashton?) and an Assistant SLO (in the same period 1st Secretary, Andrew Baxendine, backed by Ruth Barton and Gary Brooks).

David Owen alleged to have been 'medium to senior ranking official in MI5' before moving to the hotel group Forte as human resources director (Private Eye, 12.1.96).

Russell Lee (obit. D.T. 31.10.95~ retired from MI5 in 1977 having spent most of his career advising Commonwealth Special Branches on telephone interception arrangements. Michael Clayton (obits. Dorset Evening Echo, 31.10.95 & D.T. 1.7.95) also retired in 1977 having also spent most his career in the Commonwealth and then as director of the Personnel and Protective Security Branches.

Ronald Reed (obit. D.T. 2/2/95) involved in MI5's double-cross operations during the war finally heading the Counter Espionage Branch (1951-57) again retiring in 1977.

Arthur Koestler, author, anti-communist and loony supporter of the para-normal, served with MI5 during the war (Tom Bower, The Perfect English Spy, Heinemann, p. 46).

Peter Wright loony of another kind finally died (obits, I. 28.4.95., G. 24 & 28/4/95). —

Hampton, head of counter-espionage, 1975 (see Brian Crozier's biography.) According to James Adams (S.T. 4.2.95) 'Grey eminence [James David Prydeaux Bickford] behind Britain's spies emerges from the shadows'. Adams did not respond to my letter suggesting that he was two years too late as Bickford, MI5's legal adviser before he retired, had been outed by myself, Richard Norton-Taylor and David Leigh. Awarded CB in Queen's Birthday Honours (G. 17.6.95).

Life Peerage to Sir John Cuckney.

Veronica Sutherland was made ambassador to Ireland in 1995. The Sun had said three years earlier that Sutherland had previously been a MI5 head of Personnel. It appears unlikely given her Foreign Office background.

Sir Philip Woodfield, staff counsellor to MI5, member of the lobby firm Public Policy Unit (I. 16.2.95).

Lt-Col. Richard Brooker (obit. 27.1.95) Port Security Officer 1940 then transferred to SOE and became Chief Instructor at Camp X in Canada.

Ann Elwell (obit. I. 26.1.96), wife of senior MI5 officer, Charles Elwell, had worked for MI5 and then spent long spell in IRD. Obituary written by friend and one-time MI5 secretary, Marie-Jacqueline Lancaster. Are these MI5? John Alexander Gordon (MoD) awarded CB in honours list as was Roger Tustin Jackling (G. 17.6.95), John Michael Moss or John Francis Howe - New Year Honours, (I. 30.12.95).

Letter in D.T. (20.1.96) from a John Russell

suggesting that MI5's expertise should be kept to covering 'the threat of espionage to this country's military and economic interests' thus retaining its 'covert character' and avoiding full public scrutiny.

A.W. Simpson's extremely impressive piece of research, 'In the Highest Degree Odious: Detention Without Trial in Wartime Britain (Oxford University Press, pbk., 1994) contains details on the following wartime MI5 officers (mostly barristers and solicitors:

A.S.D. Albert (Lincoln's Inn)
Edward J.P. Cussen (Inner Temple)
A.A. Gordon-Clark (County Court Judge and novelist Cyril Hare)
James L.S. Hale (Middle Temple)
B.A. Hill (Gray's Inn)
C.M. Hughes (Middle Temple)
G.T., Martin (Lincoln's Inn)
John C. Maude (Middle Temple)
Helenus 'Buster' H.P.J. Milmo (High Court Judge)
Sydney H. Noakes (Lincoln's Inn)
Gonne St C. Pilcher (High Court Judge)
John P.L. Redfern (Lincoln's Inn)
A.W. Roskill (Inner Temple)
E. Blanshard Stamp (Lincoln's Inn)
R.W. Stevens (Inner Temple)
T.F. Turner (Inner Temple)
G.E. Wakfield (Gray's Inn)
W.E. Watson (Gray's Inn)
Cecil F.J. Liddell (Middle Temple)
William C. Crocker (Wood, Lord and Co.)
Patrick R.J. Barry (KC)
John F.E. Stephenson (Inner Temple)
Alan S. MacIver (Reginal Security Liaison Officer)
John C. Phillips (RSLO)
Geoffrey P. Wethered (RSLO)
Gerald A. Glover (RSLO)
C.H.N. Adams (on special Italian committee)
Miss Weeks (ditto)
Nigel Watson (Russian linguist who became a partisan in Yugoslavia)
D.C.H. Abbott (Advisory Committee)
T.M. Shelford (monitoring officer of detainees)
Walter H. Moresby (once MI5's legal adviser)
David Ian Wilson (solicitor, ran Dusko Popov, 'Tricycle')
Lt.-Col. P.R. Parry (Security Executive discussions)

New chief at GCHQ, David Omand, a civil servant at the MoD, to replace Sir John Adye. Expected to oversee a series of cuts of up to 25 per cent and changes in its post-Cold War role. (S.T. 8.10.95. G. 20.4.95 & 10.10.95.)

John Paul Foster, a superintending director at GCHQ, received a CB in last year's New Year's honour list (O. 8.1.95). Former GCHQ employee, Ian Brandon, went to an Industrial Tribunal over his forced resignation, following a letter from

the security officer, David Illif, when he planned to marry a woman from Belorussia (G. 19.8.95).

Mathematical logician, Professor Robin Gandy (obits. I. 24.11.95 & D.T. 4.12.95), worked at Hamnlope Park during the war with Alan Turing building a speech encipherment device codenamed Deliah. Donald Bancroft, classics schoolmaster at Lancing College (obit. D.T. 18.10.95), did a stint as a cryptographer at Bletchley Park until 1948.

Harry Golombek, chess-player and journalist (obit. I. 10.1.95), part of the code-breaking elite at Bletchley Park during the war.

Professor Bernard Wilson, German scholar Leicester University (obit. I. 7.11.94) wartime codebreaker at Bletchley.

Professor John Cruickshank, French scholar (obit. 31.7.95), cryptographer in Military Intelligence from 1943 to 1945.

Sir Stuart Milner-Barry (obits. I. 25.3.95 & D.T. 8.4.95), civil servant and chess-player, worked in Hut 6 Bletchley Park. Rose to be Under-Secretary in the Treasury.

Sarah Norton, formerly Viscountess Astor, brother of Lord Grantley, represented GCHQ at the 1995 Festival of Remembrance in the Albert Hall. She translated German decrypts in the Bletchley naval section from 1942 to 1944.

Edward Thomas (obit. I. 27.1.96), worked at Bletchley Park during the war. Founder member of the team which produced the official history of Intelligence during the Second World War.

SOE personnel include Frank O'Shanohoun, a signals troubleshooter for SOE in the Far East (obit. D.T. 12.1.96).

Sydney Hundson, wartime SOE operational member, who in a letter to the Independent (16.10.95) attacked Michael Portillo's anti-Europe speech at the Tory conference.

James Joll, historian, sub-warden at St Antony's College, (obits. I. 18.7.95 & G. 14.7.95) served in the German section of SOE.

Ronald Kaulback, pre-war adventurer in Tibet who joined the Intelligence Corps and then SOE, Force 136, in South-East Asia behind Japanese lines in Burma with the Karen tribesmen (obit. D.T. 7.10.95). Also working with Force 136 was the colourful saboteur and racketeer, Edward Wharton-Tigar, managing-director of the mining company, Selection Trust (obit. D.T. 19.6.95). He ran Remorse, a massive black-market operation, smuggling diamonds and Swiss-watches into China, making a reported profit of £80 million.

Major Malcolm Munthe, joined MI(R) in 1939 fighting with the Finns, later SOE in Scandinavia (obits. D.T. 11.12.95 & I. 30.1.96).

Dispute over the bona fides of Peter George Howard who supposedly ran operations

in the Middle East and Balkans during the war undercover of research on political books. (Caught in France, Howard spent a time in Dachau but survived the war ~S.T. 15.1.95). SOE archivist and former MI6 officer, Gervase Cowell, denied that this was so. He said Howard, an Hungarian, worked in Istanbul and Cairo, after the war wrote under his Hungarian name, Gyorgy Paloczi—Horvath (S.T. 12.2.95).

Mark Norman (obit. 21.12.94). Managing director of Lazard Brothers, worked with Peter Fleming to enlist Italian PoWs held in Egypt. Wounded in Greece, worked in the War Cabinet Offices.

Duncan Guthrie, charity organiser (obit. 21.10.94), SOE in France working with the Maquis and then in Burma.

Reginald Spink (obits. I. 21.9.94 & G. 7.11.94). Worked with the Danes in SOE and then for the Political Warfare Executive sending anti-Nazi propaganda on the BBC's European Service. Spent three years in Denmark after the war renewing his contacts, working for the Financial Times. (Lord) Gordon White, partner of Lord Hanson (obit. D.T. 25.8.95), extreme right-winger served with SOE Force 136 in Burma and India.

Colonel Bill Hudson (obits. I. 14.11.95 & D.T. 21.11.95), legendary Section D, then SOE figure in Yugoslavia. Went back to live in South Africa after the war, finding a vast deposit of zinc.

Captain Peter Cottrel (D.T. 23.4.95) ran SOE mission Operation Anti-Scorch in April 1945 designed to protect Venice from destruction by the retreating Germans. Stayed in Italy to become Rome correspondent for the Telegraph. Odette Hallows, French national heroine for her work with the wartime Resistance. Much controversy surrounds her wartime record, see D.T. (17.3.95).

The following are not necessarily spooks but had contact or dealings with the netherworld of spookdom.

Sir Clifford Jarrett, last permanent secretary to the Admiralty (obit. D.T. 14.7.95), member of the Tribunal hearing appeal by Philip Agee who recently returned to Britain.

Alaric Jacob, writer and ~journalist, brother Ian, director general of BBC (obit. I. 8.2.95). Worked at BBC monitoring station in Caversham, had problems with security because wife in Communist Party.

Kathleen Tacchi-Morris, who ran Women for World Disarmament (D.T. 26.1.94), died aged 94 had been featured in World in Action programme on GCHQ which had tapped her telephone. Had been given a shake-down by Special Branch in 1950s 'after they had finished she entertained them with whisky'.

KGB defector to MI5, Oleg Lyalin (obit. G. 28.2.95).

Sir John Peck (obits. D.T. & T. 14.1.95, I. 20.1.95 - obituary written by Michael Cullis,

former IRD.) diplomat responsible in early 'in organising and intensifying official efforts to counter Soviet propaganda and disinformation in the initial stages of the Cold War'. To that end helped develop IRD (1951-54) and then head of the Political Department of the British Middle East Office (Cairo, 1954-56).

G. R. Urban, former director of Radio Free Europe and editor of *Studies in Comparative Communism*, (letter, IoS. 5.3.95), admitted that he 'benefited greatly from IRD's extensive knowledge of Eastern affairs'.

T.B. Martin, former political correspondent of the *Telegraph* (obit. 13.2.95), posted during the War by RAF to the Middle East Intelligence Centre in Cairo.

Edward Henderson (obits. T. 22.4.95, G. 24.4.95 & I. 5.5.95). Important Arabist who was in turn a soldier, diplomat and businessman.

Graham Baldwin, an evangelical minister who 'rescues' members of religious cults, learned his interrogation techniques on a course at the Joint Interrogation Wing in the seventies. Doesn't reveal why or how (IoS. 15.1.95).

Dr Christopher Andrew pulled out that hoary old myth about Arthur Ransome of Swallows and Amazons fame being a Soviet spy. Debunked in IoS (8.1.95).

Sir Patrick Dean, cold warrior and Atlanticist par excellence. Nasty piece of work as Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee during Suez (I. & T. 8.11.95). His death gave the apologists a chance to defend him.

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, diplomat (I. 19.12.94). Private secretary to prime minister Eden. Hard right position during Suez.

Mark Abrams (obit. G. 27.9.94), founder of Market Research worked in psychological warfare during the war.

Brig. Sir Edgar 'Bill' Williams (obit. D.T. 28.6.95), Chief Intelligence Officer in 21st Army Group which invaded France and continued to Berlin.

Sir William Hayter, diplomat (obit. I. 30.3.95). Late forties Chair of the JIC.

Brigadier George Taylor (obit. D.T. 25.7.94). Long time Army man in Korea and Kenya during Mau Mau period and operation Anvil which apprehended 2,000 'terrorists'. A strong Catholic, on retirement worked for Common Cause.

Lady Ranfurly, author of the recent best-selling wartime diaries worked, first as General Wavell's secretary in Cairo and then in 'British Intelligence' (O. 4.2.96).

Brig. Sir Geoffrey Macnab (obit. 6.3.95). PoW in War repatriated in 1943 and sent in 1944 as head of a military mission to Hungary where 'he evacuated a number of British agents and escaped PoWs'. Worked in Military Intelligence.

Maj-Gen. Peter Sibbald (obit. D.T. 14.7.94). 'A first class organiser and an expert on anti-terrorist operations' - in Malaya,

Kenya, Aden, Radfan and N. Ireland. Colonel Sir Guy Campbell, bt (obit. T. 7.8.93. See Lobster 28), leading operational commander against the Mau Mau killing more 'terrorists' than any other unit. Member of Special Forces Club, memorial service attended by Peter Lee from the Club (T. 17.9.93 - thanks to Harry Hilton for reference).

Major Walter Magor (obit. D.T. 18.5.95). Colonial civil servant, Chair of the Emergency Joint Staff at the Kenya Intelligence Committee and then Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Internal Security and Defence (1955).

Victor Montagu (obits. G. & D.T. 27.2.95). One of the old style 'Die-hard' Conservative MP, anti-American and Suez rebel, belonged to every right-wing pressure group going.

Cedric Belfrage (S.Tel. 22.10.95) unmasked again as KGB agent. Recently released Venona decrypts give his codename as UCN/9 and his controller as Vassili Zubilin and that he passed on details about the British Security Co-ordination (MI5/6 station in the US).

Goronwy Rees (D.T. 7.10.94), 'My father was not a spy', writes a *Telegraph* journalist in biography, *Looking for Mr Nobody: The Secret Life of Goronwy Rees - Weidenfeld & Nicolson*. It did reveal that he worked for MI6 after the war in their Political Department.

Alan Crick (obit. D.T. 30.10.95). Former director of Economic Intelligence to the MoD. Joined the Joint Intelligence Bureau in 1946. Then seconded to the British Joint Services Mission in Washington and returned to the JIB as assistant director in 1957. Chair of the Joint Intelligence Staff (1965).

Peter Kroger, heart of the Portland spying (obits. D.T. & G. 11.7.95, article G. 29.6.95).

Sir Rudolf Pierls (obit. D.T. 27.9.95). Played a crucial role in building the atom bomb, came under suspicion of being Soviet spy but as usual MI5 got the wrong man.

Stephen Spender, poet and co-founder of Encounter (obit. G. 17.7.95).

Harry Shorto (obit. G. 23.9.95). Country's leading scholar of Mon-Khmer language, during war worked in Burma in Intelligence, ending with career at the School of Oriental and African Studies.

Professor Michael Balfour, worked in the Psychological Warfare Executive during the war (obit. I. 28.9.95).

Kinta Beevor, married to Jack Beevor (SOE) and brother of Gordon Waterfield (head of the BBG Arabic Service), worked with Naval Intelligence during the war (obit. I. 4.9.95).

Tom Burns (obits. D.T. & I. 9.12.95). Leading right-wing, anti-communist Catholic, publisher of newspaper *The Tablet* and Chair of the publishers Burns & Oates. During the war worked with the Ministry of Information as press attache in Spain

organising Allied propaganda. Pro-Franco like most of the Catholic anti-communists such as his colleague Douglas Woodruff. Close to the British League for European Freedom. Someone really should do a study of Catholic influence on anti-communism in Britain.

Gunter Guillaume, spy at the centre of the Brandt Affair died (obits. G. & I. 14.4.95). Brandt's widow released some papers which revived the spy affair for a short period (T. 11.2.95 & D.T. 21.2.95).

Ian Greig, anti-communist and 'authority on Communist infiltration and subversion', died (obit. D.T. 9.11.95). Interesting little wrinkle in the obituary. Referring to his naming in 1968 of the existence of Communist cells in British universities the *Telegraph* placed emphasis on one 'particularly Hull' (why?). Co-founded the Monday Club. Worked with Geoffrey Stewart-Smith, who according to the *Guardian* (11.1.96), admitted in his bankruptcy hearing in 1987 that the Foreign Affairs Research Institute had been financed mainly by South Africa.

Air Marshall Erik Bennett, 'the most important person' in the life of Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman, injured in car crash (S.T. 17.9.95). Reveals some of his activities for the first time.

Ian Henderson, chief security adviser in Bahrain since the sixties creating the notorious Special Branch which engaged in torture, was the feature on a number of articles on asylum cases (G. 27.1.95 & S.T. 5.2.95). An old Kenya-hand, deported in 1964 after causing the 'many of our people to be killed, both innocent and guilty. He shot many Gikuyu with his own hands...' (The Swords of Kirinyaga 1975, pp. 161/2 - thanks to Harry Hilton for reference).

General Donald Isles, yet another actor in the Iraqgate saga was reporting to 'Box 500' (MI5). A former Army director general of weapons and deputy manager - director of BMARC, Isles told the HoC trade and industry select committee inquiring into BMARC's trade with Iran that he never gave any 'tittle tattle' to the Government but was in regular contact with MI5 officers (G. 18.1.96).

Cromer Braun, co-founder of the Slammer Society of Poets in Cairo during the war, 'intelligence officer' (I. 21.2.95).

Major Maurice Pryor, former Military Intelligence Officer, left £1.2 million in his will (D.T. 19.1.96). After the war worked in Germany on economic intelligence (JIB).

G. - *Guardian*
D.T. - *Daily Telegraph*
S.Tel - *Sunday Telegraph*
S.T. - *Sunday Times*
T. - *The Times*
D.E. - *Daily Express*
D.M. - *Daily Mail*
I. - *Independent*
IoS - *Independent on Sunday*

Michael Herman

The following is an interview for the BBC conducted by freelance journalist, James Garrett, with former senior Intelligence officer Michael Herman. One of the few senior British intelligence officials to go public, Herman has produced a string of academic studies of intelligence affairs, though often of a rarefied kind. Herman, who was a divisional head at GCHQ and spent a time in the Cabinet Office with the Joint Intelligence Committee in the early seventies, received the permission of his former employer for the enclosed answers.

Q. Intelligence services in cold war - how valuable?

A. The cold war had a special character as an intelligence war. Russia was deeply secret; in the late forties we had only the sketchiest ideas about it. The West was relatively open; but the Soviet regime never believed anything unless it was produced by espionage. In everything the West did. So we were in a continuous struggle to open windows on to the Soviet Union, and at the same time to limit the windows open to Soviet espionage.

Q. Who won the intelligence war?

A. In the sense of collecting information, the West picked itself off the floor in 1945 and on the whole won the conflict. The really decisive advance was American satellite surveillance from the early 1960s onwards; for the first time Soviet missiles could be seen and counted. But the different sense of using information, it was almost no contest. The Soviet Union had excellent sources of intelligence, but was a self-serving organization. Intelligence conformed to policy. People told Stalin what he wanted to hear. On the Russian side there was never anything like the British Joint Intelligence Committee. With all its mistakes, Western intelligence had a structure for bringing all information together, trying to decide what it all means, and putting its interpretation to national leaders. If I could now offer the Russians any kind of lease-lend it would be advice on how to build an objective system of this kind.

Q. What did intelligence do to the cold war?

A. No one really knows how Soviet intelligence affected Soviet policy. On the Western side I am sure that intelligence made politicians more sensible than if nothing had been known about the USSR. One of the most important U-turns was President Reagan's move in 1984 from regarding Russia as the 'evil empire' to seeking some kind of rapprochement, and my guess is that intelligence had some influence. CIA gets a bad press; but I believe that when the history of the cold war comes to be written its assessment work - not its covert collection and covert action - will be seen as a benign influence.

Intelligence was also some sort of guarantee on both sides against surprise attack. It was the foundation of the Russian and America arms control from the early 1970s. Intelligence about the adversary helped to manage the cold war.

Yet some of the methods increased tension. Espionage; intelligence officers under diplomatic cover - three quarters of Soviet diplomats in some places were KGB or GRU officers running agents; the photographic sorties over the USSR in the 1950s; the casualty rate of American aircraft; and so on. Both sides engaged in these activities, in varying degrees. They reflected

the cold war and did not start it. Nevertheless there is the paradox. Intelligence information increased international stability. Some of the methods some, not all of them - intensified the conflict.

Q. Does Britain now need such a sophisticated intelligence apparatus?

A. Not all intelligence has been cold war stuff, of course. The importance of the Middle East or international terrorism has not been affected. And of course there is all the instability following the cold war - those 30,000 nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union that everyone worries about. But intelligence grew up so much around the cold war and is now in a period of reappraisal. Here you must distinguish between its roles. One is putting information together to understand things and guess what will happen next; the work of the JIC and the Defence Intelligence Staff. There is not much doubt about the need for this - even more perhaps in an unstable world than the stable cold war. The other is collecting some of this information by secret means, as by SIS and GCHQ. We now have a more open world: diplomats reporting from many new places, and international TV. No one doubts that we still need some covert intelligence. Or that we should try to keep its quality - good intelligence is better than bad.

Q. But what about its size?

A. One thing that does not get much attention is support of military forces. If you have military forces you need intelligence to support them, increasingly important. Gulf War showed what good intelligence could do. Falklands showed the importance of intelligence in a different way. Probably Bosnia does so as well. Troops need intelligence support like weapons and ammunition and communications; the capability has to exist - cannot just be improvised every time you fight. Total intelligence budgets are probably somewhere about 3-4% of defence budgets. You probably need something like this if you want effective forces, not just toy soldiers.

As for peacetime use, big chunks of the unstable world are still secretive: Iraq, international arms traffic, insurgent movements, terrorism, perhaps part of Islamic fundamentalism. Some intelligence serves national policies; other is a kind of insurance policy or fire alarm in case things go wrong.

But these are second-order threats - not the same as the long-running cold war intelligence war. So the size of intelligence should follow the political view of Britain's world role. Intelligence may well be less centre-stage than in the cold war. I hear talk of some contraction and most people would find this reasonable.

Q. Accountability to a Parliamentary committee [and statutory basis]?

A. Two cheers. I hope it will make some people happier. (But doubt it - industry recycled stories - credulity like believing in flying saucers). May be some genuine gains for intelligence community. Policy 'who's in charge of intelligence on IRA terrorism in this country'. Someone took sensible decision that someone should be in charge - might well have been taken earlier.

But problems. (1) Not just propriety and legality. 'Expenditure, administration and policy'. Micro-management? The 'better not' philosophy? (2) Next step Select Committee? How can Parliamentary accountability be reconciled with real secrets?

Congressional example - not bad record - but at cost of full panoply - control access - vetting of congressional staff - Congress as intelligence customers - part of the system - not a party issue. Can it be insulated from party politics here? Politics are about openness and not secrecy. There is long history of political madness about intelligence. [Politicians always looking for ammunition against opponents in government. 1944 Thomas Dewey opposing Roosevelt in the Presidential campaign was all set to include fact that Japanese ciphers were being broken as part of his attack on R for Pearl Harbor disaster; dissuaded]. April 3 1982 debate, the day after the Falklands invasion, an Opposition ex-minister quoted the reading of Argentine ciphers when he was in office shortly beforehand.

But two cheers. Intelligence needs to be taken out of the political arena. If it gets bipartisan support, good thing. If it leads to endless political tinkering it will be a waste of time.

Q. Do you feel you wasted your life?

A. I was lucky; I coincided with the cold war and always felt I was helping to avoid nuclear war. [There is of a element of patriotism - 'country right or wrong' - any more so than soldiers or diplomats?] Most of us felt that our governments of both parties were pursuing morally defensible policies. But there is also the feeling that intelligence is knowledge, and that governments, and the world, are better with knowledge than ignorance. Intelligence officers are not entirely unlike academics in these ivory towers, as seekers after truth.

Russia claims to have reduced its foreign intelligence. But still some signs of its intelligence running on auto-pilot. If the case persuades the Russian government to rein back, so much the better. But I don't think this should be taken as giving the West carte blanche for building its own effort back up to cold war scales. Arms control at the end of the cold war sought Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. If the case encourages nations to seek tacit understandings about not going overboard on espionage, so much the better.

Thomas Doheny worked undercover for Army Intelligence in Ireland. In March 1993, he was convicted in Omagh of stealing a car but the sentence was suspended for four hours allowing him to leave British jurisdiction. After crossing the border to the South, he moved to London where he was subsequently arrested and imprisoned. Alleging that he pleaded guilty under duress, Doheny claimed to be a victim of rivalry between competing intelligence agencies running agents across the border, one of which was the Joint Services Group, a unit previously only known to be responsible for coordinating intelligence-gathering in Northern Ireland.

In order to clear his name, Doheny launched a series of legal actions based on the document opposite. Except for brief references in the Guardian (18.11.94), News of the World (3.4.94), Private Eye (18.11.94) and the Ulster Newsletter (13 & 29.3.95) little has appeared on Doheny's case. Coming at a sensitive time with the peace process, the media bowed to pressure from the D-Notice Committee and refused to name names, except, that is, Colonel George Williams, one of the intelligence officers who died in the helicopter crash on the Mull of Kintyre in June 1994.

Joint Services Group

IN THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION THE STRAND LONDON WC2 2LL

For some time I was engaged in sensitive undercover work in and relating to Northern Ireland on behalf of Her Majesty's Government for the Intelligence Corps (Joint Services Group) of Templar Barracks Ashford Kent TN23 3HH, I have been informed that a 'D Notice' has been issued in respect of media coverage of the circumstances arising out of my activities. I believe that this work was of great benefit to the public and was of a nature to attract the hatred of subversive organisations, and certain elements within the Royal Ulster Constabulary opposed to Army Intelligence operations of a covert nature, and has placed my life and the lives of family members, in grave danger.

I was asked to set up a front company called Rose Northern Ireland Ltd. It was a Timber Frame buildings construction and sales company, but it's true nature was to acquire Intelligence on republicans in Ulster and the Republic of Ireland on behalf of the JSG, formerly under the command of Col. George Williams, and presently under the command of Lt-Col. P. Everson (0846) 609750. It was agreed from the outset that I would be recompensed all incurred expenditure.

I was sent on missions across the border into the Republic by an Army officer believed to be Captain Rowdon-Smith the former Whiskey Detachment commander of the JSG in Enniskillen, code name Carl, (0365) 32758. They identified all my targets in the Republic and Northern Ireland. My sole purpose in Northern Ireland was for covert intelligence action and as such I followed all the instructions given by the JSG and Col. G. Williams at HQNI in Lisburn. At no time was my wife aware of my relationship to the Army. My wife comes from a Republican background, i.e. some members of her family are active within the republican Sinn Fein faction.

I was sent on missions into the Republic from a number of pre-arranged departure points, and given the name of a Military Police officer at an OPV on the border (0365) 748606. I was also given a secure telephone number to use if needed (0365) 324708, at St. Anglos Barracks where the JSG have a hanger to the rear right side of the base.

Carl was able to contact me at any time via my pager and on a number of occasions we meet at various Army posts and at the Drumshane Hotel out side Irvinestown in Co. Fermanagh. At these meetings I would receive instructions for further

missions in to the Republic and on selected targets in Northern Ireland. It was made clear from the outset to me of the risk to myself and my family should the Republicans discover the true nature of my work, and that I should not reveal even to the RUC at anytime my Intelligence work on behalf of the Army. I was informed that they could not even trust the RUC and I was not under any circumstances trust anybody.

I continued to make inroads within the Republican movement and visited the targeted individuals identified by the Army in the Republic, and also at a number of Irish Army bases along the border, with a pro republican member of the Irish Army. I was ordered to establish links with a number of political officials in the Republic, which I did, and cultivate their friendship for any future assistance.

I became aware on a number of occasions upon leaving my home that a silver Ford Granada and a four door blue Volkswagen Golf were following me. I informed Carl who instructed me to go about my business as usual and that they were making enquiries. Their identity was revealed some time later on the Irvinestown to Enniskillen road. The car contained RUC police officers who asked what I was doing in Northern Ireland. We had an exchange of words and I left. Some time later I was informed that I would be left alone by the RUC to get on with my work for the Army. These RUC officers were in fact an Intelligence unit of the RUC opposed to covert operations by the Army.

This harassment by the RUC intensified to such a point that the Army were becoming alarmed at the prospect that I had been followed to an Army base on the border. I was frequently being stopped at night coming back across the border by RUC officers wearing webbing and armed, who were quite clearly Military drilled and were quite threatening in their manner. I reported this to Carl and continued to work, but the Army were quite clearly unable to hold the RUC in check. At this stage I was becoming alarmed myself as it was becoming clear that the RUC'S interest was revolving around a target that I was given by the Army in Enniskillen some months previously. This individual introduced me to a number of Republicans I had previously met in the Republic on other missions for the Army. A number of these individuals are wanted in the UK for questioning in relation to terrorist offences committed in Northern Ireland.

As the RUC'S harassment intensified I began to notice a change in my relationship to this target. It was at this point around the 10 June 1992 an incident happened at my home which resulted in the death of our unborn daughter when the RUC raided

my home. The Army is aware of the nature of the incident, and even contacted the RUC at a very high level and again requested that I be left alone. I was informed by the Army that my work must continue at all costs, we buried our daughter on the 29 June 1992. Since this time the target in question, ***** ***, has admitted that he is an informant of DS Peter Wray RUC and this clearly is the reason why the RUC are harassing me.

Around Christmas time December 1992 after attempting to come to terms with the loss of our daughter, the strain afflicting myself and my wife, along with the harassment by the RUC, made it impossible to live and work under these circumstances. My wife moved back to her family in the Republic and I waited for Carl to return from leave so I could inform him that I could no longer go on and that I was going to join my wife and daughter. I made my position quite clear - that promises were made by the Army in particular regarding the safety of myself and my family - and that I would be recompensed all incurred expenditure. I was informed to keep in touch which I did on a weekly basis.

Frequent attempts were made to get us to move back to the North. In fact I made four trips to an Army base on the border to drop intelligence material to the JSG, but I still refused to go any further in to Northern Ireland for fear of risking my life.

In January of 1993 I made to London and stayed with a friend who I have known for about 12 years. He works at the London Mennonite Centre and he is a Christian Missionary. From his home I contacted Carl to inform him I was in London and that I was most unhappy about the situation. He again attempted to talk me in to going back to Northern Ireland. He stated "we have got the RUC under control now, everything is OK". My reply was I will think about it and I then went home to my family in Galway.

On the 08 March 1993 whilst at the London Mennonite Centre visiting my friend again, I was arrested by officers of the Metropolitan Police who stated that I was being arrested for the theft of a Fiat Tempra motor car and that I was being deported to Northern Ireland. I was removed to Holloway Police station where I telephoned Carl who was unaware of the situation that was going on, but he ordered me not to say anything to the Police and that under no circumstances was I to inform the RUC or any court that I was an Army Agent as this would place my life, and that of my wife and daughter in grave danger.

I of course complied with this request because of the risk of exposure and endangering my family and loyalty to the Army and the Crown.

The following day I was removed to Northern Ireland and taken by car to Enniskillen where I was held for a total of four days. In these four days I was arrested four times, subjected to illegal interrogation and psychological torture which included laughing at the death of my daughter. The RUC demanded to know the names of JSG personnel I was working with, and to identify who the Army had targeted for intelligence purposes in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. I refused to answer all the questions put to me. At no time was I ever asked any questions in relation to the theft of the said car. At no time was any statement taken or was I ever interviewed in respect of the car, but I was directly interrogated in respect of my work for the Army. It was made quite clear to me that should I not give them the information they required they would inform the Republicans at the Crumlin Road Prison that I was a British Army spy. This would have been a death sentence. Although I was under extreme pressure and very fearful for my life and that of my family, I refused to provide the RUC with any information as ordered by the Army.

On the 12/03/93 I was removed from the RUC station and taken to Omagh Magistrate's Court under escort of eight RUC police officers in two cars. On arrival at the court I was made to sit in the hall with my RUC escort. At approximately 10 am the solicitor, Mr Furguson, that the RUC had appointed, arrived at the Court and then entered the Court room with two RUC police officers, DS Peter Wray and J Latemir. I attempted to follow the others in to the Court to hear what was being said against me, but the RUC officers in the hall with me physically prevented me from entering the Court. At about 10.30 to 10.45 Mr Furguson emerged from the court and was very upset. He took me into the Solicitors' chambers and said when you enter that Court you will not be represented by me as I am coming off record. I asked what do you mean? He stated that the Magistrate and the police had agreed that "if you pleaded guilty they would let you go, or if you pleaded not guilty you would be held at the Crumlin Road Prison" (which would be a death sentence).

I never committed any crime and would never have pleaded guilty if my life had not been placed in danger by the Army and the RUC. I was given four hours to leave Northern Ireland or go to prison. I left Northern Ireland and in reality I have been banned from entering Northern Ireland and the UK. This act of banning has prevented me from visiting the grave of my daughter whose death was caused by the RUC.

I returned to the United Kingdom and was arrested by the Metropolitan Police on 9 May 1994 whilst making a complaint at

Tintangel House in the presence of DCI Pickard of CIB2, who instructed TI Mark Newton of Hornsey police that I was to be removed from this building and arrested elsewhere because if anything happens to this man "heads will roll". I was taken to Belgravia police station where I was arrested on a committal warrant issued by Omagh Magistrates Court on the 12/03/93 for a term of 12 months imprisonment, for the theft of a car that was never stolen. Mark Newton then informed me that the RUC were on the way. In fact I was held on this prison warrant for six months and released on the 07/11/94. Whilst in custody I was in frequent contact with Col. Williams head of the JSG, and the new head Lt-Col. Everson (0846) 609 750 and also the Ministry of Defence, in particular Gen. Sir Charles Guthrie (071) 218 7114, Colonel Commandant of the Intelligence Corps, Brigadier Springfield (071) 218 7849 at the War Office, then Director of the Intelligence Corps and the present Director Brigadier Laurie (0233) 657 242, Captain Moorby Intelligence Corps Support Unit (0233) 657 331.

I was in great fear of my life and communicated this to the Army. I was left as it were on death row not knowing if I was going to live or die for four and half months, until the Home Secretary granted me the right to remain in England.

As the Intelligence Corps and the Ministry of Defence are holding documents and information that is going to confirm that I was an agent of the British Army and that I was acting with authority engaging in covert action on behalf of her Majesty's Government in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, I would ask the Court to order a disclosure of such information and documentation, as is relevant to this action.

I would further ask this Court, that if it becomes necessary, for permission to issue witness summonses against Lt-Col. Everson and the Director of Intelligence Brigadier M. I. Laurie and the former Director Brigadier E. P. O. Springfield. I further attach an index of Evidence for further consideration by the Court.

I have pursued the Army through every complaints procedure to seek compensation and damages for work undertaken on their behalf. The Intelligence Corps and the Ministry of Defence has blocked all my attempts at seeking redress and monies owed, they have deliberately mounted a cover up and are refusing to assist in seeking an investigation of any kind, I have attempted to settle this dispute in a dignified and honourable fashion but they have continuously and habitually rebuffed my approaches. I therefore have been left with no alternative but to bring these proceedings before this Court on this day the Twenty eight day of the twelfth month in the year Nineteen Hundred and ninety four.

Joint Services Group

JSG (PWA)	0846 609 0211	Ext 42011
Col. George Williams	0846 609 750	Ext 42750
Int/Cor	609 294	
JSM Maj Ronal Proctor	0846 609 273	Ext 42273
Black Watch		
Maj Gerry Asbridge	0846 609 330	Ext 46530
PARA		
W/O 1st Amdt Div	0846 609 727	Ext 42727
AJG KIA Crossing Capt		
CAPT D J Slapeon		
Int/Cor		
Sgt Mason	0846 215 243	
	0462 52 888	Ext 46532
JSG Enniskillen	0365 32 708	Ext 37308
Det. Sgt	0365 32 758	Ext 37358
Det Commander		
Capt Rawdon-Smith		
Col. Office	0365 322 312	Ext 37504
Maj. Mayne (Opps)	0365 322 312	Ext 37204
FRS	0365 322313	Ext 37242
Ext		
Corpl. Tracey Owen (HQ/PT)	0846 645 111	
OPV (Derrylyn)	0365 746 608	
E. Det (RQMT)	0846 645 111	Ext 45232/
G. Det (RQMT)	0846 645 111	Ext 42469
Sig (RQMT)	0846 645 111	Ext 42415
C/Clark (RQMT)	0846 645 111	Ext 42415
IIC	0846 645 111	Ext 42087
Ext		
G1 Heileen McMan	0846 609 215	
G2	0846 645 111	Ext 41933
S Shidden (Security Complaints)	0846 609 923	Ext 41933
Capt Gale SO1 (CAS)	0846 609 324	Ext 42234
THE WOLF OFFICER (PWA)		
Brig. Springfield	0233 657 242	Ext 3242
Int/Cor		
Capt P Rafford	0233 657 242	Ext 3242
Int/Cor		
Fax	0233 657 458	
TIA	0233 657 441	Ext 3441
Maj. Jefferys	0232 657 449	Ext 3449
Int/Cor		
Capt. A Jones	0232 657 311	Ext 3211
Int/Cor		
Lt Col Woolmore RDC ICSV	0233 657 330	
Int Centre	0233 657 260	Ext 3160
Mr Arthur Wright	0233 657 303	
Officer Postings		
Capt/Col Elliot	0233 657 199 AS	Ext 3399
C/C Templar	0233 657 210	
Maj A.R.K. Sagnall (DEPT)	071 314 9000	Ext 82659
A/Maj J.P. Butler	0232 657 273	
Over Hill (Courses)	0232 657 271	Ext 3271
Wald	0232 657 256	
Woc	0232 657 274	
Spracklan		
Sq Lnd Cunningham /officer	0232 657 286	Ext 3286
Sq Lnd Wearning (DEPT)	071 671 2344	
GOC Lt Gen Wheeler (RQMT)	0846 609 408	Ext 42408
Ext	0846 645 111	Ext 42408
Fax	0846 609 785	Ext 42785
Col Desper (CO3)	0846 645 111	Ext 424100
Maj RDC Army Complaints	0846 609 498	Ext 42498
Madell Murphy	0846 645 111	Ext 42826
Butchinson	0846 609 324	Ext 324
39 Linc Army	0846 645 111	Ext 41021
Capt Richmond/Rickmann		
Capt W Tower		Ext 41021
GPO Lajal		Ext 42499
Nadras & Flanagan		
Gerry Hyland	0232 336007	
Fax	0232 439276	
RDC	0232 650 2233	
Inspector John Wright	0232 700 321	
Fax	0232 700 321	
Comm/Room	0232 700 329	
Ken McFarland	0265 212 822	
Fax	0265 2127001	
Det/Sgt. Peter Wray		
John Lattner		
C/D C.I. Bradley	0461 92331	
Robert Porter	0365 323 358	
Omagh	0463 243 056	
North/Bus	0461 672 555	
Inspector Susan Hall Sealgar/Int		
Travoc Francis	0232 327822	
Ext/Asst/Military Complaints		
ISIS on Base		
Peter Collins	0846 609 423	
Seamus Todd	0846 645 111	Ext 42413
SAFER (Housing)	0846 645 111	Ext 42008
0846 609 008		
Canon J Everett	0232 430 473	
Lt Col Rav Price	0302 128 109	
	0304 202 979	
Zav Gan Barkness (CS)	0278 471717	
Methodist Church In Ireland		
Alan Wardlow Zav	077 83041	
Edmund Mawlinney	0232 324 554 (O)	
	0232 468 458 (B)	
Fax	0232 329 447 (O)	
Mr Steven Smith	0846 609 053	Ext 42052
Ext		Ext 42424
NP (RQMT)	0846 645 111	Ext 40901
	0846 608 190	
Brig. Strodly (RQMT)	0846 645 111	
Gen. Sir P Inge (CS)	071 214 7124	
Assistant Tim Allan Fax	071 214 7840	
Maj. Gen M.J.D. Walker	071 214 7191	
DI Sec	071 214 0957	
Lt. Col Tyrrell (Inte/Co)	071 214 9000	Ext 82750
MS	071 491 4488	
RDC/Liaison S Reid/Dowling	0365 327 582	
Butchinson		
A Coy R.I.A. (JR) Army Liaison	0345 327 521	
SGT Holden		
No. 10	071 930 4433	
St. Hon. Joan Taylor	0861 522 409	
London	071 219 4934	
Northern Ireland Office		
Sir P Mayne	0232 528 194	
	0232 528 122	
Fax	0232 748 938	
Police Division (B)	0232 527 049	

Queries and Info

Lobster receives requests for information on a wide range of subjects and contributors also seek information on projects they are researching. It seems appropriate, therefore, to start a queries section, in which interested parties may share materials. If you are seeking information on some obscure individual or organisation, drop us a line and enclose a couple of stamps for forwarding of replies (or give us your address/telephone number); we will put your query in the next issue.


1 Mr Blamires is seeking information on his father, Derek Taylor Blamires (b 28.12.25, d 22.4.90). Captain in the SAS and was an explosives expert as well as an instructor at the School of Snow and Mountain Warfare. Spoke fluent German and Urdu, worked undercover behind enemy lines during the war in Yugoslavia (decorated four times for rescuing key personnel held by the SS). Later served in the 6th Gurkha rifles in India and Nepal. On his return from India, he worked at the 112 POW camp in Ayr as a translator. In September 1952, he was appointed to the 'Intelligence Corps' and may have been working for the intelligence services.

2 Any information on Palingenesis Press, which was active in the Scottish nationalist campaign of the seventies. There were once allegations in *International Times* that the CIA might have been involved. Any pamphlets by this outfit would be useful - particularly by one Gordon Brown, now Labour Shadow Chancellor.


3 Information on the British equivalent of Paixet Liberte, which was very active in anti-communist activities in France, and may have been involved in the Gladio network. The British group's name is not known - Peace and Liberty? - but may have had something to do with the Economic League.

4 Does anyone have a (photo)copy of *The Raven No 5 (Freedom Press, 1988)* for sale? It tells the story of the Spies for Peace. Also wanted, any of the *Solidarity* pamphlets from the sixties? I am looking, too, for copies of the *Soviet Progress* publications, such as *Caught in the Act* (1963, updated 83) and *Wanted*, about western intelligence operations against the Soviet Union which, curiously, are not held by the British Library, nor are they available through its lending system. SD

SOE ORGANISATIONAL CHART



Thanks to Anthony Frewin for the above



Bumming round the net

Even a few brief visits to the Internet will begin to convince you that the image of "surfing the net" is a good metaphor. The jargon that surrounds the Internet is well endowed with more or less appropriate metaphors. Is the Internet a sea on which you surf? Or is what it says it is - a "net" around which you scramble, and sometimes get entangled?

Of these different images the best is probably the last because it describes the Internet itself rather than what you do, or would like to do on it. But for many serious users of the Internet its interconnections and the ease with which you can follow threads and strands have not the least interest. For me the immediate purpose was the potential for better communication and access to information as a trades unionist and Labour Party activist. To achieve this I would never need to know more than a couple of addresses on the Internet.

However for the serious student of parapolitics, the interconnectedness of the internet has a great many attractions and uses. Much of what we do is underpinned by effective network analysis - as Stuart Christie pointed out in "The Investigative Researchers Handbook" - and by our ability to track down fairly obscure sources. We are after all people who read books backwards - first the index, then the bibliography, then the notes and references, and finally perhaps even the book itself. Even my stumblings around the internet have shown me enough to believe that it could be the most effective investigative research tool around.

The anarchic nature of the Internet means that no one knows how many sites there are on the Internet. New servers come on line every day and new sites are set up on the servers every day. Many even quite small and peripheral groups have their own site, and some interesting individuals have their own sites.

The useful aspects of the information sent to you from a distant site is that it will often contain automatic links to other related sites on the Internet that you might not know about.

The strange thing about this interactive linking is, in my very limited experience, that you often end up far away from where you started and find it difficult to get back without quitting and starting again.

My stumbling around the Internet demonstrates one thing - it doesn't have to cost the earth and you don't have to wait to get in there if you've only got an old, and nowadays rudimentary, machine.

There are definite advantages to joining the Internet for parapolitical researchers. It is an aid to network chasing, offers access to new and first hand and background sources, and is a useful means of establishing new contacts. On the other hand there are some dangerous disadvantages - not least that it represents a vast and changing archive of uncritical information. There is the inevitable temptation of unfocused and uncritical trivial pursuits for people who are already, by inclination, collectors of obscure source material.

The other problem with the Internet is, I suspect, the misconception that it allows you access to secret information. Don't let this idea convince you to get in there, cruising, stumbling or shuffling around the Internet isn't "hacking", far from it, the internet sites are there to be read and used.

For all my skepticism about the Internet I am convinced that the way ahead for publications like *Lobster* lies inevitably with the internet. For the price of the production of a single issue we could purchase a site on the net for a year not only providing information for millions of readers but sending them surfing round the net to other valuable sites, for a little more we could organise a reader's news group on the "usenet" network.

During a fifteen minute phone link I did a little delving round some right wing internet/world wide web sites.

I started with an address for the Anti European Union Server, that I had found in "Internet" magazine: (<http://www.soton.ac.uk/~nss194/index.html>). The first page of information from server gave me a number of choices about what to look at next:

- Information about this server*
- General Information*
- Independence Magazine.*
- Analysis*
- Soap Box*
- Diary dates*
- From our Bookshelf*
- Documents*
- Connections to other sites*

"General Information" - choosing this option led to further options including Contact names and addresses although when I chose it, it sent me back to the main menu suggesting that the site is still being constructed. I got the same response at "Independence Magazine" and "Diary Dates" and "Analysis".

"Soap Box" - contained a short rant from Theresa Gorman and nothing else.

"From our Bookshelf" - was more interesting, and more obviously useful. It was a short list of recommended books with publication details. Examples of entries in this section:

Britain and the European Union : Democracy or Superstate? by John Boyd, 75p from Committee Against Euro-Federalism, 57 Green Lane, Wallasey Village, Wirral, Meresyside L45 8JQ.

Europe of Many Circles : Constructing a Wider Europe by Sir Richard Body MP, £14.95 from New European Publications Ltd, 14-16 Carroun Road, London SW8 1JT.

No Laughing Matter England and James, £3.00 from Anti-Common Market League, Highdown, Worcester Park, Surrey KT4 7HZ.

The Bastards by Teresa Gorman MP, £5.00 from Teresa Gorman MP, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA.

The Consolidated Treaty on European Union, £12.50 from British Management Data Foundation, Highfield, Langridge, Sheepscomb, Stroud, Gloucestershire GL6. *The Meaning of the Maastricht Treaty* by Stephen and Gill Bush, £1.25 from Prosyma Research Ltd, PO Box 19, Poynton, Cheshire SK12 1FL.

The Rape of Britannia by Jack Obdam, £4.95 from The Pentland Press Ltd, 3 Regal Lane, Scham, Ely, Cambridgeshire CB7 5BA.

Your Country, Your Democracy : The Threat from the European Community by Rodney Atkinson, £3.00 from Compuprint Publishing, 1 Sands Road, Swalwell, Newcastle upon Tyne NE16 3DJ.

"Documents" - gave access to the full text

The Right Side of the Web
BBC Westminster On-Line
Anti-Maastricht Alliance
Nei til EU.

I had already visited the interesting American "Right Side of the Web" so choose the Anti-Maastricht Alliance.

Here you discover that: "The Anti-Maastricht Alliance is an all-party umbrella organization. It was formed in 1992, initially to fight the implementation of the Treaty of European Union. After November 1, 1993, its new task acquired a dual aspect. It campaigns by every Legitimate and democratic method against the further centralisation and unification of the Western European countries. Instead of that ahistorical idea it offers its own vision of a loose alliance of free and sovereign countries of the whole of Europe trade and build up relations between themselves and countries outside the continent in a free manner as it seems appropriate to them. At the same time, the Anti-Maastricht Alliance sees as its task the spread of information about the European Union and the effect it has on politics and on ordinary life in the United Kingdom. In December 1992, the Anti-Maastricht Alliance organized the Edinburgh Counter-Summit to coincide with the meeting of the leaders of EC countries in that city. Leading politicians, academics and businessmen from this country and Western Europe spoke at the Counter-Summit which, needless to say, cost a fraction of what the other one did. The idea was deemed so successful that it was copied by anti-Maastricht organizations in other countries. To date we have held a Counter-Summit in Strasbourg and more are being planned.

The AMA comprises all the various anti-Maastricht organizations that subscribe to its democratic principles. It does not and will not include extremist anti-democratic groups of either right or the left."

A bit of probing of this site led me to other connections, some of which weren't yet in place:

"EUROPEAN FREEDOM LINKS

This Page Was Last Modified: Monday, September 11, 1995 following links refer to other web pages which may be of interest. Inclusion in this list does not imply any relationship with the AMA unless stated otherwise.

AntiCommon Market League (Link to be added)
Campaign for an Independent Britain (Link to be added)

Nei til EU Anti European Union group in Norway. These pages are in Norwegian.
Ian Geldard's Home Page"

There wasn't much choice but to opt to have a look at what Ian Gelderd had to offer. This was a very well designed and comprehensive sites offering links to many other sites of interest including the Libertarian Alliance Home Page, where Ian describes himself as the "Webmaster of the Libertarian Alliance home pages". In which case he has been a busy man since there was a wealth of articles to be down loaded from this site and links to other useful pages.

Some sites to visit

Sites change, go out of business, or are just so popular you can't get into them. Here are a few sites you may want to visit.

Library of congress at: <http://lcweb.loc.gov/homepage/lchp.html>

Sinn Fein at: <http://uts.cc.utexas.edu/~sponge/aprn/SFhome.html>

Conservative Party at: <http://www.Conservative-party.org.uk>

Blackwell's bookshop at: <http://www.blackwell.co.uk/bookshops/>

CIA at: <http://www.odci.gov/>

US Federal Government at: http://www.fie.com/www/us_gov.htm

Metropolitan police at: <http://www.open.gov.uk/metpol/methome.htm>

Amnesty International at: <http://organic.com/Non.profits/Amnesty/index.html>

Labour Party at: <http://www.poptel.org.uk/labour-party/>

Newtwatch at: <http://www.cais.com/newtwatch/>

Statewatch at: <http://www.poptel.org.uk/statewatch/>

Right Side of the Web at: <http://www.clark.net/jeffd/index.html>

Cults at: <http://www.observer.co.uk>

Scientology at: <http://www.xs4all.nl:80/~fonss/>

UK Police and forensic web at: <http://www.innotts.co.uk/~mick2me/ukpolice.html>

LSE at: <http://www.blpes.lse.ac.uk/>

Intelligence Watch Report at: <http://sisko.awpi.com/IntelWeb/index.html>

If you have a good quality machine you may wish to try:

Declassified military satellite photos at: <http://edcwww.cr.usgs.gov/dclass/dcalss.html>

Unfortunately, Robin Ramsay has not allowed me access to back copies of Lobster. Despite this setback, I will supply photocopies of all back issues. The first eight issues were produced in A5 format. These were the naive beginnings of Lobster and some of the material no longer stands up; we have moved on from then. However, there are good articles and a mass of interesting snippets which I had largely forgotten about. Please allow 28 days for delivery.

Issues 1 to 10 cost £1.50 each (UK); £2.00 (USA/Canada/Australasia and Europe)

11 to 28 (except 19, which is double the price) are £2.50 each (UK); £3.00 (US/Canada/Australasia and Europe)

Who's Who is £5.50 (UK); £7.00 (US/Canada/Australasia and Europe)

The prices include postage.

NB outside the UK - please send either International Money Orders, cheques drawn on UK banks (made out to S Dorril) or cash - I will accept US dollars. Foreign cheques will be returned as they cost too much to convert into sterling.



Back Issues

- 1 Kincoragate; Spooks Digest; The Round Table and Quigley; 16 pages, 1982.
- 2 Special on the JFK assassination; Dorril on Maria Novotny; Permindex; Ramsay - An alternative hypothesis; Epstein's Legend. 34 pages, 1983.
- 3 More Kincora; Police and computers; American Friends and the anti-CND groups; clippings digest and reviews. 32 pages, 1984.
- 4 Even more Kincora; Shooting the Pope; The British in Vietnam; more on the anti-CND groups; the CIA and Mountbatten; Intelligence and clippings digest; Bank Havens. 28 pages, 1984.
- 5 Jonathan Marshall on Secret Societies, part 1; Ian MacGregor and Lazards, part 1; The SAS; Intelligence and clippings digest. 36 pages, 1984.
- 6 Secret Societies and MacGregor, part 2; Oswald in Mexico; The Round Table; Reading Italy; Who's Afraid of the KGB? 36 pages, 1984.
- 7 Conversation with Peter Dale Scott; Gregory Korkala's address book; JFK assassination; Intelligence and clippings digest. 36 pages, 1985.
- 8 Conspiracy Theories; Airey Neave assassination; Korkala; Pinay Circle. 40 pages, 1985.
- 9 Who's Who of British Spooks, part 1; KAL 007; Watergate revisited - Jim Hougan's Secret Agenda reviewed; Trying to kill Nasser; Falklands conspiracy theories; Jonathan Bloch on the overseas repression business. 24 pages, 1985.
- 10 Spooks Who's Who, part 2; Kitson, Kincora and counter-insurgency; Anthony Summers and 'Maurice Bishop'; Jim Hougan on Frank Terpil and 'Deep Throat'; statement from Fred Holroyd on Northern Ireland 'dirty tricks' and Colin Wallace. 24 pages, early 1986.
- 11 Wilson, MI5 and the Rise of Thatcher - the start of the 'Wilson plots' story; the first attempt to understand and explain what Colin Wallace was saying. 56 pages, published April 1986 - before Peter Wright came on the scene.
- 12 Peter Dale Scott on Transnational Repression - the major, previously unpublished essay by this American master; Notes on the British Right. 42 pages, 1986.
- 13 The Rhodes-Milner Group (Round Table); Two Sides of Ireland; Colin Wallace's 1974 notes on MI5's plots to smear British politicians; more jottings on the British Right. 24 pages, 1987.
- 14 US involvement in the Fiji coup; Colin Wallace update - and the Ulster Citizens' Army smear decoded; Irangate - the 'October Surprise'; Martin Walker on policing the future. 46 pages, 1987.
- 15 Inside Inside Intelligence - Steve Dorril on Anthony Cavendish; The Independent's smearing of Wallace and Holroyd; Christie Institute on 22.11.63; the Tory Right between the wars - review essay; Fiji coup update; review essay on Geheim. 34 pages 1987.
- 16 Rothschild, the right, the far-right and the Fifth Man; death of Hilda Murrel; French Vendetta - the Rainbow Warrior to the Iranian hostages; KAL 007; Ken Livingstone's questions; Philby names names, overthrowing Gough Whitlam. 40 pages; 1988.
- 17 Five at Eye: Private Eye and the Wilson smears; Colin Wallace and Information Policy in fiction; disinformation and the new 'terrorist threat'; the London CIA station; Crozier, Goldsmith and the Pinay Circle; more anti-Labour forgeries; the death of Zia. 24 pages, 1988.
- 18 Jeffrey Bale's Right-wing Terrorists and the Extra-parliamentary Left in Post-World War 2 Europe: Collusion or manipulation; covert propaganda and the Right - more on the Pinay Circle; a short history of the SAS in Northern Ireland; Inside BOSS and after - Gordon Winter. 36 pages, 1989.
- 19 The final testimony of George Kennedy Young; Common Cause; the CIA and the British trades unions, supplement to spooks' Who's Who; Hugh Thomas on Fred Holroyd; Jeffrey Bale on Shooting the Pope; Disinformation; ELF; obituaries of Michael Stewart, Stanley Mayne, Greville Wynne; conspiracy theories reconsidered. 42 pages, 1990.
- 20 Peter Dale Scott's The United States and the overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-67, Clay Shaw's United Kingdom contact analysed; Scott Newton's The Economic background to appeasement and the search for Anglo-German detente before and during World War 2; Hugh Thomas' response to the Timewatch hatchet job on Hess; Calcutt's judgement on Colin Wallace. 36 pages, 1990.
- 21 Jeffrey Bale's Heavenly Deceptions: the Moonies, WACL and the Korean CIA; Colin Wallace on Chapman Pincher's version of Wallace; Western Goals (UK). 28 pages, 1991.
- 22 The Fall of Willi Brandt; MI5 and the British Fascists before WW2; A Who's Who of Appeasement; more British spooks spotted; ELF update. 24 pages 1991.
- 23 Mind control and the American government; US Army Intelligence LSD testing; Stalker reconsidered; British fascism 1974-83, part 1; bit and pieces on JFK and JFK; Timothy Good demolished; the British Parliamentary Lobby's rules circa 1969. 36 pages, 1992.
- 24 Larry O'Hara's British Fascism 1974-92, part 2; An Incorrect Political Memoir - Daniel Brandt; Scott Van Wynsberghe on JFK and occult thinking; R Ramsay on 'Our Searchlight problem'; the Gable memo reprinted in full; Garrison reconsidered; mind control update. 32 pages, 1992.
- 25 Moscow Gold; John B Alexander, the Pentagon's Penguin - Armen Victoria; Mike Hughes on Churchill and the Focus group; Larry O'Hara's British Fascism, 1983-86, part 3; Scott Newton on Hess. 28 pages, 1993.
- 26 David Teacher on Brian Crozier and the Pinay Circle; Wilsongate; Mike Hughes on 'Blinker Hall'; Irangate; Spooks. 36 pages, 1993.
- 27 More on the plots against Wilson; election rigging in Nigeria; Julian Putkowski on A2 and political surveillance, part 1; JFK assassination review; Mike Hughes on anti-fascism. 36 pages, 1993.
- 28 Julian Putkowski on A2 and Ireland; Mike Hughes on George Makgill; Spooks - 'Alan Judd' and Stefan Koch; MI6 and radio signals. 32 pages, 1994.
- 29 The British 'Gladio'; A2 and the Labour Movement; Ireland; Spooks; Nick Toczek on Green neo-fascists and Peter Styles on monitoring Green activists. 28 pages, 1995.

Special Issue

A Who's Who of the British Secret State, compiled by Stephen Dorril. 110 pages, 1850 (approx) names and brief biographies. (A number of these were included in Nos 9 and 10.)