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DORRIL

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L**94**OBSTACLE



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- NIGERIA: ELECTION RIGGING
- A2: 'BOLSHEVIKS'
- JFK ASSASSINATION

Journal of Parapolitics

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Editorial

Thanks to all those who responded to issue 26. The many letters I received were supportive, in particular, about the 'return to basics' - parapsychology is definitely a no-no.

There is now a good, solid base of subscribers and, hopefully, by the time this issue is out there should be some national (and international) distribution.

The current issue is delayed because I (twice) went down with a particularly virulent strain of flu. I am in the process of completing a post-war history of MI6, so the next issue will be later than hoped, but is planned to be out in July.

A number of readers of the early *Lobster* have recalled a subscribers' meeting held back in the mid-eighties, and have asked if this might be repeated. In the next issue I will include some details for an informal meeting planned for the end of this year. It might include a couple of speakers on the British end of Gladio, but nothing too formal, more an opportunity to exchange information and views. Any ideas, please get in touch.

CROZIER AND THE PINAY CIRCLE - A LETTER FROM DAVID TEACHER

The lead article in the first issue of Dorril's *Lobster* was a partial reprint of a manuscript of mine which *Lobster* had planned to publish in 1991 as a Special Number devoted entirely to the Pinay Circle. In preparing this Special Number, I had worked with Robin Ramsay, having never had any direct contact with Stephen Dorril before January 1994. Shortly after submitting my manuscript to Ramsay in 1991, I made further discoveries which showed that an account of the Pinay Circle could not be compressed into the limited length of a *Lobster* Special Number. Ramsay then agreed not to publish in the *Lobster* as I wanted to prepare a full-length book on the Pinay Circle. There the matter of publication by *Lobster* rested as far as I and Ramsay were concerned, and I lost touch with *Lobster* whilst continuing to work on the book. I was therefore outraged to see my preliminary and under-researched draft published in Dorril's *Lobster* without my consent, in violation of the legal and ethical responsibilities of the editor. No letter was sent to me c/o Robin Ramsay to ask for my consent which in any case I would not have given: a considerable bulk of additional information gathered over the last three years calls into doubt some of the interpretation included in the 1991 draft. Since 1991, the manuscript has doubled in length and changed focus considerably; a full version which also integrates the mass of information provided by Crozier's memoirs is planned for the book publication in 1995.

APOLOGY - STEPHEN DORRIL

Having promised to publish David Teacher's letter without omission, I feel the need to point out that his memory is slightly at variance with a number of facts.

In April 1991, David sent *Lobster* a manuscript which he wanted the magazine to publish. Robin Ramsay then delivered a bollocking to David for having dressed it up with a cover as a *Lobster* special with a title for himself as *Lobster* European Correspondent, something he was not entitled to do.

Both Robin and I decided not to publish the work as a special issue because it was felt to contain too much material that had already appeared in *Lobster*; this being, mainly, about Crozier and the Institute for the Study of Conflict, the majority of which had been my work. (The article that appeared in *Lobster* 26 was a version of the manuscript, less the already published material.) David and I did, in fact, meet in Hull during 1991. I was later informed that he was working on a book on the Pinay Circle, later still that it had been abandoned.

In the Spring of 1993, I tried to contact David, who was working in Belgium, without success, to let him know that *Lobster* would now be publishing his manuscript. (The route through Robin Ramsay is, of course, non-existent - as I have discovered on other matters.) However, since David had clearly wanted *Lobster* to publish his work I saw no difficulty in going ahead with it.

From what David has now told me, the idea of the book was only revived following the publication of Crozier's which raised the profile of the Pinay Circle. David does not have a publisher, as far as I am aware, but I hope he does get his work published as it is a subject which deserves attention.

Having got this little unpleasantness out of the way, I am happy to accede to David's request that the second part of the article is not published while he pursues his research and I apologise unreservedly for any problems which have arisen for David from the publication of his early manuscript. We are now back in contact and exchanging information and research on the Pinay Circle and other related topics.

All contributions are welcome and should be typed up on A4 paper or, better, supplied on 3.5" floppy disc (MS Dos or Apple Mac, wordprocessed or DTP in Aldus Pagemaker).

Steve Dorril considers Michael Mates/Asil Nadir, private security spooks, the murders of Letelier, Calvi and David Wilson, government buggings, Martin Dillon and John Costello, Bravo Two Zero, and fresh allegations about the 'Brandt plot'.

Michael Mates, a former Military Intelligence officer and security minister in Northern Ireland, knows his way around the intelligence world. Interestingly, he accused MI6 of plotting to bring down the tycoon, Asil Nadir, by de-stabilising Poly Peck in the months leading up to its collapse in 1990 with debts of £1.3 billion. The main reason for the alleged MI6 involvement was that Nadir was a major stumbling block to a political solution in Cyprus (*S Tel*, 20.6.93; *DT*, 2.7.93). The idea had been to weaken Nadir's position and force the Turks back to the talks which had stalled (*SE*, 20.6.93).

There had apparently been a joint Anglo-American operation set up around 1983 which lasted about five months and was set up after the MI6 station in Ankara had allegedly reported that 'senior Turks, including Ministers with access to NATO secrets, were receiving drugs cash'. A Nadir company was among those named as a probable conduit for cash to the politicians. The affair was called off, according to the *Sunday Express*, when Mrs Thatcher became sympathetic to Turkey's entry into the EU.

Mates' concern grew when he learned that an MI6 operative based in Northern Cyprus flew to London in December 1992 and met with Nadir. The MI6 operative had, according to the *Sunday Telegraph*, asked whether Nadir would pursue the Serious Fraud Office and other authorities for damages if the case collapsed. There were rumours that the SFO was considering dropping the charges against him because of lack of evidence.

The MI6 operative appears to have been Lord Erskine of Rerrick who moved to Cyprus - where he had served in the Grenadier Guards before independence in 1991, a year after he was declared bankrupt. Erskine admitted 'peripheral links' with the security services and that he had met with Saddam Hussein shortly before the Iraq invasion of Kuwait (*G*, 23.6.93). After retiring from the Army in 1955 he became a higher executive officer in the MoD. Erskine was once a leading figure in Scottish banking and commerce.

Simon Hoggart in the *Observer* (29.8.93) spotted an interesting passage in the infamous 'Bastardgate' tape on which John Major talks to ITN reporter, Michael Brunson. The Cabinet Secretary, Robin Butler, told the Prime Minister that Mates's resignation was 'an act of gross injustice'. Major added that 'Nobody knew what I knew at the time'. Butler then, rather extraordinarily, made his views known around Whitehall.

What Major appeared to know was revealed in Mates' resignation speech in

the House of Commons on 29 June 1993 when he said that the police had been investigating not only a conspiracy to bribe the judge, Mr Justice Tucker, but also whether the judge himself had been a part of the conspiracy. As Hoggart pointed out, the police took the allegation seriously enough to spend months investigating them, deciding that they were 'neither a hoax nor a prank'. But who planted the evidence on the police? That was partially revealed in November 1993 by two key witnesses to the £3.5 million plot.

Wendy Welsher and British businesswoman and 'conman', Michael Francis, who had acted as a police informer during the eighties (*I*, 17.11.93), alleged that they had been involved in a conspiracy to destroy Nadir and that the plan was 'perfectly legal and had the authority of senior police officers, the Government and MI6' (*G*, 8.11.93). In November, (*G*, 17.11.93) the Crown Prosecution Service officially announced that the police had found no evidence of a conspiracy to bribe the judge, leaving more questions than answers.

A new turn in the story took place when in the new year the *Independent* (24.1.94) revealed that Erskine had been involved in an illegal arms deal to supply Azerbaijan with military backing, including mercenaries and -initially- military trainers, in its war with Armenia. Erskine acted as consultant to a consortium based in Turkish Cyprus operating through a British company, Summit (Consortium) Ltd. Plans of the deal were provided to the Foreign Office by Erskine, through a regular contact.

Sir Peter Imbert, former Metropolitan Police Commissioner, in May 1993 became a consultant to private investigators, Integrated Security Systems, which was set up nine years ago by ex-SAS member John Wick. ISS, formerly known as Integrated Security Services, went bust two years ago but Wicks bought the company back (*IoS*, 23 & 30.5.93).

In April 1993, a Harley Street Doctor, Paul MacLoughlin, won substantial damages against a former colleague for libel. His fellow doctor had allegedly planted a bug in the ceiling of his consulting rooms (*T*, 14.4.93). A fertility specialist, MacLoughlin, who was a former member of the SAS, had a client list which included members of the Brunei royal family. He had served with the SAS in remote jungle regions, according to the *Observer* (22.7.93), and had 'established contacts which served him well'. Money for the fertility clinic had been promised by the government of Borneo. I remember that the doctor had been in the early eighties a director of the

well-known security firm Thor Security Systems and of the Pan-African Export and Import Company, of which I know nothing.

Better late than never. In November 1993, two former Chilean DINA secret police chiefs were convicted in Santiago for the murder in Washington in 1976 of the former foreign minister, Orlando Letelier. However, one DINA agent who escaped justice was Eugenio Berrios, who was believed to have been kidnapped in November 1992 by the Uruguayan Army on the orders of General Pinochet. Berrios was a biochemist who developed chemical weapons in the basement of Michael Townley, the US-born DINA agent who placed the bomb under Letelier's car. Quantities of the odourless gas, Sarin, which Berrios had developed were given to the agents involved in killing Letelier. What is interesting is that the ingredients for the gas were obtained by Townley from a British chemical engineering company, Gallenkamp, which eventually merged into Fisons (G, 11.6.93). Did the British government know? Did MI6? Is anyone asking questions?

Strange goings on. Arms dealer Stephen Schepke, who was found guilty in October 1993 of conspiring to kill businessman David Wilson as part of a multi-million pound international cigarette fraud, told Carlisle Crown Court that he had been in Army intelligence and that Special Branch could vouch for him (I, 8.10.93 and G, 21.10.93). Wilson had been shot in the head in March 1992 by two professional gunmen. Schepke was alleged to have conspired with a man in New York, 'Hector Portillo', after it was discovered that Wilson was co-operating with Fraud Squad officers. In April 1993, *Private Eye* ran a piece on Portillo, aka Noretto/Austin/Gomez, about the apparent reluctance of the British authorities to seek his extradition. In Brussels, in 1987, 'Gomez' had apparently sought to persuade a British Security consultant to carry out three contract killings on behalf of the security services of the Dominican Republic. For some reason, detectives in the Wilson case had spent a long time interviewing former SAS personnel. Portillo was also, according to American documents, linked to Chilean arms dealer Carlos Cardeon. The *Eye* wondered if he was also linked to British Intelligence. Portillo is apparently awaiting extradition to the UK.

Poor old MI5 gets blamed for every thing. Former Roberto Calvi associate, Francesco Pazienza, alleged in a Rome court that the

people who ordered Calvi's death should be sought inside MI5, English freemasonry and a leading Italian merchant bank tied to Banco Ambrosiano, Mediobanca, which had become the 'Italian terminal of certain English freemason interests' (DT, 2.10.93).

Did anyone spot Nigel Lawson's statement during the BBC's documentary series on Mrs Thatcher that while Chancellor, 11 Downing Street was 'spied' on by Mrs Thatcher, who was concerned about his handling of the economy. The *Independent* said that there had been rumours that the Chancellor's residence 'may have been bugged by No 10 during the most turbulent period in the mid-eighties, when Lady Thatcher was resisting his pressure to join the European Exchange Rate Mechanism' (20.10.93). The allegation followed those of former defence minister Alan Clark that the Cabinet Secretary had a file of details of his private life and that his telephones had been bugged; an allegation which the government were naturally quick to refute (DT, 10.5.93 and T, 24.5.93).

Has anyone noticed the quite extraordinary turn around in the views of Martin Dillon. It recalls Peter Taylor's about turn on Stalker. In his book on security and intelligence operations in Northern Ireland, *The Dirty War* (1988) Dillon bent over backwards to stay sympathetic to the security forces, dismissing as conspiracy nonsense any claims of their complicity in assassinations in the province. Despite not bothering to interview him, Dillon went out of his way to attack the credibility of Fred Holroyd. In *Stone Cold* (1992), which I happened to read over the Christmas period, Dillon makes the case that undercover units have been involved in assassinations. He then goes on to write: 'Too many journalists have ignored the nature of undercover wars, and have acquiesced with official accounts of shootings'. Quite!

It wasn't the best of books but it was curious how John Costello's *Deadly Illusions* failed to be reviewed by the major papers. Any old crap on the Ring of Five gets full-page treatment, but when something genuinely new appears, little or nothing of it is printed. One of the few reviews by the reactionary Donald Cameron Watt in the *Independent* (19.7.93) seemed to believe that it was all a KGB disinformation effort. Since the book was based on KGB documents, it was not to be trusted on any account. Does Cameron Watt show the same scepticism with regard to British files?

I wonder what he makes of Andy McNab's (a pseudonym) *Bravo Two Zero* (Bantam, 1993) an account of an SAS patrol during the Gulf War? This is an odd choice for the year's best-selling non-fiction book since it describes an operation which turned out to be a complete disaster. But is it reliable? McNab claims that the unit, three of whom were killed and four captured by the Iraqis, inflicted 250 casualties on the Iraqis, in what was officially only an observation mission. Mark Urban was rightly sceptical in his review (I, 11.11.93) but the *Telegraph* (8.10.93) in a long article treated it as another example of the indomitable Dunkirk spirit and the heroic nature of the SAS.

One result of the fall of the Berlin Wall has been a string of revelations concerning the downfall of Willy Brandt in 1973. During the espionage trial of Marcus Wolf, the former East German spymaster claimed that West German intelligence knew about the mole close to Brandt well before he was exposed. In Wolf's view that meant that there must have been a conspiracy to damage Brandt by letting secrets leak out. This would back up claims, explored in *Lobster 22*, that James Angleton (CIA) and Peter Wright (MI5) were involved in such a plot. The 'mole', Gunter Guillaume, also backs this scenario. He told the court that 'I was only the stick with which certain circles wanted to drive the Social Democrat chancellor from office'.

Klaus Kinkel, one-time head of the BND, and right-hand man of Hans Dietrich-Genscher, then West Germany's interior minister, vigorously denied such claims. However, he did concede that after he had been informed by the former counter-intelligence chief, Gunter Nollau of the suspicions in May 1973, he kept the memo in his personal safe for a year. Nollau blamed Kinkel in his memoirs for the Guillaume debacle.

Fresh allegations came in January 1994 when Brandt's widow claimed that there had been a second East German spy in the chancellery. Ms Seebacher-Brandt, who belongs to the nationalist wing of the SPD, appeared to want to damage the SPD leadership by linking her husband's fall to colleagues who had connived with East Germany. A 43-page dossier on the affair compiled by Brandt, was set to be released for publication. Just as with Wilson, the Brandt affair just rumbles on and on. (Information from articles by Anna Tomforde, *Guardian* correspondent in Bonn.)



Nigeria: Election Rigging and Dirty Tricks

*The case of Harold Smith was looked at briefly in **Lobster 25** (not my doing) and not, I might add, in a very satisfactory manner and against the wishes of Harold Smith, who is in ill-health. Unfortunately, Robin Ramsay failed to print out the IBM discs which contain Harold's writings and relied instead on a number of newspaper cuttings. I have, therefore, edited down some of Harold's writings and parts of his unpublished memoir **Sons of Oxford**. An introduction and certain explanatory notes have been made by me.*

Harold Smith is a member of that select band of patriotic British citizens who, having blown the whistle on wrong-doing and corruption, have found to their dismay that their adherence to duty brought not a slap on the back but a slap in the face. Smith discovered a plot to rig the elections in colonial Nigeria but no one in authority wanted to hear the truth. Instead, when not met with indifference by politicians and the press, he was initially subjected to persecution, threats of blackmail, and later had his telephone tapped and his home searched. Harold Smith believes that he may even have been poisoned.

Stephen Dorril

Harold Smith's allegations of vote rigging in Nigeria in the late-fifties are not just an historical curiosity. Following the suspension of Nigeria's presidential elections in June 1993, which plunged the country into political turmoil, they have a particular resonance. The case to stop the polls after allegations of vote-rigging was brought by a shadowy group of wealthy businessmen and former politicians who wanted the military to continue to rule the country. The prime motive was to stop a president being elected, for the first time, from the Southern region of the country. Senior Army officers of the sixth military regime to rule Nigeria since Independence in 1960, were concerned that Moshood Abiola would expose the true extent of corruption the country, as well as pursuing allegations of assassinations of journalists and opponents of the military regime. The corruption, principally from the illegal sale of oil, has turned a once prosperous country into an area of unmitigated economic disaster. Nigeria is now the seventeenth poorest nation in the world.

The military's call for fresh elections in August 1993 was a sign that the powerful Northern elite in the country will not relinquish power to the Yoruba-dominated South-west. Chief Ojukwu, who led Biafra's Igbo people away from the rest of Nigeria in May 1967, warned that the issue is power and that prominent Western Nigerians were talking about secession leading to the break-up of the country. Harold Smith would argue that many of these present day problems can be traced back to the events and decisions made in the mid to late fifties to which he was witness.

After the Second World War, Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa and the most important colony that Britain possessed, was caught up, according to Martin Meredith (his book *The First Dance of Freedom: Black Africa in the Post-War Era*, Hamish Hamilton, 1984, provides the basis of the introduction), in a web of disaffection and tribal rivalry. There was a wave of disaffection over low wages, rising prices, while unemployment, inflated by returning ex-servicemen, swept the towns, resulting in a general strike in 1945. The educated elite were also resentful over discrimination and about proposals for constitutional advancement which the British authorities put forward without consultation.

In 1944, the versatile nationalist leader, Nnamdi Azikiwe, described by the authorities as the 'biggest danger of the lot' to colonial rule, formed the first modern political organisation, the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons, with the object of seeking self-government. Initially, the NCNC achieved some success by championing the rights of workers and attracting the youthful support but within a few years the Nigerian nationalists had fallen into disarray and rival factions.

Nigeria's's great size added to the problems of the nationalists. In the North, powerful Muslim

emirs still ruled in accordance with Islamic law. In these feudal societies few traces of modern life had been allowed to intrude. The British went some way to supporting this way of life, treating the North as a distinct and separate entity preserving many of its traditional ways. In all, the North comprised two-thirds of Nigeria's territory and contained more than half of its population, many of whom looked disdainfully upon the Southern peoples.

The South was divided into two regions each with their own dominant tribal group. In the West, the Yoruba had absorbed many western ideas and skills, while the poorer Igbo in the East had migrated to the other regions. There they found jobs in the administrative classes which caused some tension and created a degree of hostility among the Northerners.

Nigerian politicians were well aware of these divisions. Northern leader Abubakar Tafawa Balewa said in 1948: 'Since 1914 the British government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs and customs, and do not show themselves any signs of willingness to unite . . . Nigerian unity is only a British invention.'

The Yoruba leader, Obafemi Awolowo, who dominated Western region politics, wrote: 'Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no "Nigerians" in the same sense as there are "English". The word "Nigerian" is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria and those who do not.'

Finding a constitutional arrangement which would satisfy so many diverse interests was bound to prove difficult. In 1948, the British announced that a new constitution would be forthcoming in full consultation with the Nigerians. This inevitably led to a power struggle between the rival groups which sharpened all past animosities. Each region had its own ruling political party: Azikiwe's NCNC controlled the East; Awolowo's Action Party led the West and the Northern People's Congress led by the Saduna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello, dominated the North.

The 1951 constitution, which gave considerable powers to the regions but kept a strong central legislator, lasted only a few years. In 1953, when Southerners pressed the federal assembly for a resolution demanding self-government by 1956, Northern members held back fearing that the North would be swamped by the better educated and more sophisticated Southerners. In the crisis that followed, the British authorities realised the need for a different constitution. The 1954 arrangement gave the three regions much greater power. Each had its own assembly and the East and the West were able to move separately to self-government, while the North was given more time to prepare. The bitter contest that divided them proved to be, however, an ill-omen for the future.

In 1955 Harold Smith was interviewed for a civil service post in Nigeria by Mr Barltrop, the Labour Advisor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who advised him that he would have heavy responsibilities thrust upon him in Nigeria. Labour Officers were 'very thin on the ground.'

Barltrop's Deputy, Edgar Parry, a former trade union official who had served in West Africa filled him in on the real picture in Lagos. 'The Labour Department in Nigeria is a shambles. Peter Cook, the Deputy Commissioner, who's been passed over yet again, really runs everything and he's a total disaster, a homo, a pervert. His speech is almost impossible to decipher and his handwriting is totally illegible. He does have some skills in settling strikes, perhaps because the workers will sign anything to get away from him. Now he will hate your guts and as soon as you arrive he'll try to post you up shit creek.'

Parry, however, had anticipated that move and, by what means is not known, ensured that it would be impossible for Cook to move Harold out of Lagos.

Parry continued, 'Into this Augean stable goes bright, ambitious George Foggon, the new Commissioner, the new broom. He's come from the Control Commission in Berlin but really he's just a jumped-up labour exchange clerk. He knows bugger all about industrial relations so we're sending him a researcher from the TUC whom Cook will tie up in knots. You see, George's problem is that he can give orders but nobody will take any notice because Cook is really in charge.'

Having painted a black picture of his new bosses, Parry said that he wanted Harold to 'keep me informed on what George is up to'. He was also to draft a new Factories Act for Nigeria.

Once out in Lagos, Harold found that Cook did indeed control the Labour Department's administration, including promotions, postings, sackings and bicycle allowances. He made the African employees' lives a misery whenever he chose.

In the early fifties, colonial administrations had been forced with some reluctance to set up Labour Departments under pressure from progressive Colonial Secretaries in London. Peter Cook's policy of doing nothing would have found favour with Governor Generals in the past. 'Notwithstanding the Administration's long-standing distaste for progressive measures, the blimps did find that the Labour Department had its uses', Harold recalled.

'Most important was the Intelligence aspect. Intelligence is the life blood of any colonial regime. Trouble must be nipped in the bud and trouble makers controlled. The apparatus of conciliation and even the encouragement of trade unions made sure that most kinds of dissent or rebellion were channelled into the offices of the Labour Department whence they were immediately notified to the Administration's Special Branch officers. The Commissioner of Labour in each colony sat on the main Intelligence Committee with representatives of the Police, Military and Administration. The industrial relations section of the Labour Department in Lagos maintained daily contact with Special Branch headquarters. In the cold war atmosphere of the 1950's which the British had spread throughout their African possessions, the bogey of international communism was suspected of lurking behind every clerk or railway worker who sought to live on more than two or three shillings (ten or fifteen pence) per day.'

Despite Cook's apparent inactivity and failure to clear the mountain of paperwork, 'he did keep a close eye on industrial disputes and could act decisively to damp them down when he chose'.

Harold was not finding it a happy experience working in the Labour Department. 'I felt sick with the whole situation. What had I let myself in for? It was not that Peter Cook was a homosexual. That need not have been anyone's concern, but his own and his friends. I was going to be responsible for the running of the juvenile bureau and the proper and fair handing out of jobs and Peter Cook would be - and I was to find he was indeed - seducing and raping the boys in my charge. Edgar Parry, in London, knew this. Foggon, the Commissioner, knew this. Apparently everybody in Lagos knew. How could it be allowed?'

Cook, known as 'Satan' to Africans or the 'Big White Queen' to his chums, controlled recruitment to the Civil Service and any ambitious young African who wanted to get ahead had to meet Cook's requirements. One of Satan's neighbour's children wandered into a party given by Cook for his friends in the administration. 'She observed what was described as the black and white necklace dance. A circle was formed of naked white men and black boys. Each participant, while dancing in a circle, penetrated the black boy in front, and so on... The child ran screaming to tell her parents.'

Harold Smith did manage to draft a new Factories Act which was presented to Foggon, who was stunned that anyone had managed to achieve such a feat. The Act

immediately went on to the Nigerian Statute Book and was passed without amendment, being generally regarded as the best presented bill to go to the Attorney General's chambers. 'It was met with tremendous approval from all sides.'

Harold had also become concerned about the general level of corruption. He was always being offered bribes and favours, which he turned down, and when a new Labour Officer, Victor Beck, a former TUC researcher, joined the staff, Harold hoped to enlist him in the battle to clean up the Labour Department.

Gradually, Harold began to hear of corruption within the Department and the way Cook used such information to blackmail other officials or to keep them in their place. Cook had even reclassified some files which Harold had and placed them in his personal files. Cook was, himself, taking bribes from the Spanish authorities. Some twenty thousand Nigerian workers were on Fernando Poo and their conditions were often appalling, despite the presence of a British Vice-Consul. 'Little or nothing was done to check the most awful atrocities. There were reports on the files of workers being tied to trees and beaten to death.' Cook, who ensured that this information was suppressed, observed to Smith: 'They deserve all they get.'

When Harold saw Cook 'he went on to talk about Fernando Poo and the Spanish who gave Sir John Macpherson (who, following retirement, became Permanent Secretary in the Colonial Office) an incredibly valuable string of diamonds and a necklace for his wife.' The necklace, however, was not handed over to the government. Cook recalled that 'Once she saw that necklace, that was it. She'd probably never had better than Woolworth's till she saw that diamond necklace! I know Sir John kept the diamonds and he knows that I know. You see they can't touch me. I know too much.'

As Harold Smith became more involved in the work of the Department and became responsible for more areas of work, friction increased with Cook. His boss used to taunt him that all the work he was doing to revise and update labour codes would come to nothing.

It was not only the British officials on whom Cook had something. Festus Samuel Okotie Eboh became the Minister of Labour and later Minister of Finance and was to play a crucial role in the later very tragic history of Nigeria. The British Authorities played

a decisive part in the selection of politicians for ministerial posts.

The essence of colonial rule is that politics is banned for the people of the country while the colonial regime engages in full time politics. The notion that colonial administration functions without politics would be laughable to those administrators or political officers engaged in the trade. The politics of the colonial regime are employed in the selection, destruction and manipulation of the leaders of the native people. Although the idea of indirect rule has become closely identified with Nigeria, it is not a new idea as every conquering power exercises its authority using existing power structures in the community. To this end in Nigeria a highly efficient intelligence service operated both through the administration which routinely completed intelligence reports and through the army, police and Special Branch. The Labour Department also played a key role. The major aim of all this is to encourage friends of the colonial regime, people who are "sound", that is prepared to betray their own people's interests for personal advancement, and to put down irresponsible elements, that is to say nationalist politicians who act in their people's interests and cannot be bribed.'

'A major proportion of the politicians who made Nigeria notorious for corruption after Independence were selected by the British before Independence. The politicians and leaders and men of eminence not chosen were often honest, trustworthy and responsible people. Why were these people not brought in by the British? The answer is that the British needed people they could control. They sometimes selected crooks whom they knew they could control after Independence. Balewa, the leader from the north, was of course the exception, as was Awolowo. Balewa was so pro-British that he hardly needed manipulating. He was sound because he took advice from his band of British advisors. Awolowo in the West was not sound because he was extremely intelligent, wrote first class books and taunted the British for their stupidity. At the same time he betrayed a love of democracy and touching faith in British fair play that was to lead to his downfall. And yet his integrity, which led to his being jailed in 1962, also saved his life when the first coup took place in 1966. The mercurial leader of the East, Dr Azikiwe (Zik), was an enigma. A charismatic and the first Nigerian nationalist leader of note. He was seen as an egotistical, temperamental and flawed character by his political enemies, but revered by his Igbo followers. Zik was not feared by the British. His often unpredictable behaviour in the 1950's may have been more in response to pressure from without than his

own faults of temperament. If a nationalist politician had skeletons in his personal or political cupboard the British knew about them. At the same time the preponderance of Igbo members of the lower and middle ranks of the civil service meant that, apart from the highest levels, an Igbo politician who did not know most Government secrets simply was not listening.'

Harold Smith was born in Manchester in 1927, one of seven children. He left school at fourteen to become an engineering apprentice and through hard work at evening classes won a WEA scholarship to Oxford University. He graduated from Magdalen College with an Honours Degree in Politics and Economics, and a Diploma in Public Administration.

A Labour Party activist, he became a civil servant in the Colonial Service in 1955 working in the Nigerian Ministry of Labour's Lagos headquarters. He left the service in 1960, after a mysterious wasting disease failed to respond to treatment. In 1972, doctors diagnosed his illness as tropical sprue which only responded to treatment slowly. He subsequently undertook unpaid work for unmarried pregnant teenagers and acting as secretary for the Coelic Action Group. His wife, Caroline, a teacher and later HM Schools Inspector, supported the family through thirty difficult years.

The interlocking blackmail that Peter Cook exemplified in the civil service was paralleled in the control of politicians by the colonial regime. One of Harold's expatriate neighbours was a Post Office engineer who specialised in tapping Nigerian politicians' telephone lines. Surveillance of politicians by other Nigerians employed in Special Branch was also routine, as was interception of the mail to prevent subversive literature coming into Nigeria, much of which was burned in the stove at the Post Office.

'Ronald Wraith, in a fascinating study of corruption in Nigeria, fails to mention the involvement of the British at all. (Although he does demonstrate that corruption was rife in Britain up to the middle of the nineteenth century.) It does seem a little unfair. After all, although corruption undoubtedly got worse after the British left, it was clearly much in evidence while the British were in charge. The British not only tolerated and indulged corruption. They actively took part at the highest possible levels and instigated it and encouraged it in Nigerian politicians, the

better to control or blackmail them. The most corrupt act of all is colonialism itself.'

'By 1955 the problem was how to hand the country back to the Nigerians. A coalition of politicians from the major tribes in each Region filled the ministerial posts. At this juncture there was no Prime Minister and the Governor General presided. Large ministerial palaces were provided for each Minister and Mercedes Benz limousines became normal transport for top politicians. Standards of luxury were dictated by the British colonial regime far in excess of the living standards of most British politicians, let alone Nigerian ones, most of whom had risen from the most humble backgrounds.'

The rumours which circulated about Festus Samuel Okotie Eboh were well founded as those in contact with him knew. The Nigerian public wanted to know why he was allowed to get away with it. Why had the Governor General chosen such corrupt politicians? Why did the civil servants not refuse to co-operate with corrupt Ministers? It was evident that the Ministers could not colonial regime still had overall power and was fully informed as to what was going on. It was clearly official policy to let the Ministers be corrupt. In the Department of Labour George Foggon saw it as his job to carry out the Minister's orders, whatever his personal qualms.'

'Not only did the Ministers betray ignorance of the proper role of Ministers in a parliamentary democracy, but the top civil servants seemed to be ignorant too. In the Ministry (formerly Department) of Labour Okotie Eboh acted as if he could do what he liked unless he was stopped. Given top civil servants who lacked training in constitutional and parliamentary practice and substituted a simplistic notion that they merely had to carry out a Minister's orders and the scene was set for corruption and larceny on a grand scale. Although I was supposed to be in charge of trade testing matters, it was kept from me that Okotie Eboh had sold the trade testing headquarters in Lagos to a large trading company [United Africa Company]. This was not the whole story. The deal was arranged by the Commissioner of Labour. The trade testing headquarters were on a prime site opposite the main Lagos railway station. Having pocketed the proceeds the Minister then had built a makeshift edifice as a replacement in the bush outside Lagos. It was evident that Government House was fully informed as to what was going on. However, Okotie Eboh was one of the politicians most favoured by the British.'

'Okotie Eboh was a fat, jovial character of much the same build and disposition as the seventeen stone Governor General, Sir

James Robertson. The Minister had until recently been Sam Edah, but had changed his name to that of a family who were powerful in his constituency. Those who disliked the Minister referred to him as "Festering Sam".

'Presumably the Governor General had political reasons for not throwing the rule book at Okotie Eboh. When the Governor General wanted to get rid of Adelabu, an extraordinary politician who, had he lived, might have been Nigeria's most dynamic leader, he promptly sacked him, presumably because he was seen as dangerous by the British. A rival to Dr Azikiwe, he not only frightened the Igbo leader but frightened the British more. Okotie Eboh was into interlocking blackmail too. The trade testers were corrupt and were hardly in a position to protest when their office was sold over their heads. George Foggon's justification for putting through the deal was that he was obeying orders, although he knew he was doing wrong. But the Minister knew George tolerated the corrupt trade testers. George was on thin ice too. Peter Cook could not protest even if he had wanted to. The Minister knew the Department and the follies and weaknesses of its officials intimately. If its top officials could get up to tricks, so could he.'

In London, Okotie Eboh was granted VIP status and entertained by the Foreign Office hospitality section, which laid on a constant supply of prostitutes. His trips abroad, ostensibly to attract capital investment for Nigeria, became a notorious round of Foreign Office hospitality and prostitutes.

'The three Regions of Nigeria already had a measure of independence and were in effect federal states. The 1956 elections would be the final regional elections before Independence and the major political parties were preparing massive campaigns. The Minister of Labour, whose constituency in the mid-west returned a member to the Western parliament, was campaigning heavily for his party's candidate. Okotie Eboh was a major figure in the N.C.N.C., Zik's party, because he was also Party Treasurer.'

In Foggon's absence, Francis Nwokedi was running the Labour Department with Peter Cook, while Harold, a 'mere' Labour Officer, was charged by the Commissioner to 'keep an eye on things.' At this juncture the order arrived which was to change Harold's life. It had come through the chain of command headed by the Governor General and was addressed to Harold personally. The order directed Harold to arrange for all Nigerian staff of the Department and all departmental vehicles to proceed to the Minister's constituency for the duration of

the election campaign to work under the Minister's orders and to get his candidate elected. This was a covert operation and a cover story was needed. Harold was to devise a survey of migrant labour covering the Minister's constituency.

Harold's reply was brief. 'No,' he wrote on the minute sheet. 'This would be a criminal act.' He was immediately ordered to leave the head office of the Department and take over the Lagos office at Alakoro.

'I was preparing my resignation from the Colonial Service when Vic Beck came to see me. He had brought an apology from Francis Nwokedi. It had all been a dreadful mistake. I was flattered by Francis's message. I liked him very much. I went along with what he wanted and agreed to return to the central office and my desk. It was the wrong move really. I should have resigned. Strangely perhaps I thought George Foggon would approve of my action. I had played it by the book!'

Nwokedi was only acting on the Governor General's orders to prevent him resigning and creating a fuss. Harold's masters were much more clever than he was in foreseeing his moves and forestalling them. While still awaiting Foggon's return from leave, Harold was approached by Vic Beck again. Apparently, when Harold had refused to get involved in the covert election plan, the orders had passed to Major Charles Bunker, a Senior Labour Officer. It was unclear whether he had carried them out.

Bunker had been ordered to put severe pressure on British and foreign firms, such as Shell and BP, to make donations to the N.C.N.C.'s election funds (the Party happened to be bankrupt at the time). 'Threats of official harassment by the Labour Department's Inspectors were to be made against firms who refused to pay up. In addition fleets of cars with loud-speakers were to be obtained either free or at greatly reduced prices and free or cheap petrol to run them.'

Vic Beck and Charles Bunker went to see Harold to discuss what could be done. "You're not going to carry out these orders, Charles, surely?" Harold asked. But it was already too late. Charles replied, "I've done it."

'The British Government was taking credit for its liberal policies in moving towards Independence and the honest and fair handover of power to the new democratically elected leaders of Nigeria. Yet here was chicanery and cynical interference in the electoral process beyond belief. The thrust of the British Government's policy was against the Action Group led by Chief Awolowo which

ruled in the Western Region. Not only was the British Government working hand in glove with the North which was a puppet state favoured and controlled by the British administration, but it was colluding through Okotie Eboh with Dr Azikiwe - Zik - the leader of the largely Igbo N.C.N.C. which ruled in the East. The actual orders which were clearly a criminal breach of Nigeria's own electoral laws, as well as being a gross betrayal of trust by the British who were supposed to embody the notion of even handedness, fair play and honesty, had come through Francis Nwokedi, the acting head of the Labour Department, and Peter Cook, the Deputy Commissioner, both close friends of Dr Azikiwe. And Okotie Eboh, the Minister of Labour, was Dr Azikiwe's Party Treasurer.'

'The British loved the largely illiterate and backward North and had arranged for fifty percent of the votes to be controlled by the Northern party, the N.P.C., which was largely a creation of the British and hardly a normal political party in the accepted sense. It was funded by the British controlled Native Authorities and was quite simply a tool of the British administration (it was also supposed to receive funds from the multi-nationals, channelled through British officials). Because of this, Independence was to some extent a sham because the results were a foregone conclusion. The North and the British would continue to rule. However, it was still possible that the two advanced and educated Southern parties would unite against the North, so it was necessary to keep them apart. Divide and rule, the old British device for creating conflict, was employed in its most brazen and cynical form to keep the Igbos and Yorubas from working together in Nigeria. British policy was to encourage tribal rule in the East and West by discouraging the creation of new states which would have broken up these two power groups. Of particular importance was the need for the N.P.C. in the North to go unchallenged. And it was made quite clear to the leaders in the South that the British would not tolerate more than token electioneering against the British-favoured N.P.C. in the North. There may well have been tacit agreements between the British and the leaders of the West and East. There was certainly anger from the British when the Action Group in the West was seen to be planning a major election campaign in the North.'

'What was obvious from the orders coming out of Government House in 1956 was that Zik was working with the British and the N.P.C. in the North against the Action Group in the West. The Northerners disliked all the Southerners, East or West, as being too clever by half, a view shared by the British administration. In many

respects in the North it was difficult to detect where the British administration ended and Northern rule began. The sickening sycophancy of the Northern leaders towards the British and the equally nauseating and patronising contempt (disguised as admiration) displayed by the British to Northern leaders, horrified educated Nigerians. But Southern politicians were needed to work with the North so as to ensure total domination by the North. Festus Okotie Eboh was the ideal candidate to become the lynchpin of this pact between the North and Zik's N.C.N.C. which ruled in the East. Okotie Eboh was from the mid-West, so was not too close to the Igbo in the East, although he was Party Treasurer of the Eastern Party. Although from the mid-West, he was not a Yoruba but an Itsikeri, so he could be relied on to be hostile to the Yoruba-dominant Action Group in the West. As Party Treasurer, he held a powerful position so long as he could raise funds for the N.C.N.C. But the N.C.N.C. was bankrupt. To strengthen Okotie Eboh's position, it was essential that he should be able to raise funds. The British then set about helping their stooge to do this. Okotie Eboh had to sell a policy of collaboration with the North to the N.C.N.C. and to Dr Azikiwe in particular. The Minister of Labour was a cynical party hack intent on becoming rich very quickly. Already in the late 1950's he was a byword for corruption. Okotie Eboh was not a nationalist and in no sense an idealist. He was a large, fat, cheerful crook and he was much loved by George Foggon and the Governor General, perhaps because he conformed to a stereotype which confirmed their low opinion of Africans in general.'

'Zik had a reputation for devious behaviour which was well deserved, but he had learned from masters of deceit. The British used every possible stratagem to defeat Zik and there was no intelligence technique that was not employed against him. His telephone was tapped; his mail opened, or even destroyed, routinely. Plots and dirty tricks were used; conspiracies and sabotage encouraged. That Zik survived this barrage of assaults by a determined enemy is a tribute to the skill of the old fox. Sadly, he did not survive unscathed. By 1956 Zik was caged. Suddenly he was a damp squib on the political scene. His trips to Northern leaders were not those of a major politician seeking alliances but a defeated, burnt-out leader begging for scraps.'

A warning shot had been fired by the Governor General over Dr Azikiwe's bows, with an investigation - based on secret police reports - of his African Continental Bank and the Eastern Region Finance Corporation which had been financing the N.C.N.C. 'Very serious malpractice was

revealed as also was the fact that Zik's business affairs were in a mess and he was practically bankrupt. There was no question of Zik financing his party's election campaign. The charges were allowed to lie on the table, and although Zik could very easily have been dismissed from public office, as Adelabu was in very similar circumstances, no action was taken by the British which would perhaps have put Dr Azikiwe behind bars, a fate he had always shown considerable ingenuity in avoiding, unlike other nationalist leaders. The Bank enquiry not only served as a warning to Zik, it made it impossible for the Eastern Regional Government, which was under the spotlight, to divert funds to finance its party, the N.C.N.C. That the North and the West used public funds to finance their parties was no secret to anybody in the British administration.'

Quite how much money was used is not known, but it is a fact that the N.C.N.C. spent £1,200,000, though it only had an income between January 1957 and July 1960 of £500,000. Harold Smith estimates that at least £1m came from British companies in the years leading up to Independence.

'The result of all this was to make Okotie Eboh a key figure and, after Zik, the most powerful leader in the N.C.N.C. It also meant that Okotie Eboh was able to influence both N.C.N.C. and Zik's policies away from confrontation with the British and the Northerners and in favour of collaboration and a cynical display of horse dealing which would make the 1959 Federal election a mockery, because the outcome - Northern domination of Nigeria after Independence - was assured before a single vote was cast in that election.'

'The group of Ministers which gathered round Okotie Eboh was known as the 'Ikoyi clique' because they lived in the largely European suburb of Ikoyi. A close ally of Okotie Eboh was T.O.S. Benson, the Minister of Information. His offices were next to the Labour Department on the Ikoyi Road.'

'The roar of anger from Government House at our audacity in questioning His Excellency's orders at least made it quite clear that the orders were official and not some freakish forgery.' At this Beck and Bunker put their heads together and decided to pin the blame on Harold Smith. 'I had persuaded them into this foolish action against their will. After all Bunker had carried out his orders! And Beck made it quite clear he would be perfectly happy to do anything he was told. To make sure he really was pliable, Beck was posted to

the North where he happily applied himself to hush-hush political duties.'

Harold Smith had, in the past, volunteered to help in elections in Lagos; he had also volunteered for everything else which came his way. However, he wanted nothing to do with the 1956 election in the West and made his views known. Foggon retaliated immediately by informing him that he had volunteered to take part. Smith told Foggon that he was misinformed. The next he heard of this was a remarkable letter from Sir Ralph Grey, the Chief Secretary, informing him that he had been recommended for immediate dismissal by the Commissioner of Labour for wilfully refusing to obey orders to volunteer to help in the elections. The world around him was in a state of chaos. 'The seventeen stone Governor General of the most populous British colony in Africa, in his white uniform and plumed hat, while posing as a liberal to visiting V.I.P.'s, was secretly rigging elections and destroying the very foundations of democracy in the new state which outwardly would be the fifth largest democracy in the world. Sir James Robertson, not content with that, was urging his newly elected Ministers to loot and pillage the State and make Nigeria's first great nationalist political party, the N.C.N.C. almost totally dependent for funds on levies and bribes from British and other multinational firms which already had a powerful grip on Nigeria's economy.'

By the mid-1950's, when Harold Smith's wife became the Personal Secretary to the General Manager of BP (West Africa), Shell BP and Exploration were becoming aware that Nigeria possessed vast oil supplies. The Foreign Office knew what had to be done and it was done quickly and efficiently. 'Our oil' had to be placed in 'safe hands' at Independence.

George Foggon then attempted to have Harold kicked out of the Colonial Service on a trumped up charge, which Sir Ralph Grey scornfully rejected. Harold continued to work flat out on his several combined schedules of work to the last day of his two-year tour in Lagos and his return to London.

Harold had gone to Nigeria on a contract which was renewable. 'However, I had made it clear that I was not returning. It was not my intention to have any further contact with the Colonial Office.' Edgar Parry had made it abundantly clear that he was fully informed on events in Lagos when Harold was first appointed. The election rigging could not have been carried out without the approval of Whitehall. 'However, it was my very success in finding a new job which put me in touch. Learning

I had returned to the U.K., a friend working with a market research firm asked if I would like to work with them.'

The firm had taken on an assignment for the U.S. Government. The State Department wanted to know the reactions of leading British political figures to U.S. foreign policy. 'This seemed an extremely interesting proposition. Considerations were in my mind. Was the proposed employment strictly above board politically, or was it some kind of semi-intelligence, C.I.A. operation?'

Barltrop was shaken. "How could you possibly wish to work for a foreign power?" he asked Smith. Barltrop made the Americans sound like the enemy. Was this a reaction to Suez? He insisted Harold must return to Lagos. 'I had a brilliant career and rapid promotion to look forward to. I would be throwing away the brilliant start I had made. I chose my words carefully. "Mr Barltrop, the Labour Department was and still is a shambles. It is also corrupt. The Colonial Government is busy rigging the so-called democratic elections to decide who is going to take over at Independence."'

Harold Smith turned down the State Department job and also declined an offer to work for the T.U.C. 'I could pick and choose from many offers. There was an interesting job going at Esso as Personnel Officer. It was a well paid job and I liked the people who interviewed me. The job was mine if I wanted it.' Soon after, however, Esso received a secret letter from Whitehall saying that their new Personnel Officer was totally unsuitable for any kind of responsible employment in a senior capacity. He was disruptive, unco-operative and disloyal.

'Somebody is trying to destroy you,' Smith was told by a friend at Esso. 'Esso will not want to upset Whitehall, however unjustified this is.' Harold telephoned Barltrop at the Colonial Office. 'Mr. Barltrop was dead. He had had a heart attack. Had I caused this by forcing him to lift the lid on the atrocities in Lagos? A Mr Foggon had recently taken over as Labour Advisor to the Secretary of State.'

Foggon's first act had been to try to get Smith sacked but he had been overruled. He then supplied Esso with a terrible reference on Smith. 'The bastard wants you dead. You must have a lot on him', his friend at Esso told Smith. Foggon was rewarded by Whitehall with a C.M.G.

'With the assistance of these Whitehall officials who had been astounded at my story of cynical election rigging, I returned to Nigeria for the second time in 1958. My

story had been checked out and found to be true by these officials. All they could do, however, was to return me to active service, and this they did. At the same time, I knew they were removing a source of considerable political embarrassment for the Government. From Whitehall's point of view, the Governor General had brought this clandestine operation close to disaster.'

'Lagos was changing. Young American college boys were driving and cycling around Lagos and they did not all belong to the C.I.A. Journalists and writers, anthropologists and sociologists, were wandering around the back alleys. Carol took up her old job at British Petroleum and we could pay our bills. Okotie Eboh's name had become synonymous with corruption in Lagos. During our stay in London, Carol had called on a friend in the City who specialised in unusual deals. Carol had worked for him on leaving University. "You'll know Okotie Eboh then, Carol, Festering Sam. I've been moving his money through London to Swiss accounts. He's minting it!"'

Harold Smith found that little had changed. 'The whole of the SIS, MI5 and Nigerian Special Branch and related agencies were deployed during the independence elections to make sure that "our boys" won. The covert plan, which succeeded, was to deny the leadership of Nigeria to the two eminent nationalists, Dr Azikiwe (Zik) and Chief Awo (Awo), who ruled respectively in the East and the West.'

'Dr Zik was robbed by the British at Independence of the power that he had fought for. If it seemed that in the election of 1959 it was his fellow nationalist, Awo, who was targeted by the British - as he was - it was only because Zik had been set up and neutralised three years earlier. Zik was nobbled by the Bank Enquiry of 1956, which simply sprang a trap elaborately prepared by British intelligence.' In 1962, having clipped Awo's wings in the 1959 election, the same trick was pulled on Awo by the Coker Commission, as had been used on Zik six years earlier. The Senior Resident in the West, as he told Smith in 1960, had for years had a safe full of evidence against Awo. 'The timing was crucial. Nipping an offence in the bud can lead to a minor breach being corrected. Left to develop into a major misdemeanour and tragically times, the same offence can be devastating.'

'Zik and Awo were thought to be fiercely anti-British, which was nonsense, but compared to the feudal backward Northerners headed by Balewa, to whom we handed power on a plate, they must

have seemed wildly rebellious. Balewa was a smoothie and a creep who was happy to have the elections rigged for him. He was surrounded by British advisors and quite simply did as he was told. Zik and Awo were liberals, or right-wing labour, and both were bookish and very Fabian-like.'

'If the Brits select a friend they are very good to him and will overlook every weakness, failing or blemish, so long as it does not affect the central performance. Balewa was a party to the rigging of the North's population statistics and did his best in his off-duty hours to increase the Northern population in a catch-up exercise. He was known to have at least nineteen children. He had several wives and many casual partners. The British approved of his crusade and laid on a supply of very young girls when he was in Lagos and had no access to his usual suppliers. In 1960 Balewa was Nigeria's Prime Minister.'

Harold Smith was still concerned by the campaign and the part played by the British, and made his views known to those who were prepared to listen. There followed an unpleasant meeting with the Governor General, Sir James Robertson. 'This was a very unhappy experience, as I was subjected to continual threats and bluster in an effort to obtain my silence. When it became clear that I would not be bullied, the tactics changed and soft words were used and rapid promotion offered, all to no avail. Even at that stage, I still hoped that somehow I had got it wrong, that the whole squalid mess was some awful mistake, but it seemed Sir James read my mind because his opening remarks dashed any remaining hopes I had. "I want to make it absolutely clear at the outset," he said, "that I issued the orders you will not accept."'

'The Governor General admitted that they had known the result of the election before a vote had been cast. Many senior British staff had taken part in the election rigging, some of which was complex, ingenious and deeply laid. He went on to lay responsibility for the whole thing on the "wallahs" in Whitehall and on Harold Macmillan, the then Prime Minister. He stated that this whole covert operation had involved many senior British officers and I was the only one to protest. "Your position as a senior officer is exactly the same as if you were in the army," he proclaimed.'

Harold Smith was then offered, on condition that he gave his word never to reveal the election rigging, 'a brilliant career ahead of you' in the Colonial Service. He would not, however, be allowed to work in the UK. If he did not agree, he would never work again, later qualified to 'in a responsible position ever again'. Means

would be found to silence him. Smith felt that he had no alternative but to return to the UK in disgrace.

Before he left, Smith was warned by an MI5 officer to get out of Nigeria before they killed him. They were MI6. The Colonial Service had been MI5's territory but as Independence loomed, the Foreign Office boys from the Sudan took over the positions and MI6 moved in with them. More planning went into covert action before Independence than into training people to take over from the Brits. The con was to get "our boys" - pliable, corrupt Nigerians - into key positions.'

When Harold Smith later discovered that Porton Down had a nerve gas station in Nigeria and that poisons had been developed which mimicked tropical diseases, he began to wonder what lengths the intelligence services might go to to silence him. From 1960 until 1972 he suffered the severe wasting of coeliac sprue and then the maddening itch of dermatitis heretiformis, followed by the awful effects of the leprosy drug Dapsone which was meant to cure it. His medical records covering twelve years also mysteriously disappeared.

Back in London: 'For months I frantically tried to alert government circles to what was happening in Lagos. I spoke to eminent lawyers, top civil servants and was in touch with the Prime Minister's son-in-law, Julian Amery, who was Minister at the Colonial Office. Everyone was incredulous as what I told them. The Permanent Under Secretary at the Colonial Office told Amery I had never served in Africa and that I was mad. When Amery, who was very perturbed, persisted, he was told it was a mistake. Of course they knew who I was but sadly a fire had destroyed all my papers. Only a file cover with my name on it had survived.'

There followed thirty years of media indifference, evidence of telephoning tapping and the kind of official obstruction familiar to 'dissidents' such as Colin Wallace and others.

'The public relations job is not confined to some historians. As an administrator, I drafted and edited many reports which gave a rosy picture of the Labour Department and its work. My aim was to present my Department as efficient and hard-working in an effort to encourage it to be like that, and anyway I would not have been allowed to write the depressing 'truth' emphasising all the faults and negative aspects. Henry Bretton, an American scholar, realised all this in 1962 when he

wrote that most articles and books on Nigeria did not shed light on its problems. The majority paraphrased official reports written by bureaucrats (like myself) "whose purpose it is to conceal rather than to reveal." Bretton goes on to say that for this reason no real insights should be expected from studies based on official reports of elections in Nigeria. Bretton was very perceptive. If the 'official' story, history or report is not the whole truth, how can one find out what really happened? For the officials who know the secrets risk their jobs, promotion and pension rights if they reveal those dark secrets. Where law breaking is concerned it is my personal belief that the civil servant's true loyalty must be to the electorate and not to criminals who happen to be civil servants or politicians. In the United States civil servants are positively encouraged and ordered to blow the whistle on criminal activity. In Britain the establishment regards the public, the taxpayers who pay their salaries, as the enemy who must not be allowed access to secrets, for the simple reason that if they knew what was going on they would put a stop to it.'

'The official story, that the British handed sovereign power in Nigeria over to a democratically elected group of party leaders was written and stage managed by officials. The true story must not be revealed to the public. Keeping these two scenarios going was no problem for the experienced bureaucrat. Even what appeared to be an absolute truth, the granting of Independence in October 1960 is not as well founded as it appears.'

'The Regions already had considerable powers of self-government and became independent in 1957. British influence and power continued unchecked in the most vital areas of Government after October 1960, and to some extent, so successful have British policy and the machinations of British Governments been, even to the present day. A secret defence pact, which Nigeria's leaders had to agree to sign before Independence was granted, is but one small example. As the elections were not fair and above board, the legitimacy of the Government was doubtful. The British Government determined beforehand to whom it would be handing the keys of the Nigerian kingdom. They were the rulers of the North, who had been long favoured by the British.'

'When the British invaded the Moslem North and realised that a stable if feudal and authoritarian system of government was already in place, they decided to rule through the Emirs. This system of indirect government which has probably always been the stock-in-trade of conquering powers, became almost a religion or a fetish

and attempts were also made to apply it in Southern Nigeria with disastrous results. The basic idea was that the Northern rulers could do as they pleased so long as they did not offend the British. The restrictions placed on the Emirs were not arduous and so long as taxes were collected and there was no disorderly behaviour, the Emirs not only had a free hand but were assisted by British administrators and, if necessary, by the force of the British army. Missionaries were disliked by the British and only allowed into very restricted areas. As the Northern Region covered most of the area of Nigeria and arguably the majority of Nigeria's population, only a minority of Nigerians had access to the civilising influence and the schools, hospitals and Christian message of the missionaries.'

'Sir Alan Burns, an acting Governor of Nigeria and historian, asked after Independence what British rule had done for the Nigerian people. He said the chiefs had little to complain of, their positions were assured and their incomes more certain. As for the common people, no attempt was made to force upon them "all of the doubtful advantages of modern civilisation." Dr. Robert Collis was also in Nigeria at that time. He wrote, "The children of Nigeria are suffering unbelievably. I have seen nothing like it since Belsen. Death and pain stalk beside them. Out of every two born one must die... often suffering the greatest agony as they go."'

After Independence, Okotie Eboh's opportunities for corruption greatly increased and was one of the main causes of the military coup which took place on 15 January 1966. He was dragged from his ministerial palace and gunned down. His body, riddled with bullets, was thrown into the jungle outside Lagos. In the Civil War which followed up to one million Nigerians lost their lives.



Stephen Dorril ponders the strange goings-on and musical chairs in the intelligence world.



Spooks

In March, it was announced that the new chief of MI6 to replace Sir Colin McColl (retiring) in September would be David Spedding. The press reports based on Foreign Office briefings made the right connections given the slim amount of material available, however, they were, in some respects, highly misleading. Spedding's career is conventional enough but is in marked contrast to those of previous heads of the service.

- 1967 Third Secretary FO
- 68 MECAS
- 69 Second Secretary
- 70 Beirut
 - was named by Kim Philby in response to the expulsion of Soviet intelligence officers from London in September 1971 (which may explain his next posting away from the Middle East - see *Lobster* 19.)
- 72 Second Secretary Santiago
 - posting coincides with the overthrow of Salvador Allende's social democrat government. Until the Falklands War, MI6 had not done a great deal in South America, which makes his presence there at that particular time significant. More so, given the recent controversy in Australia over the revelations of two former ASIS intelligence officers about the way MI6 runs their service. In particular, ASIS was heavily involved in Chile where Spedding no doubt used their assets to good effect.
- 78 Abu Dhabi
 - Spedding was up to something in this area as he received an OBE (1980) but FO officials have been nervous about saying exactly what it was.
- 81 FCO
 - alleged by *Intelligence Newsletter* (24.3.94) to have been head of Irish Desk at a time when Charles Haughey was convinced MI6 was destabilising his government
- 83 Counsellor Amman
 - this was probably a crucial posting. In the aftermath of the Falklands War an understanding was reached whereby MI6 undertook operations which were denied to the CIA because of Congressional oversight. This included the transfer of satellite and other intelligence to Saddam Hussein during the Iran/Iraq war. The pipeline for this intelligence was through the Jordanian King Hussein, a CIA asset. MI6 later took over from the CIA in delivering the intelligence to Saddam. This was also the early period of the arms sales to Iraq through Jordan. In 1984 he received a CVO.
- 87 Counsellor on loan to the Cabinet



Evening Standard

Monday, 7 March, 1994

Spedding's secret service

ONE day Britain will become a real democracy, in which its citizens are not content merely to have a vote every four or five years but, through their elected representatives, to have a share in the day-to-day business of government. A country, the democratic credentials of which were once truly the envy of the world, in these days beginning to look just a little behind the times. This matters very much indeed.

At the end of last week, the Government announced the name of the new head of MI6, Britain's Secret Intelligence Service. In a country like America, the government has only the power to nominate its senior officials. It is up to Congress to decide, through specially convened hearings, whether or not to give its consent. That is important for the official and the citizen alike. The former, once his post has won the approval of Congress, is immeasurably strengthened by the knowledge of everyone that his appointment is open and above board. The citizen knows that he has a direct voice in choosing the politicians who will rule him and just as importantly, through his Congressman, every senior bureaucrat too: including the head of the CIA.

No doubt Mr David Spedding, who succeeds Sir Colin McColl in September, has the very best qualifications for the job. But as we are denied all but the most sketchy information about him, our approval can hardly be wholehearted. Now that Mrs Stella Rimington has allowed her photograph to be published, Mr Spedding's ban on photographs of him is ludicrous. This will be an interesting challenge to most newspapers. Let us hear no nonsense that to publish his picture would be to endanger his life. It hasn't Mrs Rimington's, and it won't his.

Quid pro quo

There are question marks over Mr Spedding of a more serious nature which a properly convened Parliamentary Committee would no doubt wish to raise. Mr Spedding, apart from two years in Chile as the SIS head of station coinciding exactly with the CIA-sponsored coup which destroyed the government of President Allende (and one would like to hear his views on that too) has spent virtually his entire career in the Middle East as a member of what has come to be known as the camel corps. There are a lot of people inside the Foreign Office and out of it, who believe that the FO's Arab specialists, especially those who graduated, as Mr Spedding did, from the Middle East Centre for Arabic Studies, are a self-perpetuating elite who serve the interests of the most repressive regimes of the Arab world with as much enthusiasm as they do their own country. The Kurds and the Marsh Arabs of Iraq have been betrayed time and time again by these gentlemen. The Palestinians of the Gulf States and beyond have suffered and suffer today because the camel corps, on behalf of clients like the Kuwaitis and the Saudis, helps keep them in subjugation.

Thanks to a most fortuitous piece of timing, SIS has emerged with clean hands out of the arms-to-Iraq deals which led to the Scott Inquiry. It did abysmally badly over the supergun affair about which questions ought to be asked and never have been. That aside, the Israelis, of course, regard the camel corps as hostile, which inevitably means that Mossad, the only intelligence agency in the region which has information worth having, doesn't share the cream of it with this country. In that matter, as in others, the camel corps, whatever it may imagine it is doing, actively causes this country harm.

Whether or not Mr Spedding shares in the deeply disturbing prejudices of some of those who have similar backgrounds we cannot know. Whether his appointment is the quid pro quo for another seedy little deal in the Middle East, of the kind about which we have been hearing recently, we cannot know either. All we can usefully do, therefore, is assume that Mr Spedding is in every way the best possible candidate for an important job, and wish him well in his tasks ahead. Wouldn't it be nice, however, to think that some day, some time, we would be able to make these appointments openly and democratically. Then indeed we would all have grown up.

Office.

- was head of a joint MI6/MI5 operations unit, later in charge of Middle East operations with specific reference to the Gulf War. The *Independent* (12.3.94) said that he had been responsible for the operation 'running' Paul Henderson and other businessmen during the Iraqgate period. This was portrayed as a 'success' though it indicated MI6's failure in gathering intelligence through its own efforts and in penetrating Saddam's regime.

92 Counsellor FCO

- director of operations (1993) - in one account, Deputy Chief

What is obvious is that Spedding is a Middle East specialist. Unlike most chiefs, his field of experience is relatively narrow and certainly indicates a move away from the areas of the Cold War. One colleague claimed in the *Independent* that there 'seems to be one underlying feeling among staff about this appointment. That this marks the end of the old age: the image of the "gentleman of leisure" spy.' All the press reports indicated that Spedding was 'the one outstanding candidate' and 'the best person for the job'. Curiously, the Foreign Office refused to say whether there had been a short list, though there had been one consisting of three men and two women. Was the Foreign Office line just a little too pat, just a touch too enthusiastic?

Indeed it was. It now seems that Spedding's appointment followed deep divisions inside the Foreign Office and the service. Following what James Adams has described as the '1992 Christmas Massacre' (ST, 13.3.94), when McColl promoted a new generation of 'Young Turks', who had all played a part in the Cold War battle with the Soviet Union, to head the four divisions of the service; in November 1993 it was reported in the *Sunday Express* (7.11.93) by the informed William Massie that some inside the service were lobbying for a new Chief with 'operational experience of covert action'. It was also known that the younger officers around McColl were not happy with the Chief's extra two years in post. It is now clear that the Chief was not that happy with Spedding's appointment.

Taking into account Stewart Steven's known Zionism, the *Evening Standard's* editorial remains a quite extraordinary piece. Even more so, given - I understand - that he received a briefing from a very, very senior MI6 officer before writing it. Spedding and the 'Camel Corps' have won out but quite why remains unknown. Is it because he knows where the bodies are buried in the Middle East? One of the old

hands from the 'Camel Corps', perhaps the most experienced in the service, **George Lancelot St Leger**, is now Counsellor in Algiers, an indication of how seriously the Foreign Office takes the Islamic fundamentalist threat in that country. What is now apparent is that Spedding's appointment suggests that the MI6 is destined for a more aggressive future, more 'disruptive action' as part of its pursuit of a new agenda of 'Global Issues'.

The *Sunday Times* released enough clues in a recent article for me to be able to identify the MI6 officer at the centre of the Iraqgate scandal, 'John Balsom'. Born in 1959 and recipient of an OBE in 1991, there is on close inspection of that bible the 1993 *Diplomatic Service List* only one candidate - **Timothy Gawin Bradley**.

B 3.6.59

1983 FCO

1984 Language Training

1986 Second later First Secretary (Chancery) Kuwait

1988 - First Secretary FCO

Of course, if this is the right person and I have no reason to doubt it then he would appear to have been misleading the Scott inquiry. Matrix Churchill director, Paul Henderson, has claimed in his autobiography that he was contacted by 'Balsom' in 1988 (though this claim is contested by Mark Gutteridge) but 'Balsom' told the Scott inquiry that he was out of the country in the relevant period. He said that he did not meet Henderson until '24 April 1989'. However, the MI5 officer, Ford, agreed at the Matrix Churchill trial that it had been around 'June/July 1988'. It is possible that he was in, say, Northern Ireland but because the details in the list are so vague it is impossible to say with any certainty. This is not an academic question, but goes to the heart of claims from government, or at least MI6, about what it knew, and when.

Anyone who has read the novels of **Michael Hartland**, which follow the adventures of spymaster 'David Nairn', will have realised that he has some intelligence experience. Publishers' publicity blurbs have said in the past that he became a diplomat working in counter-intelligence and at one time served in Vietnam. He also served 'in a rather peculiar capacity' for Mrs Thatcher, early in her ministerial life, and for Jennie Lee when she was Arts Minister. He later operated in 'close contact with MI5, SAS and SBS', presumably when he later worked in counter-terrorism. Now it can be revealed that 'Hartland' is listed in *Who's Who* as Michael James.

JAMES, Michael Leonard; Chairman: The Hartland Press, since 1985; Hartland Film and Television Ltd, since 1991; writer; b 7 Feb 1941; son of late Leonard and of Marjorie James, Portreath, Cornwall; m 1975, Jill Elizabeth, d of late George Tarján, OBE and Etelka Tarján, formerly of Budapest; two d Educ: Latymer Upper School; Christ's Coll, Cambridge. Entered British govt service, 1963; Private sec to Rt Hon Jennie Lee, MP, Minister for the Arts 1966-68; Principal, DES, 1968-71; Planning Unit of Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP, Sec of State for Educn and Science, 1971-73; Asst Sec, 1973; DSCO 1974; Advr to OECD, Paris, and UK Governor, IIMT, Milan, 1973-75; specialist duties, 1975-78; Director, IAEA, Vienna, 1978-83; Advr on Internat Relations, EEC, Brussels, 1983-85. Member: Exeter Social Security Appeal Tribunal, 1986-; Devon and Cornwall Rent Assessment Panel, 1990-; Governor: East Devon Coll of Further Educn, Tiverton, 195-; Colyton Grammar Sch; Sidmouth Community Coll, 1988-; Chm Bd of Management, Axe Vale Further Educn Unit, Seaton, 1987- (Mem, 1985-). FRSA 1982. Hon Fellow, Univ of Exeter, 1985. South West Arts Literary Award, 1984. Publications: (jtly) Internationalisation to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1980; articles on internat relations and nuclear energy; five novels under a pseudonym. Address: Cotte Barton, Branscombe, Devon EX12 3BH. Clubs: Athenaeum, United Oxford & Cambridge University, International PEN; Devon and Exeter Institution, Honiton Working Men's (Devon).

Godfrey 'Paul' Paulson (MI6) served in Beirut at the time of Philby's residence. Recruited into Lonhro as an aide by Nicholas Elliott in 1968. Travelled to Africa on Lonhro business. (See p 129, Tom Bower, *Tiny Rowland: A Rebel Tycoon*, Heinemann, 1993). Bower makes a case, not entirely convincing, that Lonhro was never in league with MI6, despite the assumption of the CIA and other agencies that they were close allies.

Barrie Gane (MI6), former deputy chief of the service joined security company Group 4 in February 1993 (T, 26.5.93). Gane was a highly controversial figure within the service who was not liked by many officers. See previous *Lobsters* for career details.

Lord Derwent - Robin Varden-Bempe-Johnstone (MI6). Foreign Office diplomat 1954-69, between 1955 and 1958 was a serving MI6 officer (*Business Age*, July 1993). A director of the merchant bank, NM Rothschild, appointed head of the European operations of LI Ka Shing, Hong Kong based Chinese businessman (24th largest financial donor to Conservative Party funds).

G	-	Guardian
DT	-	Daily Telegraph
S Tel	-	Sunday Telegraph
ST	-	Sunday Times
SE	-	Sunday Express
T	-	The Times
I	-	The Independent
IoS	-	Independent on Sunday

The following statement was made in 1988 in the aftermath of the Peter Wright affair and the subsequent publicity given to the mid-seventies plots against Harold Wilson. It is, in turn, a copy of an original 1974 statement which was handed to the Press Office at Transport House in April of that year.

In 1974 Molly Brandl Bowen was a journalist and junior page editor with the *Jewish Chronicle*. She left work one day in April to catch the home train to Brighton from Victoria station. Travelling back in the buffet car, a strange tale unfolded which adds much to our knowledge about the events of that April and the plotting against the Labour Government. That the statement was made and delivered when Molly claims was backed up in 1988 by Lady Falkender and her sister, Peggy Field, and the then editor of the *Jewish Chronicle*, after Lord Wilson requested a copy. Whether the contact made by the Department of Trade and Industry official was deliberate or a matter of co-incidence has never been resolved.

Stephen Dorril

I sat opposite a tall, fattish, well dressed man who was having a meal and something to drink. It was obvious he had already had too much to drink. He was very friendly and shifted his coat to make room for mine on the rack. As he stood up, he stumbled over and knocked his drink over my clothes and into my toast. He was very apologetic and said had been to a reception and had too much to drink. He was very concerned about my clothes and the fact that he had knocked his drink into the toast, but I was more concerned that he had damaged a book which I had on the table, entitled "Karl Marx and the Labour Movement" which had been written by a close friend of mine, Dr Henry Collins. When I discovered the book was OK, he picked it up and said: "Why do you waste your time reading a book like that?". I replied that I had done a lot of research on the Bibliography with one of the co-authors.

He flicked through it and said, "The bloody Labour Party and Wilson have had it. If you knew what's going on in the corridors of power, you'd have a fit." I commented that I wouldn't be surprised at anything that was going on in the corridors of power, and immediately became interested in this man from a journalistic point of view.

He said he had a Jensen at Brighton car park and wondered if he'd be fit to drive. I nicknamed him Jensen Johnny in my mind from that point on.

He went to open his brief case and knocked it off the seat and a load of official looking papers fell under the table into the gangway. I helped him pick them up. "Christ!" he said, gathering them up. "I don't want that lot floating around."

I asked him what he did and he said he was with the Department of Trade and Industry. If I had to take a guess at what or who he was, I would have taken him for either a Fraud Squad or Special Branch man, because he had that look about him.

He asked me what I did and I just said that I was a writer and researcher, but did not mention that I was a journalist.

I then geared the conversation back to his remark about 'what was going on in the corridors of power' and asked what he meant by it.

He leaned across the table and said "Buy the *Daily Mail* on 13 September (1974) and you'll find an interesting lead story about Brayley." I asked, "Who's he?" and he replied, "The former Defence Minister." [The reference to former by the DTI man was, Molly believes, a sarcastic remark in tune with his general attitude.]

I was taken aback and said "Are you telling me now in April what's coming on the front page of the *Daily Mail* on 13 September? - well, for that to happen you've either got to be a prophet or somebody's getting a big rake off on the *Daily Mail*."

Although he'd drunk a lot, I instinctively knew that he was definitely in the know about something, so I took my diary from my brief case, stuck a newspaper on the table and ringed 13 September, noting the name Brayley beside it, and from then on began taking notes on that page. It was very difficult because I didn't want him to see what I was doing and the motion of the train caused a problem.

He then started talking about Harold Wilson being a spy for the Soviet Union [the diary refers to 'Wilson working for Russia - double agent.'] and I said "What's this? A set up or something? You can't really believe that." He said "They can make or break anybody with the money they've got" and referred to Conservative Party Funds and something about a Treasury Official together with them paying professional burglars and criminals to steal files and set up bugging devices. He also mentioned some of Harold Wilson's own colleagues being involved.

He then admitted that Harold Wilson wasn't a spy, but said "It will put the cat amongst the pigeons to say he is." [This is very similar to the view of George Kennedy Young and his colleagues.]

I said it was despicable to use burglars and professional criminals to do this sort of thing and expressed by disgust at the whole business of people being in a conspiracy to get at Harold Wilson and other individuals. I said to him, "How can you sleep at night?" and told him he was a corrupt bastard. He said the money was good!

By this time I was getting angry but had to subdue it and go along with him, otherwise he could have dried up. I knew from many of the things he was saying that even though he'd had too much to drink, he really was involved in this dirty business.

I wondered why he was spilling the beans to me and came to the conclusion that for one reason or another, maybe he had a psychological need to tell someone. In my years as a journalist I have encountered the most unlikely people who have come out with the most incredible things that have been true - and this man knew exactly what he was talking about.

He then started talking about Parker's place being watched. I didn't know who he was speaking about. [This is Arthur Parker, a Kagan employee, who was recruited by MI5 to keep an eye on his boss.] Then he spoke about a Stephen Cohen who had big contacts at the *Daily Mail*. I didn't know him either.

The conversation then concentrated on what he called "Jewish Freemasonry". I said "What on earth is Jewish Freemasonry? There's no such thing. A mason is a mason." He said "Well you know what I mean" I replied that I didn't but could guess what he was getting at.

At that point he started talking about Waley Cohen [father of Stephen], the former Lord Mayor of London, and from what he said, certain people were trying to get at him, but he didn't expand on this except to say "He'd got his fingers in may pies, like the rest of them." - again meaning the Jews, I presumed.

Then he said "Shall I tell you what Wilson's real trouble is? His own 'so called colleagues' and people at the top don't like the company he keeps and who he supports. The company he keeps will be his downfall, you'll see."

I felt like thumping him one at that point but did say "You are talking like a fascist pig." He still went on about Harold Wilson's and Marcia Williams' peculiar taste for friends - again meaning the Jews.

I said "So what's wrong with having Jewish friends? Sounds like a tidal wave of anti-semitism to me." I added that I supposed the pro-Arab lobby didn't like it. I also said the Conservatives had too much vested interest in Arab countries because of the oil. "If the dammed oil fell through the sand, the pro-Arab lobby on both sides wouldn't give a fig for the Arabs." I also went on about the arms dealers perpetuating wars by selling arms to so many Arab countries. He agreed.

He told me that the biggest Press Campaign against Harold Wilson was being prepared which would knock him and his cronies out of the elections, and implied that certain newspapers and various Government Officials in a variety of Departments were conniving together to bring about his downfall for good. [Knocking Wilson out of elections was, indeed, Conservative Party strategy, according to Chapman Pincher's account.]

Again he spoke of professional criminals being used for bugging and stealing files about Harold Wilson, Marcia Williams, Brayley and Kagan. [The diary note also says that 'Kagan and Wilson... in espionage activities with KGB - "what a set up"'. This was a smear then known only to a very tight circle of MI5 officers.]

I commented that America was bad enough. "What you're telling me isn't about politics, it's about 'dirty tricks' and corruption." I told him that breaking people like this was a national scandal. If the other side can't get in without all this, it's not worth living in this country anymore, and asked him who was running the country anyhow.

He replied "The bloody world is a sham." I told him he could say that again. I asked him how he could live with himself, and who was supplying the professional criminals - Scotland Yard with references and all I suppose.

Something like that," he answered. "The public doesn't know what goes on, they're so damned

ignorant." I said it was a pity they didn't, but I didn't think the public was as ignorant as he thought.

Then he started speaking about Peter Shore and I was very surprised. He said they were going to get at him indirectly [probably through his son] - I couldn't work that one out at all. He then spoke about legal people at the top in the Queen's Bench Division, and again I couldn't work out if he meant they were involved in the conspiracy or if one of them was going to be the victim of a 'set up'.



He mentioned Shore and Benn being pinned to the wall before the election and again he didn't elaborate on that. Then he went back to the subject of Marcia Williams and Harold Wilson's overt liking for the Jews, and repeated "It will bring them down - it's the company he keeps and people don't like it." He started talking about the spying business and said Kagan and Wilson would be together in it. I reminded him he had said it wasn't true, and that he had said it would set the cat amongst the pigeons. His answer to that was "The great British public believe anything they read."

He went back to Kagan and said a personal dossier was being built on him. Then said the Press would make a smear campaign against Wilson and Marcia Williams. I asked how and he said that it would be said they were having an affair. The papers would say they were having a sexual relationship and repeated the public would believe it. He then went on to say that the Masons could make or break anyone and asked what I thought of Freemasonry and I replied "Not a lot." Then he slipped in a remark about Hattersley having a girlfriend [subject of much gossip]. I said the whole business of the smear campaign and a conspiracy against Wilson was disgusting. I said it was disgusting having a

plot against anybody for that matter. He said "Don't tell me you don't know such things go on." I replied that I did but it was very offensive and sickening. He said Wilson was crafty and cunning and could look after himself and so is the company he keeps. I said, "We are back on the Jews again are we, when you say the company he keeps." He answered, "You take it from me, the company he keeps will be his downfall - wait and see."

I remarked that he had said a mouthful on the journey. I asked him if he was sick of what he was doing and he admitted he was sometimes.

When we got to Preston Park Station we stood in the corridor together until we reached Brighton and he said: "You said you were a writer, what do you write?" I said I wrote books for kids and teenagers and was a researcher, and added "I'm also a journalist!" He looked completely shattered and said "Jesus Christ, what a bloody fool I am."

When we got off the train in Brighton I tapped him on the shoulder and said: "By the way, I'm a Jewish journalist - one of those 'peculiar' people you kept on talking about on the train." I then left him on the platform and hurried to the car-park as it was raining. I looked around for a Jensen and there was a green one parked near my own car. I put the number in my diary. It was JXE 753K. I waited about five minutes to see if he would come to that car - he did. He had difficulty in opening the door, probably because he'd had too much to drink. He also stepped into a large pool of water by the car as it was pouring down.

I got out of my car and said "It's not your day, is it?" He turned round and said "Oh, my God, now I suppose you've taken my number as well." I said I had and that I wouldn't forget to buy the Daily Mail on 13 September. He wasn't aggressive or unpleasant, but looked rather worried and I told him he should leave his car there and get a taxi - that was the last I saw of him.

The following day, I told Joseph Finkelstone, an editor on the Jewish Chronicle, that I had met a Department of Trade and Industry Official on the train the previous night and what had transpired. I told him that he had said that something about Brayley would be appearing in the Daily Mail on 13 September, and about the plot against Wilson etc. After that discussion, I spoke to Marcia Williams; I told her to also look out for the story in the Mail on 13 September and gave her the gist of the events on the train.

She asked if would make out a report and take it to Transport House. I did and I took it there myself. I didn't hear from any more from them.

When 13 September came, I bought the Daily Mail and, sure enough, there was the story about Brayley. I brought he matter up with Mr Finkelstone.

I didn't hear from Transport House and I was surprised, but the following year a call came through to my secretary asking me if I would go and see Lord Brayley's solicitor - a Mr A Wilson [now dead] - at 199 Piccadilly. I went one afternoon to make a statement about the events on the train.

He showed me a file which contained some documents about a Stephen Cohen connected with the Daily Mail who, it was alleged, had received thousands of pounds in connection with the whole affair. I was surprised when the solicitor asked me if I couldn't spring a leak in Fleet Street. He pressed me on the issue of what the man had said about Harold Wilson and Marcia Williams and I said I wasn't there for that, but about Lord Brayley.

Some colleagues said that I could have made a bomb in Fleet Street, with the story, but when I found out that Stephen Cohen was Waley Cohen's son (the former Lord Mayor) I decided against it as I thought the whole lot could bring a wave of anti-semitism in the City and I didn't know how the papers would handle the whole affair. It could have boomeranged back on Mr Wilson, Waley Cohen and, with all that the man had told me on the train, I felt it was too hot to handle. I had done my part by reporting it to Transport House to give them the 'tip-off' and certainly it must have been they who contacted Lord Brayley's solicitor - how else would anyone have known to find me at the Jewish Chronicle?

It might well be asked why such a potentially sensational statement was not, in 1974, made public or at least used as a political weapon. While there is considerable circumstantial evidence that, aware of the statement's content, Wilson used it to back up his warnings about imminent smear campaigns, it appears not to have been made public because of the fear of an anti-Semitic backlash. This may, from this distance in time, appear far-fetched, but there was considerable conservative, traditional hostility, in the period, to Wilson's association with Jewish businessmen and his support for Israel. So much so, in fact, that Lady Falkender was eventually forced to write to The Times to protest at the campaign. It is also apparent that Martin Gilbert's reluctance to publicise his own encounter with the smear campaign (at a lunch party in June 1974) was based on similar fears.

When a new opportunity arose, in 1988, to release the statement, journalistic rivalries and problems in the Wilson camp - "I do not know what should be done with the memorandum... it is difficult, as you will appreciate." (Wilson to Molly, 18.11.88) - resulted in, once again, a missed chance.

Desmond Brayley was on the edges of the

Wilson circle and a particular friend of George Wigg, who arranged his post of Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Army, in March 1974. Brayley was on the board of the Canning Town Glass Works which, during the sixties, he made into a successful company that provided him with a relatively lavish lifestyle. In 1964 he gave 50,000 shares to the Labour Party and in 1970 became a knight in Wilson's resignation honours list.

In April 1974 when Scottish whisky distillers, Arthur Bell and Sons paid £1.5m for Canning, Brayley was said to have made £500,000 from the sale. Soon after, problems arose when Bell decided to take a close look at the books. There was gossip about Brayley's appointment and articles concerning the sale, including those in Private Eye (3.5.74 and 28.6.74) which revealed that strong reservations about his appointment to the MoD had been made by the Treasury. However, it was not until September that the press picked up signs of an impending row over the company's annual report which questioned payments totalling £197,105 made out to an unidentified director, who turned out to be Brayley. This prompted the Department of Trade and Industry to take a closer look and aroused the interest of the Tory press.

Brayley was forced to resign in the run up to the October 1974 election, while Peter Shore at the DTI ordered a report which was finally delivered to the Director of Public Prosecutions in March 1975.

The affair provoked banner headlines - Wilson and the Brayley Affair - but his resignation effectively ended their interest. Brayley, like many other Labour personalities, was the subject of an unexplained burglary.

As Private Eye pointed out, the only newspaper to take any interest in the Brayley affair was the Daily Mail, which as Molly's mysterious DTI informant predicted, splashed Brayley's name across the front page on 13 September. The Eye also noted that the essential point was: who leaked the information to the Mail?

This account only scratches the surface of a major break in the Wilson plot story and is now subject to new investigation which will, hopefully, reach a wider public at the beginning of next year.



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I tried to see him in the morning but he was out. I wrote a letter to him but it was not sent. I tried to see him in the afternoon but he was not in. I tried to see him in the evening but he was not in. I tried to see him in the night but he was not in. I tried to see him in the morning but he was not in. I tried to see him in the afternoon but he was not in. I tried to see him in the evening but he was not in. I tried to see him in the night but he was not in.

September 1974

9 Monday 75 3K GREEN JENSEN
 Jensen says they were worried about the body with the money. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault.

10 Tuesday
 Jensen says they were worried about the body with the money. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault.

11 Wednesday
 Jensen says they were worried about the body with the money. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault.

12 Thursday
 Jensen says they were worried about the body with the money. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault.

13 Friday
 Jensen says they were worried about the body with the money. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault.

14 Saturday
 Jensen says they were worried about the body with the money. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault.

15 Sunday
 Jensen says they were worried about the body with the money. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault. He says he is a bit of a drinker but it's not his fault.

Rough notes made in my diary while travelling on Victoria to Brighton train in April 1974. Notes made on September pages because the man from Department of Trade and Industry had mentioned 13 September and what was going to appear about Lord Brayley. Please understand that I was trying to copy down under difficult circumstances, without him seeing, which involved me sticking a newspaper on the table, with a brief case on my lap in which I had the diary. Also the motion of the train made it very difficult. Where I have put brackets refers to my thoughts. I nicknamed the man Jensen Johnny because, early on he said he had a Jensen car in Brighton car park - MOLLY BRANDL BOWEN

able to pinpoint Towmaster Transport at the heart of the understating. Furthermore, it denied a previously unheard "whisper" that "an approach has already been made to the Director of Public Prosecutions". A curious form of words, this, as the DPP is only brought in by the police or by the Home Secretary/Prime Minister, and neither the police nor the DoT had been approached.

3. On September 5 Brayley's solicitor was informed that the £16,500 referred to the Army Minister. This warning came four days before the annual meeting of Canning Town shareholders. This it transpires was a very shrewd legal move. Putting Brayley on notice made the answering of any question on this matter at the meeting much easier, given the law of libel. Normally, were such an unusual question asked, most chairmen would stonewall and not name names.

Yet the warning might suggest Brayley's successor Raymond Miquel expected the unusual and was prepared to name the Minister.

4. According to the Daily Telegraph (September 9) the meeting was attended by "a handful of shareholders". However, Fleet Street was there in force. This turnout might seem odd given the lack of interest in the accounts - odd that is unless it was thought likely that something interesting might emerge.

5. Despite the high turn-out of reporters, not one newspaper interviewed or even named the mysterious shareholder who, from among the handful at the meeting, queried the £16,500 item. This showed an astonishing lack of thoroughness. For it is rare that shareholders ask questions on their company's accounts and rarer still that they are given incriminating answers against a former chairman who is in the Government.

6. Circulation of the investigation carried out by accountants Deloittes and an un-named QC (?) into Canning Town's affairs was extremely limited - the auditors and the QC themselves, the Canning Town board (now dominated by the directors of whisky distillers Arthur Bell & Sons who bought out Brayley's 30% family share stake last April) and Brayley. The Army Minister would hardly have given these documents to the Mail. Both Deloittes and Canning Town have denied responsibility. The QC remains un-named. Distillers are not ranked among the staunchest supporters of the Labour Party and the around £500,000 paid by Bell for most of Brayley's shares - held by his family in the tax haven Channel Islands - looks unfortunate with the current price, 16p, signalling a loss of over £400,000.

This, of course, should not be taken to blame Arthur Bell's directors for the 'leak'.

It would be churlish to suggest the Brayley affair might be anything other than fearless journalism exposing unacceptable Socialism. However, while this may cheer 'Slapsey' Brayley and his sponsor Wilson, who wisely did not come to his protegee's defence but deftly pulled out the rug by letting the quite justifiable but private Companies Act inquiry become public, the other facts will not. Brayley's initial ploy of getting his solicitor to threaten that "any allegations made against Lord Brayley will be met with a writ" was hardly the mark of a man who welcomed publicity.

Canning Wheeze

One of the more interesting pieces from Private Eye in the 74/75 period (date not known but probably October 1974). It recognised that something odd was going on.

One matter which will not be looked into by the Department of Trade will be just how the story of Lord Brayley's extra-curricular activities at Canning Town Glassworks got out.

- So consider the following:
1. No newspaper paid any attention to the Canning Town accounts showing Captain Brayley's £16,500 alleged debt to his former company, when they were published on August 20.
 2. The only newspaper to show any great interest was the Daily Mail - an intriguing fact given that it was the Mail which on September 13 revealed Canning Town's near £200,000 claims against its former chairman. However, the Mail instead was concerned (August 21) with the qualification of Canning Town's accounts due to the "past actions of former directors which may have resulted in profits being understated". The Mail was

Julian Putkowski, historian and researcher for the BBC series *The Monocled Mutineer* sheds light on one of the most controversial aspects of the British Army, uncovering a top secret spy network set up amid fears of revolution.



A2 and the 'Reds in Khaki'

During the first three months of 1919 unrest touched its high-water mark. I do not think that at any time in history since the Bristol Riots have we been so near revolution. (1)
- Basil Thomson

Thomson's assessment of the political crisis which threatened the British Government has been echoed by many military and labour historians in their reviews of the period. The symptoms of the crises were characterised not only by widespread industrial action by striking railway workers; miners; Clydeside engineers; London and Belfast electricians but also the comparative weakness of counter-strike forces, including the police and the Armed Forces. Lloyd George's administration was also frightened by the threat of Bolshevism: 'vents on the continent, and especially in Russia, gave little cause for comfort. The Russian revolutions of 1917 presented a frightening example of what could happen to a great empire if matter got out of control.' (2)

The personal diaries and correspondence of many senior politicians and military commanders featured references to the rash of mutinies which infected the Army during the first six months of 1919. Mostly prompted by demands for accelerated demobilisation by war-weary soldiery, these incidents involved the other ranks in strikes, demonstrations and other forms of direct action on an unprecedented scale. About 250,000 troops stationed in Britain; mainland Europe; Egypt; Palestine; Mesopotamia; India and North Russia. (3)

British Official histories, with one exception, make no mention of these incidents and British Army historians tend to ignore or gloss over their significance. (4) Labour and socialist historians, either lament the lost revolutionary opportunity or attempt to conjure up heavily qualified links with Leninism. Walter Kendall summarises the former perspective: '...if the soldiers and sailors had launched a co-ordinated movement, or established links with any of the trade union struggles pending, then the whole future of the state might well have been called in the balance... the struggles of the soldiers and sailors and, to a lesser extent of the police force, went on unaided, and indeed to a large extent, unnoticed, by the socialist movement. Confronted with the greatest revolutionary opportunity in generations, the socialist movement showed itself largely unaware of its existence'. (5)

The Communist Party veteran, Andrew Rothstein, unsurprisingly adopts the latter interpretation: 'When British soldiers began saying the job for which they had put on their uniforms had been done, that it was time for them now to go home, and

they wouldn't stay in the "bloody army" for another "bloody war", they were themselves paying an effective, if belated and unconscious, tribute to the October Revolution'. (6)

Although neither Kendall or Rothstein fell prey to the simplistic sensationalism which notoriously dogs journalists' attempts to chronicle such affairs, neither seek to establish a chronological link between the post-war mutinies and similar events which occurred during the war. Yet the mode of the soldiers' post-war challenge and the Army's clandestine suppression of dissent may best be appreciated as an extension of war-time class confrontation.

The mutinies which occurred in the British Army during the First World War were almost invariably brief affairs which were settled peacefully. This goes some way to explain why few soldiers convicted of mutiny faced either long prison sentences or the firing squad - as long as they had white skins. (7)

Where any kind of formal political ideology expressed by the mutineers may be identified, it was akin to the perspectives expressed by contemporary Trade Union activists. This could logically be expected since the war created a large conscript Army and blurred distinction between the soldier and civilian. This was acknowledged, for example, by General H. A. L. Tagart Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General GHQ Home Forces, who commented: 'There is no longer the definite hard and fast line which used formerly to separate the soldier from his brother in civilian employment.' (8)

This blurring was also accentuated by the passage of wartime emergency legislation. The Defence of the Realm Acts & 1915 Munitions Act, prompted by military lobbying as well as civilian employers - combined to establish a kind of industrial marital law and sanctioned harsh codes of practice which were akin to military discipline. The State, for example was thereby empowered to suppress any opposition to workshop practices in munitions plants. It also meant that wartime trade disputes were politicised as offences against the State, including disputes about wages, labour demarcation, staffing, machinery and above all, the dilution of craft workers' status and skills.

Industrial workers could no longer rely on pre-war Labour and trades union leaders for representation. Pre-war Labour leaders, like George Barnes (engineers), William Brace (miners), Ben Tillet (transport workers), Havelock Wilson (seamen), had opted to subordinate all to support the war effort. Nor was their support for the Government unenthusiastic. For example,

after the socialist and leader of the Irish Citizen Army, James Connolly was executed for his part in the 1916 Irish Easter Rising, the Labour Party leader and wartime Minister, Arthur Henderson led a round of applause by MPs in a packed House of Commons. (9)

Some powerful trade unionists were less compromised, but: 'Individually, employers had been summoned to aid the government on a far greater scale than trades unionists or Labour's MPs. Lord Weir a senior member of the Federation of Engineering Employers, were made advisors on production, Lord Cowdray, Air Minister; Lord Rhondda, Food Controller; Lord Devonport, Shipping Controller; while the press Lords, Northcliffe, Beaverbrook...and Rothermere ...took on political responsibility in addition to their function as moulders of public opinion ... Thus the business community reached the centre of government in an unprecedented fashion.' (10)

The shop floor opted to organise itself, particularly in the engineering, shipbuilding and munitions industries, and developed a national network of shop stewards' committees. Unlike their military counterparts, the civilians managed to develop and sustain the Shop Stewards' movement as widespread network via which the shop floor communicated its grievances.

The response of the ruling class to the shop stewards' movement was predictable, politically simplistic and indiscriminate. Typically, the Vickers' engineering magnate, Sir Vincent Caillard viewed the Shop Stewards Movement; British Socialist Party; No Conscription Fellowship; Union of Democratic Control and the ILP as subversive. (11) Other industrial barons simply referred to trades unionists, of whatever political complexion, as 'the enemy'. Employers' groups, like the Mineowners' Association and the State's secret services took a similar view, harassing and repressing industrial dissent. This partnership, aided by State censorship of communications, the media and wartime propaganda, developed an enormous, orchestrated campaign to suppress wholly legitimate trades union and other working class organisations.

The blurring of the distinction between soldier and civilian; officer and employer, also extended to the covert agencies which harassed the workers. Government Intelligence agencies, nominally controlled by the Ministry of Munitions; Ministry of Labour; Special Branch and Military Intelligence allied themselves with buccaneering patriotic organisations like the National Democratic & Labour Party

and the British Workers' League. (11a) Raids, imprisonment without trial, arbitrary arrests, theft, blackmail, and the use of jingoist mobs, spies and agents provocateur were tactics freely deployed by this covert alliance to destroy socialist, pacifist and shopfloor organisations. Even where they broke elementary rules of law and attracted public odium, the excesses of covert agency operations were uncensored by the State.

The Wheeldon affair, involving PMS2, the Ministry of Munitions intelligence organisation, provides the best-known example of such operations. Headed by Major William Melville Lee, brother of the Parliamentary Military Secretary, PMS2 had originally been established in June 1916 to spy on aliens and labour agitators. Two PMS2 agents provocateur conspired to fit up Mrs Alice Wheeldon, a Derbyshire feminist and ILP speaker. She was alleged to have plotted to kill Lloyd George with a poisoned dart from an air rifle on Walton Health. The affair, culminated in a show trial; the jailing of the Wheeldon family and the takeover of PMS2 activities by MI5 in April 1917. Although Munitions officials privately expressed a desire to distance the Department from the provocateurs, no-one was arraigned for what became an enduring scandal. (12)

The abuse of power exemplified by PMS2 was unnecessary in the Army, because the existing system of control was quite effective. This was not an outcome of the largely mobilisation of a 'nation at arms' suspending class conflict nor because officers had been transformed into democrats. The pre-war Army had been a class dictatorship and the war did little to change the class-composition of officer corps. (13)

Although diluted by an influx of 'temporary gentlemen' volunteers and a few thousand NCOs promoted from ranks, senior pre-war regular officers controlled the apex of the command structure. They were, even by the conservative standards of Edwardian England, mostly authoritarian, political neanderthals with dictatorial powers which they freely exercised.

Shorn of patriotic flummery and unquantifiable 'fighting spirit' and 'morale' the officers operated a crude but effective system of individual material rewards and coercion. Rewards for soldiers' obedience consisted of regular wages; purportedly good rations; occasional de-lousing, accommodation of varying quality; clothing; home or overseas leave; sports and entertainment; controlled access to alcohol and brothels, and medals. Penalties for wartime breaches of discipline, let alone collective protest, were extremely harsh.

Wartime Army courts-martial found 92% of men guilty as charged - and the Army made a particular point of ensuring that all ranks were regularly paraded to be told of the punishments. Penalties were codified in the Manual of Military Law were used, like the provisions of DORA and the Munitions Act, as a deterrent to the expression of collective grievances. (14)

There was also a carefully cultivated military counterpart to the divisions which fractured civilian trades union and labour organisation. This was expressed in traditional inter-regimental rivalries; distinctions between combat and non-combat units; technical and non-technical formations. At the top, this system was controlled by the War Council and various GHQ officers - whose ideology was informed by eugenicist perspectives associated with the gender, class, race and geographical catchment area from which units were notionally recruited. With few exceptions, the political perspectives of the British High Command were similar to those of Victorian Imperialists and the Tory magnates who controlled British Industry. Collectively, they constituted a corporate dictatorship which uninhibitedly exercised power over a subservient population which it simultaneously gulled and coerced.

This depiction of the British State more than serves to explain why, for example, workmens' and soldiers' councils failed to develop after the 3 June 1917 Leeds Convention. Not only did the gathering take place in the face of covert moves against the event, forming workmen's and soldiers' councils was never its primary objective. The Leeds Convention celebrated the end of Czarist tyranny but otherwise was: 'in essence an organisation formed in order to press for a negotiated settlement of the war rather than for revolutionary change or "dual power"'. (15)

Public meetings, like the one held in Hackney's Brotherhood Church on 28 July 1917, which were subsequently held to convene Councils were dispersed by patriotic mobs. The latter were incited by newspapers like the *Daily Express*, leafletting and Government provocateurs. It is hardly surprising that by mid-October 1917, Basil Thomson concluded that the Workmens' and Soldiers' Councils were moribund. (16)

The effect of the Leeds Convention on the Army rank and file was minimal. Troops stationed at Tunbridge Wells managed to produce a draft manifesto for a Workers' and Soldiers' Council, which General Tagart remarked was too clever for Lance Corporal Dudley, its secretary, to have drafted. (17) The Tunbridge initiative was swiftly quashed when, as Basil Thomson

recalled: 'The leisure which had made the agitation possible was cut short by the unit being called overseas, where they had other things to think about.' (18)

The situation in the British Expeditionary Force in Northern France and Flanders was no more revolutionary. The BEF commander, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig briefly mentioned an exaggerated report of red flags being waved by the Etaples Base mutineers in September 1917 and hinted at possible links with Republican dockers. (19) A few months later, the Canadian Expeditionary Force were frightened into returning their Russian-born troops to Divisional Wings in March 1918. (20)

Rather more significant was an attempt made by soldiers of the 51st Highland Division to form a soldiers' and workers' council in early 1918. This affair involved other ranks, wearing armbands, stencilled with the letters 'SWC' disarming and imprisoning their officers. Further details of this incident have not emerged but after a couple of days the council was suppressed by a counterforce. (21)

For various reasons, including the impact of the British Army retreat of March 1918, the Brest Litovsk Peace Treaty negotiations and a formidable anti-Bolshevik campaign by the British press, bolsheviks did not appear to have featured in any of the British Army mutinies during the rest of 1918. In any case, it is unlikely that mutineers would have called themselves Bolsheviks because it would not have assisted them in negotiations with their officers. However, for their part, it is quite likely that most officers would have abused mutineers by calling their activities Bolshevikist.

This was because during 1918, the press use of the terms 'Bolsheviki', 'Bolshevik' and 'Bolo' became synonymous with what Thomson called 'advanced revolutionaries and pacifists'. Although he maintained: 'A few extremists ... adopt the term applying it to themselves' (22), in December 1918, Thomson himself could not accurately explain the origins of the term Bolshevik. Lenin may have been in power for a year but most British soldiers would not even have known what a Bolshevik was. Even had their curiosity prompted soldiers to find out more about bolsheviks, they would have found it very difficult to discover alternative definitions to the demonic and frequently anti-semitic imagery of bolshevism peddled by the wartime media. This was encouraged by Ministry of Information propagandists and insufficiently challenged by the comparatively weak opposition press. (23) The *Herald* and smaller circulation newspapers which challenged official

depiction of bolshevism were smeared by rumours of subsidies from German or Bolshevik sources. However, in spite of Thomson's repeated efforts to ferret out damning links, they received no cash from enemy nor erstwhile ally. Though some historians have argued to the contrary, even Sylvia Pankhurst's pro-bolshevik People's Russian Information Bureau, founded in September 1918, received no starting-up subsidy from Lenin. (24)

The converse cannot, however, be maintained - for by March 1918, the War Cabinet had clandestinely bought up all the major Russian banks and indirectly, a control of the country's industry and grain trade. This operation was managed by Major General Poole and Colonel Terence Keyes, via the Petrograd financier Karol Jaroszynski. The significance of this highly confidential purchase goes a long way to explain the financial rationale behind British intervention in Russia, for, as Michael Kettle states: 'If the Bolsheviks could now be ousted by military intervention, Britain would have virtual control of the entire economy in the new White Russia.' (25)

The history of the North Russian Expeditionary Force and clandestine efforts made by British secret agents to subvert the Bolshevik Army have been well-enough chronicled. (26) However, the domestic aspect of the Intervention has been less well-explored. Ideologically, the Intervention intensified the re-formulation of the British Government's ideological basis for suppression of working class organisations. Justification for sustaining the war against Labour shifted away from ill-substantiated German plots to the exposure of a succession of almost equally fanciful British Bolshevik intrigues.

If the pattern of wartime unrest in factories was basically a continuation of pre-war unrest, it was replicated in post-war Secret Service operations which had been developed against the extra-parliamentary Left during the war. However, the armistice with Germany altered the situation in the Army. As far as the rank and file were concerned, the German surrender signalled the end of their reason for accepting wartime standards of discipline. This showed itself in a rash of minor confrontations and bust-ups in the closing weeks of 1918. These bothered the Army Council but they were most concerned about bolshevik agitators establishing a foothold in the ranks.

As well as intensifying press propaganda and spying on soldiers, the Army arranged for propaganda speakers to tell units about the evils of bolshevism. This had hardly begun to develop in a major way when a

massive wave of protests and strikes swept the British Army. Occurring principally in the South of England and Northern France during January 1919, most of these affairs focussed on the men's demand for immediate demobilisation. With few exceptions, notably the confrontations at Folkestone, Dover and Whitehall, the demobilisation mutinies were dealt with by local and regional Commands. Their cumulative effect was serious because it caused the Government to accelerate demobilisation. But even the most optimistic socialists never felt it was a prelude to revolution. For example, the British Socialist Party newspaper, *The Call*, on 16 January 1919, commented: 'The soldiers' strike has arisen primarily out of disgust with which the intelligent fighting man regards the attempt to deal with him on the question of demobilisation as with an unreasoning machine and that it is not the outcome of considered revolutionary opinions, it would be foolish to dispute.' (27)

Though the Communist historian Andrew Rothstein has tried to politically inflate these events into a tribute to the Russian Revolution, where a mutinous flag was flaunted it was the Cross of St. George or the Union Jack, rather than a rebellious red banner. Furthermore, few politically significant links were sustained between the mutineers and their turbulent industrial counterparts. (28) However, it was not soldiers' strikes but a rising tide of industrial unrest and the re-activation of the Policemen's Union which led to changes in the regional commands of the Home Defence Intelligence Corps surveillance network. In March 1919 the Corps regraded the Assistant Competent Military Authorities. The ACMAs, senior officers who headed the dozen or so military areas into which the country had been divided during the war, were re-designated from being Deputy Assistant Adjutant General to GS02 (Intelligence). They were ordered:

i) To obtain information as to the industrial situation from Chief Constables, employers of labour, branches of the Labour Ministry, conversations with private acquaintances, and from the study of newspapers.

(ii) To make detailed reconnaissance and tabulate therefrom information as to vulnerable points liable to attack in the case of civil disturbance. (29)

This aspect of the British Army's role in supporting the civil power during the post-war crisis has been written about in a number of books. Less well known, however, is the fact that the Commander in Chief of the British Home Forces, Sir William Robertson was also very worried about the attitude of the rank and file to the

rising tide of civilian social and industrial unrest.

Recognising that successful Army operations in support of the civil power depended on reliable soldiers, Robertson was alarmed about reports that: 'Determined attempts to undermine the stability of the troops by encouraging Bolshevik principles are being made'. (30) Robertson therefore sanctioned the establishment of an organisation to counter the threat. This organisation, whose existence was confided to senior Army Commanders on 4 March 1919, was designated A.2 Branch GHQ G.B.

A2 was accommodated in Whitehall in an office adjacent to Room 101, Horse Guards' Annexe, Carlton Terrace, the Intelligence Headquarters of Home Command. The man selected to recruit, organise and command A.2 was Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Isham, Royal Engineers. Isham was an American who had enlisted in the British Army in 1916 and worked as a cryptographer until 1917. He was then commissioned and saw active service in France as a lieutenant with the Royal Engineers. After being wounded, Isham returned to Britain and by December 1918 was reported to be combatting mutinies, earning the reputation of being 'very successful in this class of work'. (31)

Isham was given a free hand to select his office staff, which consisted of a Major and six other officers. At its inception their work involved:

(a) *Talking to the troops and placing before them the real facts and the devastating effects of Bolshevism.*

(b) *Investigating causes of unrest amongst the troops, in order to ascertain from what source the disaffection springs, and to suggest the means of eliminating such sources.*

(c) *Keeping in close personal touch with Officers Commanding Formations and Unit Commanders, in order to co-ordinate for the benefit of all the experience, information and opinions of each.* (32)

Senior commanders were informed that A.2 Branch Officers would be detailed to visit their units on a routine basis but could also be made available on request. Aside from routine Army reports and information culled from the Home Defence Intelligence Corps, Special Branch and other Secret Service organisations, Isham's staff relied on two other sources for A.2's daily intelligence precis. Firstly, they monitored newspaper reports, mostly via a subscription to a commercial clippings agency but key publications, like the *Daily Herald* and *Workers' Dreadnought* were

personally scanned by A.2 staff.

Secondly, A2 also relied reports from other secret intelligence organisations. These were mainly summaries and spies' reports forwarded to A2 by the Provost Marshal Corps, Special Branch and an employers' espionage network, the National Stability League. Isham seems to have considered himself well-informed from these sources but A2 also employed two full time spies. One was Private Gray, the former leader of a mutiny by Royal Army Service Corps troops based at Kempton Park. Isham, then a Captain attached to HQ London District, had been ordered to investigate the outbreak in early January 1919. He dealt with the affair by getting Pte. No.S420635 G.R. Gray to betray his supporters. Whether by persuasion or bribery, Gray soon became an enthusiastic A2 agent, providing reports on military units and left-wing civilian groups. (34) A2's other full-time agent was Jack Byrnes, who had formerly served with the Royal Engineers. Byrnes appears to have already been spying, possibly for Special Branch, on ex-servicemen when he was engaged by A.2 at a weekly wage of 3 guineas plus expenses. Byrnes concentrated his efforts on infiltrating the British Left to report on revolutionary activities directed at subverting the Army. (35)

All incoming information gathered by A.2 about revolutionary or Bolshevik activity was sifted into four geographically-defined categories: the United Kingdom; Europe; America and Other Foreign Countries. This data was then collated via a card index which was divided into two parts: 'General Information, excluding personal notes' and 'Personal Notes of Individuals who are in any way concerned with Labour, Socialist or Revolutionary activity.' (36)

A2's anti-bolshevik propagandists, principally Isham, Major O.P.L. Hoskyns, Captain A. Cormack; Captain Percy J. King RE and Captain Stanley Parkes RE appear to have addressed meetings of officers and men of virtually every Home Command unit. Isham also conducted a lecture tour of the British Occupation forces in Germany. (37) 'The meaning of Bolshevism and what it has done to Russia' was the subject about which they generally spoke but further details remain unknown. However, a sample of subjects retained in the A.2 registry used to make these presentations, preserves a flavour of the speakers' perspectives: 'Some Pithy Remarks on John Maclean's Creed'; 'Bolshevik Ethics - the Nationalisation of Women'; 'Hackenschmidt on Bolshevism - it means ruin'; 'Proving Officers in the Army of Russia Were Loved Before the Regime of Tyranny Came'; 'Lansbury is Helping a Corrupt Group of German Jewish Capitalists'; 'Politics of Massacre.

Destroying the Foundation of Russian National Life' and 'British Bolshevik Conspiracy'. A further article by an anti-bolshevik British Trades Union Official, classified as 'very good', affirmed that 95% of children had died in Bolshevik-controlled regions. (38)

A.2 propaganda appears to have been an ill-substantiated mess of Carlton Club tittle-tattle, laced with Northcliffe press paranoia and garnished with anti-semitism - but their efforts were hailed in numerous letters of congratulations from HQ Commands. However, as with many similar exercises, it is otherwise impossible to assess the effectiveness of this aspect of the A2's work. The work of Gray and Byrnes is rather easier to evaluate because reports make it clear that the principal organisation against which their efforts were targetted was the Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmen's Union (SSAU). (39)

The original group of men who made up the SSAU came from 'The Discharged Consumptives' Society and Sailors' and Soldiers' Protection Society' (DCSSSPS). The DCSSSPS was an ex-servicemen's welfare initiative, founded in late 1918 by Captain E. S. Donisthorpe (Machine Gun Corps). Assisted by his brother, Donisthorpe co-ordinated the organisation from a bell tent and later a small cottage in Midhurst, Sussex. (40) It was briefly re-named the Sailors' and Soldiers' Union in early 1919, just before the Folkestone mutineers' delegates joined Donisthorpe's organisation. mutiny was being settled. The enlarged 2,000-member organisation elected a new executive committee and decided to change the name to the Sailors', Soldiers' and Airmen's Union. (39)

The Union's association with the Folkestone Mutiny and co-option of mutineers onto its executive committee, drew the SSAU to the attention of other Intelligence agencies. For example, Basil Thomson's 10th March edition of 'Fortnightly Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom and Morale Abroad', expressed particular concern about the SSAU. Compiled from Special Branch sources and circulated to the Cabinet, the Fortnightly Report recorded: 'THE SAILORS', SOLDIERS' AND AIRMEN'S UNION ... a very active and mischievous body ... is becoming bolder. At first it followed the example of the "Comrades of the Great War" in inviting men actually serving to become Honorary members, but it has lately issued a leaflet urging that soldiers should not interfere in labour disturbances. The connection of Captain Donisthorpe, the President, with the Herald League, and the fact that Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy, of the Royal Navy, whose wife lately inherited a considerable fortune, is

believed to be financing the Union, invest it with an importance it would not otherwise deserve. The Executive of the Union are believed to have held a meeting in London a few days ago, at which Kenworthy, Fairchild and other revolutionaries were present. Plans for a coup d'etat of a very childish nature were discussed, and Kenworthy is asserted to have declared that the Navy was ripe for mutiny. Other speakers talked of arms and bombs being secretly stored and of soldiers who were ready to join them in establishing a republic. There is no cause for alarm in this, for such talk is the stock in trade of these extremists when they get together, whenever men such as Stanhope, the secretary, for a speech to serving soldiers during the strike on the tube railways is already being considered.' (41)

From its inception, the SSAU was openly supported by the *Daily Herald*. *Daily Herald* presses printed the SSAU manifesto and reported SSAU branch meetings, usually in the newspaper's 'Soldier's Notes' feature. The newspaper's editor, the ILP veteran and former MP, George Lansbury, also provided printing facilities at the Herald Offices in Gough Square, off Fleet Street - but otherwise left the Union to organise itself.

By the time A.2 launched its covert offensive against the SSAU, the Union Headquarters had temporarily crossed the Thames to 4a Iliffe Yard, in Walworth. A recruiting handbill featuring that address proclaimed the SSAU to be an organisation run on Trades Union principles, with the endorsement of industrial Trade Unions and the Police Union. The SSAU handbill listed eight objectives, which included: improving the status of serving men; adequate maintenance for dependents; improved pensions; no victimisation of Union members; increased pay and shorter hours of duty; official recognition of the SSAU by the Government and the prevention of servicemen being used as strike breakers in industrial disputes. If the objection to troops strike breaking were omitted, the SSAU programme would have been relatively unexceptional. But it was the key element of the programme which had been amplified in an article which was published in the *Dreadnought* on 15th February 1919. The author, a veteran ASE member and militant Shop Stewards' Movement activist and Special Branch informer, W. F. (Billy) Watson revealed a more extensive programme: 'They deserve the backing of the Shop Stewards Movement ... it is also intended, I am told, to link up with the Soldiers and Sailors of all other countries, which would easily prevent the League of Nations becoming a League of Capitalists.'

The link with the Shop Stewards Movement was further endorsed when the SSAU called a meeting at the Orpheum Theatre, Croydon on 12 March 1919. The theatre had recently established itself as a centre used by pacifists and local trades union militants. The police spied on the theatre's management and users - and had arrested industrial militants, like David Ramsay, after meetings held at the Orpheum. (42) The SSAU intended to use the rally express objection to the continuation of military conscription. However, according to the spy (possibly from the National Stability League) who attended the affair, it was not the SSAU General Secretary, Sergeant R.W. Stanhope, nor the President, Captain Donisthorpe, nor the Chairman, ex-Rifleman Henry MacDonald, who controlled the event. Though MacDonald had explained the SSAU objectives and Stanhope retold the tale of the Folkestone mutiny to the audience, the spy recorded that a Russian-born civilian named Eden Paul, 'one of W. F. Watson's gang and who writes in the *Dreadnought* was obviously in command of the proceedings'. (43)

Eden Paul was described as, 'a gaunt, spectacled, long-haired crank, without a collar or tie'. (44) Paul had delivered a speech which linked the recent trials of Watson and David Ramsay with the Rhyll mutiny and rioting which had occurred earlier that day outside Bow Street Police Station. (45) He announced that legal action had been taken to prevent the SSAU amalgamating with the militant Scottish Discharged Workers' Federation, which had supported the Clydeside Workers' Committee. Paul also added that the SSAU would shortly be producing a paper called *The Forces*, which he would be editing. (46)

Ex-Metropolitan Police Inspector Syme, expressing fraternal greetings from the National Union of Police & Prison Officers, delivered the final important speech at the Orpheum Theatre meeting. (47) He deprecated the arrest of David Ramsay, announced that the Government was preparing to deploy a military cordon around London to counter strike action. He finally urged the SSAU to improve relations with the National Federation of Discharged Soldiers and Sailors from whose ranks many members of the former had defected. This report was only one of many which ended up in the A2 registry but it was important because the speakers' statements highlighted issues of common importance to both soldiers and civilians. It was also significant for the absence of detailed references to Bolshevism. In fact the detailed five-page report included only two references to Bolshevism.

The first was an indirect comment by

Sergeant Stanhope, who complained about soldiers who had been forcibly drafted overseas to Russia. The second, more telling reference was made in the final paragraph of the spy's report which commented: 'The peculiarity of this meeting was that it represented the Union of extreme anti-British Bolshevism with men in and discharged from, the British Army. The resolution was somewhat of a blind and several speakers hardly noticed it. The real object of the meeting was to urge soldiers to mutiny if called upon to assist the civil power during coming disturbances.' (48)

More publicly, the *Sunday Times*, on 16 March, featured an article from a 'Trades Union Correspondent' headlined 'Undermining the Army - Bolshevik attempts in this country - scheme outlined'. The text contained many references to A2 propaganda material and opened with a reference to Labour Party opposition to proposed Conscription legislation. It commented: 'Suspicion of the Government's motives have been engendered among all sections of the workers. Agitators have alleged that the real object of the Bill is to create a Conscript force to be used 'for the perpetuation of capitalism and the subjugation of the workers at home.' (49) Echoing the Orpheum Theatre spy's conclusions, the *Sunday Times* correspondent proceeded to report: 'The Sailors' Soldiers' and Airmen's Union ... is being used for the purpose of spreading unrest among the armed forces. The wirepullers discreetly remain in the background in an advisory capacity, and leave the task of appealing for members to misguided ex-servicemen who believe the sold object of the union is to obtain better conditions for their serving and demobilised comrades. The union demands that soldiers shall not be used in any capacity in connection with industrial disputes or strikes, and is endeavouring to obtain recognition for "welfare committees" which are to be established in every unit to put forward the minor grievances of the rank and file. The handiwork of the revolutionary wirepullers can be detected in this programme. The "welfare committees" are to evolve into soldiers' councils of the approved Bolshevik pattern and are then to link up with the Shop Stewards and Workers' Committees, and so form a political body modelled on Soviet lines, which at the appointed moment is to replace Parliament.' (50)

By way of substantiating this thesis, the correspondent referred to a politically speculative article in the Anarchist publication *Freedom*; scoffed at Leftist refutations of the 'nationalisation of women' under Russian Soviet Government - and ended by citing the report of two unnamed delegates of the Norwegian Socialist

Party who, at Lenin's invitation, had visited Russia and returned to: 'tell the tale of a vicious circle of unemployment and starvation.' (51)

Immediately after publication of the *Sunday Times* item, the SSAU leadership fractured. This was principally over the issue of allowing civilians, especially supporters of wartime Conscientious Objectors (including Eden Paul) to join the Union. Stanhope, A.2 noted, had been given a bundle of Socialist and Bolshevik literature to distribute to SSAU members by Paul, and was unsettled by the latter's 'politically extreme' views. When, at a meeting of the SSAU Executive, Stanhope openly stated his misgivings he was promptly sacked by his fellow members. (52)

Captain Donisthorpe, the SSAU President, was then discovered to have spent a third of the £87 SSAU account on personal expenses. With a bank balance reduced to £3.00, the SSAU was forced to vacate the Iliffe Yard premises. Donisthorpe simultaneously tendered his resignation, which was accepted by the four-strong SSAU Executive Committee, which included Jack Byrnes. The ousted pair, Donisthorpe and Stanhope, voiced their disenchantment in different ways. Donisthorpe published a scathing article in *The Times* (23.3.19), entitled 'Undermining the Army - the truth about the SSAU', and promptly departed for South Africa.

Stanhope, who was subsequently discovered by A.2 to have been an Special Branch informer, went to secure redress via Special Branch Police Superintendent MacBrien. MacBrien, however, declined to assist Stanhope to regain control of the SSAU. The chagrined ex-General Secretary was later observed to be working for the *Daily Herald*, supervising the distribution and messenger staff, as well as, speaking at public meetings on behalf of the National Federation of Discharged and Demobilised Soldiers and Sailors. (54)

By the end of April, the SSAU was estimated by Army Intelligence to be in a state of terminal decline, exemplified by a membership that had diminished to 5,000, of whom not more than 200 remained in the Army. From the near-bankrupt state of the SSAU exchequer, it was also apparent that hardly any members had paid their subscriptions (1/3 per week for ex-servicemen and 6d. per month for those still serving in the Armed Forces). (55) Tangible evidence of the numerical weakness of the SSAU was also apparent at the 1919 May Day demonstration in London. Although the procession which made its way from the Embankment to Hyde Park involved 15,000-20,000 people,

the SSAU contingent was estimated at a mere 200-300 men, of whom around half were serving soldiers. (56)

The A.2 spy report on the Hyde Park rally, singled out ex-Rifleman Henry MacDonald and Regimental Sergeant Major Humphreys DCM of the Royal Fusiliers as key speakers delivering speeches from one of eight platforms. In addition to reciting familiar element of the SSAU programme, the spy noted that a resolution was read at all platforms. Prefaced by a bugle call, it 'protested against sending troops to Russia and demanded their withdrawal ...'. (57) All the speakers had also urged the crowd: 'to observe a general strike on 11 May, as this date marks six months after expiration of hostilities, when the Government contract expires.' (58)

It was on this basis, that A.2 spy No.5 reckoned that civilian support for SSAU views was considerable. Isham was informed: 'The demonstration was in reality a great meeting on behalf of the SSAU. The attitude to the enormous crowd shows the present power of the union. All were absolutely in favour of the Conscription Act being repealed.' (59) Logically, the low SSAU turn-out might be taken as evidence of an organisation on the wane, but this was ignored by the A.2 report on the May Day gathering. Instead, Isham concluded that the SSAU had now become a surrogate of the march larger Herald League, whose immediate aim, according to A.2 was: '... to foster discontent amongst all workers so that they may co-operate in any revolutionary movement which might aim at the overthrow of the present system of Society.' (60)

As a national organisation, the SSAU could muster probably fewer than half a dozen branches in London and the Home Counties, with some links in Northern Command. As an autonomous political organisation, posing a direct threat to the Army, A.2 candidly admitted that it was a little more formidable than: 'an extremist attempt at a counterblast to the loyal "Comrades of the Great War" and the "National Federation of Discharged and Demobilised Sailors and Soldiers".' (61)

Diminishing numbers of serving members caused the SSAU to become essentially an organisation for ex-servicemen. Accordingly, A.2 should have handed over the task of combatting the SSAU to Basil Thomson's newly-created Directorate of Intelligence. However, A.2 continued to feel justified in viewing the SSAU as a 'potential' threat to military discipline and as such, Isham argued that A.2 should continue to operate its spy network because of the handful of genuine SSAU activists who were the: 'means of recruiting new

members for the Herald League and of promoting a feeling in the Army hostile to the use of troops in industrial questions.' (62)

Paradoxically, the A.2 mole, Jack Byrnes - who had succeeded Stanhope as the SSAU's General Secretary - worked hard to arrange secure accommodation and with some success extended the life of the organisation he was working to destroy. There was, of course, an ulterior motive, because the SSAU General Secretaryship also placed Byrnes in an important position to furnish A.2 with intelligence about the organisations and personalities who made up London's radical Left. Nor was Byrnes the only member of the SSAU who was a spy. The extent of penetration of the SSAU by Army Intelligence and Special Branch agents may be illustrated by the composition of the Executive Committee meeting held at Chandos Hall on 9 May. Of the fourteen people attending the meeting at least five may be identified from secret reports as either Government agent provocateurs or spies - namely, Pte. Gray, Jack Byrnes, Pte. J.C. Greengrass, W. Mason and Maurice Facey. (63)

This covert surveillance was also matched by sustained overt harassment of both the SSAU and the Herald League. For example, on 8th May, Special Branch officers simultaneously raided both the SSAU offices and the home of ex-Rifleman Henry MacDonald. MacDonald, who also edited the servicemen's advice column 'Tommy's Troubles' in the *Daily Herald*, witnessed the sequestration of all the associated correspondence, as well as the SSAU minute books, and papers. Neither he, or any SSAU leaders were arrested, but MacDonald, an able and articulate organiser, left the SSAU a few days later. (64)

The raid was part of Winston Churchill, the Minister of War's response to MacDonald's May Day exhortations. MacDonald had repeated the call in the *Daily Herald*, reporting: 'that all men who had enlisted under the Derby Scheme should demobilise themselves on 11 May - six months after the armistice of 11th November 1918.' (65) Churchill told the Cabinet: 'It was possible that on this day soldiers might march out of camp and discard their uniforms. He had received information from the Adjutant-General as to the conditions in France, at the Curragh, Kempton Park, Winchester and other centres, to the effect that men might possibly demobilise themselves. The *Daily Herald* had fostered this campaign amongst the men, and the leaders who had been working the affair up had been to see General Childs and confessed to him that they were frightened at the turn events had taken. As

for himself, although affairs were grave, he thought nothing untoward would happen. The commands had been notified and steps taken to meet any great outbreak that may occur.' (66)

The raid on MacDonald's home provoked consternation in the dwindling ranks of the SSAU, who became alarmed at the prospect of further official harassment. (67) Members were also convinced that there was a traitor in their midst and correctly identified Private Gray. Gray promptly disappeared from London but A.2 carried on paying him for his services elsewhere in England and Scotland. (68) Gray's departure was soon followed by Commander Kenworthy MP disaffiliating from the SSAU on 22 May. Winston Churchill interviewed Kenworthy and intimidated the MP into severing links with the SSAU. The MP, fearing a raid by Special Branch, destroyed all SSAU-associated correspondence in his possession. (69) Kenworthy's resignation from the SSAU was a political blow because it meant the organisation now had not MP representing its interest in the House of Commons. It also damaged the SSAU's income because Kenworthy had been paying a subscription of 10/- per week to the organisation. (70)

These losses were not redressed by the links which simultaneously developed between the SSAU, Sylvia Pankhurst and the British Socialist Party (BSP). In spite of allegations of bolshevik funding, direct financial and material support from Sylvia Pankhurst or her Workers' Socialist Federation never seems to have materialised. (71) However, the BSP did honour its promise of assistance with publicity, a limited measure of financial aid and office space at the BSP Headquarters in Whitechapel. SSAU negotiations with the BSP were advanced, if not actually initiated, by Byrnes. It follows that A.2, at the very least, sanctioned this link which sealed association of the SSAU with the BSP.

The SSAU was now very publicly wedded to a socialist organisation, an alliance unequivocally committed to fostering revolutionary change. It was probably on this pretext, if no other, that BSP Secretary Lynes' house was raided by Special Branch a few days after the SSAU moved in with the BSP. (72) Although, the link-up with the BSP was hardly required as a pretext, the Army had also taken formal measures to weaken the SSAU at grassroots level. An Army Council Instruction, forbidding troops to join the SSAU, was promulgated in May 1919. (73)

It was at this juncture that the actions of at least two of the Army Intelligence spies became melodramatically provocative. As

part of a range of SSAU expressions of solidarity with NUPPO Jack Byrnes had promised the full support of the SSAU for a proposed strike by the police on 1 June. The NUPPO action, backed by a ballot of its members, aimed to secure official recognition for the Union, a pay rise and reinstatement of a dismissed NUPPO activist.

A couple of days before the Hyde Park demonstration that could have launched the Police Union action, Byrnes had met with Sgt. Hayes, one of the Police Strike leaders. An eyewitness summary, incorporated in a spy's account which was forwarded to A.2 by the Provost Marshal's office, detailed what Byrnes had reported back to the SSAU Executive: '... that although the SSAU are not yet in a position to call a strike of troops, every endeavour will be made to distribute suitable literature amongst the troops ... In the event of a Police strike, Byrnes said that the Triple Alliance will strike in sympathy, and that this action would result in the proclamation of Martial Law. Byrnes stated that he had studied the disposition of the Guards Division, which practically encircled London and that upon a promise of support from the unions in the Triple Alliance, would undertake to prevent the arrival in London of any of these troops ... both Facey and Byrnes produced revolvers and declared their intention to die fighting, in the event of Martial Law being proclaimed.' (74)

Government contingency planning certainly did involve military aid to the civil power and a draft Bill had been prepared for quick submission to Parliament in any emergency, placing the police under a disciplinary code similar to that of the Army. However, Byrnes' was incorrect in asserting that support for NUPPO had been pledged by the miners', railwaymen and transport trade unionists who made up the Triple Alliance. In fact the Parliamentary Labour Party opposed the police strike and George Lansbury was the only major Left-wing figure to support the Police militants' abortive action when it materialised in August 1919. Byrnes' undertaking that he could, in the event of a Police strike, prevent the deployment of the Guards was fraudulent. (75)

In the event, few soldiers featured at the NUPPO Hyde Park rally on 1 June and ex-servicemen of the NFDSS were actually hostile to the Police. The friction had arisen after recent a violent confrontation outside Parliament between ex-soldiers and the police on 26th May. NUPPO's organiser, Hayes' subsequent press statement blamed the violence which occurred on 'militarism in the Police' and called for 'closer linking up of the Police with organised labour', did

little to placate ex-servicemen.

Byrnes' and Facey's behaviour contrasted sharply with the apparent quiescence of the SSAU during and after mid-June. This was borne out by another Army Intelligence spy's report, forwarded to A.2 during June by Lieutenant Colonel S. H. J. Thunder from the Provost Marshal's Office. He stated: 'There is no intention on the part of members of the SSAU of creating any disturbance neither is any literature being prepared which would be likely to cause disaffection in any section of the community. The only literature in circulation at the moment is this month's issue of the Forces.' (76) Headed: 'Trades Unions are now rendering financial assistance and I understand that there is now no anxiety on account of funds... In future the Executive Committee will convene meetings in secret periodically and in such places as may be convenient; this measure is being taken to evade the attentions of the Police who are thought to be keeping observation upon the activities of certain members of the Union.' (77)

Nor could SSAU Executive Committee members be assured of an appreciative audience when they made public their rejection of allegiance to the Crown. When, on 17th June, Private Greengrass exhorted a crowd attending an SSAU meeting at Hyde Park to: 'tear up the Union Jack as it only stood for tyranny and oppression and to scatter it to the winds'. He was driven from the platform by angered listeners. Though he managed to make good his escape, SSAU members were unimpressed by his rhetoric, rightly concluding that Greengrass was really acting as an: 'agent provocateur for the Government'. (78)

Another, more influential means of communicating SSAU propaganda was almost simultaneously blocked on 4 July, when the Army Council informed the Newspapers Association that because: 'the *Daily Herald* is deliberately trying to undermine the discipline of the Army, they have decided that they cannot continue to authorise the provision of funds for the distribution of this paper to the troops in overseas theatres of war.' (79) However, an Army Council secret order for copies of the *Daily Herald* to be summarily incinerated at Brigade Post Offices had been circulated to the British Army of Occupation in Germany a fortnight earlier on 23 June. (80)

The SSAU's own magazine, *The Forces*, remained the other main device by which the organisation's message could be publicised- but the third and final edition of the magazine was not produced by the SSAU Executive. Although, Byrnes was credited with authorising its production, it was W. R. Halls, a solitary, self-styled SSAU

Organiser from Hornsey, London, who raised the 40 necessary to print the 5000 copies of *The Forces*. Of Halls, Byrnes reported: 'The general opinion is that this man is of unsound mind.' (81)

Despite the surfacing of occasional references in August, the Intelligence summary circulated to the Ministry of Munitions at the end of October 1919, reported: 'The Sailors', Soldiers' and Airmen's Union, an association with extremist views is now practically defunct. Its leaders are now attempting to save it from dissolution by proposing to amalgamate with the International Union of Ex-Servicemen, a small but vigorous Glasgow organisation.' (82)

The amalgamation between the SSAU and the revolutionary INUX, which had first been discussed at a meeting in June, came to nothing. The threat, which Home Command declared the SSAU posed to good order in the Army, had ended. However, the clandestine activities of A.2 continued at least for a further three months. A2's spies continued to scour public and secret gatherings of the Left even though it was apparent that there was no prospect of Bolshevik soldier's councils being established. Operations were maintained in spite of Field Marshal Haig's declared opposition to what became A.2's principal activity after the demise of the SSAU - namely, infiltrating civilian organisations. (83) At a meeting with Basil Thomson in June 1919, Haig announced that he: 'would not authorise any men being used as spies. Officers must act straightforwardly and as Englishmen.' (84) At the end of January 1920, the Intelligence section of GHQ Home Forces was declared to have been dismantled. A2 and Home Defence Intelligence Corps' responsibilities were either taken over by MO4 (X) (nominally a civil/military emergency liaison section under the command of General Romer), MI5 or Special Branch. (85)

In reviewing the brief history of A2's history, it has to be admitted that it succeeded in securing covert information about the SSAU and other radical organisations. However, A2 data was not superior to that secured in the same manner by Special Branch nor can it be said that A.2 alone defeated the SSAU. To be fair, A2 never claimed sole credit for having destroyed the SSAU. Even before the May Day Rally, Isham rightly concluded that other developments had doomed the SSAU. He cited increased rates of pay and an accelerated demobilisation programme as the principal reasons why the appeal of the SSAU to service personnel declined even before SSAU membership was proscribed. Nor could Isham be faulted in his contention that the SSAU was out-classed, when it

came to recruiting ex-soldiers, by bigger and better organised rival organisations like the NFDSS. However, Isham's simultaneous assertions that SSAU leadership was incompetent, given to squabbling and making political statements that alienated SSAU members have to be qualified. The key SSAU leaders were controlled by either A2 or Special Branch and sometimes claimed payments from both the War Office and Scotland Yard. Byrnes, Stanhope, Facey, Gray, Greengrass and kindred spies, repeatedly acted as agents provocateurs. Unchallenged, if not encouraged, by A2 officers, Byrnes and his associates breached the objectives which had been originally sanctioned by Robertson. A2 infiltrated the SSAU Executive and used the Union as an organisational Trojan Horse with which to penetrate left-wing civilian organisations.

Aside from the political rhetoric expressed in SSAU speeches, and lurid allegations by A.2 agents of secret revolutionary agendas, there is little evidence that the SSAU was originally anything more than what it purported to be - an initiative to secure a better deal for service and ex-service personnel.

The reported existence of Reds in the ranks during 1919 was not the consequence of contemporary bolshevik intrigue; it was very much a legacy of the British ruling junta and wartime propaganda. Reds in the ranks was also a convenient enough pretext to create A2. But it must be emphasised, A.2 was only one of a succession of initiatives conducted by employers and Lloyd George's regime, by which it was intended to neutralise British working class movements during 1919. It is quite clear from numerous reports contained in Isham's papers (now deposited at Yale University) that a significant number of British left-wing stalwarts were actually provocateurs and their groups' revolutionary potential needs re-assessing.

The secrecy of A.2's operations was preserved so that, unlike PMS2, it did not attract public criticism. However, the official covert congratulations A2 attracted from the War Office, including a C.B.E. for Isham, were unequivocal endorsements of official approval for A2's skulduggery against the British Left and latterly against Michael Collins and the IRA.

[Next Issue: Part 2: A2 and the IRA]



Notes:

1. B.H. Thomson - *Queer People* (London:1922), pp.424-5. Knighted in 1919, Thomson was Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police 1913-19; Director of Intelligence, Home Office 1919-21.
2. K. Jeffrey, P. Hennessy - *States of Emergency* (London:1983), p.5.
3. 250,000 strikers - computed from various War Office and India Office communications and a survey of local press reports.
4. J.E. Edmonds, H.R. Davies - *History of the Great War: Military Operations, Italy 1915-1919* (London:1949) pp.386-7; W.F. Elkins - *A Source of Black Nationalism in the Caribbean: The Revolt of the British West Indies Regiment at Taranto, Italy* (Science & Society - Spring 1970, pp. 99 - 103).
5. W. Kendall - *The Revolutionary Movement in Britain 1900-21* (London:1969), pp. 194-5.
6. A. Rothstein - *The Soldiers Strikes of 1919* (London:1980), p. 106.
7. Only three soldiers were convicted and shot for mutiny under the British Army Act during the war. Egyptian and Chinese labourers were gunned down when they struck work in France during 1917 but no white New Zealand Mounted Brigade cavalrymen were punished for massacring over 50 Arab villagers at Surafend on 10.12.18. See: J. Putkowski - *Toplis, Etaples & The Monocled Mutineer* (Stand To! No.18:Winter 1986, pp. 8-9); N. Boyack - *Behind the Lines* (Wellington, NZ:1989), pp.163-7.
8. Intelligence Circular No.15, December 1917, p.1, Public Records Office (PRO), Kew: AIR 1/720/36/1.
9. R. Challinor - *The Origins of British Bolshevism* (London:1977), p. 150.
10. K. Middlemas - *Politics in Industrial Society* (London:1979), p. 114
11. *Ibid.*, p.112
- 11a. J. Hope - *Surveillance or Collusion? Maxwell Knight, MI5 and the British Fascisti* (forthcoming: Intelligence & National Security).
12. N. Hiley, *British Internal Security in Wartime: The Rise and Fall of PMS2 1915-1917*; N. Hiley & J. Putkowski, *Postscript to PMS 2* (Intelligence & National Security, vol.1, 1986); S. Rowbotham, *Friends of Alice Wheeldon* (London: 1986); M. Durham, *Death of an English Socialist* (*Independent on Sunday*, 13.9.92).
13. See: P.E. Razzell - *Social origins of officers in the Indian and British Home Army 1758-1962* (British Journal of Sociology, 14, No.3. Sept. 1963).
14. *Statistical Abstract of Information Regarding the Armies at Home and Abroad 1914-20* (War Office:1920), p.642.
15. S. White - *Soviets in Britain: The Leeds Convention of 1917* (International Review of Social History, XIX, pt.2, 1974, p. 192)
16. Report of Supt. P. Quinn, Special Branch, 28.7.17 et al, *The Brotherhood Church Riot 1917*, PRO:MEPO3/150; K. Weller - *Don't Be A Soldier!* (London: 1985), pp. 56-7.
17. *Ibid.* WO32/5455, p.4.
18. B.H.T[homson]. - *Bolshevism in England*, 28.12.1918, PRO: FO371/3300, p. 362.
19. Haig Diary, 22.9.17
20. Canadian Army Corps, A. & Q. 1915-19 War Diary, 5.3.18, 11.4.18, PRO: WO95/1056.
21. Sir Philip Christison, unpublished memoirs, Imperial War Museum.
22. *Ibid.* FO 371/3300, p. 365.
23. C. Holmes - *Antisemitism in British Society 1870-1939* (London:1978).

24. M. Swartz - *The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War* (Oxford:1971), 181-7; in FO371/3300, p.367. Though Kendall (ibid.) maintains the P.R.I.B. received funds for Bolshevik agitation, his allegation is unsupported by Thomson (ibid. 28.12.18, FO371/3300), who makes no reference to Pankhurst's receipt of such subsidies being forwarded from Russia.
25. M. Kettle - *The Road to Intervention* (London: 1988), Preface.
26. *Ibid.*; see also: J. Plotke - *Imperial Spies Invade Russia* (Westport USA:1993).
27. *The Call*, 16.1.19
28. Ex-Colour Sgt. Guff, *The Soldiers' Strikes* - Review (Solidarity, London, No.14, Oct-Nov. 1980, pp. 14-5); G. Dallas, D. Gill - *The Unknown Army* (London:1985), Chs. 9 - 12; almost any contemporary local newspaper published in the South-East of England.
29. PRO: WO32/553 March 1919.
30. Brigadier General D.A.G., Great Britain to G.O.C. in C. Aldershot Command, 4.3.19, Isham Papers: 1/1.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*
33. Organisation of the Branch Office - A.2. Branch. G.H.Q. G.B., n.d, Isham Papers: 1/1.; 2/25.
34. PRO: WO329 Medal Roll; Isham Papers: 1/10; 1/11-13; 1/2.
35. Isham Papers: 1/6.
36. *Op. cit.*, 33.
37. Isham Papers: 2/15 Papers for France; 2/16 Lectures - Private Notes & Memoranda.
38. Isham Papers: 1/2, Precis of Papers received in A2 Branch, 8.4.19 - circa 28.8.19.
39. Isham Papers: 1/6, Byrnes, John C. [Agent No.8]; 1/10, 1, 12, 13 Gray, G.R..
40. Service Notes, 28.12.18 - *Herald*; Undermining the Army - *Sunday Times*, 16.3.19; 23.3.19; *The Sailors' Soldiers' and Airmen's Union* - *Sunday Times* 6.4.19; Isham Papers: 4/42, S.S. & A.U. Meetings etc., March - June 1919.
41. Fortnightly Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom and Abroad, 10.3.19 in PRO: CAB 24/76 GT6976.
42. "Of Leicester, Dartford and Walthamstow. A dangerous agitator with criminal ideas closely resembling the methods of the I.W.W.". Arrested and charged with inciting sedition for a speech at Croydon Orpheum Theatre, Ramsay, a pattern-maker, was jailed for 5 months on 8.3.19. Isham Papers: 2/40, David Ramsay, pp.1 - 4; An Injury to One is an Injury to All - *The Masses*, Vol.2, No.1, April 1919.
43. W.F. "Billy" Foster Watson, an engineer and friend of Ramsay's, was a veteran industrial militant. He was president of the London Workers' Committee; assisted Sylvia Pankhurst to establish the P.R.I.B. and was arrested for making a seditious speech at the "Hands Off Russia" meeting at the Albert Hall on 8.2.19; Weller, *ibid.*, pp. 60-2. R.W. Stanhope, Royal Fusiliers, had been elected secretary of the Folkestone mutineers. MacDonald edited the *Herald's*, "Service Notes" and "Tommy's Troubles" features.
44. Maurice Eden Paul was a professional translator and militant socialist.
45. Report of the Meeting at Orpheum Cinema held Sunday March 9th 1919...- National Stability League Report No.3230, p.3 in Isham Papers: 2/32. The Rhyll mutiny is detailed in J. Putkowski - *The Kinmel Park Camp Riots 1919* (Flintshire Historical Society Journal, vol. 32, 1989, pp. 55-107).
46. *Ibid.*
47. Inspector John Syme, dismissed from the Metropolitan Police in 1910 after complaining about his superiors; repeatedly jailed in his campaign against police injustice and corruption; founder and secretary of the National Union of Police and Prison Officers (N.U.P.P.O.) 1913-17. Ousted from the N.U.P.P.O. committee, Syme was subsequently almost as critical of the organisation as he was of his former employers but he claimed he was at the meeting at the request of the militant N.U.P.P.O. organiser PC Jack Zollner. See G.W. Reynolds, A. Judge - *The Night the Police went on Strike* (London:1968); PRO: MEPO series contains a number of files on Symes' activities and N.U.P.P.O..
48. *Ibid.*, 47, p.5.
49. *The Times*, 16.3.19.
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.*
52. Report of No."5", Sailors, Soldiers and Airmen's Union, 12.3.19 - Isham Papers: 3/42
53. Untitled Memo., signed J.C.Byrnes, circa. early June 1919, pp. 1-3. Isham Papers: 1/8.
54. Report of No."5", Sailors, Soldiers and Airmen's Union, 24.3.19. Isham Papers: 3/32.
55. Memo: The Growth of the Sailors, Soldiers and Airmen's Union, Lt.Col H. de Watteville, GHQ GB, 2.5.19, para. 22; Report by No."5", The May Day Procession and the SSAU, 1.5.19, Isham Papers: 3/42. *Portsmouth Evening News*, 12.3.19.
56. *Ibid.*, Memo., 2.5.19.
57. *Ibid.*
58. *Ibid.*
59. Report by No."5", The May Day Procession and the SSAU, 1.5.19, Isham Papers: 3/42.
60. *Ibid.* 55, Memo., para. 12.
61. *Ibid.*, para. 20.
62. *Ibid.*, para. 21.
63. Ex-Pte. J. Cecil Greengrass RASC No. 360600, 109, Bravington Road, London W9, nominally employed as a War Office clerk; W. Mason, 3, George Street, Romford, Romford SSAU Branch chairman; National Union of Ex-Servicemen Romford Branch member; worked as barrel cooper in Limehouse. J. Maurice Facey, 48, Cornwall Road, London W11, employed (December 1919) at the Labour Research Department, Eccleston Square, London SW1. Details collated from: Isham Papers: 1/7, 1/8, 1/11-13; 2/25, 21.8.19. *Romford Times* 21.1.20.
64. Isham Papers: 3/42, SSAU, 9.5.19.
65. *Daily Herald*, 9.5.19.
66. PRO: CAB 23/10/WC564, 8.5.19.
67. Isham papers: 3/42, 16.5.19.
68. *Ibid.*
69. *Ibid.*, 67.
70. *Ibid.*, 23.5.19.
71. Kendall (p.246) maintains that Axel Zacharaissen and other Comintern agents brought large sums of money to fund subversion in London and hints that Sylvia Pankhurst received more than the £280 she admitted in the *Dreadnought* (16.8.19). Byrnes reported, "The Norwegian has handed Sylvia Pankhurst £300. He was known to have brought £5 to £7,000 also propaganda. In London two weeks" (22.7.19); "Sylvia Pankhurst is suspected of being a Government agent and giving the Norwegian away" (25.7.19). From A2 reports, proof of Comintern aid is far from conclusive but the allegations generated an atmosphere of suspicion in revolutionary circles. Zacharaissen's arrest at SSAU Executive member, ex-Pte. E. Perryman's home in Camberwell appears to have been Maurice Facey's work. Was "Red gold" circa 1919 a Special Branch disinformation exercise? Certainly no funds ended up in the SSAU exchequer. Isham Papers: 1/7, 11.6.19; 1/8, 22.7.19, 23.7.19 25.7.19; 2/25 21.8.19.
72. Isham Papers: 3/42, 30.5.19, 2.6.19.
73. Isham Papers: *ibid.*, 22.5.19.
74. *Ibid.*, 30.5.19.
75. G.W. Reynolds, A. Judge - *The Night the Police went on Strike* (London: 1968), p. 137.
76. Isham Papers: 3/42 Soldiers Sailors and Airmen's Union and alleged attempts to create riots upon the occasion of the signature of peace... [poss. from No."5", circa.] 20.6.19.
77. *Ibid.*
78. *Ibid.*
79. *Daily Herald*, 4.7.19.
80. *Ibid.*, 8.7.19.
81. Isham Papers: 1/8, 28.7.18, p.1.
82. PRO: MUN 5/55/300/47 pt. 2, CP25: 29.10.19 The Labour Situation, p.374.
83. Haig took over from Robertson as Commander-in-Chief, Great Britain in April 1919.
84. *Ibid.*, Jeffrey, Hennessy, p.14.
85. *Ibid.*; A.C. Brown - *The Secret Servant* (London: 1988), p.114. MO4(X) was controlled by Major-General C.F. Romer, Major Torr from GHQ GB and Major Stewart Menzies (Churchill's futurespymaster). Home Defence Intelligence Corps reports have been preserved in the PRO: AIR1/558/16/15/55 *et seq.*. See D. Englander - *Mutiny and Myopia* (Journal of Labour History, vol. 52, No. 1, 1987) pp. 5-32.





Jim Garrison

JFK Assassination

Deep Politics and the Death of JFK Peter Dale Scott

(University of California Press, London, 1993)

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Passport to Assassination: The never-before-told story of Lee Harvey Oswald by the KGB Colonel who knew him

Col Oleg Maximovich Nechiporenko
(Birch Lane Press, US, 1993)

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Destiny Betrayed: JFK, Cuba and the Garrison Case James DiEugenio

(Sheridan Square Press, New York, 1992)

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The Last Investigation

Gaeton Fonzi
(Thunder's Mouth Press, New York, 1993)

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The Man Who Knew Too Much

Dick Russell
(Carroll & Graf, New York, 1992)

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Lee Harvey Oswald: The CIA and Mexico City (Part I and II) Dan Hardway and Edwin Lopez (Sanitised version, declassified under the FOIA, 21.8.93)

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JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue and the Struggle for Power

John M Newman
(Warner, New York, 1992)

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I haven't put Gerald Posner's new book on the list because it is so appalling and not really worth wasting time on. As US vice-president Al Gore said when asked about Posner's claim that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone, 'It's only a book.' Gore remains convinced that JFK's assassination was the result of a conspiracy and Posner is unlikely to change opinions. (You may like to know though that due to the legal intervention of Anthony Summers, Posner's book is not the same as the American version). The current fad for single-assassin, non-conspiracy theory books and the accompanying articles in the press supporting the Warren Commission would appear to be no more than a media reaction (or head-snap) to Oliver Stone's movie, *JFK*, which achieved astonishing

publicity and commercial success. The conspiracy books still keep coming.

About four years ago, at a cocktail party in London, I was talking to a leading American literary agent about JFK assassination books. In conversation I mentioned that as an assassination buff, I had always fancied writing a book on the case. He said that he could sell one very easily if I named the assassins - he was not too concerned about who they might be, any culprit would do. I replied that we do not know enough at this stage to do that but I thought that there was one area which deserved re-investigation, namely, the Garrison inquiry. After explaining the background to this and what went on during 1966-69 in New Orleans, the agent said that he understood the interest but did not think the story would sell. Just six months later, when I was well into writing a different book, the news was that Oliver Stone was making a film based on Garrison. Such are the missed opportunities that we all experience.

Over the Christmas and New Year holidays, I managed to sit down and read a selection of assassination books; the first was DiEugenio's on the Garrison case. Unfortunately, despite an earlier positive review by Scott Newton (*Lobster* 24), the book turned out to be a major disappointment and, more importantly, a wasted opportunity. Essentially it is a review of the existing literature. I have no problem with that, but its analysis is so pro-Garrison and out to make the District Attorney a hero that interest and usefulness soon dissipate. None of the important questions about the inquiry are tackled or, if they are mentioned at all, are invariably tucked away, barely explored, in a footnote. For instance, how and why was the inquiry set up? Who were the businessmen who funded Truth and Consequences Inc, the mysterious trust which enabled Garrison to carry out his investigation? Astonishingly, DiEugenio does not explore the Hoffa/Partin angle and the generally accepted theory that the inquiry was instigated (or, better, manipulated) by pro-Hoffa forces out to crush his chief opponent and witness against him, Edwin Partin. Without this essential piece of the jigsaw, the role of Robert Kennedy stooge, Walter Sheridan, who did so much to monitor and sabotage the inquiry, is barely understood. I would also have liked to have known more about Sheridan's links to the National Security Agency and more about the CIA's role in undermining the inquiry. Some of this information is already in the public domain.

There are positive points in the book's favour but these are more than outweighed by the negatives. To say that there was not

a degree of homophobia about what I still believe was the persecution of New Orleans businessman, Clay Shaw, is simply not true. Or does DiEugenio believe that the whip and other items which were prominently displayed for the edification of newspaper readers after Garrison's men raided Shaw's flat were, in fact, an essential part of the assassination of JFK?

Depressingly, DiEugenio (and Scott Newton in his review) recycle the old conspiracy stuff about the role of the mysterious European company, Permindex, in the assassination. Despite reference to declassified State Department files on the company, no more is revealed than that which I attempted to dissect in *Lobster 2* (I thank Paul Hoch for distributing this article to interested parties, which DiEugenio deliberately ignored). Further, while he mentions Anthony Week's groundbreaking article in *Lobster 20* on Shaw's personal British connections, he fails to tackle the homosexual angle.

There is some welcome new information on Shaw's CIA inks but little more than what we already knew. Shaw was probably connected to OSS during the Second World War, and later a businessman who travelled a great deal and acted as a 'contact agent' for the CIA. He was no different to many a hundred others who supplied low-grade information to the CIA. Low-grade and, from the information offered in the book, of no great importance but obviously a great embarrassment to the CIA hierarchy when Garrison decided to go after him. On Shaw's supposed role in the assassination, there remains not a shred of evidence.

To be fair, and the reason why I was initially so interested in the inquiry, Garrison did choose to focus on one important character, namely David Ferrie. Garrison probably overplayed Ferrie's CIA links and his supposed role in the assassination, but he was important because of his connection to Oswald and his strange behaviour after the assassination (searching for Oswald's library ticket and disappearing into Texas to go duck shooting). Peter Dale Scott speculates, to good effect, in his new book that Ferrie was most likely not a conspirator but, like Oswald, another patsy, set up to take the flak.

Unfortunately, Garrison's botched investigation, which was indeed subject to intense pressure and manipulation, became sidelined in the interesting, but probably irrelevant, pursuit of Shaw. The ensuing muddying of the waters made the pursuit of the truth a great deal more difficult and its effects are still with us today.

A fair number of characters have popped up over the years who have, similarly,

muddied the waters by claiming to have had some involvement in the conspiracy. A leading example is Richard Case Nagell, who claimed to have worked for the CIA and to have been hired to kill Oswald in order to prevent the assassination. He made an appearance during the Garrison inquiry but was not called as a witness to Shaw's trial. DiEugenio suggests that this was Garrison's biggest mistake since Nagell's evidence would have confirmed Shaw's CIA links. On the contrary, this was probably Garrison's most astute decision.



Clay Shaw

I was asked by a British publisher to read Dick Russell's massive 825-page tome on Nagell for possible publication in this country. I informed the publisher that it deserved to be published since it contained some very good new information, principally on Oswald in Mexico City. However, it would need to be edited and pruned by about a half to make it a worthwhile proposition. All assassination buffs want to publish the assassination book. Unfortunately, the majority are basically rubbish. All too often, authors throw in everything they know, including the kitchen sink; quantity outweighs quality.

Dick Russell is a good investigator and writer but he has produced what is essentially a non-book. What he has achieved but is afraid to admit to the reader, and perhaps to himself, having spent a great deal of time, effort and money, is the proof that Nagell has nothing to do with Oswald and is probably psychiatrically ill; still suffering from the effects of a head injury sustained during the Korean War. As so often in this type of case, when Nagell is asked to produce the evidence that he claims to possess, he backs away. By the end of the book the only conclusion that can be drawn is that there is none.

For the buff who wants everything, the Russell book will be a must, but for those of with only an occasional interest much more worthy is Gaeton Fonzie's excellent update

and expansion of his long article, 'Who killed John F Kennedy?', which originally appeared in the *Washingtonian* magazine in November 1980. It is a personal account of the problems encountered surrounding the setting up and running of the House Select Committee on the Assassinations in the late seventies. It also continues the hunt for 'Maurice Bishop', the anti-Castro intelligence operative who 'ran' the Alpha 66 leader, Antonio Veciana, and who is supposed to have met with Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas, shortly before the assassination (no evidence has ever been produced for the last assertion).

His account of the machinations in Washington may be very one-sided - he was, after all, a field agent away from the main political battleground - but it is informative and entertaining. It also suggests that a fruitful subject for further research - and another book - would be the events leading up to the formation and then the day-to-day running of the Select Committee on Assassinations. (For instance, what precisely was Robert Murrow's role in all this? He appears to have been an influence on some senators and, according to a source who spoke to me, a close friend of James Angleton).

Fonzie provides new evidence which builds the case against the CIA disinformation specialist, David Atlee Phillips, concluding that Phillips and 'Bishop' were indeed one and the same person (see *Lobster 10*, 'Afterword: The Search for Maurice Bishop' for the background on this area). If Bishop was one person, and not a composite of two or more intelligence contacts then Fonzie's case against Phillips would appear to be overwhelming. However, one little (large?) niggle remains: Veciana never did acknowledge that Phillips was 'Bishop', even after Phillips was dead. Instead, he enigmatically repeated, 'he knows'. What did he mean?

Perhaps Veciana did know Phillips and had seen 'Bishop' with him. If so, who could Bishop be? I venture to suggest that investigation of Phillips' friend and CIA colleague, Henry (Heinrich) Heckscher, would be of interest. A man of the right and of fierce anti-communist views, his career curiously parallels that of Phillips. Ex-OSS/CIC, Heckscher had been a senior officer in German after the war, working with Allen Dulles' DAD, and during the time of the 1953 riots had been chief of base in Bonn. Phillips and Heckscher were both involved in the coup in Guatemala, with the latter the senior man. Heckscher was station chief in Laos between 1958 and 1961, followed by stint as attaché in Caracas. (He may have had a brother, August, who was a CIA linked journalist with the *NY Herald Tribune*). In the *Lobster 10* article on

'Bishop', I listed Heckscher's name but did not then know who he was. According to an unknown informer, in Mexico Heckscher was responsible for running Alpha 66 - is that interesting or not? Phillips and Heckscher teamed up again after the assassination in the Dominican Republic and later on in the sixties/early seventies when Heckscher was head of station in Chile, with Phillips responsible for operations against Allende. Did anyone ever show Heckscher's photograph (aged fifty-three in 1963) to Veciana?

Interestingly, despite being one of the very best investigator's around, Fonzie does not mention David's brother, James Atlee Phillips, who, under the pseudonym 'Philip Atlee', wrote around twenty thrillers. The series' hero is 'Joe Gall' who worked for the CIA as a counter-espionage operative and was forced to become a freelance agent because of his involvement in the Bay of Pigs operation (*Spy Fiction: A Connoisseur's Guide*, Donald McCormick and Kay Fletcher, Facts on File, 1990, pp 24/25).

Fonzie is a good writer and *The Last Investigation* should be published in this country; it comes highly recommended. The book is welcome because it does have new information and helps counter the feeling, which appears to be growing, that the investigation of the assassination has run into the ground. There is a feeling of despondency, especially among those who have been painstakingly researching the case from the beginning. Some, naturally, are disillusioned by the activities of the buffs themselves, who continue to produce endless recycles of old material and bizarre new conspiracy theories that only serve to distance us from the truth. Will we ever get to the bottom of the conspiracy?

Although it may seem slightly pompous for someone on the other side of the Atlantic to say it, I hope that the true keepers of the faith stay on board, because now is not the time to give up. Fonzie makes the point in his conclusion that it is not enough merely to change the climate of opinion, as has been achieved in the United States; it is important that the search for the facts and the truth continues. In a review of my own book, *The Silent Conspiracy*, Colin Challen posited that 'some of [the] uglier facts' about the secret state can be obscured by his meticulous concern for evidence. . . that same evidence may well bury rather than inspire the campaign for reform, he espouses'. As Fonzie concludes, that sort of notion is dangerous nonsense. Widespread knowledge of evil doing does not in itself produce results. Inspiring rhetoric based on limited information is easily displaced in the kind of media saturated society we live in. In fact, all that it tends to produce is apathy. It is only the

'meticulous concern for evidence', Fonzie concurs, which, in the end, brings forth reform.

It has to be admitted that Oliver Stone's faction movie did have one important consequence. The Clinton administration have re-invigorated the FOIA and helped to push for the release of JFK files from the HSCA. The most important of these is the detailed study of the 'visits' by 'Oswald' to the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City. The Mexico City angle would appear to be one of the ways forward.

Much of the, till now, classified report was, in fact, outlined in *Lobster* 10 (with thanks to Anthony Summers). Those leaks stand up well. What becomes apparent from reading the HSCA report and additional material which was shown on the three hour American version of the (1.5 hour) BBC2 *Timewatch* programme on the assassination, is that the CIA Mexico Station did, indeed, have a photograph of the real Oswald in Mexico. There were also tape recordings of Oswald which were in existence long after the assassination. These were passed to Warren Commission investigators and may even be in existence still. Key CIA personnel, Ann Goodpaster and, unsurprisingly, David Phillips, lied repeatedly to HSCA investigators. The reasons why have remained unclear but there is now strong evidence that there was a second person on the photograph and that he was recognised as a CIA agent.

It had been thought that there was an Oswald impostor in Mexico but my own opinion, based on an admittedly quick reading of a vast amount of new material on Mexico City, is that it was the real Oswald who made the strange visits to both embassies. From his behaviour, not only at the embassies but also at the local university campus, the possibility exists that Oswald was continuing his role as a COINTELPRO-type agent; the attempt to gain a visa to Cuba (I don't believe that he had any intention of actually going, or leaving for the Soviet Union), the final link in his smearing of the pro-Castro, leftist activists.

Incidentally, research undertaken for the *Timewatch* programme (from which Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swann removed their names) which was not broadcast, shoots down all those right-wing conspiracy theories about the role in Mexico City of KGB Officer and alleged assassination expert, Valery Kostikov. I find it curious, however, from studying the cables between Mexico City and CIA headquarters, that while Kostikov's identification following his contact with Oswald, caused a substantial bureaucratic flap in Virginia, the Mexico City station

displayed no excitement at all at the mention of his name. Something very odd was going on.

Clearly, too, little was going on in the Soviet embassy. Nechiporenko's book is a welcome addition to the knowledge of Oswald in the USSR and confirms the view that the KGB dealt with the false defector at arms length. It is, though, rather let down by some second-grade theorising on Oswald's true role.

Peter Dale Scott provides an illuminating addition to the continuing research by outlining a scenario in which Oswald works for a private agency as the sponsor for his activities; one with links to the intelligence community. Scott's method of working and the way he thinks contrasts sharply with the majority of other buffs, even though they are in many cases, using the same material. He rarely has new material from interviews but instead concentrates on digging deep into already published material. Scott discovers those forgotten books or reports which others have missed but which add a new dimension to the inquiry. Once he has the material, instead of making a simple connection between A and B, Scott will consider the implications of the relationship. An obscure example might be Ferrie's relationship to the semi-underground religious Orthodox Old Catholic Church of North America, which cropped up during the Garrison inquiry; Paris Flammonde claimed that Ferrie was 'involved' with it, presumably on the basis that it was, according to Flammonde, 'controlled and peopled by homosexuals'. Scott's reading of the material is that Ferrie was, in fact, involved in an ongoing investigation for a private agency of this church. This is a very different interpretation.

Unfortunately, having made clear how much I admire and am influenced by Scott's work, I have to say that his latest book is not a success. I found it confusing, jumbled and ultimately self-defeating. Parts of it are brilliant but, overall, as a book it just doesn't work.

'*Deep Politics*' is an attempt to advance from the concept of covert politics, which Scott has openly admitted is only one way of looking at the world. In his first chapter, he explores disillusionment with the American system of government. Corruption can no longer be portrayed as some kind of externalised threat such as the Mafia, which can be dealt with independently, it is an integral part of the system, from which few, if any, politicians are exempt. He believes that organised crime has some dirt, mostly sexual, on the majority of politicians. In a follow on from this, Scott argues, convincingly, that the

Mafia is largely a media and government concept which has been used to portray corruption and organised crime as an alien idea.

Similarly, Scott had believed that the many scandals which the United States had faced in the past, such as Vietnam, Watergate and Irangate, were external problems which could be solved by adjustments in the democratic process. He now dismisses ideas of 'secret teams' or parallel governments as another example of the idea of the outsider, which protects the system from proper analysis or genuine reform. He is more or less saying, though in a sophisticated manner, that this is all 'business as usual'. Where this leads to is his assertion that Deep Politics killed JFK. If the various groups nominated as possible culprits did not, in fact, do it then they were moving in that direction and wanted it undertaken. As a consequence, they all ensured that the cover-up was put into place.

On the whole I found his introduction to the book wonderful; I was not, however, convinced by the end that he had made a case. Perhaps it was a problem on my part because, having read all of Scott's brilliant unpublished manuscripts on the assassination, I was expecting this to be the culmination of that work. Instead, it seemed that Scott had lost the thread and the book simply sprawls all over the place; just as you think he is about to pull material together, Scott instead moves on to what appears to be, initially, a totally unrelated area.

I have to say, however, that if anyone is genuinely interested in investigating the JFK assassination then they have to buy this book. There are some brilliant insights and sections where Scott opens up totally new areas of research. Out of many that could be quoted, I found new information pointing towards the identity of the QJ/WN within the intelligence/drug arena, particularly intriguing.

Scott also deserves credit for almost single-handedly bringing to notice the change in policy on Vietnam following the assassination of JFK. His chapter in *Deep Politics* on this change rebuts Noam Chomsky's criticisms of John Newman's work, which was an important influence on Oliver Stone. Stone took the fact, and there would appear to be no doubt about this, that JFK intended withdrawing troops from Vietnam, and added the notion that he was assassinated because of this. There is as yet no evidence for this linkage - and these things may be totally unrelated (I understand that Newman is working on this area) - however, it is of immense interest not only to gaining an understanding of

Kennedy but also of Johnson and of American politics in general in the sixties.

It is a long time since I read anything on Vietnam and I am no expert on the subject, but Newman's book does seem to me to be one of the best investigative books written in recent years. Neither am I a Kennedy admirer, but I could be persuaded by this book. Kennedy was clearly doing something very different on Vietnam and was not quite the military cold warrior previously portrayed. One can see here, evidence to back up Scott's notion that the post-Cuban Missile Crisis Kennedy, a president who had faced the reality of what a nuclear war would mean, was a different politician to the cold war warrior of the early years.

Newman provides persuasive evidence, as does Peter Dale Scott, that contrary to general perceptions, the Johnson administration did not pursue a policy of continuation but deliberately and swiftly instituted a break in policy, intent on implementing increased full-scale military intervention in South East Asia. Newman provides evidence that following the 1964 election, Kennedy would have begun the process of withdrawing from Vietnam. If one accepts Newman's thesis, and it is hard not to, then Kennedy was, indeed, attempting something different. The romantic sixties notion that something good did die with the assassination of Kennedy may, after all, have more than a ring of truth to it.

Stephen Dorril

Destiny Betrayed



David Ferrie

It truly pity anyone coming into the Kennedy assassination field today. Even though I caught the bug only in 1983 - the twentieth anniversary did it - it was still fairly easy then to find useful primers and outright classics in local used-book stores.

Conspiracy, by Anthony Summers, was just a couple of years old in those days, and I even found a remaindered copy of the 1976 re-issue of Sylvia Meagher's *Accessories After the Fact*. Robert Sam Anson's 1975 Bantam paperback, *They've Killed the President!*, was not uncommon, and I also stumbled across the 1976 Zebra compilation by Bernard Fensterwald's Committee to Investigate Assassinations, *Coincidence or Conspiracy*. Throw in some inevitable material from Harold Weisberg and (for better or worse) Mark Lane, and it was difficult not to get a decent grounding in the assassination.

Today, I'm not so sure I could do it. The above works are becoming rarer with time, and the new books now emerging are too frequently fraudulent (*Double Cross*) or laughable (*Mortal Error*). When I first heard about *Destiny Betrayed*, I was hopeful that this lamentable trend would be reversed, that an important moment in the assassination controversy - the Garrison interlude - would finally receive a definitive treatment. Boy, was I wrong. I can only offer my sincerest apologies to the people at Sheridan Square Press, who so generously sent me a copy. I really did want to give it a glowing review, but the book is a severe disappointment.

For me, the first shock was that *Destiny Betrayed* is not actually a book. In the preface (pp xi-xiii), James DiEugenio reveals that what he first wrote was "a treatment for a movie". In early 1991, DiEugenio learned about Oliver Stone's *JFK* and "went into a funk" over having been beaten to the punch. "But then," he says, "I decided to turn my years of research into a book, this book." In other words, *Destiny Betrayed* was something that was not at first intended to be a thorough, written account and was nailed together into book form only as a last resort. It looks it, too.

A shallow, cinematic spirit and a rushed, slapdash style are evidence in the opening chapter. In the course of a mere two pages (pp 1-2), DiEugenio melts the convoluted origins of the entire Cold War down to a single meeting in 1947 between US and British officials. After that, he insists, "the Truman Doctrine was born and the Cold War became irreversible." His sources up to that point? Three books. Just three books to sum up something that top scholars have raged over for decades, churning out scores of volumes in the process. Such basic names as Louis Halle, Gar Alperovitz, Gabriel Kolko and John Lewis Gaddis are all missing from DiEugenio's bibliography.

Aside from posing a serious problem as to DiEugenio's credibility as a researcher, his

Cold War commentary inspires a central question: why is it even there? Why does a book about Garrison start in 1947? The answer is that DiEugenio is a man with a mission - a true believer. "The more I read," he confides in the preface (p xii), "the more I was convinced there must have been multiple assassins in Dealey Plaza. The problem was to find an alternative theory that fit all the facts. It was difficult.

I found the Robert Sam Anson-Michael Eddowes school - Oswald is still in Russia, a double was sent over by the KGB - outlandish. The Mafia theory was credible enough with Ruby, but strained with Oswald. Some of the others were too weak to mention." With those few lines, DiEugenio dismisses all rivals to the Garrison platform, as if he knows it all - which he doesn't. There has never been a "Robert Sam Anson-Michael Eddowes school" in which Oswald is treated as a KGB double. How could there be? Anson postulates in *They've Killed the President!* (p 211) that if there was any Oswald double, he was a US agent, not a Soviet one. Likewise, DiEugenio does not confess that he has to deride the "Mafia theory", whether or not that theory is convincing: if New Orleans Mafia boss Carlos Marcello was behind the assassination, then New Orleans District Attorney, Jim Garrison, looks like an idiot at best and an accomplice at worst for wasting his time on Clay Shaw.

With DiEugenio, then, nothing less than undiluted Garrison is acceptable. On p xii, he declares: "For me, the conclusion was inescapable. Garrison's explanation was the most logical, comprehensive, detailed, thorough and demonstrable. No one else came close." If Garrison's maunderings about what may be called a fascism-intelligence complex are so brilliant, then it follows that the world must have unfolded according to Garrison's vision - hence the business about 1947, the year in which the CIA was formed. DiEugenio follows up his reprehensible recapitulation of the birth of the Cold War by stressing (pp 4-8) the extent to which the CIA cut deals with fascists left over from World War II, notably the German military-intelligence man, Reinhard Gehlen. He emphasises the degree to which OSS official (and future CIA director) Allen Dulles worked with Gehlen, grooming him as early as 1945. This passage of the book is heavily dependent on articles by Peter Dale Scott and Carl Oglesby from *Covert Action Information Bulletin* - but neither of the two articles mentions a Gehlen-Dulles contact in 1945, it makes a mockery of his cherished 1947 benchmark.

Having set the fascism-intelligence complex into evil motion, DiEugenio places Castro's Cuba in its path - Vietnam is hardly

mentioned - and then introduces the man Garrison views as the ultimate victim of that collision. One can almost hear the trumpet blaring (pp 17-18): "At the time there were some scholars and politicians (and many ordinary people) who were bold and imaginative enough to think of the world as more than just bipolar, free versus enslaved, and who wished to penetrate the surface of this new constellation of ideas and how they worked - especially in the Third World. One such person was Jack Kennedy." Needles to say, ol' Jack loses the confrontation, leading ultimately to the Garrison probe. By this point, however, the informed reader does not much care, due to the formidable record of misrepresentation and error built up in as few pages.

For those who do proceed with the story, the pitfalls are countless. Let's take an important, Garrisonian 'fact' concerning David Ferrie, as related by DiEugenio. On p 34, we are told about a mob-linked, anti-Castro training camp at Lacombe, Louisiana, near Lake Pontchartrain. DiEugenio states: "Ferrie had been an instructor at the camp." This is important, because it ties Ferrie in with violent, political activities at about the time he supposedly was associating with Clay Shaw and Lee Harvey Oswald, but where does DiEugenio get his information? We turn to p 338, find Note 20, and see references to p 74 of the hardcover edition of Carl Oglesby's *The Yankee Cowboy War* and p 207 of *The Fish is Red*, by Warren Hinckle and William Turner (New York: Harper and Row, 1981). Assuming the Oglesby citation translates to p 73 of the softcover edition (New York: Berkley, 1977), the pertinent sentence is this: "David Ferrie, linked by New Orleans District Attorney, James Garrison to Clay Shaw and the CIA, was involved in the operation of the Louisiana camps." Okay, but where does that come from? On p 344 of Oglesby, Note 40 lists p 52 of a January 1968 article in *Ramparts* by William Turner and p 112 of *The Kennedy Conspiracy*, by Paris Flammonde (New York: Meredith, 1969). Both the Turner article and the Flammonde book are listed in DiEugenio's bibliography, so there is no excuse for not citing them directly, instead of going through Oglesby. And look what happens when you are careless like that with your documentation: p 52 of the Turner article says, "One of Ferrie's covert tasks in the New Orleans area was to drill small teams in guerrilla warfare," but it offers nothing specific about him being at the Lake Pontchartrain which is discussed three paragraphs lower. P 112 of Flammonde mentions a 'covert group' near Lake Ponchartrain. "The covert group' according to Garrison, was led by David Ferrie, who drilled five-man commando teams in guerrilla warfare practice and infiltration

techniques on a site adjacent to the McLaney cottage." Got all that? The first half of DiEugenio's original citation leads to Oglesby, and Oglesby leads to Turner and Flammonde, but Turner does not place Ferrie at the Lake Pontchartrain camp, and Flammonde places him there only because of Garrison's word. The other half of DiEugenio's original citation, p 207 of Hinckle and Turner, states, "He (Ferrie) became an instructor at the Lake Pontchartrain camp when it opened." For that, there is no source. Therefore, the final count is this: an irrelevant claim by Turner (who was close to Garrison, an interested party), an allegation from Flammonde derived from Garrison, and an unsourced comment by Hinckle and Turner. In the end, DiEugenio has provided no clear proof - police reports, eyewitnesses, and so on - that David Ferrie was ever at the Lake Pontchartrain camp.

The same sloppiness is to be found in DiEugenio's discussion of the so-called Clinton witnesses, the people who testified at the Shaw trial that they saw Shaw, Ferrie and Oswald together in Clinton, Louisiana, in 1963. As pointed out by James Kirkwood in *American Grotesque* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970, pp 213-214), two of the "Clinton" witnesses were actually Jackson witnesses, since they spotted Oswald - on his own - in that town just before his purported appearance in nearby Clinton. These two were State Representative Reeves Morgan and barber Edwin McGehee, whom Kirkwood incorrectly calls "Edward McGehee". DiEugenio misses that distinction and places both men in Clinton, not Jackson. At least he gets McGehee's name right, but one always has to check with DiEugenio, who calls Oswald's uncle Carlos Murret by the nickname 'Dutch' (p 235) instead of 'Dutz'. With such performance, it cannot be expected that DiEugenio would detect a disturbing undercurrent related to the Clinton witnesses. Garrison, in his *On the Trail of the Assassins* (New York: Sheridan Square, 1988, pp 106 - 108), remarks that the witnesses were discovered with the help of a Louisiana state policeman named Francis Fruge. As DiEugenio is well aware (p 25), Fruge was also involved with the case of Rose Cheramie, a narcotics addict who allegedly linked Jack Ruby to the assassination. Was Fruge just lucky with witnesses, or was something going on? Jerry Shinley, of Seabrook, Texas, has done some brilliant research on the Garrison era merely by looking through back issues of the *New Orleans Times-Picayune*, and he has uncovered some disturbing points about Fruge: 1) he was "named in a legislative audit for travel expense irregularities" around the time he was working with Garrison (*NOTP*, 30 April 1968); and 2) he was 'presumably' involved in Louisiana's

Sovereignty Commission, a state intelligence operation (NOTP, 1 May 1968). The Sovereignty Commissions are a now-notorious part of the record of Southern opposition to civil rights in the 1960s. Mississippi's Sovereignty Commission, for instance, helped obstruct justice in the 1963 assassination of black activist Medgar Evers, as reported by *Newsweek* in its issue of 23 July 1990. Turner, in his January 1968, Ramparts piece (p 48), points out that Louisiana's Sovereignty Commission obtained some of the papers of Guy Bannister after the latter died in 1964. The implications here could be considerable - but you would never know, going by DiEugenio. I'm still trying to figure out the fairness of a world in which he will be paid for not revealing any of the above information, while I - or Jerry Shinley, more to the point - get not a cent for doing the opposite.

Time and again, DiEugenio either misses a good story or dismisses it. The index in *Destiny Betrayed* has just one reference for mobster John Roselli - and it is not the CIA allegation, uncovered by the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA X, pp 190 - 191 n55), that Garrison met Roselli in 1967, just after charging Shaw. That Roselli appears at all is a wonder, since someone as important as Carlos Marcello is cited on just five pages, four of them in the notes. The damning 1967 *Life* series that blasted Garrison for his laxness over Marcello's mob activities is acknowledged so briefly and grudgingly (pp 169, 363 n63, 364 n2) as to be an insult. This is not to say the Mafia did in Kennedy and the CIA did not, but it is to say one cannot pretend certain things do not exist. Arguably, Garrison's prosecution of Shaw was born in the ravings of lawyer Dean Andrews. DiEugenio says very little about his background, but Rosemary James and Jack Wardlow, in *Plot or Politics?* (New Orleans: Pelican, 1967 p88), quote his own testimony before Garrison's grand jury, which displays his claim to have represented Marcello at one point.

Several of the stories that DiEugenio does choose to push are unworthy of respect. In fact, DiEugenio should quickly familiarise himself with *Lobster*, which has more than once made itself useful by pointing out where JFK assassination literature has become tainted with the unbelievable. In issue 2, it ran an article that was later reprinted in *The Third Decade* of November 1985. The writer, Stephen Dorril, examined a long-running rumour - passed from researcher to researcher over the years without scepticism - that Clay Shaw was linked to a European-based organisation, Permindex, that was up to its board room in dangerous, far-right fanatics who would have liked to see Kennedy die. Dorril

found little or nothing to back up the suspicion that the group was a nerve centre for the fascism-intelligence complex. Despite that, DiEugenio plunges into these waters as if he had never heard of Dorril's study. Permindex is mentioned at several points, with the passage on pp 209 - 213 standing out. To his credit, DiEugenio found that Bernard Fensterwald had acquired some State Department documents on Permindex dating back to the 1950s (p 371 n3) - but the documents still provide no basis for lurid, assassination-linked speculation. His other references include Flammonde and Robert D Morrow, two of the worst offenders when it comes to the unquestioning repetition of the Permindex chant.

Similarly, DiEugenio should have consulted *Lobster* No 12, which mocks a summer 1985 article in the *National Reporter* (previously *Counterspy*) by Elton Manzione. Manzione had asserted that a Permindex-connected group called the Defence Industrial Security Command was part of the assassination, but he provided no evidence that DISC even existed and committed a glaring error concerning Reinhard Gehlen. What the folks at *Lobster* did not know was this was merely the latest version of a rumour that was already out of control when Penn Jones Jr drew attention to it in Vol IV of his *Forgive My Grief* series (Midlothian, Texas: self-published, 1974, pp 5 - 7). Worsening apprehension about Manzione was an article he co-wrote with Douglas Valentine for the spring 1987 issue of the *National Reporter*. There, he announced - without any corroborating material - that he had been part of a commando raid that caused the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Incident, which provoked escalation in Vietnam. How careful one has to be in these matters is shown by Valentine's *The Phoenix Program*, an apparently sincere but sometimes naive study of the infamous CIA killing spree in Vietnam (New York: William Morrow, 1990). The very first person mentioned in the book is... Elton Manzione. DiEugenio is immune to such considerations. With a straight face, he mentions DISC on p 357 n34.

I don't know where to stop. DiEugenio thinks Robert Esterling is for real (p 385 n22), he apparently makes up a detailed conversation that precedes the suicide of Gary Underhill (pp 28 - 29), and his description of the early career of Guy Bannister (p 38) is the usual, unreliable stuff. He never explains why Garrison investigator Andrew Sciambra just happened to have a photo of Clay Shaw for his crucial first encounter with Perry Russo (p 145), and, for that matter, never pinpoints the exact moment Garrison began to suspect Shaw. *Destiny Betrayed* is an exercise in

recklessness, gullibility and bombast. It constitutes pseudo-knowledge. As such, it fits right in with Garrison's world - but the author probably takes that as a compliment. (he might even like to be dubbed 'Little Jim'.) Nothing will shake his faith in Garrison, but I can certainly try, once again with the help of Jerry Shinley. On 19 February 1962, Garrison was in a debate with Richard Dowling, who he was trying to unseat as DA of New Orleans. Even though Dowling was fated to lose the upcoming election, he did have one fact straight (NOTP, 20 February 1962): he accused Garrison of taking money from Leander Perez, the vicious segregationist and power broker whose influence was felt throughout Louisiana. Garrison conceded he had accepted a "moderate" donation from the Perez clan, through Leander's son, Leander Jnr, but insisted he was in no way obligated to the father. Leander Perez is known to anybody who has seen Jerry Rose's article in the May 1990 issue of *The Third Decade* (plus a follow-up piece for November of that year). On 20 November 1963, Rose divulged, none other than Gen Edwin Walker appeared at the New Orleans office of Perez. So far, nobody knows why. Certainly, Garrison would not have wanted to know why, having become DA thanks in part to Perez. Marcello, Perez; who else was missed because Garrison did not want to see them? I suspect we have not the slightest idea of the true nature of the Garrison affair.

A last point: even though Robert Sam Anson screwed up the details and the reference, it seems Garrison's people really did dig up a guy who thought he had been Julius Caesar in a prior life. DiEugenio rightly maintains (p 370 n101) that no such person testified at the Shaw trial, but the implication that the person did not exist is wrong. In *The Garrison Case* (New York: Clarkson N Potter, 1969, p 196), Milton E Brener names him as Howard Rice Knight. he was brought in from California for questioning before the case went to court. I will let readers conjure up on their own obvious cheap shots about Garrison and the supernatural.

Since I had asked for a review copy of his book from Sheridan Square, I made sure to send my article to DiEugenio, who was soon denouncing me in letters as a boundless poltroon so irrational over Garrison as to conspire - I'm not kidding; that was the accusation - to sink the book at an early point, without regard to all its merits. Our brief, vicious correspondence, which was terminated by DiEugenio, and not me (I can be very shallow and petty about getting the last word in an argument), merely confirmed my low opinion of the man. It turned out he was well aware of Stephen Dorril's Permindex inquiry and

simply chose to ignore it: "I thought it was about as honest, incisive and convincing as your article on Clay Shaw, which was not really about Shaw at all. It was a springboard to trash Garrison." Most disturbing was the degree to which DiEugenio had demonised Shaw in order to justify slack-jawed adoration of Big Jim (although I suppose it follows that the one must be Pluto if the other is Zeus): "In fact," he insisted, "I predict that when everything is in about Shaw, the evidence will show that he was involved in three political assassinations, two of them successful." Did he identify the other two plots? No. Did he at least cite a single page number of a specific source in attempting to refute my numerous criticisms of his work? No. Could he not even stop hiding behind Sheridan Square and give his own address? No. Good work, Little Jim. (By the way, DiEugenio dubbed me "Little Walter", after Robert Kennedy's anti-Garrison/anti-Hoffa hatchet man, Walter Sheridan, whom, believe it or note, DiEugenio thinks may have had something to do with RFK's death.)

In one sense, it was a pity I did not "out" myself as a transvestite earlier than my article in *Lobster* 24, since DiEugenio would have been able to accuse me of letting my sexuality cloud my judgement concerning the gay Shaw. Then I could have sneered and opened a nasty can of worms about Garrison. In the 16 November 1983 issue of a gay newspaper, the *New York City News*, one Hugh Murray discoursed at length about the number of confirmed and suspected homosexuals in the Kennedy assassination saga: Shaw, Ferrie, maybe Ruby, maybe Oswald, and so on.

Without elaboration, Murray also threw in this line: "Incidentally, a few years later, Garrison himself was charged with making sexual advances to a male teenager at a local health club." I have yet to corroborate this, and the ultimate source may turn out to be a baseless smear, but Garrison did have 'queers' on the brain. In 1967, he told the journalist James Phelan (one of the top figures on DiEugenio's hate list) that the JFK conspiracy amounted to "a homosexual thrill-killing, plus the excitement of getting away with a perfect crime" (*Scandals, Scamps and Scoundrels*, New York: Random House, 1982, p 150). Needless to say, you will find little about that sort of thing in DiEugenio's book, making me wonder whose sexuality has clouded whose judgement. Had he paid any attention to Paul Hoch, DiEugenio would have become concerned over the "thrill-killing" remark years ago.

Scott Van Wynsberghe

Mike Hughes reviews recent anti-fascist publications, attempting to tread a path through an increasingly insane minefield of distrust and invective. Lobster does not subscribe to the stupidity of 'our Searchlight problem'. SD

The Parapolitical World of Anti-Fascism



The 43 Group, Morris Beckman, Centreprise Publications, (071 254 9632), ISBN 0 903738 75 9, £9.50

Fascism and anti-Fascism in the Medway towns 1927-1940, David Turner, Kent Anti-Fascist Action Committee, PO Box 88, Rochester, Kent, ME1 1AU, ISBN 0 9521599 0 2, £3.00

A Lie Too Far - Searchlight, Hepple & the Left & At War with Truth Mina Enterprises, GA Mail Order, c/o 151b London Rd, Camberley, Surrey, GU15 3JY, £1.50

At War with Society Searchlight, ISBN 0 9522038 0 4, £4

Fascist/Anti-Fascist Chronology, in *Here and Now* Issue 14, AK Distribution, 22 Lutton Place, Edinburgh EH8 9PE, £1.20

Editors! Are you being fed a load of bullshit? - A documented expose of Gerry Gable's Error Prone, Lie Ridden, Mischief Making Magazine, Alexander Baron, Anglo-Hebrew Publishing, Box 2293, BCM Mono, London WC1N 3XX, ISBN 1 898318 75 1.

In spring 1933 the Labour Party candidate for Chatham told a May Day meeting that 'Only by the unity of the working class could attempts at fascism in this country be stamped out.' The Labour Party, Independent Labour Party and Communist Party formed an Anti-Fascist Campaign Committee, but its development was curtailed by a successful move, by the local Labour Party's right-wing, to ban any appearances by the candidate on the same platform as CP speakers. Some members resigned from the party, although not the candidate who worked with British Intelligence during the War and went on to become the leader of the Labour Party. But Hugh Gaitskell's early radical experiences in Chatham are more than merely ironic. It wasn't that he was right in '33, and wrong when he became the sectarian firebrand in the fifties. He was always wrong. Fascism has always been contained in Britain by strange, and strained, coalitions of activists of all political persuasions. And it has been achieved despite the labour movement's chronic disunity, not because of its unity.

In the thirties many labour activists were happy to follow the lead of the CP when they organised Anti-Fascist activities. Yet the most effective propaganda was produced by a radical right-wing Tory - Winston Churchill, the rabidly anti-communist TUC President - Walter Citrine, and the left-wing Labour Party activist - Michael Foot. In the seventies later generations of Labour and Communist activists swelled the ranks of the SWP's Anti Nazi League.

The Gaitskell story comes from David Turner's pamphlet on *Fascism and Anti Fascism in the Medway Towns*. It is a model of how to deal with local history. It is

is realistic about the scale of the fascist organisation in the area. Likewise, Morris Beckman's autobiographical history of *The 43 Group* is superb piece of writing and history. It tells the story of how, immediately after the war, 43 Jewish ex-servicemen set up a group of 'commandoes' to smash up attempts to reestablish Mosleyite fascism in Britain. Beckman makes no mock apology for the violence he describes, the pitched battles and skirmishes. He is recalling what can only be regarded as a military campaign, and one which was highly successful. The 43 Group's approach was what would later be categorised by trotskysts as 'squadist'. It was a dedicated campaign unhampered by attempts insinuate a wider political programme, or to use confrontations with fascists as the spur for a confrontation with the State. In many ways it was the same approach that categorised the Anti-Nazi League in 1978.

Although the ANL was established by the SWP with ulterior ideological motives, the League grew so much faster than expected that it became uncontrollable. To the growing dismay of the Central Council, SWP members forgot the class struggle in the fight against fascism in their own area. This was the main reason that the League had to be abandoned by the SWP as soon as possible after the 1979 election campaign. It was a cynical political manoeuvre of monumental idiocy by the SWP, from which it has deservedly never recovered. Although the SWP has now resurrected the League, with some success, they are at the moment avoiding any squadist approach. The new ANL publicly confronts fascism on the street, but does not seek it out and attack it in the way it did before.

The 43 Group were outstandingly successful, and received considerable public support. This is perhaps unsurprising in the immediate post war period. But despite reports of the holocaust, in Britain the fascists were still able to capitalise on deep seated anti-semitism by quoting reports of the Zionist terrorist activities against British troops in Palestine. The secret of the Group's success lay in the military precision of their operations, and the quality of their intelligence. The source of the best of this intelligence stemmed from their success in 'turning' ex-fascists, and infiltrating agents into the fascist movements around Oswald Moseley. It enabled them not merely to turn out commandoes to smash up meetings, but to establish a clear picture of Moseley's, Raven Thompson and Jeffrey Hamm's tactics and to accurately gauge his ability achieve his objectives. Since the days of the 43 Group the fight against fascism has continued to rely on the quality of its intelligence, and those that obtained and distributed it

established a key power role in the movement. Which brings me to the remaining three booklets, and the *Here & Now* article.

Since 1975 the anti-fascist magazine *Searchlight* has been the dominant influence on anti-fascist activity, by virtue of its control of intelligence on ultra right and fascist activity. Like the 43 Group, *Searchlight* has succeeded in 'turning' fascists and infiltrating agents into fascist organisations. The quality of its raw intelligence has generally been good. But its analysis has continued to bring it controversy, and the world has changed dramatically since the days of the 43 Group. Although fascists retain their fanatical anti-semitism, continue to prate on about the International Jewish Conspiracy, and there are sporadic outbursts of fascist destruction of Jewish property, the fascists primary target is black not Jewish communities. Palestine is now Israel, and its ruthless treatment of Palestinians has driven a wedge between radical Jews and the British left, the very two groups which have historically provided the backbone of the British anti-fascist movement. That *Searchlight* has been caught in the middle of this is no secret and it is a problem of their own making. They have failed to resolve it, and it has been incredibly disruptive to the re-creation of the anti-fascist movement since the SWP decided to wind down the ANL in 1980.

The uneasy coalition between between the anti-zionist-anti-fascists and pro-zionist *Searchlight* team was to some extent uneasily managed by the incorporation of 'Carf' (The Campaign Against Racism and Fascism) into the magazine. But this arrangement collapsed acrimoniously during the Gulf War. In the necessarily conspiratorial world inhabited by *Searchlight*, the threat of infiltration by fascists looms large. For anti-fascist activists this threat is combined with the threat of infiltration by police or MI5 agents. There has always been atmosphere of unhealthy distrust within anti-fascist organisations in which I have been involved. Privately *Searchlight* has always been willing to feed this distrust, spreading stories of widespread infiltration by fascists. Anarchists and syndicalists, who have been prominent activists in the post-ANL anti fascist movement, have been particularly targeted by *Searchlight*, but it has also sought to establish significant links between black separatists and fascists. More recently this behind-the-scenes whispering campaign has emerged in the magazine with claims that anti-fascist researchers and writers - notably Larry O'Hara and Robin Ramsay - who question *Searchlight's* interpretation of events and highlight its connections with the British secret state are fascist agents.

This, frankly, ludicrous line has greatly discredited *Searchlight*, and led to the publication of the remaining booklets and articles in this review.

O'Hara is a Ph-D student writing about fascism, and the spin offs from this research turned into some excellent journalism for *Tribune* and some longer pieces in *Lobster*. He started talking to the fascists and began to get some excellent information. Unfortunately for him it seriously challenged the *Searchlight* view of the fascists' world, and he was drawn to looking closer at some of the big stories that *Searchlight* had been plugging. The result was an explosion of bile, vitriol and inuendo from *Searchlight*. He had committed two sins - he had broken *Searchlight's* monopoly of fascist intelligence and challenged its veracity - and it was therefore only a matter of time before he was branded a 'fascist errand boy'.

O'Hara had exhibited a curious mix of bloody-mindedness and naivety in the way he set about challenging *Searchlight*. And it must be said a lack of awareness of his own personal ability to cope with the onslaught that he would inevitably face. His pamphlet *A Lie Too Far* was his first inadequate response, and serious mistake. The quality of its research is completely obscured by terrible writing that is always on the brink of hysteria, and over-simplistic connections. Some of these problems have been ironed out in a substantial re-working of the material in another recently published pamphlet by him called *At War with the Truth* but the simmering hysteria remains. O'Hara's foolhardiness, however, almost pales into insignificance next to *Searchlight's*. The split with 'Carf' over its unwillingness to confront anti-arabism during the Gulf War did it much damage. O'Hara had exposed some of its weaknesses - particularly when combined with Robin Ramsay's reopening of wounds caused by the "Gable Memorandum". This memorandum was an internal London Weekend note from 1979 in which Gerry Gable, who has been the dominant influence on the *Searchlight* team for more than a decade, tried to set up journalists involved in the ABC case. The dispassionate chronology of the events in this sorry saga, in *Here & Now*, does suggest strongly that *Searchlight* is doing someone's dirty business.

Alexander Baron's pamphlet rakes up all the dirt on Gerry Gable and *Searchlight* that it can find and it might have been very damaging if it not emanated from the Conservative ultra right. It is not going to be widely read, and its strained mask of liberal reasonableness slips sufficiently often to weaken its impact. In all the other recent Baron publications I've seen there is

an undisguised anti-semitism and psychopathic and pornographic hatred of Gerry Gable. I am convinced that the Baron works aren't the work of a single hand. There is also so much myth and confusion about this relative new-comer amongst right-wing pamphleteers that I am convinced that it is some sort of ultra right-wing stunt to fan the flames of controversy with the anti-fascist movement. But do, in fact, O'Hara, *Here & Now* or the apparently reasonable ranting of Alexander Baron, prove a state inspired conspiracy by *Searchlight*?

Just because *Searchlight* is doing an effective job of dividing and incapacitating the anti-fascist movement doesn't mean it is doing it deliberately or for an outside agency. It may have links of some kind with security services and be surrounded by 'turned' fascists, but it does continue to provide accurate and damaging information about fascists. The Hepple booklet is an example. If you ignore the ridiculous *Searchlight* commentary about Larry O'Hara and his friends, its good stuff about the fascists. Herein lies the problem with *Searchlight*. It serves its purpose well, and no other group is providing such detail on fascist activity now.

Larry O'Hara is interesting on the recent history of fascism but not on contemporary activities, and has a pedestrian and narrow definition of 'fascism'. But *Searchlight* too has its limitations. Its analysis is loaded, and getting too close to it causes problems for the left who form the backbone of the anti-fascist movement. The rather obvious answer to this would be don't trust them, don't tell it anything you don't want anyone else to know and don't believe it if it tells you some is an 'infiltrator' or a 'spy'. This might be an answer for activists, but for historians the perpetual problem is the loaded analysis. The history of fascism over the last twenty years could not be written without the work of *Searchlight*, but it could not simply be written from it. There are serious question marks over some of its obsessions - just how significant are the fascists' 'connections' with paramilitary loyalists in Ireland, just how significant are some of the characters - like Steve Brady [see *Lobster* 28 for more on Brady's links] - that *Searchlight* has turned into international players, just how significant are the fascists' half cock attempts to link up with or infiltrate other groups such as anarchists or black separatists? After all, the politically significant aspect of fascism over the last twenty years has been its ability to orchestrate and motivate racism and racist attacks, and to act as a spur to institutional racism by keeping alive the prospect of Enoch Powell's 'rivers of blood'.

Of course, O'Hara is right that *Searchlight*

has a relationship with the secret state, and *Searchlight* for its part doesn't deny it and since the recent dispute began has indeed gloried in it. But what is the nature of this relationship? O'Hara would have us believe that *Searchlight* is an MI5 front and that Gerry Gable is an asset. This is too simple and neat, and omits the obvious explanation, which is that *Searchlight* is a dedicated if machiavellean anti-fascist group. The implications of this explanation - more or less the one one given by *Searchlight* itself - are interesting because the secret state has always regarded fascism as threat to national security only insofar as it inspires the left to activity, and enabled the CPGB to recruit in the thirties, or presumably the SWP to recruit in the seventies. It suggests that the intelligence community has adopted a policy of nurturing anti-fascist activity sufficiently to contain fascism without allowing another mass anti-fascist movement to grow.

The parapolitics of anti-fascism are fiendishly complicated and the development of anti-fascism has brought together widely differing groups and introduced previously unpolitical individuals to politics in a highly charged and conspiratorial setting. It is also a setting that is wide open to manipulation and infiltration by the secret state, should it so wish. That secret history of anti-fascism needs to be written. But it also needs to be put firmly into its context.

In Britain fascism has so far been contained. Fascist movements have been destroyed, decimated, or incapacitated by the determination, dedication and at times unapologetic brutality of popular opposition. Britain is not now in the same boat as Italy, France or Germany. Over the last fifteen years *Searchlight* - at times with and at other times without the help of the secret state - has played a key role in focusing and directing that opposition. Unfortunately this does not make *Searchlight's* unjust accusations against anti-fascists such as Larry O'Hara and Robin Ramsay any more palatable or acceptable. The sheer political ineptitude of *Searchlight's* handling of the affair beggars belief. It has quite straightforwardly discredited it and divided the anti-fascist movement, to the particular advantage of nobody but the more or less inert Metropolitan Police Special Branch, MI5 and (most significantly) the increasingly active fascists themselves.



James Rusbridger - Obit



The death of Rusbridger was, initially, a shock, but not surprising. It had been known by some of us for a number of months that he was in financial difficulties and that without his telephone, which had been cut off, he would be lost.

The obituaries which followed his death were a strange mix, especially a particularly nasty one by James Adams in the *Sunday Times* (20.2.94) which played up Rusbridger's fantasy life as a spy (fortunately a piece by Rusbridger's literary agent, Andrew Lownie, in the *Independent* and a long article in the *Guardian* helped to redress the balance). With his keen and mischievous sense of humour, Rusbridger would have been highly amused by the article. Likewise, it is quite obvious that his own death was a staged event.

I suspect that one of his letters would have been winging its way to the editor as soon as he saw the article in the paper on 13 March 1994 which claimed, based on 'security expert' sources, that the mortars which the IRA fired at Heathrow had been disabled - possibly by an informer working for the British government within the IRA'. The fact that the *Sunday Telegraph* ran exactly the same line suggests an obvious, and crude, disinformation effort.

I, more than anyone, should have been annoyed at Rusbridger's antics - he informed the Attorney General's office that my book *The Silent Conspiracy* was prejudicial to the case of the Marconi employee and KGB spy, Michael Smith, thus forcing the AG to intervene and demand the withdrawal of the book - which cost time and money and sales. However, I think we should be generous in death, and praise his positive qualities of generosity and his general desire to poke fun at the pomposity of those in official life.

I liked the man and his death is a sad loss. I miss his letters in the columns of the daily press.

Stephen Dorril

Subscriptions (for four issues) : £8.00

USA/Canada/Europe: £12.00

* see Special Offer (page 16)

Unfortunately, Robin Ramsay has not allowed me access to back copies of *Lobster*.

Despite this setback, I will supply photocopies of all back issues. The first eight issues were produced in A5 format. These were the naive beginnings of *Lobster* and some of the material no longer stands up; we have moved on from then. However, there are good articles and a mass of interesting snippets which I had largely forgotten about.

Issues 1 to 10 cost £1.25 each (UK); £2.00 (USA/Canada/Australasia and Europe)

11 to 26 (except 19, which is double the price) are £2.25 each (UK); £3.00 (US/Canada/Australasia and Europe)

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 - 2 Special on the JFK assassination; Dorril on Maria Novotny; Permindex; Ramsay - An alternative hypothesis; Epstein's 'Legend'. 34 pages, 1983.
 - 3 More Kincora; Police and computers; American Friends,, the anti-CND groups; clippings digest and reviews. 32 pages, 1984.
 - 4 Even more Kincora; Shooting the Pope; The British in Vietnam; more on the anti-CND groups; the CIA and Mountbatten; Intelligence and clippings digest; Bank Havens. 28 pages, 1984.
 - 5 Jonathan Marshall on Secret Societies, part 1; Ian MacGregor and Lazards, part 1; The SAS; Intelligence and clippings digest. 36 pages, 1984.
 - 6 Secret Societies and MacGregor, part 2; Oswald in Mexico; The Round Table; Reading Italy; Who's Afraid of the KGB. 36 pages, 1984.
 - 7 Conversation with Peter Dale Scott; Gregory Korkala's address book; JFK assassination; Intelligence and clippings digest. 36 pages, 1985.
 - 8 Conspiracy Theories; Airey Neave assassination; Korkala; Pinay Circle. 40 pages, 1985.
 - 9 Who's Who of British Spooks, part 1; KAL 007; Watergate revisited - Jim Hougan's *Secret Agenda* reviewed; Trying to kill Nasser; Falklands conspiracy theories; Jonathan Bloch on the overseas repression business. 24 pages, 1985.
(NB Personnel listed in the Who's Who and in No 10 are included in the Special Issue, *Who's Who of the British Secret State*, listed below.)
 - 10 Spooks Who's Who, part 2; Kitson, Kincora and counter-insurgency; ANthony Summers and 'Maurice Bishop'; Jim Hougan on Frank Terpil and 'Deep Throat'; statement from Fred Holroyd on Northern Ireland 'dirty tricks' and Colin Wallace. 24 pages, early 1986.
 - 11 *Wilson, MI5 and the Rise of Thatcher* - the start of the 'Wilson plots' story; the first attempt to understand and explain what Colin Wallace was saying. 56 pages, published April 1986 - before Peter Wright came on the scene.
 - 12 Peter Dale Scott on Transnational Repression - the major, previously unpublished essay by this American master; Notes on the British Right. 42 pages, 1986.
 - 13 The Rhodes-Milner Group (Round Table); Two Sides of Ireland; Colin Wallace's 1974 notes on MI5's plots to smear British politicians; more jottings on the British Right. 24 pages, 1987.
 - 14 US involvement in the Fiji coup; Colin Wallace update - and the Ulster Citizens' Arms smear decoded; Irangate - the 'October Surprise'; Martin Walker on policing the future. 46 pages, 1987.
 - 15 Inside *Inside Intelligence* - Steve Dorril on Anthony Cavendish; *The Independent's* smearing of Wallace and Holroyd; Christic Institute on 22.11.63; the Tory Right between the wars - review essay; Fiji coup update; review essay on *Geheim*. 34 pages 1987.
 - 16 Rothschild, the right, the far-right and the Fifth Man; death of Kilda Murrell; French Vendetta - the Rainbow Warrior to the Iranian hostages; KAL 007; Ken Livingstone's questions; Philby names names; overthrowing Gough Whitlam. 40 pages; 1988.
 - 17 Five at Eye: *Private Eye* and the Wilson smears; Colin Wallace and Information Policy in fiction; disinformation and the new 'terrorist threat'; the London CIA station; Crozier, Goldsmith and the Pinay Circle; more anti-Labour forgeries; the death of Zia. 24 pages, 1988.
 - 18 Jeffrey Bale's 'Right-wing Terrorists and the Extra-parliamentary Left in Post-World War 2 Europe: Collusion or manipulation?; covert propaganda and the Right - more on the Pinay Circle; a short history of the SAS in Northern Ireland; *Inside BOISS* and after - Gordon Winter. 36 pages, 1989.
 - 19 The final testimony of George Kennedy Young; Common Cause; the CIA and the British trades unions, supplement to spooks' Who's Who; High Thomas on Fred Holroyd; Jeffrey Bale on Shooting the Pope; Disinformation; ELF; obituaries of Michael Stewart, Stanley Mane, Greville Wynne; conspiracy theories reconsidered. 42 pages, 1990.
 - 20 Peter Dale Scott's *The United States and the overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-67*, Clay Shaw's United Kingdom contact analysed; Dean Andrew's testimony to the Warren Commission; Scott Newton's *The Economic background to appeasement and the search for Anglo-German detente before and during World War 2*; an extract from Hugh Thomas' response to the *Timewatch* hatchet job on his research about Hess; the text of David Calcutt QC's judgement on Colin Wallace's appearance before the Civil Service Appeal Board in 1975. 36 pages, 1990.
 - 21 Jeffrey Bale's *Heavenly Deceptions: the Moonies, WACL and the Korean CIA*; Colin Wallace on Chapman Pincher's version of Colin Wallace; *Western Goals* (UK). 28 pages, 1991.
 - 22 The Fall of Willi Brandt; MI5 and the British Fascists before WW2; A Who's Who of Appeasement; more British spooks spotted; ELF update. 24 pages 1991.
 - 23 Mind control and the American government; US Army Intelligence LSD testing; Stalker reconsidered; British fascism 1974-83, part 1; bit and pieces on JFK and JFK; Timothy Good demolished; the British Parliamentary Lobby's rules circa 1969. 36 pages, 1992.
 - 24 Larry O'Hara's *British Fascism 1974-92, part 2*; An Incorrect Political Memoir - Daniel Brandt; Scott Van Wynesberghe on JFK and occult thinking; R Ramsay on 'Our Searchlight problem'; the Gable memo reprinted in full; Garrison reconsidered; mind control update. 32 pages, 1992.
 - 25 Moscow Gold; John B Alexander , the Pentagon's Penguin - Armen Victoria; Mike Hughes on Churchill and the Focus group; Larry O'Hara's *British Fascism, 1983-86, part 3*; Scott Newton on Hess. 28 pages, 1993.
 - 26 David Teacher on Brian Crozier and the Pinay Circle; Wilsongate; Mike Hughes on 'Blinker Hall'; Irangate; Spooks. 36 pages, 1993.
- Special Issue - *A Who's Who of the British Secret State*, compiled by Steve Dorril. 110 pages, 1850 (approx) names and brief biographies.