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Right-wing Terrorism is one of the most poorly-understood political phenomena of our time, so much so that many highly educated and knowledgeable people seem to be entirely unaware of its existence. There are two main reasons for this dangerously high level of ignorance. To some extent it is simply an inevitable by-product of the general absence of serious scholarly work devoted to the activities and ideologies of the extreme right since the end of World War 2, a lacuna that is almost invariably commented upon and lamented by the handful of specialists on these matters. Most academics avoid the post-1945 right altogether, whereas others casually dismiss its ideological and operational significance on the basis of pre-existing biases or - at most - superficial examinations of traditional indicators of political strength like electoral results and parliamentary influence, indicators which are largely irrelevant when one is attempting to assess the threat posed by clandestine or covert organizational networks that rely primarily on the use of subversive extra-legal methods. The upshot of this neglect and cursory treatment is that far too little is known about any aspect of the contemporary ultra-right, including its extensive and systematic use of terror.

However, most of the confusion surrounding this subject can be traced to the pernicious cumulative impact of large numbers of politically distorted, sensationalistic, and superficial publications dealing with terrorism, many of which appear to be the direct or indirect products of a loosely-coordinated disinformation campaign launched by hardline rightist elements with various Western intelligence services and disseminated through their media assets. This ever-increasing flood of material portrays 'international terrorism' as an essentially left-wing phenomenon, specifically as a form of 'surrogate warfare' that constitutes part of a larger Soviet strategy of subversion and expansionism - an interpretation that has by now gained a certain degree of popular acceptance despite the generally spurious or contaminated nature of the evidence upon which it rests. Under these circumstances, it is little wonder that the serious threat posed by transnational right-wing terrorism has so often been underestimated, if not entirely unacknowledged.

This widespread lack of awareness was rudely shattered in the latter half of 1980 when a series of spectacular terrorist attacks by the 'Nazifascist' groups - the Bologna train station bombing on 2 August, the Oktoberfest bombing in Munich on 26 September, and perhaps the bombing outside a Paris synagogue on 3rd October
temporarily focused the attention of the press, the public, the security forces, and the coteries of intelligence-connected terrorism 'experts' on a subversive ultra-rightist underground that had never been truly banished from the European political scene. For years prior to this trio of bombings, the authorities and 'experts' had systematically minimized the threat posed by neo-fascist and neo-Nazi elements; (9) but now even they were forced to publicly acknowledge the existence of an international network of right-wing extremists willing to use force to achieve their goals.(10) Even so, official concern about violence from this quarter quickly dissipated, and both the media and the public subsequently lost interest in keeping an eye on what journalist Frederick Laurent has referred to as the 'black orchestra'. (11)

Since then, certain terrorism 'experts' have cast the events of 1980 in a new light. One of these is Christopher Harmon, a researcher at the rightist Heritage Foundation,(12) who has suggested that these bombings did not so much reflect a resurgence of 'fascism' - the standard media line - as a new and dangerous form of collusion between rightist ('black') and leftist ('red') extremists, aided and abetted behind the scenes by the sinister hand of the KGB.(13) Although his view that the Soviets manipulated these developments is based on politically-motivated speculation rather than credible evidence,(14) Harmon's thesis that various contemporary black and red revolutionary elites have been 'displaying common modes of action, proclaiming common strategic and doctrinal ends, and attacking the same targets', is not at all baseless.(15) The question is not whether certain groups of rightist ultras have been publicly expressing solidarity and secretly 'cooperating' with their leftist counterparts during the past decade - of this there is little doubt - but rather what these actions signify.

The purpose of the present article is to shed light on this latter query by examining two of Harmon's key assumptions in more depth. The first is that certain shared attitudes and interests provide a basis for operational collusion between black and red ultras, a view that has much to recommend it. The second is that recent neo-fascist overtures to the violent extra-parliamentary left necessarily reflect genuine efforts by the former to initiate a common struggle against the hated bourgeois state, an interpretation that ignores both the overall complexity of the situation and the specific pattern of right-wing terrorist activities from the mid-1960s up to the mid-1970s and probably beyond. Although it would be premature to attempt to resolve these issues definitively in the absence of sufficiently comprehensive and reliable source materials on the last decade's incidents of Euro-terrorism,(16) some discussion of the historical background should make it possible to put them in context and thereby avoid over-simplified assessments.

The Bases for Right-Left Collusion

In regard to the first of these assumptions, I believe Harmon is justified in calling attention to the limitations of the traditional left-right dichotomy, as well as in pointing out certain fundamental assumptions between contemporary radical leftists and rightists. There is nothing new about this. Many scholars have commented on the problems involved in applying the conventional 'left' and 'right' political labels to particular movements;(17) and attempts to draw parallels and even moral equivalences between groups at the termini of this standard spectrum are now common to several theories, most notably certain versions of 'totalitarianism', 'authoritarian personality' and 'opposing extremism' theories.(18) Despite the blatant political biases characteristic of many such attempts, there are good psychological, ideological and practical reasons for suspecting that various violence-prone rightists and leftists may
be willing to work with each other, at least on a temporary basis.

First of all, 'extremists' of all political persuasions probably have more in common with each other psychologically than they do with any sort of moderate.(19) All genuine radicals are profoundly alienated from the status quo, not merely dissatisfied with particular aspects of it on an abstract intellectual level.(20) It might therefore be said that specific ideological orientations are later accretions grafted onto estranged, rebellious tempaments,(21) a perspective that is well illustrated in the following remark by a young Italian ultra-rightist named Giancarlo, Esposti: 'I colored my nausea with black. Others instead colored theirs with red.'(22) Although it would be absurd to disregard or minimize the potential political differences between individuals who may only share an overriding and visceral hostility toward society at large, this hostility in and of itself creates a psychological bond between them which is arguably deeper than that which links them to less disaffected personalities who have similar political opinions. From this point of view, it does not seem at all incongruous when an Italian neo-fascist editor insists that 'a revolutionary of whatever stripe is closer to us than a conservative',(23) a view which echoes those expressed by many fascists and Nazis in the 1920s and 1930s (24); or when a German neo-Nazi from Schwartzwald-Franz Schubert Kommando argues that the petty differences between the right and left 'can be set aside by those who claim to be undogmatic.'(25)

Second, as Harmon points out, contemporary neo-fascism is 'marked ...... by socialist, revolutionary, anti-Jewish and anti-American strains, and as such shares very disturbing affinities with Europe's terrorist left.'(26) If taken at face value, this would suggest that a certain degree of collusion between black and red extremists might be the natural result of a process of ideological convergence or parallelism. But the ideological situation is considerably, more complicated than Harmon indicates.

For one thing, Harmon shows little awareness that neo-fascism is only one ideological component among many associated with the extreme right. Far from constituting a monolithic entity, this right actually consists of a kaleidoscopic array of rival factions with distinct and often irreconcilable ideological orientations.(27) As Bernard Brigouleix has aptly characterized the situation in modern France, 'there is not really one extreme right, but several',(28) a description that applies equally well to other national contexts. Moreover, neo-fascism is itself fragmented into several conflicting currents of thought,(29) the most important of which are nowadays: the 'social racist' or neo-Nazi tendency (30); the 'revolutionary nationalist' or left fascist tendency (31); the 'mystical traditionalist' tendency based on the theories of Italian 'conservative revolutionary' philosopher Julius Evola (32); the 'Nazi-Maoist' tendency that evolved out of the Evolan current in response to the rise of the New Left (33); the intellectual 'Nouvelle Droite' (ND) tendency (34); and the legalistic 'national right' tendency associated with the moderate and conservative factions within the 'neo-fascist' electoral parties like the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), Spain's Fuerza Neuva (FNU), the West German Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP), the Parti des Forces Nouvelles (PFN) and Front National (FNA) in France, and the British National Front (NF).(35)

One can hardly make a general claim about the ideological bases for right-left cooperation without coming to grips with these crucial distinctions. However, since further untangling the various strands of extreme right-wing ideology would take the discussion too far afield, I will confine myself to making a few relevant general observations.
As Italian political commentator Giorgio Galli noted several years ago, the contemporary European radical right has adopted two main geopolitical perspectives, one Atlantic-oriented, the other pan-European. (36) The bulk of the non-fascist ultra-right - including radical nationalists, Catholic integralists ('national Catholics'), monarchist extremists, certain circles among the rightist intelligentsia etc. - is politically wedded to the Atlantic alliance and its major sponsor, the United States, since it views these as the military bulwarks of a Western civilization that is locked in a life-or-death struggle with an implacable communist adversary. This view is also shared, albeit more reluctantly, by the conservative 'national right' elements within the aforementioned neo-fascist electoral parties. (37) In marked contrast, most radical neo-fascist-factions promote the establishment of a strong, united Europe - a 'Nation Europa' - that would be capable of constituting a 'third force' in opposition to the twin 'imperialisms' of international communism and international finance capital, both of which they perceive as being decadent, materialistic, exploitative, dehumanizing and - according to pro-Nazi elements - controlled by parasitic Jews. (38) This neo-fascist substitution of an 'international of nationalism' for 'national chauvinism' (39) has precedents in classical fascist and Nazi rhetoric, (40) but it developed primarily as a pragmatic response to the 'inescapable geopolitical fact' that no single European nation could hope to match the post-war military and economic strength of the two superpowers. (41) The resulting pan-European 'third force' perspective is well captured in the following Nazi-fascist slogan: 'Against the gold of America and the iron of the USSR, the blood of Europe'. (42)

These radical neo-fascist elements also generally subscribe to a number of notions that parallel those of left-wing terrorists. (43) Among other things they believe:

- that clandestine paramilitary vanguards are the engines of revolutionary transformation;
- that violence and direct action are inherently purifying cathartic experiences;
- that bourgeois democracy is a cancer that must be destroyed to make way for a new social order;
- that Zionism is an evil, insidious movement;
- that moderate 'respectable' elements within their respective political milieus (like the MSI's 'double-breasted' (doppiopetto) faction and the reformist majority in the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) are contemptible sell-outs.

It would therefore seem that in most of its current variants, the ideology of neo-fascism - like that of classical fascism - has a number of genuinely revolutionary components which are not wholly alien to certain doctrinal positions normally associated with the voluntarist, post-Marxist, ultra-left. And since it is from the ranks of such radical elements that most postwar right-wing terrorists have been drawn, at least since the early 1960s, Harmon's interpretation is not as far-fetched as it might at first appear.

Finally, both black and red terrorists aim to destroy the 'pseudo-democratic' bourgeois state by provoking violent repression (44) In the left-wing variant, 'armed struggle' is initiated to force the regime to abandon its democratic facade and expose its underlying 'fascist' core. This, in turn, will supposedly catalyze public discontent and allow the 'advanced' elements of the proletariat to lead a revolutionary transformation of society. (45) In the right-wing version, terrorist acts are launched to create chaos and thereby pressure the public into clamoring for 'law and order'. This will provide the necessary preconditions and pretext for an authoritarian response led by ultras within
In sum, Harmon's first assumption that attitudinal bases exist for cooperation between the radical right and left appears to have considerable validity. Nevertheless, when one actually investigates the earlier pattern of relations between right-wing terrorists and the extra-parliamentary left, a rather different picture emerges, one that not only casts some doubt on this assumption but also seems to directly contradict his second assumption about the genuine nature of neo-fascist participation in the 'anti-imperialist' struggle. Far from displaying authentic solidarity with their red 'brothers', the most radical elements of the extreme right have frequently attempted to infiltrate bona fide leftist groups in order to goad them into undertaking violent, counterproductive actions - actions which would not only serve to discredit the left and terrorize the public, but also to provoke an authoritarian response by the government. And when such provocateurs found themselves unable to successfully manipulate the actions of existing left-wing formations, they often proceeded to launch terrorist attacks and attribute them to the left, or, alternatively, establish bogus 'red' organizations which could serve as a cover for all sorts of disruptive activities. Even more disconcertingly, the predominant form of 'collusion' that has so far been documented has been between black terrorists and various repressive agencies linked to NATO and the US, the very 'imperialist' forces that neo-fascist ultras claim to oppose.

**Evidence of Right-Wing Manipulation.**

To illustrate this widespread rightist strategy of disruption and intoxication (50), I will focus on two well documented cases. The first involves the far-flung infiltration and assassination operations launched by former Organisation de l'Armee Secrete (OAS) terrorists under the cover of a Lisbon-based press agency called Aginter Press (AP). The second involves a series of violent provocations initiated by members of the two most active neo-fascist organizations in Italy, Ordine Nuovo (ON) and Avanguardia Nazionale (AN). As we shall see, the latter actions were partially planned and/or executed by some of the very people Harmon identifies as key figures in his purported black-red terrorist alliance. In both of the cases under consideration, once can find two common denominators.

First, the terrorist groups in question worked in close cooperation with rightist elements within various security agencies. Some of the specific evidence will be provided below, but here it should be pointed out that this type of linkage is not a new phenomenon. As long as secret police forces have existed, they have recruited and made use of provocateurs drawn from sympathetic or desperately impoverished segments of the population. The antecedents of post-war ultra-right recruitment stem from the World War 2 period and its immediate aftermath, and include such developments as:

- the alliance between American intelligence and various organized crime syndicates (which began in 1942) (52);
- the exfiltration of thousands of Nazi war criminals and collaborators from
Europe by US Army counterintelligence officers and pro-Axis factions within the Vatican (53);
- and the subsequent recruitment of Axis intelligence and security personnel by several Western secret services at war's end.(54)

The latter specifically set the pattern for the post-war recruitment of new generations of right-wing extremists, which has unfortunately continued up to the present day. (55)

Second, the methods employed by these terrorist outfits were derived in large part from French counterinsurgency techniques via the medium of the OAS.

**The Development of Guerre Revolutionnaire Doctrine.**

Following the traumatic defeat of the French expeditionary corps in Indochina at the hands of the Viet Minh, certain of France's most brilliant and battle-hardened junior officers became obsessed with trying to understand how a relatively ill-equipped peasant army had overcome an experienced and professional fighting force. They immersed themselves in the military writings of Mao Tse-tung and other communist theorists in order to acquaint themselves further with the enemy's techniques of revolutionary guerrilla warfare.(56) On the basis of these studies and their own first-hand experience in southeast Asia, they developed a potent counter-revolutionary doctrine known as *guerre revolutionnaire* which eventually came to dominate French military thought in the late 1950s.(57)

Put simply, *guerre revolutionnaire* wedded a simplistic and manichean geo-political conception to a fairly sophisticated ensemble of operational techniques. The former held that the Third World War between the West and its intransigent communist foe had already begun, but in a new guise.(58) Nuclear weapons had made large-scale conventional war impractical and potentially suicidal, so the communists had devised and launched a new type of 'subversive warfare' to destroy Western civilization. Rather than engaging in direct confrontations, the Soviet Union was waging 'remote control' or 'surrogate' wars by stirring up discontent in the Third World, particularly within the territories of colonial empires. The ultimate goal was to strip the West of its resources and isolate Europe geopolitically, thereby creating the preconditions for its total defeat. From this perspective, all so-called decolonization or national liberation struggles were seen as communist-inspired and serving Soviet ends. (59)

Moreover, this Third World War was viewed as a total war being waged on all fronts. It was no longer possible for Western nations to concern themselves solely with military measures, for in communist subversive war such measures were inextricably linked with political, social, psychological, and especially ideological elements.(60) To protect itself from this multi-dimensional assault, the West had to rally behind a coherent, monolithic doctrine that could successfully oppose the totalitarian doctrine of the communists on equal terms.

From an operational standpoint, the *guerre revolutionnaire* theorists described communist revolutionary strategy as a combination of partisan (guerrilla) warfare and psychological warfare.(61) According to their analysis, its primary objective was to 'conquer' the population, not to gain strategic territory as in conventional war.(62) They had been amazed at the extent to which the Viet-Minh had retained the support of the population of Vietnam; but rather than examining the underlying historical and social causes of this allegiance, they focused on the organizational and psychological
techniques used by the guerrillas to assert their control. These were identified as the creation of 'parallel hierarchies', clandestine cross-cutting vertical and horizontal networks that tightly enmeshed each person in an elaborate, all-encompassing infrastructure geared towards exerting social control; the skillful and systematic application of action psychologique, which included both mass propaganda directed at groups and 'thought reform' employed against particular individuals; and the ruthless but controlled utilization of terrorism, whether discriminate or indiscriminate, to intimidate the population and complete its psychological separation from the incumbent regime. However, it is important to note that said theorists did not see these as discrete or successive processes, but rather as different components of a single coordinated effort to gain control of the population; indeed, they felt that it was precisely this fusion of methods that made subversive war so dangerous and effective.

Having thus identified enemy techniques, the proponents of guerre revolutionnaire sought to devise ways of countering or neutralizing them. Most concluded that to gain the upper hand in the struggle against international communist subversion, it was necessary to adopt the enemy's totalitarian methods and turn them against their users. Therefore, the young colonels experimented with varying combinations of these techniques to keep Algeria French and, in the process, avenge the army's earlier humiliations in Indo-China, Morocco, Tunisia, and at Suez. But their zeal to apply totalitarian solutions throughout Algeria was not shared by the majority of the army, government, or the French population. As a result, despite some notable successes achieved through guerre revolutionnaire methods, e.g., the destruction of the rebel Front de Liberation National (FLN) network in Algiers in 1957, the bitter war dragged on without definitive resolution, causing the government to waiver in its commitment to Algerie Francaise. This official vacillation completed the alienation of the guerre revolutionnaire officers, who had already become deeply estranged from the French public and regime due to the apathy and pusillanimity the latter groups had displayed during the Indo-China war. Feelings of betrayal and abandonment again welled up inside them, and many decided that the only way to retain control of Algeria and recover their lost honour was to apply guerre revolutionnaire techniques against their own countrymen and thereby morally regenerate France itself. This subversive attitude was fanned by extreme rightist groups in both Algeria and the metropole.

The stage was thus set for the fateful alliance between the disaffected practioners of guerre revolutionnaire, especially those working in the army's 5th (Psychological Action) Bureau or commanding elite Foreign Legion and paratroop units, and fanatical pied noir ultras. This alliance soon bore fruit in the series of insurrections in Algiers - the 13 May 1958 coup, 'barricades' week in January 1960, and the 'generals' putsch' of late April 1961 which brought down the Fourth Republic and threatened the political survival of its Gaullist successor. Eventually, elements of the same forces joined together in the clandestine OAS, which applied numerous guerre revolutionnaire techniques, first to maintain control over Algeria and later to overthrow the Fifth Republic and replace it with an etat muscle capable of rallying the nation behind its efforts to confront international communism.

The Spread of Guerre Revolutionnaire Concepts

For our purposes, the important thing is to indicate how this alliance affected both groups and thereby provided a foundation for subsequent right-wing terrorism. The rebellious colonels, who had been seeking to develop a powerful counter-
revolutionary ideology capable of resisting communism, were offered several by civilian ultra-rightists. The most important of these were 'national Catholicism', which was promoted in slightly different versions by militant far-right lay organizations like Jean Ousset's Cite Catholique and George Sauge's Centre d'Etudes Superieures de Psychologie Sociale (76), and 'national communism', a doctrine promoted by radical neo-fascist groups like Jeune Nation (NJ).(77) Both doctrines had their adherents within the army and thence within the OAS, which was divided between an integralist wing led by Colonel Pierre Chateau-Jobert and a fascist wing dominated by Colonel Antoine Argoud.(78)

On the other hand, right-wing extremists throughout the world were galvanized by the exploits of the seditious guerre revolutionnaire officers who led the military revolts in Algeria (79), and those in the super-heated Algerian milieu were indoctrinated with guerre revolutionnaire concepts and more or less systematically trained in their application by elite, battle-hardened military personnel. To be sure, many pied noir and even metropolitan ultras had already developed strong links with official coercive agencies. For example, some had been recruited into the so-called 'Main Rouge', a counter-terrorist organization created by the French secret service (Service de Documentation Exterieure et de Contre-Espionage (SDECE), to eliminate the FLN's support network in Europe and prevent supplies from reaching rebel forces in Algeria.(80) Others had provided services for the army's 2nd (Intelligence) Bureau or various police apparatuses. (81) Moreover, the Algerian colons had established several paramilitary 'counter-terrorist' groups on their own, most of which were later incorporated into the OAS.(82) But at that point they were directly exposed to the most advanced techniques of clandestine organization, action psychologique, and, above all, terrorism. OAS experts were even sent elsewhere to help European supporters of the organization accomplish various tasks.(83) Finally, the collapse of the OAS forced many of its members to flee abroad where, in return for asylum and other amenities, they offered their considerable skills to help train foreign counter-insurgency and parallel police units. (84) This is why many have viewed the OAS as the embryo of later black terrorist internationals.

Indeed, Aginter Press was itself a product of the OAS diaspora.(85) Its founder Yves Guerin-Serac (nee Guillot) had fought in Asia and then been attached to the notorious 11th Demi-Brigade Parachutiste du Choc, a special 'dirty tricks' unit stationed in Algeria that was at the disposal of SDECE,(86) before joining the OAS and leading one of its commando units in the Oran area. (87) In June of 1962, he fled to Spain and helped Chateau-Jobert organize the Mouvement du Combat Contre-Revolutionnaire (MCR),(88) then moved onto to Portugal, one of the most intransigent European colonial powers. In Lisbon he made contact with old Vichyite exiles and other OAS fugitives, and was introduced to the Portuguese authorities by former Petainist and ultra-nationalist pro-Salazar editorialist Jacques Ploncard d'Assac.(89) He was hired as an instructor for the paramilitary Legiao Portuguesa, and later employed to train counter-guerilla units of the Portugese army. Meanwhile, several of his OAS comrades arrived in Lisbon, and together they decided to try and form an international anti-communist organization of their own. Fortunately for them the Portugese government was then attempting to set up covert intelligence networks using foreign personnel in various African countries, and it agreed to fund their projected venture through the intermediary of its much-feared secret police, the Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado/Direccoao Geral de Segurancan (PIDE/DGS).(90) Thus was born Aginter Press (AP) and its satellite organizations.
Aginter Press

Aginter Press was formally established in September 1966 and did in fact serve as an actual press agency: it syndicated articles in various right-wing media outlets and published its own bi-monthly bulletin. But its main function was to camouflage the activities of what Laurent refers to as a 'center of international fascist subversion', which was divided into several components (92), including:

- an espionage office 'covered' by the PIDE/DGS and purportedly (93) linked to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the West German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) (94), the Spanish Dirección General de Seguridad (DGS), the Greek Kentrike Yperesia Pliroforion (KYP or Central Intelligence Service), and the South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS) (95):
- a unit that specialized in recruiting and training mercenaries in the arcane arts of 'unconventional' warfare;
- a strategic centre for coordinating 'subversion and intoxication operations' that worked in conjunction with reactionary regimes and politicians on every continent; and an international 'action' organization called Ordre et Tradition (O and T), which had a clandestine paramilitary wing known as the Organisation d'Action contre le Communisme International (OACI).(96)

Most of the personnel consisted of former military officers, Portugese ultras, and rightist intellectuals, and shortly after its creation its operatives made extensive (and highly successful) efforts to establish links with extreme-right organizations throughout the world.(97) Due to these far-reaching connections and the strength of its institutional support in Lisbon, AP exerted an influence far beyond its numerical strength.

The history of AP can be divided into two major phases. In the first, which began in 1966 and ended in 1969, the agency initiated a series of operations aimed at weakening and destroying guerrilla groups operating in Portugese Africa. (98) These were undertaken at the behest and with the direct assistance of PIDE/DGS and other agencies of the Portugese government. In the second phase, which lasted from 1969 until AP's formal dissolution in 1974, agency personnel offered their specialized guerre revolutionnaire training to a number of repressive regimes in Latin America, and were in fact hired to provide it in Guatemala and post-Allende Chile. (99) During this period, the organization was no longer subsidized by the Portugese state, although its Lisbon apparatus was still 'covered' by the PIDE/DGS. Following the April 1974 'Revolution of the Flowers' led by leftist elements within the Portugese armed forces, both the PIDE/DGS and AP were dismantled, although many of their agents later resurfaced in the counter-revolutionary Exercito de Liberacao de Portugal (ELP). (100)

While it is beyond the scope of this article to go into the entire history of AP, two of its activities throw light on later black-red relations. As noted above, one branch of AP was charged with the training of mercenaries and terrorists. It set up facilities in specially-designated Legiao and PIDE/DGS training camps, and offered an intensive three-week course that included both the theoretical instruction in the tradecraft of subversion (including methods of action psychologique, intelligence gathering, clandestine communications and infiltration), and hands-on training in urban terrorist techniques (including the use of explosives and other specialized weaponry).(101) Not
surprisingly, most of those who passed through the AP's *guerre revolutionnaire* course were drawn from the ranks of European neo-fascist organizations, (102) and some were later implicated in terrorist actions. (103)

Even more importantly, given the topic under consideration, 'the infiltration of pro-Chinese (Maoist) organizations and the use of this cover was one of the great specialties of Aginter.'(104) At the end of 1965, even before the creation of AP, Guerin-Serac and his men commenced operations in Portuguese Africa with the objective of liquidating guerilla leaders, installing informants and provocateurs in genuine resistance groups, and setting up false liberation movements.(105) Somewhat later, they found the perfect vehicle to use as a cover - the Parti Communiste Suisse/ Marxiste -Leninist (PCSIML), an ostensibly Maoist organization headed by Gerard Bulliard.(106) The AP man responsible for arranging this was Robert Leroy, a former member of Charles Maurras' Action Francaise, the pre-war Cagoule terrorist network, Vichy intelligence, the Waffen SS, and Otto Skorzeny's commando force who worked after the war for both NATO intelligence and the BND, where he specialized in acquiring information on the left under journalistic cover.(107) With the help of the communist Chinese embassy in Berne, he persuaded Bulliard to hire him and other AP personnel as correspondents for the PCS/MI-paper, *L'Etincelle*. (108) Armed with these credentials, Leroy and Jean-Marie Laurent were able to penetrate 'liberated territory' in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique in order to 'interview' several African guerrilla leaders. After doing so, they engaged in *intoxication* operations to provoke dissension within the resistance movements. Leroy's machinations may have been partially responsible for the bombing that killed Frent de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO) leader Eduardo Mondlane.(109) In addition to their African ventures, AP 'correspondents' also infiltrated the Portuguese opposition in western Europe by posing as Maoist journalists.(110) And, as we shall soon see, Guerin-Serac, Leroy, and possibly Laurent were later linked to rightist provocations in Italy. These examples, which could be multiplied, give a general indication of the important role played by Aginter in transmitting *guerre revolutionnaire* techniques to the European extreme right. It is now time to consider the link between Aginter and the development of a systematic 'strategy of tension' in Italy.

Rightist manipulation of the postwar Italian political climate originated long before the arrival of AP's 'correspondents'. Before World War 2 ended, the American Office of Strategic Service (OSS) operatives such as Allen Dulles (a future director of the CIA) and James J. Angleton (a future head of CIA counter-intelligence) were working to neutralize the postwar political influence of communist-controlled resistance organizations - Dulles by arranging for the escape and/or recruitment of certain Axis intelligence and police personnel, (111) Angleton by forging close links to key industrialists and rightist circles within the Vatican, army, police and secret services.(112) After the war, Angleton helped to subsidize several far-right paramilitary groups, ostensibly to prevent a communist coup,(113) and played a decisive personal role in saving the life of the 'Black Prince', Junio Valerio Borghese, an Italian war hero and war criminal who was later to be involved in several right-wing coup plots.(114) Moreover, the postwar 'purge' in Italy was limited to a few thousand radical fascist supporters of the Nazi-backed Repubblica Sociale Italiano (RSI) and thus did not affect numerous high-ranking officials from the period of the fascist *ventennio*, (115) including personnel within Mussolini's secret police apparatus, the Opera Vigilanza Repressione Antifascismo (OVRA) and the pre-war and wartime secret service, the Servizio Informazioni Militare (SIM).(116) Finally, from the late 1940s on, the US government secretly funnelled millions of dollars into Italy to
establish anti-communist trade unions and networks of civic 'self-defense' committees, as well as to finance rightist publications and electoral campaigns by conservative parties. It was in the context of this extensive intervention in Italian affairs that neo-fascism reconstituted itself.

The Italian 'Strategy of Tension'

As the war drew to a close, former fascists generally followed one of two paths to ensure their survival and promote their political views. Those of a more conservative stripe, including most of the adherents of the ventennio regime, swelled the ranks of the many reactionary parties that were springing up to take advantage of the new political system being imposed on Italy by the victorious Allies, especially Guglielmo Gianini's populist anti-democratic Uomo Qualunque (UQ) party. But for the intransigent pro-'socialist' and pro-Nazi elements among the supporters of RSI, following such a course of action was both psychologically objectionable and difficult in practice, since it was precisely these ultras who were being hunted by former partisans and various Allied agencies. Many were therefore forced to go underground, and some established ephemeral clandestine paramilitary organisations, the most important of which was the Fasci d'Azione Rivoluzionaria (FAR), which engaged in acts of symbolic resistance and sporadic violence. Such groups remained politically marginal until their members gradually made their way into the ranks of the MSI, an ostensibly 'democratic' electoral party organised by lesser RSI figures after the announcement of amnesty in late 1946. However, when the pro-NATO 'double-breasted' moderates led by Arturo Michelini took charge of the party's political direction in the early to mid-1950s, the more radical and youthful elements grew increasingly restive and began to form new clandestine action groups. Among these were Ordine Nuovo, which began in 1954 as an extremist current within the MSI and formally broke with it in 1956, and Avanguardia Nazionale, which also emerged from within the ranks of the MSI's youth sections in 1959. These organisations soon became the most active black terrorist formations in Italy and were intimately involved in every phase of the strategy of tension.

With this background, we can turn to the opening phase of the strategy of tension in Italy, which began in earnest in 1968 and culminated in the terror bombings in Milan and Rome in 12 December 1969. A number of official and 'unofficial' organs of repression appear to have played an important direct or indirect role in the evolution of this rightist strategy, including NATO intelligence, the CIA, the Greek KYP, the Servizio Informazioni Difesa (SID), and sections of the Italian army and police; but here I will focus attention on the series of Nazifascist infiltrations and provocations apparently inspired by guerre revolutionnaire doctrine as practiced by the barbouzes of Aginter Press. This provides another excellent illustration of the nature of the previous relations between black terrorists and the extra-parliamentary left, one that undermines Harmon's simplistic interpretation of the complex role played by Italian Nazi-Maoist and other types of neo-fascist groups.

The initial acquaintance of the Italian extreme right with guerre revolutionnaire concepts goes back to the early 1960s when the OAS was waging its desperate struggles against both the FLN and De Gaulle. To establish a support network for their political and military efforts, OAS representatives made contact with far-right circles throughout Europe. As a result, young Italian neo-fascists from ON and the Italian section of Jean-Francois Thiriart's international Jeune Europe (JE) organisation went
to special training camps in Belgium and West Germany to learn techniques of OAS and Nazi propaganda, (130) and the OAS set up bases in Italy to give them 'refresher courses',(131) presumably in methods of action psychologique and terrorism.

Moreover, among those who took a special interest in rendering assistance to the OAS were several Italian neo-fascists who were later deeply implicated in the strategy of tension, including Guiseppe ('Pino') Rauti, one of the founders of ON, who organised demonstrations on behalf of the OAS;(132) Serafino De Luia of AN, who offered to shelter fleeing OAS terrorists at his home;(133) and Guido Giannettini, a Nazi-fascist journalist, intelligence asset for several secret services, and national leader of the MSI, who was mentioned in a Servizio Informazioni Forze Armate (SIFAR) report as one of the principal agents of the OAS in Italy. (134)

Not surprisingly, Giannettini and Rauti later played a key role in disseminating guerre revolutionnaire doctrine among the upper echelons of the Italian military. They made a particularly strong impression on General Guiseppe Aloja, then Army Chief of Staff, at a time when he was waging a bitter battle with General Giovanni De Lorenzo over the reorganisation of the armed forces. Essentially, Gianetti had convinced Aloja of the need to employ action psychologique and institute commando-style training to create an elite, ideologically sound, and highly motivated military instrument capable of warding off communist subversion; whereas Lorenzo preferred to rely primarily on an expanded intelligence service and fully militarized police apparatus,(135).

Although neither general won a clear cut victory for his pet project, one indication that guerre revolutionnaire was taken seriously is provided by the SID-funded Instituto Alberto Pollio conference devoted to the subject at Rome's Parco dei Principi hotel in May of 1965.(136). This conference brought together numerous high-ranking military officers, conservative politicians, rightist journalists and neo-fascist terrorists like Stefano Delle Chiaie and Michele Mario Merlino. and it featured presentations by both Giannetti and Rauti, (137). While it is difficult to assess the impact of guerre revolutionnaire concepts on the Italian officer corps as a whole perhaps a study of specialized military publications would provide some indication (138) - there is a considerable body of evidence demonstrating that extremist factions within the security forces aided black terrorists in applying them over a period of several years. (139)

Guerre revolutionnaire methods also reached Italy via a somewhat surprising intermediary - the ultra-rightist Greek colonels who had launched their own highly successful military coup in April 1967. Some indications of the important functions they served in the first phases of the strategy of tension will be given below, but here is should be pointed out that Colonel George Papadopoulos and other officers linked to the KYP (and thus to the CIA)(140) had long been devotees of guerre revolutionnaire doctrine. Papadopoulos was himself apparently an avid reader of the French counter-insurgency theorists, including Colonels Charles Lacheroy, Roger Trinquier and Argoud.(141) Moreover, the Greek golpistas employed their own 'strategy of tension' with great success in the months prior to their coup. and it involved the same elements that soon made their appearance in Italy - terrorist bombings, provocations launched under 'leftist' cover, action psychologique etc.(142)

Finally - and perhaps most significantly - the leading figures behind the strategy of tension in Italy had long been in direct contact with Aginter's operatives. The first known link was established between Robert Leroy and Delle Chiaie, the founder of AN and arguably the world's most dangerous quasi-governmental right-wing terrorist during a 1965 Nouvel Ordre Europeen/ Neue Europaische Ordung (NOE/NEO)
convention sponsored by ON in Milan.(143) Several other such meetings took place during the period from 1966 to 1969,(144) and apparently Leroy became close friends with a number of Italian neo-fascists, including Merlino (ON and AN). Stefano Serpieri (Europa Civiltà), Clemente Graziani (co-founder of ON with Rauti), Prince Borghese (founder of the Fronte Nazionale), and Carlo Maggi, a friend of Nazi-Maoist Franco Freda.(145) The most important of all these get-togethers may have occurred on 31 January 1968, only a couple of months before the eruption of the strategy of tension, when Guerin-Serac himself met with Rauti to discuss 'anti-communist activities' involving both propaganda and 'eventual offensive actions'.(146) Aside from these meetings, an ex-OAS veteran named 'Jean' helped to train AN personnel in the use of explosives and participated with AN members in a bombing of the South Vietnamese embassy in Rome, which was then attributed to the left.(147) This 'Jean' was later tentatively identified as AP's Jean-Marie Laurent.(148) Still another concrete indication of AP's direct involvement was provided by Merlino, who attempted to infiltrate the Italian Maoist group Avanguardia Proletaria by boasting of his connections to the Swiss 'Maoist' journal, L'Etincelle (149).

However, the most damning evidence linking Aginter to the strategy of tension in Italy was provided by a November 1968 report from one of AP's Italian 'correspondents' to the agency's Lisbon headquarters, where it was later discovered. In this report, the manipulative tactics characterizing the strategy were clearly outlined:

'We think that the first phase of our political action should be to promote chaos in all the structures of the regime. Our activity must be to destroy the democratic state under the cover of communist or pro-Chinese activities; we have already infiltrated some of our people into these groups and obviously we will have to adapt our actions to the ambience of that milieu (propaganda and forceful actions of the sort that seem to emanate from our communist adversaries). The introduction of provocateur elements into the circles of the revolutionary left is merely a reflection of the wish to push this unstable situation to the breaking point and create a climate of chaos. Pro-Chinese circles, characterized by their own impatience and zeal, are suitable for infiltration. That will create a feeling of hostility towards those who threaten the peace of each and every nation (i.e. the radical left). We should work on public opinion to demonstrate the failure and incapacity of the legally-constituted apparatus, making ourselves appear as the only ones who can furnish a social, political, and economic solution adapted to the moment. At the same time, we should raise up a defender of the citizens against the disintegration provoked by subversion and terrorism.'(150)

Similar ideas can be found in a terrorist manual prepared by Guerin-Serac, in which he argued that the psychological purpose of terrorism was to achieve 'power over the masses by the creation of a climate of anxiety (and) insecurity', thereby conditioning them to accept authority. (151)

Now that it has been established that certain guerre revolutionnaire concepts were disseminated within the Italian neo-fascist orbit by Aginter operatives, it remains only to outline the intoxication tactics employed in the initial stages of the strategy of tension to show that they were applied. As the above document suggests, the first stage was characterized by a 'vast operation of infiltration in the milieu of the left and the creation of new fascist groups masquerading under labels that vaguely echo Marxist
The second witnessed the launching of several terrorist attacks, especially bombings, many of which were attributed to the left by police and judicial authorities working in collusion with the rightists that actually committed them.

Prior to 1968, the most violent Nazi-fascist outfits in Italy confined their activities to traditional squadristi tactics and occasional terrorism directed against the left; but the growth of the New Left and the increasing possibility of PCI participation in the government led the far right to adopt new and more severe measures associated with guerre revolutionnaire theories. I have already mentioned the possibly seminal meeting between Guerin-Serac and Rauti in January 1968, but the actual launching of provocation operations directly followed another important event. In April of that year, members of several Italian neo-fascist organizations took a 'tour' of Greece with some ultra-right Greek counterparts who were studying in Italy.(153) This tour was arranged by Rauti, who had personally visited Greece right after the coup and had established close relations with the ruling junta.(154) In Greece, a series of meetings were held between the visitors, among whom were Merlino and Serpieri, and representatives of the Greek regime, including Rauti's friend Konstantin Plevris, leader of the Nazified '4th of August' movement and an agent of the KYP.(155) Since Plevris was himself the architect of the Greek 'strategy of tension', most researchers have supposed that he advised the visiting rightists on the techniques he had used to manipulate the political climate in Greece prior to the launching of the coup. (156)

This assumption seems entirely justified, for the 'tourists' who returned from Greece appeared to have undergone a miraculous political transformation. Within days Merlino had founded the 'anarchist' Circolo XXII Marzo with 'converted' fascists,(157) and a number of other 'leftist' groups were also established by far-right militants, including De Luia's Movimento Studentesco Operaia d'Avanguardia, Attilo Strippoli's 'anarchist' Gruppo Primavera, Diego Vandelli's Banda XXII Ottobre, and - perhaps most importantly - a complex of 'left-wing' organizations and distribution companies established by Nazi-Maoist Freda and Giovanni Ventura.(158) Other neo-fascist 'converts' penetrated genuine leftist organizations and attempted to generate internal dissension and provoke violent confrontations with the authorities. Merlino, for example, infiltrated and fractured the anarchist Circolo Bakunin, while Domenico Polli (of ON) and Alfredo Sestili (of AN) joined the Maoist Partito Communista d'Italia/Marxista-Leninista (PSdl/M-L) and created considerable confusion before being identified as provocateurs. (159) Many of these manipulation ventures met with only partial success because their executors were as yet too unprofessional, but even those that were exposed served to heighten general paranoia and create further divisions within the already divided student movement.(160)

This phase of the strategy of tension gradually merged into a second phase marked by continued provocation coupled with the initiation of numerous terrorist attacks, especially bombings (161) As early as November 1968, Della Chiaie's operatives had placed a number of bombs in schools and outside police stations, hoping to make them appear to be the work of leftists.(162) But things really began to heat up in 1969. From 3 January to 12 December of that year - the date of the Piazza Fontana massacre - at least 145 attentats were launched by neo-fascists. Of these, 96 were targeted at the left and the remainder, almost all bombings in public places, were attributed to the left.(163) In April 1969, after meeting with Rauti and a 'journalist agent' (perhaps Giannettini), members of the Freda-Ventura group set off several bombs in Milan and Padua which were falsely pinned on the opposition. (164) This event set the pattern for a number of similar 'incidents' throughout 1969, incidents which were invariably
blamed on the left by both the conservative press and various underhand police officials. The goal was to persuade the more moderate elements within the army and security forces that a violent 'communist' coup was in the works, thus providing a stimulus and pretext for military intervention.

This process culminated in a series of 4 blasts on 12 December 1969 in Milan and Rome. Of these, the most serious occurred in the lobby of the Banca Nazionale dell'Agricoltura off the Piazza Fontana, where 16 people were killed and over 80 wounded. Only a few hours after the attack, Milan police commissioner Luigi Calabrese notified the press and other police agencies that he suspected that anarchists were behind the massacre, just as he had done after the April bombings earlier that year. Shortly thereafter, several anarchists belonging to the Circolo 22 Marzo were arrested, including Pietro Valpreda, an unemployed ballet dancer who had previously refused to 'cooperate' with the police and inform on his friends. Another politically active anarchist named Guiseppe Pinelli was brought to police headquarters for questioning and thence 'accidentally' fell to his death out of an upper story window while being interrogated. Soon after, Valpreda and his associates were charged with the bombings and sentenced to prison. The Italian public breathed a sigh of relief, thinking that a group of violent subversives had been brought to justice.

Unfortunately, the true authors of the attacks had not been put behind bars. The Circolo 22 Marzo had in fact been established in late 1969 by Merlino. His purpose was to persuade some genuine anarchists to join so that they could be blamed for the upcoming terror bombings, and Valpreda and his friends had taken the bait. In other words, the Piazza Fontana bombing was yet another neo-fascist provocation, aided and abetted by elements of the police and SID. It was not until years later that a handful of honest investigating magistrates were able to overcome political obstacles, piece together the sequence of events, and indict the real perpetrators. On 18 January 1977 - over seven years after the event - thirty-four neo-fascists and officers of the secret services were formally charged with the crime, but only Freda, Ventura and Gianettini were actually in the dock.

Meanwhile, the strategy of tension continued to unfold in Italy. From 1969 to 1975 there were 4334 officially-registered acts of terrorist violence, 83% of which were attributed to the extreme right. Throughout those years the country was afflicted by waves of public bombings, abortive coup attempts, widespread intoxication, provocations behind a 'leftist' cover, mass uprisings (as in Reggio Calabria in 1970), 'deviations' of the secret
and security services, and other forms of black subversion of the democratic process. (174) Although these activities did not precipitate an overt rightist military putsch, as the employment of similar tactics accomplished in Greece (1967), (175) Chile (1973), (176) and Turkey (1971 and 1980), (177) they caused the deaths of hundreds of innocent bystanders, created a general climate of psychological insecurity, inhibited the political growth of the democratic left, and helped prompt the government to enact a series of harsh 'anti-terrorist' measures that adversely affected the civil liberties of all Italians.

Provisional Conclusions

What does this suggest about the black-red collusion thesis promoted by Harmon and others? On a superficial level, there is no way to reconcile the radical anti-system pronouncements of neo-fascist terrorists with their past history of intelligence-connected manipulations and provocations, except by (i) ignoring or minimising the latter, as most 'collusion' proponents have done, (178) or (ii) assuming that all black expressions of solidarity with the reds and antipathy toward the bourgeois state are simply rhetorical devices designed to mislead and disrupt the extraparliamentary left - as most 'manipulation' supporters have done. (179) In other words, the problem has hitherto generally been presented as an either-or issue. However, I believe that one must conjoin elements of the two perspectives in order to grasp the real complexity of the situation, even though it is not yet possible to clarify it fully.

As I suggested above, it would be a serious mistake to ignore neo-fascism's revolutionary ideological components or underestimate the profound sense of alienation felt by recent generations of fascists. (180) The expressions of hostility toward the corrupt pseudo-democratic partitocrazia, US and Soviet domination of Europe, the tyranny of international capitalist exploitation, and modern bourgeois society in general are as palpable in the in-house writings of many radical neo-fascists as they are in those of the ultra-left. (181) There is no reason to suppose that such visceral hatred could not engender violent attacks on the state and a search for allies on the left who were likewise both anti-Soviet and unremittingly hostile to what Brigate Rosee (BR) communiques have often referred to as the 'imperialist state of the multinationals'. (182) Indeed, one of the salient characteristics of the post-1968 period has been the adoption of certain New Left perspectives and tactics by various neo-fascist elements, (183) a development that was further stimulated in Italy by the partial mid-1970s crackdown on black terrorist formations that had previously been covertly aided, abetted, and protected by factions within the secret services and security forces. (184) Since they had begun to be subjected to official repression of the type that had been employed against the left for years, they saw increasing value in New Left critiques of the state and red terrorist organizational techniques. (185) For these and other reasons, new left-leaning, neo-fascist organizations and ideological currents arose in many parts of Europe during the 1970s, including 'national revolutionary' groups like the West German Sache des Volkes/ Nationalrevolutionare Aufbauorganisation (SdV/NRAO), (186) the Maoist evoliani in Italy's Terza Posizione (TP), (187) and 'solidarist' outfits like Jean-Gilles Malliarakis' Jeune Nation Solidariste (JNS) in France (188) and the Solidaristische Volksbewegung (SVB) in West Germany. (189) Towards the end of the decade neo-fascist terrorists were assassinating representatives of the state (especially in Italy), having shootouts with the police, bombing NATO installations (especially in West Germany) and - most relevantly - exchanging operational 'assistance' with their red counterparts, (190) all of which would seem to confirm Harmon's views.
Nevertheless, other factors should make us wary of accepting this thesis without major qualifications. For one thing, many of the rightists that Harmon and others have assumed to be genuine 'anti-imperialists' were linked to organizations which were either identical to, or direct offshoots of, those implicated in the earlier phases of the strategy of tension. These include Pierluigi Paglai of AN, famous for his later participation (along with Delle Chiaie) in the rightist Bolivian 'coca coup' of 1980; (191) Marco Affatigato of ON, a suspect in the 1980 Bologna bombing; (192) Nazi-Maoists Freda, Mario Tutti and Claudio Mutti; (193) and Delle Chiaie himself. (194) Likewise Paolo Signorelli, one of the key animators of the late 1970s left fascist groups like TP and the circle associated with Costruiamo l'Azione, had been a long term member of ON and had been backed by AN as an MSI parliamentary candidate in the mid-1960s. (195) Yet these and other links, while suggestive, do not necessarily indicate that later left fascist outfits were merely bogus front organizations since, as Vittorio Borraccetti has pointed out, it is hardly surprising that some personnel from previous neo-fascist formations would drift into the newer, more dynamic groups. (196) Nor should one assume that politicos and terrorists never change their ideological perspectives or tactical methods in response to changing conditions.

Much more significant than past affiliations per se is the fragmentary but nonetheless growing evidence of rightist manipulations - covert or otherwise - of the violence-prone extra-parliamentary left since 1980. (197) This manipulation has taken at least two forms, both of which should now be familiar to the reader. The first is external and involves neo-fascist expressions of solidarity with the reds that are clearly not genuine but, rather, are intended both to publicly discredit the left and/or enable the blacks to enter into a destructive 'cooperative' arrangement with them. This is certainly the modus operandi of Delle Chiaie, who still poses as an 'anti-imperialist revolutionary' despite his long history of collusion with forces that would be considered reactionary by any standards, and probably also of several other rightist ultras. Thus, it has been recently suggested that West German neo-Nazi Odfried Hepp, who has publicly proclaimed that 'everyone is justified in this (anti-imperialist) struggle' and whose interaction with both Arabs and left-wing European terrorists has been thoroughly documented, (198) was employed as an agent provocateur by the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA). (199) If so, this throws an entirely different light on his participation with other neo-Nazis in a series of unclaimed bank heists and bombings of NATO facilities, crimes that were invariably blamed on red terrorist groups like the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) and Revolutionare Zellen (RZ) until a 'black trail' was later uncovered. (200)

Other 'black trails' seem to lead directly inside the ranks of several of the most notorious left-wing Euro-terrorist outfits, including the BR in Italy (201), Action Directe (AD) in France (202), the Crupos de Resistencia Antifascistas Primero de Octubre (GRAPO) in Spain (203) - and possibly the Cellules Communistes Combattantes (CCC) in Belgium. (204) This second sort of manipulation is even more sophisticated and effective, since it apparently involves the internal direction of some 'red' terrorism by rightist provocateurs linked to Western security agencies. Although the extent of such activity is at present impossible to determine, the results help to justify the massive Western propaganda campaign about the threat posed by the 'communist terror network'. (205)

Thus we are still unable to arrive at definitive conclusions since evidence can be found to support both the 'collusion' and 'manipulation' theses. Yet these seemingly contradictory interpretations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. After all, some
neo-fascists may have been pursuing a strategy of disruption even as others were making efforts to establish a common black-red oppositional front. For this reason, and despite the long and continuing history of right-wing provocations, I believe Borraccetti is right to insist that the development of new left-leaning, neo-fascist groups advocating spontaneous actions and attacks on the heart of the state represented 'real political processes', and were not simply 'camouflaged tactics' adopted by older organizations. (206) Even if one were to assume the most conspiratorial scenario - that the founders and leaders of all these groups had purposely created bogus formations to confuse and discredit the left - it seems clear that many of their youthful adherents were not aware of this dissimulation and joined them precisely because they found the ultra-revolutionary rhetoric of such figures to be highly appealing. 'This explains the disillusionment that resulted' on those occasions when radical neo-fascist youths discovered that they had been misled into supporting 'reaction'. As early as 1967, for example, a young AN member accused Delle Chiaie of being a tool of the system rather than a genuine revolutionary, a sentiment apparently shared by others. He was killed by a car bomb after threatening to expose his chief's links to the Ministry of the Interior. (207) Therefore, as a tentative hypothesis and potential heuristic device to explain examples of genuine collusion, I would suggest that we are dealing at least in part with inter-generational strife of a sort which has often developed within youth-oriented fascist movements and regimes. (208) In this case, however, it was further exacerbated and greatly influenced by the far-reaching social and political transformations of the late 1960s and early 1970s, particularly those associated with the New Left. (209)

To sum up, it seems that recent relations between right-wing terrorists and the extra-parliamentary left in Europe have involved both sporadic collusion and the systematic manipulation of the latter by the former. As a result, the precise nature of black-red interaction cannot be determined in the abstract, but must be thoroughly investigated on a case-by-case basis. If this is not done, discussions of both terrorism and the contemporary extreme right will continue to be dominated by political polemics, disinformation and other sorts of distortions and over-simplifications.

Notes

2. Although the terms 'clandestine' and 'covert' are often used as synonyms today, even by intelligence personnel, they in fact refer to different sorts of actions. According to former Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operative Christopher Felix (pseudonym) clandestine operations are 'hidden but not disguised', whereas covert operations are 'disguised but not hidden'. Thus the former would apply to a group of camouflaged armed men seeking to disembark secretly on, say, the Cuban coast, the latter would apply to the landing of a CIA operative at Havana airport under business or State Department cover. See his fascinating and revelatory work (1963) pp. 27-9.
3. Cf the remarks of Tomlinson (1981) p.104: election returns do not disclose the whole story by any means. Parliament may to one arguable extent or another reflect 'the will of the people', but it cannot, indeed does not, always protect that interest from the undue influence of the infiltrator, the disruptor and the street fighter. ' A better evaluative approach in such cases would be to examine the hidden organizational networks linking these groups to their counterparts abroad and, perhaps more importantly, to sympathetic factions within powerful
private and public institutions, particularly the state apparatus. Unfortunately, this is rarely done.

4. Another research paper altogether would be required to substantiate this statement thoroughly, but there is a great deal of evidence to support it, though much of its is admittedly indirect and circumstantial. What can be said with certainty is that almost all of the leading promoters of the 'Soviet terror network' thesis - for example Brian Crozier, Arnaud de Borchergrave, Ray Cline, Paul Henze, Michael Ledeen, Robert Moss, John Rees, Claire Sterling, Pierre de Villemarest and a number of Israelis - have a long history of direct or indirect intelligence connections; that some of these people have been personally involved in prior 'counter-terror', counter-insurgency, psychological warfare, or propaganda operations; that most have at some point been connected to think tanks or other organizations which have themselves been covertly funded by intelligence agency slush funds; that they frequently meet to exchange information (and perhaps to develop and coordinate disinformation themes) at pseudo-academic conferences; and that the data they cite to buttress their claims are derived primarily from each other and 'unnamed' intelligence sources - i.e. sources that are untraceable, unverifiable and arguably contaminated. A good introduction to this whole convoluted subject is Paull (1982). Additional material can be found regularly in specialized investigative publications like Covert Action Information Bulletin, Bulletin d'Information sur Intervention Clandestine (France), Intelligence/Parapolitics (now Intelligence Newsletter) (France), Lobster (UK), National Reporter (formerly Counterspy) (US, recently defunct), The Public Eye, Celsius (formerly Article 31) (Belgium), Searchlight (UK) and the now defunct State Research Bulletin (UK). A great deal more is scattered throughout dozens of books and needs to be synthesized. In any event, one would have to have exceptional faith in both coincidence and the morality of covert operatives who specialize in deception to view this type of literature as unproblematic.

5. Examples of works that promote this thesis are Alexander and Cline (1984), Becker (1985); Francis (1981); Goren (1984); Moss (1980; Possony and Bouchey (1978); Sablier(1983); Sterling (1982). A recent anthology with the same theme is Ra’anan et al(1986). Not surprisingly, many of the same 'experts' appear in its pages. A discussion of the background of the above authors would be highly revealing, but unfortunately cannot be attempted here.

6. An excellent critique of the contaminated, circular and/or unconfirmable nature of these sources can be found in Paull pp 59-91. Cf also Herman (1982) especially pp 53-5; idem and Brodhead (1986), pp 132-6 and passim.

7. The term 'Nazifascist' signifies a Nazified form of fascist belief, i.e. one which emphasises biological racism. For more discussion on the currents of fascism and Nazism, see notes 29-36.

8. It should be pointed out that official investigators have recently concluded that neo-Nazis were probably not primarily responsible for the Rue Copernic bombing, even though it was claimed at the time by a Federation d'Action Nationale et Europeen (FANE) spokesman. Most of the clues later unearthed have pointed to Arab involvement. Nevertheless, 122 incidents of violence and arson of extreme right provenance were recorded by French authorities during the first ten months of 1980, and one week before said bombing neo-fascist terrorists from FANE had launched machine–gun attacks on five Jewish establishments. See Hoffman,(1994) p.18. For more on FANE see Dumont (1983), pp. 188-9; Chairoff (1977) pp. 209-212.
9. See Sheehan (1981), p. 25, Hoffman (1984) also notes, pp. 16-19, the lack of concern about the threat posed by right-wing terrorists among security personnel in West Germany. Cf also Walraff (1979), pp. 40-52, for a striking illustration of the double standard of the West German police toward rightist and leftist groups. However, as will be suggested below, this 'neglect' may have more sinister ramifications.

10. Even Sterling (1982) refers to the existence and potential future significance of a 'continental-wide Black Terrorist International', but that is as far as she takes the discussion. See p. 1. In Europe it is customary to use the adjective 'black' when one refers to the extreme right and the adjective 'red' when one is specifying the extreme left.

11. See his important study, Laurent (1978).

12. For more on the background of the Heritage Foundation, see the articles collected by the Investigative Resource Center vol 1 pp. 156-66. Heritage was founded in 1974 with money provided by right-wing 'philanthropists' like Joseph Coors and Richard Scaife. It is among the many right-wing think tanks that have cropped up in America, but is generally considered to be less prestigious than the Hoover Institution (with which it has also been affiliated), or the American Enterprise Institute, and less 'spooky' (i.e. intelligence-connected) than the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies.


14. Here I am not suggesting that the Soviet Union is uninvolved in terrorism or that it does not frequently engage in similar types of covert machinations, but only that there is as yet no evidence for Harmon's accusations in this particular context.

15. Harmon (1985) p. 41. Cf idem (1982) pp. 2-7; Hoffman (1984) pp. 23-5; Lee and Coogan (1987), pp. 40-6, 52-4. Harmon is the only one to emphasize a Soviet connection. Moreover, he wrongly identifies the groups on the left who share these similarities with the ultra-right. It is not orthodox communists, Trotskyites, and anarchists who are generally involved, but Maoists and other 'unorthodox' groups among the extra-parliamentary left.

16. Here it is worth noting that reliable information on terrorist operations is very hard to come by, and it is probable that many details about them will never be known.

17. See e.g. Weber (1965), pp. 1-3. In this paper I have nonetheless employed the traditional designations, not because I find them satisfactory, but only to avoid undue confusion.

18. The 'totalitarianism' theory was popularized by a number of people, but especially by Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965), and Arendt (1966). The work which opened the debate on 'the authoritarian personality' was written by Adorno et al (1950). Although Adorno and company sought to measure right-wing authoritarianism - one of their tests was known as the 'F' (for fascism) Scale - later researchers argued that it could be applied equally well to left-wing authoritarianism. See, e.g. Shils (1954). For a recent version of the 'extremism' thesis, see the interesting work by Bravo (1982). Similar arguments are also characteristic of the self-justificatory 'pluralist' school within American political science.

19. Cf Lee and Coogan p. 54. A classic statement of this perspective is that of Hoffner (1951). However, I do not attribute this 'extremism' to personal pathology, as Hoffner and many other political analysts have done, but view it as a natural - if not exactly 'rational' - response to the dehumanizing features of
all bureaucratized industrial or 'post-industrial' societies. As Fromm argued in *The Sane Society* (Fromm, 1955) estrangement and resistance are healthy responses to pathological social environments, not evidence of individual psychosis.

20. According to RAND corporation researcher Bruce Hoffman, this is true of terrorism as well. See Hoffman (1985) pp. 1-2. However, he appears to be assuming that all terrorists are anti status-quo, which rules out the personnel involved in state terrorism waged through parallel apparatuses, as is common in Latin America and many other 'under developed' regions of the world.

21. Thus, Bravo has attempted to define extremism as a political phenomenon in its own right, one which is to some extent independent of particular ideologies. See Bravo pp. 7-12. Cf also the remarks of Hoffman (1985) pp. 3-4: studies of terrorist prisoners in a number of countries (Italy, Germany and Turkey among them) have concluded that in many cases it was a matter of chance whether the prisoner joined a left- or a right-wing terrorist group....' (emphasis mine).


23. Ibid p. 49

24. Fascists have always viewed themselves as revolutionaries and expressed contempt towards traditional conservatives and other types of 'reactionaries'. As Hitler himself argued, 'there is more that binds us to Bolshevism than separates us from it. There is, above all, genuine revolutionary feeling..... The petit bourgeois Social Democrat and the trade union boss will never make a Nazi, but the Communist always will.' Cited by Harmon (1982) p. 7. This assessment is partially borne out by the fact that so many leading fascists had earlier been revolutionary socialists or communists, as well as by the recruitment of Kommunistische Partie Deutschlands (KPD) personnel by the Sturmabteilung (SA) during the Wiemar period.


26. Harmon (1985) p. 42. What Harmon apparently doesn't realize is that this was also true of 'classical' fascism. Moreover, it would be more accurate to characterize the extreme left as anti-Zionist than 'anti Jewish', although one can no doubt find examples of leftists who are anti-Semitic.

27. See e.g. Algazy pp. 289-91


29. See my as yet unpublished study, 'The Main Currents of Neo-Fascist Ideology: an Overview'. Cf Cadena (1978) pp.17-72. These divisions within neo-fascism stem from the heterogeneity and ambiguity of the 'classical' fascist ideological synthesis. The most important common denominator of all genuinely fascist ideologies lies in the attempt to conjoin certain currents of nationalist and socialist thought, specifically a radical romantic, populist and authoritarian variety of nationalism, with virulent anti-liberal and anti-bourgeois sentiments, and a revolutionary, voluntarist, elitist, and mythopoetic variety of socialism with strong anti-rationalist and anti-materialist (ie anti-Marxist) tendencies. The complex causes of the alliances between groups of radical nationalists and ultra-revolutionary socialists in the late 19th and early 20th centuries cannot be entered into here, but it is important to emphasize that ever since, fascism has appealed to a diverse political constituency whose elements have been attracted primarily by either its nationalist or socialist components, i.e. by a particular combination in which one of these components took precedence. Thus, although all reasonably coherent fascists have promoted a revolutionary 'third
way' of organizing the national community that would enable them to overcome the manifest shortcomings of both 'plutocratic' capitalism and 'collectivist' Bolshevism, every fascist movement has been internally divided along basic ideological lines, and in all of them one can usually identify a 'left' and 'right' wing, not to mention many other factions. Yet despite its ideological variations, fascism should never be equated with traditional conservatism or standard varieties of reaction; nor should it be conflated with its Nazi variant, which was highly atypical due to Hitler's overwhelming obsession with biological racism and eugenics. For the best analyses of fascist ideology see Webber (1964); Sternhell (1978); idem (1983); idem (1976) pp.315-76; and Gregor (1969). Note, however, that the latter devotes more space to codified fascist doctrine in the regime phase, at which point it had assumed a more compromised conservative character. Ideologies are always 'purer' in the movement phase, before the accession of power.

30. Bale pp.33-8; Cadena pp.29-36. This tendency represented an attempt by pro-Nazi elements to adapt the Hitlerian emphasis on biological racism to postwar political and geopolitical realities. The key works promoting 'social racism' are Binet (1950,1951,1975); and Amaudruz (1971). Cf also the original Zurich 'declaration'of the neo-Nazi international Binet and Amaudruz helped found, the Nouvel Ordre Europeen/Neu Europaische Ordung (NEOINO), which can be found in Smoydzin (1966), pp.179-88.

31. Bale, pp.38-46; Cadena pp.37-47. The major proponents of this tendency in the pre-1968 period was Belgian neo-fascist Jean-Francois Thiriat, (1964 and 1965). However, this tendency became much more widespread after 1968, as many young neo-fascists sought to adopt and adapt certain New Left analyses and tactics.

32. Cadena pp.48-61. This tendency was especially influential in Italy, where elements of Evola's esoteric views - which were in fact technically neo-fascist came to be adopted by both 'social racists' and 'revolutionary nationalists' for reasons too complicated to go into here. Evola's most politically relevant and influential works are Evola (1969 1964 1971 1953 and1961). His key disciples in postwar Italy were neo-fascists Rauti (1976) and Romualdi (1978 and 1973), among other works. For a general though somewhat superficial English introduction to Evola's thought, see Drake (1986) pp.61-89.

33. Cadena pp. 70-2. The key theorist of Nazi-Maoism is Freda (1969), a fascinating work which is truly innovative in its attempts to synthesize various Evolan and New Leftist notions and thereby develop a new revolutionary neo-fascist program of action. Other important Nazi-Maoist proponents include Mario Tuti and Claudio Mutti.

34. The ND represents a Gramscian-inspired attempt by neo-fascists and other rightist intellectuals to supplant what they perceive as Marxist ideological hegemony in France and, by extension, throughout Western Europe. Its key animator is Alain de Benoist (aka Fabrice Laroche and other pseudonyms), whose chief works are 1979 and 1979. Despite repeated protestations that the ND is 'apolitical'- see e.g. de Benoist's self-righteous denials of both the neo-fascist background and the 'fascistoid' orientation of the ND in a threatening letter he sent in response to an excellent study by Verhoeyn (1974-6), published in vol.3 of same, pp.39-43 - the 'scientific' anti-egalitarian views promoted in its various organs and in certain mainstream media outlets (including the widely-read Figaro Magazine), clearly have serious political implications. The neo-fascist origins of de Benoist and many other ND figures

35. This 'national right' perspective is in many respects similar to the pro-American and pro-capitalist views generally promoted by mainstream European rightist and centre-right parties like the West German Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU) and the Italian Democrazia Cristiana (DC). For this reason it has not appealed to neo-fascist ultras, who view it as inherently reactionary.

36. Galli (1974), p.60. There are of course others with more marginal political significance, including the 'pro-East Bloc' perspective of the so-called 'nationalist neutralists' in West Germany, as well as 'Nazi-Soviet' elements among ex-SS men and a few younger neo-fascists, who admire the Soviets for successfully creating the sort of totalitarian socialist state that Hitler had failed to build.

37. For the case of MSI, see Del Boca and Giovana (1969) pp. 140-1; Weinberg (1979) p.20.

38. For more on the 'third force' perspective see Galli, pp. 60-3; Tauber pp. 208-29; Bale pp. 25-8,32. In addition to the neo-fascist works cite above in notes 30-2 and 34, see Bardeche (1961) pp. 112-5, and Soucek (1956) passim. However, not all radical neo-fascists adopted this perspective. For example, the Nazi-Maoists advocated an alliance between 'spiritual' warrior elites in opposition to the materialistic bourgeois decadence which prevailed in Europe. See Freda, pp.9-15. Also, Bardeche appears not to have taken the 'third force' perspective seriously. See his comments in (1961) p.114, where he refers to Nation Europa as an 'imaginary island'.

39. Tauber p.205. These phrases both appear in neo-fascist works.

40. Ibid pp.20-5--6; Bale pp.26-31. This is especially true in connection with the myth developed about the Waffen SS, an organization whose prewar image as an elite caste of Germanic ('Aryan') political soldiers was transformed during the war into that of a pan-European warrior aristocracy engaged in an anti-Bolshevik crusade to save European civilization. See, e.g. Koelil(1983) p.201.


42. Cited in Galli p.61

43. These themes can be found in varying combinations throughout most of the works listed in notes 30-4 above.


46. Bertini p.19. This is precisely the theory behind the Italian 'strategy of tension', on which see below.

47. For some idea of the authoritarian socialist state most neo-fascists hoped to establish, cf Soucek pp.251-70; Thiriart (1964) pp.99--153, 279-86; Binet (1950) pp.36-8; Bardeche pp.106-11, 173-95; Freda pp.27-38.

48. These techniques will be familiar to those acquainted with the standard operational procedures employed in covert political warfare, for which see Blackstock (1964), esp. pp. 41-94; Momboisse (1970) esp. pp.45--46 and 161-72; Felix pp. 21-177.

49. The only apparently genuine examples of radical right-left collusion in the post-war period prior to the mid-1970s involve cooperation between Nazi veterans and/or neo fascists and particular Arab nationalist regimes, most notably those of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir in Egypt and Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi in Libya, or factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). However in
these cases, particularly those of the aforementioned regimes, it is quite debatable whether the ideology of the Arabs was 'leftist' in any meaningful sense, since both Nasir and Qaddafi were overtly anti-communist and were seeking to forge a 'third way' between capitalism and communism - not unlike the radical fascists, albeit in an entirely different social, cultural and political context. What made it possible for these groups to cooperate with each other was their shared hatred of Israel and resentment towards the two 'imperialist' superpowers. This type of cooperation was exemplified by such things as the occasional employment of ex-SS and Wehrmacht men as military instructors, intelligence officers, and/or propagandists by Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Libya; the sporadic material support offered to the PLO by European neo-fascists (and vice versa); Qaddafi's bankrolling of ex-SS commando Otto Skorzeny's Paladingruppe; the financial help given by Swiss Nazi financier Francois Genous to the rebel Front de Liberation National (FLN) during the Algerian war and, later for the legal defense of captured Palestinian terrorists. This entire subject has yet to be researched thoroughly.

50. The French term intoxication, which in general means poisoning, here refers specifically to manipulation of the political environment by means of the systematic dissemination of false or misleading information to a target group (or groups), the purpose of which is to paralyze or otherwise influence that group's subsequent actions. The targeted group can be relatively small or encompass an entire society. For further discussion, see Nord (1971), esp. pp. vii - x (Gabriel Veraldi's preface), and 57. The term was commonly employed in a more imprecise yet delimited way by French counterinsurgency specialists during the late 1950s and 1960s, for reasons which will become clearer below.

51. For an anecdotal history of police provocation see Thomas (1972). For more on the methods of provocateur recruitment and handling, see the old but still relevant work by Serge pp. 4-21.


53. It was formerly thought that the bulk of the Nazis who managed to escape justice as the war ended had done so with the help of shadowy networks that they themselves had created, including the Organisation der ehemaligen SS-Angehorigen (ODESSA), the Kameradenwerk, the Spinne, Stille Hilfe, the Bruderschaft, the Schleuse etc. But it is now generally accepted that these networks were not as extensive as was once believed and that most of the Nazis and collaborators who escaped did so via the American Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC)'rat lines' or other routes established by the Vatican's Refugee Bureaus. See, e.g. Linklater et al (1984), pp. 144-96. Allen Jr (1985) esp. pp.38--48, Farago (1974) pp.186--203. The latter work should be used with extreme caution since much of the information the author relied on from South American sources is untrustworthy. This does not apply to his account of the role of the Vatican in helping Nazi fugitives, however.

54. The most famous example of such recruitment involved the so-called Gehlen Organisation - the former Frerride Heere Ost (HO) section of OKH intelligence under the command of General Reinhard Gehlen - which was heavily staffed with SS and Sicherheitsdienst personnel. For more on this see Cookridge (1971), Guerin (1968), Hohne and Zolling, and Whiting (1972). However, many other Nazis and collaborators were recruited by American intelligence

55. A wealth of evidence of uneven quality now exists on the use of ultra-rightists by Western intelligence services in the postwar era. Specific information can be found in a large number of sources, but in general see Chairoff (1975), idem, (1977), Gonzalez-Mata (1978), and Kruger all passim. However the works of the first two authors need to be used with special caution. Chairoff’s real name is Ivan Dominique Catzi, and he himself is a neo-fascist and Western intelligence asset who worked for many years behind a left-wing journalistic cover. See Algazy p.311, Pons pp.244-6, Kruger pp.199-202. Gonzalez-Mata was a 30-year veteran of the Spanish intelligence service under Francisco Franco (see his own account in Cygne (Paris, Grasset, 1976)), and there is some doubt about whether his later political conversion was entirely genuine. Nevertheless, both men are extraordinarily knowledgeable about rightist intelligence connections, and they have good reason to use that knowledge to embarrass rival secret services and neo-fascist groups,

58. Ambler p.309.
59. ibid pp.311-13, Menard pp. 87-8.
60. Paret p.17, Menard p.91.
61. Paret p.10, citing Colonel Gabriel Bonnet's formula.
64. This was especially emphasised by Colonel Charles Lacheroy in a series of published and unpublished articles. The best description of the system of 'parallel hierarchies' in English is that of Pike (1966), especially pp.109-231.
65. For more on 'psychological action', see especially Megret (1959). This general term is further subdivided into guerre psychologique, operations directed against the enemy; and action psychologique proper, operations directed against elements of one's own population. The techniques utilized were derived from different sources, including the direct experience of French troops captured and 'brainwashed'by the Viet-Minh and the writings of various Pavlovian psychological theorists, particularly Chakotin (1940).
67. Thus, while Lacheroy focussed on parallel hierarchies, Colonels Antoine Argoud and Trinquier emphasised the employment 'adapted justice', i.e., torture and terrorism; whereas others, particularly 5th Bureau personnel, concentrated on mass propaganda and individual re-education.
68. Ambler p.160; Menard p.97; Paret p.57.
71. For the OAS' plan to use intoxication in the metropole, see OAS (1964), document 48 pp. 225-6, wherein the organization's objectives were listed as (1)
the 'paralysis of Gaullist power', (2) the 'creation of a climate of generalized insecurity', and (3) the 'total paralysis of the country'. Cf also the remarks attributed to General Salan in the course of his trial. As he expressed it to his fellow OAS conspirators, their mission was to create a 'climate of generalized insecurity by spreading false news We must inflame all sectors'. See Salan (1962), p.457. Naturally, systematic terrorism also played a role in OAS operations, both in Algeria and France. See Sergent (1968) pp.315-18, 328-37.

72. The term *pied noir*, which means 'black foot', refers to Algerians of European descent, specifically the offspring of French colonists. Since they desperately sought to remain in their north African birthplace without turning over power to the Arab majority, they flocked to the ranks of rightist organizations that actively sought to keep Algeria under French control.

73. On these events see Bromberger (1959 and 1960), Azeau (1961).

74. There is a substantial literature on the OAS. Among the more important works are Bocca (1968), Buchard (1963) 2 volumes, Heinnisart (1970), Barange, Morland and Martinez (pseudonyms) (1964), Nicol (1962), Susini (1963).

75. For later OAS operations in the metropole, see Buscia (1981) pp.89-128, Demaret and Plume (1975), Guerande (1964); Sergent pp.53-295.


77. For 'national communism', see especially Ambler pp. 323-5 and Kelly pp .247-8. This doctrine has been often characterized as 'fascist', a label I view as appropriate in this context. Cf the ideology of JN as presented by Algazy pp.116-21.

78. Laurent p.112. For the political goals of the OAS, see the documents collected in OAS (1964) especially document 44, pp.210-14, and the OAS program printed in the 15 June 1961 issue of *L'Express*.

79. Del Boca and Giovana p.88; Laurent p.99


82. Algazy pp. 228-30; Duprat, pp. 103-4; Del Boca and Giovana pp. 194-6.

83. Laurent pp.102-3.

84. To give only one example, former OAS operatives, including Delta Commando Francois Chiappe and *guerre revolutionnaire* practitioner Colonel Jean Gardes, played an important role in the massacre of left-wing *peronistas* by their rightist Peronist counterparts at Argentina's Ezeiza airport on 20 June 1973. See Gillespie (1982) p.153, note 69, citing the Peronist left publication *El Descamisado* 7 (3rd July 1973). Later they were employed as trainers and operatives in Agentine Social Welfare Minister and Propaganda Due (P2) member Jose Lopez Rega's Alianza Anticommunista Argentina (AAA), a particularly vicious right-wing 'death squad', i.e. parallel police apparatus. See Kruger pp.113,165. For more on the links between the OAS and Argentine right see Janzen (1986) pp.96-105 and Dias and Zucco (1987) pp.103-5.

85. Other OAS veterans served in similar capacities elsewhere in Latin America, Africa, and the Iberian peninsula, a subject which remains to be explored fully.

86. The following section on AP is based primarily on Laurent's account, which is in turn based on a detailed study of the agency's documents discovered at


87. For Guerin-Serac's biography, see Laurent pp. 120-2, which is based on a report compiled by the post-1974 Portuguese secret service. Note that Chairoff claims (1977) p.158 that Guerin-Serac served as a liaison man between the SDECE and the CIA while stationed in Korea.

88. For more on the MCR, see Algazy pp.247-52.

89. Those interested in Ploncard d'Assac's political views can consult his numerous publications, among which see those of 1965, 1960, and 1972; and, perhaps most relevantly, Coexistence Pacifique et Guerre Revolutionnaire (1963).


91. Laurent pp. 119-20. There are many other intelligence-connected extreme right 'press agencies', including the defunct World Service (linked to the Greek service during the reign of the Colonels) and Agenzia Oltremare (linked to the Italian corpi separati).

92. Ibid. p.119

93. I say 'purportedly' because I have not yet seen the AP documents upon which this claim is based, but because I think it unlikely.

94. The BND is in many respects the lineal descendent of the Gehlen Org. in terms of both personnel and structure. See supra. note 54. For the general organization of the BND, see Walde (1971) pp.79-105. For BOSS, see the amazing revelations by one of its former agents, Gordon Winter (1981). Cf also International Defence and Aid Fund (1975).

95. [Footnote omitted from original]

96. I have followed Laurent's description (p. 119) here, though I suspect that O and T is identical to the strategic centre for subversion and intoxication he lists rather than a separate component. OACI would then have formed its 'action' arm. See Gonzalez-Mata pp.159-64, for OACI's 'missions'.

97. Laurent pp.128-34; Gonzalez-Mata pp.159-64

98. Laurent pp.139-56

99. Ibid pp. 156-65

100. Ibid 318-26, Gonsalvez-Mata pp.140-141, Cadena pp.255-6. For more on the ELP, see the investigative report by Walraff (1976). Walraff posed as a rightist in order to obtain inside information on Portugese counter-revolutionary organizations. Cf also Dossier Terrorismo (Lisbon, Avante, 1977) for a listing of the violent actions undertaken by the ELP and other ultra-rightist groups up to March of 1977.

101. Laurent pp.135-6, DeLutiis p.168. Here it should also be pointed out that Guerin-Serac himself 'drafted a small manual on the perfect terrorist'. See Lanteri 1977.

102. Laurent p.135.
103. See the discussion below for the direct involvement of AP-trained personnel in the Italian 'strategy of tension'. Cf also De Lutiis pp.168-9, who notes that some of the specific elements of AP's training courses later appeared in the writings of the Nazi-fascist Italian journalist Guido Giannettini. Interestingly, Giannettini had also established contacts with the Legiao Portuguesa in 1962 or 3. See ibid p.167.

104. Laurent p.148.

105. ibid p.139 (emphasis mine). Unfortunately, the AP files do not provide many details of these earlier actions. Those familiar with British counter-insurgency efforts will draw parallels here with Major General Frank Kitson's establishment of 'counter-gangs' in Kenya and elsewhere. For which see Kitson (1960) pp.72-211.

106. Laurent pp.148-51

107. ibid pp. 154-6

108. The story is more complicated than I have indicated. See ibid pp.148-51. It maybe that Bulliard himself had consciously established a Maoist party which was then used by AP personnel, i.e. he may have been a player rather than a dupe. Moreover, the aid provided by the Chinese embassy may have been far from innocent, since the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) expended increasing efforts to neutralize Soviet influence in Africa following the Sino-Soviet dispute in the early 1960s. See, e.g. Larkin (1971) pp.44-5, 63-8 etc. Also, around the same time operatives of the communist Chinese secret service (KCCPC) were cooperating with Belgian left fascist Thiriart, according to Chairoff (1977) pp.444-5.


110. ibid pp.148-9,154.


113. Faenza and Fini pp.169, 262-6; Christie (1984), pp.2-5. Christie, a well known British anarchist, was himself arrested in Spain for possessing explosives and plotting to assassinate Franco. It should be emphasised here, however, that most of these groups were not composed of radical fascist elements, but reactionary rightists of various sorts, including Catholic integralists, monarchists, and 'patriotic' veterans.

114. Faenza and Fini p.327, Christie p.6. This 'rescue' occurred on 29 April 1945. For Borghese's naval exploits earlier in the war, see his own account (1954), which prudently only covers the period prior to the establishment of RSI. For his subsequent anti-partisan campaigns, see Algardy (1958) pp. 183-248, Bertoldi (1976), pp.127-42, idem (1963) pp. 173-88, Tamaro (1948–50), vol pp. 3282-5. For insights into Borghese's attitudes, see Pansa (1971); for his Fronte Nazionale (FNaz) organization, see Ferraresi ed. idem (1984) pp.57-61. The 'black prince' was a key figure in both the abortive 'Tora Tora' coup of December 1970 (for which see Valentini 1978), and the 'Rosa dei Venti'
putschist infrastructure, as well as many less dramatic ultra-rightist ventures.

115. For the purge see Murgia (1975) pp.85-121.


118. For good surveys of the post-war Italian right see Weinberg pp.13-69, Bartieri (1976), Rosenbaum (1975), Del Bocca and Giovana pp. 126-73.

119. For the nature and appeal of Giannini’s party, see Palotta (1972); Setta (1975), Murgia (1975) pp.233-56, idem (1976) pp.9-83.

120. Those elements considered the conservative fascists who had plotted with the King against Mussolini to be reactionaries, opportunists and traitors. See Weinberg p.15, Del Boca and Giovana p.12.


122. For the birth of the MSI, see Murgia (1975) pp. 295-331, Rosenbaum pp.35-8, Weinberg pp.16-17.

123. For a good overview of this internal strife, see Weinberg pp.13-69. More details are provided by Murgia and Rosenbaum.


126. For AN, see Minna especially pp.35-6, Ferraresi (1984) pp.66-71, Gaddi pp. 33-5, Flamini vol. 1 pp.76-7 and passim.

127. Minna p.32.

128. Virtually all the available secondary sources that focus on the strategy of tension in Italy emphasise the collusion between the neo-fascists involved and various Western intelligence and security agencies. Although most have been written by leftist investigative journalists, they are based almost entirely on mainstream media accounts and, more importantly, the reports made public in the course of official parliamentary and judicial investigations, including both previously classified documents and the direct testimony of witnesses and defendants, some of which they reproduce verbatim. The single most thorough account is provided by Flamini but cf. also Sassano (1974), idem (1972); idem and Roberto Pesenti, eds. (1974), Pesenti ed. (1974), Stajano and Fini (1971); el Bosco (1972); Carla Mosca (1978); Ibio Paolucci (1977), all passim. See also Christie pp.24-70, 76-41, 109-23; Laurent pp.169-288, De Lutiis, pp. 95-300, Boatti (1978) pp.137-42, Gonzalez-Matapp78-99. The evidence of collusion is blatant in the case of the Italian secret services, but somewhat more circumstantial in the case of foreign intelligence agencies.
The term *barbouze* means 'false beards' and refers to those engaged in covert missions. To my knowledge, it was first applied to a group of anti-OAS *counter-terrorists* who were recruited from the French underworld by operatives of the Gaullist Service d'Action Civique (SAC) and dispatched to Algeria in order to eliminate the OAS infrastructure. Although these *barbouzes* did not succeed in their task, the term was later extended to encompass covert action specialists of all sorts. For the anti-OAS *barbouzes*, see the account by one of their leaders, Bitterlin (1983).

Del Boca and Giovana pp.158-9. For more on JE see Dumont especially pp.114-20, 142-5; and Verhoyen vol 1 pp.20-3.

Barbicri (1976) p.68.

Laurent p.174. For a thumbnail biography of Rauti, see Rivelli, pp. 189-90, note 5.

Stajano and Fini (1971) p.74

Laurent pp.193-4, Flamini Vol 1, p.60. For more Giannettini, see De Lutiis pp.160-5. SIFAR, the Italian military intelligence service, was reorganised and renamed SID after the coup machinations of its former head, General Giovanni De Lorenzo, were exposed. For this sordid affair, see Collin, Zangrandi (1970), Martinelli (ed) (1968), and Flamini pp.41-4. More cautious but less convincing analyses can be found in Trionfera (1968), Pisano (1978) pp.15-16, and Bartoli (1976) pp.163-203.

De Lutiis pp.76-9, Flamini vol. 1 pp. 94-6 Laurent pp. 202-3, llari (1979) pp. 523-9, 96-116 (especially 678); Giannettini and Rauti (1975) pp.12-16 (from introduction by leftist Lotta Continua commission). The last-named work is an hysterical anti-communist tract purporting to show that the communists were subverting the Italian armed forces. Although originally commissioned by General Aloja, it was considered too extreme to have the desired effect on public opinion and was withdrawn from circulation. Later it was published by the left to illustrate the paranoid rightist attitudes within factions of the Italian officer corps.

Flamini vol 1 pp.83-103, Laurent pp.201-8, Barbieri (1976) pp. 94-9, Christie pp. 139-40, De Simone (1972) pp.29-34. The conference proceedings were edited by rightist commentator Eggardo Beltrametti (1965). As the title indicates, this work was totally inspired by French guerre revolutionnaire theories.

For a list of some of the participants, including Delle Chiaie and Mario Merlino, see Flamini vol 1 p.77, Barbieri (1976) pp. 94-5. Rauti's article was titled 'La Tattica della Penetrazione Comunista in Italia'; that of Giannettini, 'La Varietà delle Technique nella condotta della Guerra Rivoluionara'. Both are in Beltrami (1965).

E.g., some indications of Italian 'anti-subversive' thinking are cited by Lehner (1975), pp. 51-68.

See supra, note 128 and cf. the general assessment of Amorosino, (1976) p.383: 'The security services, from SIFAR to SID, have been involved in all of the most obscure events of recent years: from massacres to CIA funding, from anti-worker to international industrial espionage, from trafficking in weapons to kickbacks on military spending to privileged relations with state industry, from polluting of political life via the whole arsenal of files (on both citizens and government officials), extortions, bribes, and violations (of privacy) to their presence, as actors and abettors, in coup attempts along with the systematic sabotage of judicial investigative proceedings into these criminal events.'

Meynau p.240. However, the Greek military already had extensive first hand experience in counter-guerilla and clandestine warfare as a result of the Greek Civil War and the revolt against the British on Cyprus. The French guerre revolutionnaire connection should therefore not be exaggerated.

Laurent pp.236-8, Barbierei (1976) pp.115-7, De Simone p.18, Stajano and Fini (1971) p.126, Flamini vol 1, pp.147-8. Meynau pp.221-31 provides some details of the terrorism employed by the Colonels prior to and after the coup itself. For some Greek works - unfortunately inaccessible to me due to language barriers - dealing with pre-coup covert action, subversion and/or terrorism, see Diakogiannes (1968), written by a former KYP officer; Karagiorgas (1975), which examines one of the rightist secret societies within the officer corps that launched the coup; and Lentakes (1975) which covers the right-wing paramilitary groups.

Delle Chiaie was later issued an Aginter press card in the name of 'Roberto Martelli'. See Laurent p.211, Linklater et al p.206.

Laurent p.173.


Laurent p.173


This document is partially reprinted by Laurent (pp.169-71). I have altered the sentence order slightly to make it read better, since there is some needless repetition, but the meaning is unchanged. The original was written in French, and some think Della Chiaie himself may have been the author.

Cited in Lanteri 1977

De Simone pp.9-28. Among the Italians were representatives of ON, AN, Europa Civita, Nouva Caravella, and the MSI's youth group, the Fronte Universitario di Anzione Nazionale (FUAN). The Greek 'tourists' were members of ESESI, an organization of rightist Greek students in Italy that served as a 'cover' for KYP operations supervised by Konstantin Plevris. See Stajano and Fini (1971) pp.121-8. For more on Plevris, see infra, note 155.

Barbierei (1976) p.115. According to De Lutiis (p.97), the real organizers were the KYP and SID, in which case Rauti may have only served as a go-between (in intelligence parlance, a 'cut-out') or 'private' intermediary.

For Plevris, see De Simone pp.18-19, Stajano and Fini (1971) pp.126-8, Laurent pp. 175, 236. Flamini (vol 1 p.150) cites an Italian judicial report noting that Plevris taught official courses on guerre revolutionnaire theory. His '4th of August' movement had a swastika emblem and was named after the day when the pro-Axis dictator Ioannis Metaxas took power in 1936.


Freda and Ventura, see the latter
159. Stajano and Fini pp. 39-41 and passim, Presenti and Sassano (eds), Stajano and Fini pp. 45-72.

160. De Simone claims too much success for these intoxication operations when he writes that 'almost all the small groups of the extra-parliamentary left were infiltrated' (p. 55). The account in Stajano and Fini (pp. 45-81) reveals the ineptness and failure that characterized some of these efforts.

161. I do not wish to artificially separate the first and second phases here. The fact is that infiltration and terrorism occurred in both, but infiltration predominated in the first and bombings in the second. This reflected an escalation of action psychologique aimed at both the public and the security forces. For the stages of the strategy of tension, see the scheme of Mario Sassano (1976) pp. 139-40.


163. Stajano, and Fini (1971) pp. 26-7. According to the more complete and inclusive figures analyzed by Ugo Pecchioli, there were 312 acts perpetrated by neo-fascists in 1969. (See Galleni 1981, pp. 18-19)

164. De Simone p. 64


166. Stajano and Fini (1971)


170. Minna p. 57, Weinberg p. 48. The involvement of the security forces in this affair is reflected in any number of ways, beginning with the fact that one of the members of the Circolo 22 Marzo who helped set up Valpreda was police agent Salvatore Ippolito, who naturally kept his superiors informed about what was going on. Then, Commissioner Calabrese and Procurator Antonio Amati falsely accused the anarchists, and the police both destroyed important material evidence (an unexploded bomb in Milan) and ignored the crucial testimony of a vendor who apparently sold some satchels that had been used to hold the bombs to Freda two days before the blast. Finally, members of SID's Section D (Counter-espionage) knew of the bombing beforehand and did nothing to stop it. Later they helped Giannettini escape by providing him with a false passport and sending him stipends abroad. All of this is well summarized by Laurent, but can be found in more detail in the many Italian sources cited in this section.

171. Laurent pp. 208-9. Unfortunately, the initial 'guilty' sentences were appealed and eventually the defendants were absolved on the basis of 'insufficient evidence'. This conforms to the general pattern of resolution in the trials of right-wing golpistas and terrorists - but not those involving the left - and is widely recognized that such results demonstrate more about the political pressure on (and biases of) members of the Italian judiciary than about the guilt or innocence of those indicted. For recent overviews of these general prosecution problems see Borraccetti (introduction) pp. 11-19, Nunziata (1985) pp. 246-75. According to Borraccetti (p. 17), the final judgement of absolution following the second appeal in the Piazza Fontana bombing - which wasn't handed down until 1 August 1985! - was the 'least acceptable' of all in the many poorly-handled trials of black
terrorists.
173. Peechioli, Prefazione in Galleni (ed).
174. For the later phases of the strategy of tension in Italy, see especially Flamini vols 3 and 4. Cf. also Borracaceti (ed), Corsini and Novati (eds), Lega and Santerini (1976), Testa (1976), and the references to the P2 Masonic lodge infra, note 201.
175. See supra, note 142
176. The best accounts of the subversion of the Allende regime in Chile are Landis (1975) and US Congress (1975).
177. The pre-coup situations in Turkey witnessed the sanctioning or sponsorship of provocative intoxications and terrorist operations by the so-called Kontr-gerilla (KG - Counter Guerrilla) organization attached to the general staff of the Turkish army. The purpose of these activities - in Turkey as elsewhere - was to create a climate of fear and chaos that would serve to destabilize society and precipitate a rightist military takeover. For more on the KG which the CIA was instrumental in establishing, see Deger (1978), Genc (1978), Yucel (1973), Roth and Taylan (1981) pp.70-90. Of special relevance here is the fact that there were intimate personnel links between the KG, the Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (MIT - National Intelligence Agency), and the paramilitary Bozkurt ('Grey Wolves') commandos affiliated with Alparslan Turkes' fascistoid Milliyeti Hareket Partisi (MHP Nationalist Action for Movement Party), for which see Deger, Roth and Taylan pp.90-4, 116-20,130-7. Ironically, the MHP was later suppressed by the military regime it had helped to seize power in 1980, apparently because Turkes was becoming too power-hungry.
178. It is significant that none of the 'collusionist' articles cited above in note 15 directly discuss the strategy of tension, although Lee and Coogan allude to it.
179. See, e.g., Laurent's one-sided depiction (pp.410-417) of both Nazi-Maoists and the 'Nazi-Sovietists' as nothing more than provocateurs. This is possible, but Laurent completely ignores the cultural and ideological ferment in the neo-fascist milieu during the 1970s, which could serve as the basis for an alternative explanation of these phenomena.
181. See, e.g. Freda, passim, all of Evola's later works, and a number of recent neo-fascist articles reprinted in Giuseppe Bessarione, ed. (1979). A dramatic illustration of this hostility toward the status quo was provided by Evola in a 1970 interview. Speaking of the impossibility of temporizing with the modern order, he exclaimed: 'It is not a question of contesting and polemizing, but of blowing up everything.' Cited in Drake p.79.
182. Freda had advocated such a right-left alliance and 'common struggle' as early as 1969. (See Freda pp.68-71), and this theme subsequently appeared in the writings of many other neo-fascist formations, including Clemente Graziani's ON splinter group, the Movimento Politico Ordine Nuovo (MPON). See Ferraresi (1984) p.77. However, one cannot help but be wary since Freda wrote Disintegrazione right in the midst of the early 'manipulation' phase of the strategy of tension, in which he himself played an important role.
183. As an example, note the views presented in the neo-fascist journal Costruiamo L'Azione, which sought to abolish the traditional right-left distinction, favored anti-imperialist national liberation movements, promoted spontaneous actions, insisted on the involvement of 'the people' in the revolutionary project, and in general fused New Left-inspired analyses with the

185.For the adoption of Brigate Rosse (BR) methods by neo-fascist terrorists, see Ferraresi (1984) pp.73-4, Minna p.68.
186.See Bartsch pp.154-71, Prohuber pp.36-45.
188.See especially Pons pp.233-40.
189.See Bartsch pp. 171-6. Prohuber pp.31-5.
190.For some examples of right-left collusion, see Minna p.68. Harmon(1985) pp.44, 47-8.
Generally this cooperation has involved exchanges of information and the provision of logistical support - weapons, money, false documentation, 'safe houses', etc - before and after operations rather than the formation of joint red-black cells.

194.Mentioned by Lee and Coogan, p.43, although they are surely aware of Delle Chiaie's background. Of all the individuals under consideration, Delle Chiaie is the least likely to be a genuine advocate of solidarity with the left. Since his omnipresent involvement in provocation operations in Italy in the late 1960s and early 1970s, he has served with Spanish, Argentine and Chilean military and parallel police units during their extermination operations. For a general overview of the so-called 'black bombadier's recent career, see Christie pp.71-128, Linklater et al pp.203-14, 278-302, and George Black pp. 525, 538-41, although the latter contains some minor errors. In any event, after years of official sponsorship and protection, Delle Chiaie was finally arrested in Venezuela in 1987 and deported to Italy to stand trial for his numerous terrorist crimes. The way on which his case is handled should prove quite revelatory, one way or the others. (He was acquitted in 1988 of involvement in the Bologna bombing for lack of evidence, and in February this year of murder charges relating to a 1969 bombing. See Daily Telegraph 21/2/89. Ed.)

195.For Signorelli's early affiliations with ON, see Ferraresi p.62; for his AN backing see Flamini vol 1 p.97, citing the court testimony of AN member Paolo Percoriello.
196.See his Strage del 2 Agosto pp.186-7.
197.For some recent examples of extreme right infiltration of the radical left, see Dumont pp.205-6 and Haquin p.57 and passim. The latter work is must reading for anyone interested in neo-fascist interlocks with the Belgian security forces.
199.See the fascinating but not conclusive article from the German press reprinted in Intelligence/Parapolitics 67 (July 1985), pp.18-20. This would certainly not be out of character for the BKA - since its recruitment of Vertraunsmanner had
been quite extensive. Cf. *Intelligence/Parapolitics* 62 (February 1985), p.2.

Amongst the 'leftist' terrorist organizations Hepp cooperated with were the Abu Nidal group, the pro-Iraq Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and the mysterious and ultra-violent Fractions Armees Revolutionnaires Libanaises (FARL) organization headed by Jurj Ibrahim Abd-Allah and linked to Action Directe (AD).

200.*Intelligence/Parapolitics* (July '85) p. 18. Cf Hoffman (1984) pp.24-5 and Lee and Coogan pp.53-54. Among Hepp's main comrade-in-arms was another advocate of right-left 'collusion', Walter Kexel of the neo-fascist Volkssozialistische Bewegung Duetschlands/Partei der Arbeit (VSBD/PdA). In connection with this whole issue of neo-fascist support for 'black-red' cooperation, see the interesting article by Chiodi, pp.14-17. Although the author seems to believe that the ultras he talked to were honestly colluding with groups on the far left - including the PRC regime - some of the personnel involved in planning this strategy were among the most notorious black infiltrators and intoxicators, including Yves Guerin-Serac and Delle Chiaie! (ibid p.15).

201.There are a number of suspicious things about the BR, particularly the faction formerly led by Mario Moretti. Thus, e.g., two recent studies of the kidnapping and assassination of left-leaning DC leader Aldo Moro have convincingly argued that the BR were aided by elements of the Italian underworld, intelligence personnel and neo-fascist terrorists linked to Licio Gelli's secret ultra-rightist Masonic lodge, P2, and possibly the CIA. See Zupo and Recchia pp.192-349, Scarano and De Luca pp.37-69,111-57, 201-9, 266-72. Cf De Lutiis pp.241-93. Prior to its recent exposure following a series of financial and political scandals, the P2 lodge constituted a sort of parallel or shadow government in Italy whose 975 or so members included high-ranking officials from every political party (except the PCI) and the heads of several intelligence and military apparatuses. Information that has surfaced in the course of various parliamentary and judicial investigations has revealed the links between P2 and right-wing terrorist actions ranging from the Piazza Fontana to Bologna bombings. See especially De Lutiis (ed) 1986 pp.185-223, 293-4, 303-80 etc. For more on this extremely important organization see Berger (1983), Barbieri et al, Rossi and Lombrassa, and Piazzesi. For P2's own version see Carpi and Capparelli.

202.Certain AD personnel (including the leader of its anti-Zionist 'internationalist' faction, Frederic Oriach) had previously been involved with the so-called Brigades Internationales (BI), a mid-1970s 'Maoist' umbrella organization that adopted different names and specialized in the 'political assassination of diplomatic personnel posted in Paris'. See Harmon and Marchand (1986) pp.28 (BI), 101 (Oriach faction). According to these two authors (ibid p.28), one such action involved the assassination of the Bolivian ambassador, General Joaquin Zentano Amaya, by the 'BI Che Guevara' on 10 May 1976. However this attack has already been linked to the extreme right, specifically to a Bolivian intelligence agent named Saavedra and three terrorists from Otto Skorzeny's Paladingruppe, and perhaps was initiated in connection with the third 'sanction' phase of Operation Condor, a joint operational project of the secret services of various South American military dictatorships, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. See Kruger pp.212-3. For more on the Paladingruppe, see Chairoff (1975) pp.58-9, 256; Gonzalez-Mata pp.164-7, De Lutiis (1984) pp.169-73. Other noteworthy points are that other violent leftist groups did not trust AD for a long time because they saw it as an 'amateur'
outfit that was 'heavily infiltrated by the police', and that AD later developed
links with GRAPO, a Spanish 'left-wing' group led by Franco-era intelligence
officers that sought to sabotage the transition to democracy following the
Caudillo's death. For the AD-GRAPO link, see Harmon and Marchand, p.162;
for the nature of GRAPO see note 203.

203. GRAPO was long ago exposed as an outfit controlled by rightist
provocateurs. See eg
Gonsalvez-Mata pp.266-74. According to him GRAPO was infiltrated and
manipulated from the outset by a parallel secret service known as the Servicio
de Coordinacion, Organizacion y Enlace (SCOE), a 'direct heir' of the DGS's
Technical Services Division, which was mainly staffed by fascist and other
ultra-rightist exiles living in Spain. Cf also Scott (1986, Lobster 12) p. 19 citing
February 1977) p.16.

204. See Pour p.16, who cites a CCC comminque expressing support for the 14
June 1984 attack on a NATO installation in West Germany by the RZ, and
claims that the latter organization was set up by the Hamburg-based
Aktionsfront Nationaler Sozialisten (ANS), a well-known neo-Nazi group
headed by Michael Kuhnen and others. However, the RZ are generally
believed to be a bona fide left-wing terrorist group, and I have seen nothing to
suggest that they constitute a 'front' for the ANS. Even if this were true, CCC
support for their anti-NATO attack might invite an example of the kind of
fraternal black-red solidarity that Harmon hypothesizes rather than proof that
CCC was infiltrated and manipulated by others.

205. Nevertheless, I want to emphasize that there are plenty of bona fide leftists
engaged in counter productive terrorist operations. The most difficult task of
the researcher lies in determining precisely where leftist stupidity ends and at
what point - if at all - rightist manipulation begins.

206. Borracetti p.186
207. Stajano and Fini (197 1) pp.76-7
208. Few revolutionary movements have been as youth-oriented as fascism.
Fascist leaders continually glorified and addressed their appeals to the young,
and the result was the creation of a veritable 'cult of youth' by many fascist
regimes. This later created problems when these regimes became more
conservative in the process of institutionalization and lost their radical aspects,
for those exalted youthful elements that had been weaned on revolutionary
rhetoric thence turned on their elders. See, e.g., Koon, passim, although it
suffers somewhat from her stereotypical depiction of fascism as an inherently
reactionary movement.

209. Here, the comments of a cell leader of the neo-fascist Nuclei Armati
Rivolzionari (NAR) are illustrative: '[the late 1970s] was a period of great
change for the right wing. New ideas and new needs sprang up.... We changed
our attitude towards the ultra-left groups. The guy with the long hair was no
longer our enemy. We realized that we were victims of the same system, and
we started to grow our hair long and use the same terminology that was typical
of the extreme leftwing. We felt a generational bond with left-wing youth, and
we appreciated their anti-bourgeois attitude. We understood that left- and right-
wing revolutionaries had to stop killing each other.' Cited by Lee and Coogan
p.43.
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The SAS, their early days in Ireland and the Wilson Plot

AMBUSH: the war between the SAS and the IRA

Alexander Platow

Following the Gibraltar shootings, the Sunday Times 'Insight' team lead the campaign to discredit eyewitness accounts of how the SAS killed the IRA unit. Ambush is their account of the shootings and SAS operations in Northern Ireland, and claims to be the 'first detailed account of the truth behind the headlines.' In his review of the Gibraltar section of the book Paul Foot described the authors as devoted to 'singlemindedly, and without for a moment being diverted, to publicising the view of the government and the SAS.' To understand Gibraltar, and similar events at Omagh in August 1988, (when three members of the IRA were killed just before the Gibraltar inquest) and at Loughgall, in May 1987, when eight members of the IRA (and one civilian) were killed by the SAS, it is necessary to look at the role of the SAS, and the type of operations they have carried out in Northern Ireland.

Formed to perform acts of sabotage and assassination behind enemy lines during during World War 2, the SAS evolved into a counter-insurgency regiment after the war. The 1969 Army Training manual stated that their tasks included 'the ambush and harassment of insurgents, the infiltration of sabotage, assassination and demolition parties into insurgent-held areas, border surveillance liaison with, and organisation of friendly guerrilla forces operating against the common enemy'. Examples were found during the Mau-Mau rebellion in Kenya during the mid-fifties, when SAS officers commanded some of the infamous 'pseudo-gangs' that terrorised the civilian population; in Borneo, where they used cross-border operations to attack and destroy guerrilla bases; and in Aden in 1967, where they dressed as Arabs and would use an Army officer to lure Arab gunmen into a trap and kill them. To defeat the insurgents counter-terror must be deployed back at them - described by Ken Livingstone as 'subverting the subverters'. Little indication of this is found in Ambush. But in Fred Holroyd we have a witness, and evidence that these tactics were used in Northern Ireland during the mid-70's. Here are the origins of the so-called 'shoot-to-kill' policy that John Stalker investigated.

Covert operations began in Northern Ireland following the failure of internment to suppress the IRA. Psychological warfare, including the use of black propaganda, an integral part of counter-insurgency operations, emerged in 1971 with the creation of Information Policy. In early 1972 the Military Reconnaissance Force (MRF) was created. Military chiefs wanted a unit to combine ‘intelligence gathering’ with ‘aggressive patrolling’ within the Republican areas. The SAS had been sent to Northern Ireland in 1969, and by 1972, with the MRF, they were taking part in some of the first covert operations against the IRA. In Ambush, however, the authors claim that when Harold Wilson dispatched SAS soldiers to South Armagh in 1976, they 'had never been deployed against terrorists at home'. To explain covert operations which occurred before 1976 the authors produce an undercover unit '14th Intelligence', whose
existence, they claim, 'has remained secret until revealed to the authors during their research'.

14t Int. was allegedly formed in 1972 when the Army established its own 'secret intelligence gathering unit..... known as NITAT (Northern Ireland Training Team) .... this evolved into a more specialised covert unit..... given the cover name of 14th Int. The authors don't mention that it is common for the SAS to be deployed as 'training teams' in politically sensitive situations. Under this disguise SAS units have been sent to Oman, Zimbabwe, Brunei and Kuwait. (10) The MRF and '14th Int.' appear, to be one and the same unit. Not mentioned in Ambush, the MRF was also formed in 1972, and has been described as the best example of a pseudo-gang in Northern Ireland. Trained by the SAS, it was organised on a cell basis, and contained a 'sizeable contingent' from the SAS.(11) A number of former and serving members of the IRA also took part in MRF operations.(12) According to Ambush, the alleged 14th Intelligence was trained by the SAS and used 'SAS methods'.

During the 1972 ceasefire the MRF shot civilians from unmarked cars using IRA weapons. In November 1972 the Army admitted that the MRF had done this on three occasions. (13) One of these incidents happened on 22nd June 1972 - the day the IRA announced its intention to introduce a ceasefire.(14) The shootings appear to have been done to discredit the IRA and, like the later Miami Showband murders, encourage sectarian killings. SAS involvement was also alleged in two car-bombs that exploded in Dublin on 1st December 1972, killing two civilians. This happened just before a vote in the Irish Parliament on a repressive amendment to anti-terrorist legislation. The law was passed and the IRA was blamed for the explosions. They denied responsibility and pointed the finger at British Intelligence. The Irish Justice Minister later denied that a report had been compiled implicating the SAS.(15) In the same month, David Seaman claimed at a press conference in Dublin that he was a member of an SAS unit that was detailed to cause explosions to discredit the IRA. He was soon found shot in the head, his assassins were never found. (16)

During the mid 1970s another cover name for the SAS was 'Four Field Survey Troop, Royal Engineers', introduced in 1973 and abandoned in 1975. Fred Holroyd says this was an SAS unit under cover at the Royal Engineers' base at Castledillon, Armagh. Like the authors of Ambush, the Royal Engineers were told that it was a NITAT (Northern Ireland Training and Tactics Team). Fred Holroyd, who worked with them, says its personnel were 'former, serving or recently trained' SAS soldiers, who were commanded by infantry officers attached to the SAS.’ (17) One of these was Captain Robert Nairac, described in Ambush as 'seconded to 14th Intelligence'.

The Gibraltar section of this book has already been described as a 'whitewash'. (18) Here emerges another on Nairac. The book's lack of references, the absence of Holroyd, and the production of '14th Intelligence' certainly indicates this. Who are we to believe? The journalists who helped cover-up the Gibraltar shootings, or Holroyd, who from 1974 to 1976 worked with the SAS in South Armagh as a member of the Special Military Intelligence Unit? According to Ambush, 'to this day, it is suggested that Nairac was an SAS man quietly assassinating IRA terrorists'. It certainly has been alleged, by Fred Holroyd, that with two Loyalist gunmen Nairac shot a member of the IRA, John Francis Green, at a farmhouse in the Irish Republic on 10th January 1975 - the day after the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees rejected ceasefire negotiations with the IRA.(19) The IRA cited this incident as bringing to a temporary halt the ceasefire on January 16th 1975.(20) The two Loyalists, members of the Ulster
Volunteer Force (UVF), may also have taken part in the murder of the Miami Showband on 21st July 1975. The two murders have been linked by forensic evidence - ignored by Ambush - which proves the same two pistols were used in both murders. (21)

Despite the evidence implicating Nairac, the authors try to exonerate him. Dealing with him in a chapter titled 'Mavericks', they describe him as an 'enthusiastic and intelligent officer with an overly romantic view of combatting terrorism. He enjoyed the idea of mingling with the locals............ playing the role of a dashing undercover warrior'. Fred Holroyd almost gets mentioned when the authors say that Nairac's name 'surfaced' in 1984, though they fail to inform the reader that this was actually when Holroyd first spoke to the media, via Duncan Campbell in the New Statesman. (22)

Ambush says Nairac 'boasted' of killing Green, and predictably describes Ken Livingston's claims about Nairac in his maiden speech to Parliament as 'unsubstantiated'. But if Nairac says he killed Green, why say otherwise? Holroyd says that the RUC will not return the colour polaroid photograph of Green's dead body which Nairac took just after he killed him - and showed to him the next day as proof of the kill. Ambush however claims 'it is true that Nairac had a picture of Green's dead body, but this was obtained from a contact in the RUC, who in turn obtained it from the Irish police.' This cannot be true: the Gardai did then not use colour polaroid cameras in their murder investigations. (23) (This section in Ambush is a re-run of the material first put out in The Independent against Holroyd in 1987, having been rejected at the time by the Sunday Times).

The authors also get their facts wrong over the Maimi Showband murders: ' Nairac boasted how he went over the border in the shooting of the Maimi showband'. But the incident happened in South Armagh and not in the Irish Republic as is implied. And again, if Nairac boasted he was involved, why dispute it? The Miami Showband was a Catholic rock band committed to bringing peace between the two communities. Their bus was stopped by seven UVF men wearing the uniforms of the Ulster Defence Regiment. Fred Holroyd believes the uniforms were supplied by the RUC Special Branch.(24) They took the band off the bus and then attempted to plant a bomb on it. It exploded prematurely, killing two of the UVF men. Merlyn Rees confirmed to Ken Livingstone that Nairac had supplied the guns and the explosive to the UVF unit.(25) Nairac is also alleged to have booby-trapped the bomb.(26) Two members of the UDR were later jailed for the murders.

The peak period of the Wilson plot provides the best opportunity to investigate the origins of what Ambush calls 'the shoot to kill legend' and SAS involvement in 'dirty tricks' operations. As soon as Labour won the February 1974 election, MI5 began destabilising Harold Wilson and his policies in Northern Ireland. In May 1974, the Power-sharing Executive was brought down by the Ulster Workers' Council strike - with the help of MI5 and the Loyalist paramilitaries. Two days into the strike, Loyalist paramilitaries exploded car-bombs in Dublin and Monaghan, without warning, during the evening rush-hour, killing 33 civilians - 26 in Dublin and 7 in Monaghan. At a press conference in Dublin in March 1989 (at which Fred Holroyd was invited to speak), Irish journalist Frank Doherty noted that it was during the high-point of efforts by MI5 to bring down the Power-sharing Executive. He also said that he had been told in 1974, by a former British soldier, Albert Baker, that the bombings were 'definitely an Intelligence job'. Baker had been a member of the Loyalist unit that had carried out the bombings, and Doherty claimed that it was a pseudo-gang, formed as a front by British Intelligence. (27) (In Ken Livingstone's recent book Livingstone's Labour, there is the
As the MI5 campaign against Wilson intensified, so did the Army's 'dirty tricks' operations in Ireland. In 1975, with Loyalist paramilitaries, and the SAS unit at Castledillon, MI5 helped undermine the ceasefire. Loyalist killings of civilians increased from 87 in 1974, to 96 in 1975, to a peak of 110 in 1976. The truce with the IRA had been secretly negotiated by MI6 in the aftermath of the Birmingham pub bombings. Ambush has scant details of this, although it confirms that the Army were 'furious' with the secret talks with the IRA, believing that they had the IRA 'on the run'. Colin Wallace confirmed in 1980 that MI5 officers in Northern Ireland not only objected to Wilson being Prime Minister, but to his Irish policies.

Enmeshed in these events was the intense conflict between MI5 and MI6 for control of the intelligence war in Ireland. MI5 wanted an escalation of the war against the IRA: MI6 were working for a political solution with Wilson's government. In 1975 MI5 took overall control of the Intelligence situation and began 'to replace those in key posts with others with total loyalty to them it became clear that MI5 were trying to get SIS (MI6) removed from the province - this they had almost achieved by late 1976.' In 1974, says Wallace, MI5 were already trying to get the Special Military Intelligence Unit replaced by the SAS. However this was a 'total disaster' as the SAS had little experience of Northern Ireland-type operations. According to Holroyd, who had been working with MI6, MI5 were 'eager for a quick success and brought in a bunch of ruthless SAS blokes'. MI6 'lost control to MI5 and the SAS, who wanted a more aggressive policy linked with the Protestant extremist groups these groups sabotaged many of the operations which MI6 and the Army had carefully built up'.

The Maimi Showband murders were the catalyst for the 1975 ceasefire to end in a sectarian bloodbath. According to Ambush, after the killings 'there was little doubt that the IRA would retaliate and they did, by blowing up a Belfast bar killing five people. The conflict then degenerated into a series of increasingly violent attacks on the community.' But as Livingstone said in his maiden speech: 'If one wanted to find a way of ending the ceasefire what better way to do that than to encourage random sectarian killings?'. By the end of November 1975, fuelled by a feud between the (then) two factions of the IRA, over 40 civilians had been killed. As the truce finished in October 1975, the bombing campaign in England was stepped up by the IRA unit captured at Balcombe Street on 6th December 1975. Although initially 'the principal aim was not to kill in the bitterness after the end of the six months ceasefire in 1975, the orders from Dublin switched to killing.' In a series of attacks the unit killed seven civilians.

During the term of the last Labour Government, the killing of civilians by Loyalist paramilitaries reached death-squad proportions. From 1974-1979 they killed 330 civilians, 293 during the years 1974-76, the vast majority of them Catholics. They were not operating alone. In South Armagh, 'one specific Special Branch officer handled loyalist terrorist affairs the covert SAS troop based at Castledillon were operating hand in glove with this officer. This was at a time when murders and political assassinations became rampant.' Referring to 'Four Field Survey Troop' Holroyd says: 'Many individuals and organisations were claiming that both Catholic and Protestant were being murdered (but) the government were claiming that no SAS were in the province. SAS by any other name?' The destabilisation climaxed in January 1976. On the 4th January the Protestant Action
Force (PAF) killed five Catholics in South Armagh. The next day the IRA took ten Protestants off a bus at Whitecross, South Armagh, and killed them, claiming later that they had acted to stop the Loyalist murders. Selective as ever, *Ambush* refers to only to the latter incident. But something else had been achieved. On January 7th 1976 Harold Wilson announced that an extra 150 SAS soldiers would be sent to Armagh. It was the end of the secret SAS campaign in Oman in October 1975 which released the extra SAS units for Armagh, who were flown in 'only days before' Wilson's announcement. *Ambush* says 'exactly who thought of sending the SAS is not known, Wilson, who knew very little about the Regiment, seized on the plan ......'

By March 1976 the SAS had begun a series of covert operations aimed at disrupting the IRA command structure in South Armagh. On 12th March 1976 they abducted a member of the IRA, Sean McKenna, from his house in the Irish Republic. *Ambush* says he was lucky: 'It would have been easier, and have a greater psychological effect to shoot him but the SAS did not..... terror ists considered armed and dangerous were shot.... those known to be unarmed and compliant were arrested (McKenna was later jailed and died on hunger-strike.)

On 15th April the SAS shot another member of the IRA, Peter Cleary. He also lived in the Irish Republic, and one night crossed the border to see his fiance. However, he was on the Army wanted list, and the SAS were watching her house. After he arrived they broke in and, according to *Ambush*, told her, 'There won't be no wedding now'. Cleary was taken outside where one eyewitness says he was stripped and beaten, then dragged unconscious to a nearby field, where, moments later, three shots were heard. *Ambush* repeats the SAS story that he had tried to escape and had died in the struggle.

On 1st May the body of Seamus Ludlow was found in a ditch in the Irish Republic. Local people on both sides of the border believed the SAS had intended to kill an IRA explosives expert but had shot the wrong person. Careful only to deal with Ludlow's death, *Ambush* blames it on the IRA, describing him as an 'informer for British intelligence' - something the IRA have never claimed. Three days after his death a heavily armed eight-man SAS unit was arrested in the Irish Republic, south of Armagh.

*Ambush* says that the first year of SAS operations in Armagh closed with 'some notable successes...... the attack on Cleary..... and the abduction of McKenna, served as a clear warning to the IRA that a different kind of war was being fought In simpler terms, an indication of this was given to *The Times* just before Wilson sent the SAS in: "They will be told to do what the Army has failed to do - kill terrorists." (42) This attitude was acknowledged by an anonymous SAS officer who told *The Guardian* in late 1976: 'We were all very enthusiastic about going and wasting a few of the IRA.'(43)

After a protracted disinformation campaign against him, Harold Wilson resigned in March 1976. His departure brought new faces to the top military and political positions in Northern Ireland. Merlyn Rees was replaced by Roy Mason and in 1977 a new Army Commander was appointed, General Timothy Creasy. They had met in Oman, Mason as Defence Secretary, and Creasy as Commander of the Sultan of Oman's army, staffed by SAS officers. After Wilson's resignation and the development of a new military strategy against the IRA - backed up by the process of 'Ulsterisation', the Loyalist murders dropped of, from 110 in 1976 to 19 in 1977, 6 in 1978 and 12 in 1979.(44)

On December 12th 1977 Colin McNutt (a member of the Irish Republican Socialist Party) was shot. Ambush attributes his death to '14th Intelligence'. On June 21st 1978
the SAS ambushed a van carrying a bomb and three members of the IRA in Belfast. The occupants of the van, and one civilian passer-by were killed in a barrage of over 200 rounds (one IRA member was hit by 63 bullets). In 1978 the deaths of six IRA members and four civilians, including a 16-year old, John Boyle, were attributed to the SAS. *Ambush* deals with his death in some detail but fails to report the Judge's summing up at the trial of two SAS soldiers charged with his murder in 1979: 'Probably they did act correctly, given that SAS men are as is widely known - allowed to shoot to kill and ask questions later'. (45) The SAS men were acquitted.

*Ambush* talks of a 'fog of confusion' hanging over SAS operations in Ireland. With books like this it is hardly a surprise. The book 'sets out to answer' the question of what the SAS have been doing there but contributes mostly disinformation. Ignoring completely the testimony of Fred Holroyd, the authors offer the hitherto unknown '14th Intelligence' as the explanation for the SAS unit at Castledillon in the mid 70's before the SAS were officially sent to Ireland. In fact, contacts of Wallace and Holroyd's in the MOD have confirmed that 14th Intelligence was created in the early 1980s.

The evidence suggests that what has become known as the shoot-to-kill policy - a euphemism for routine SAS counter-insurgency activities - which has claimed almost fifty lives since 1975, evolved out of the campaign of counter-terror that MI5 and the SAS used to destabilise the Wilson government's policies in Ireland. Attempts to investigate this have proved fruitless. John Stalker's investigation led back to the allegations of Holroyd and he was quickly moved to one side. Holroyd notes that Stalker's downfall came after he and Colin Wallace had sent their file of allegations and evidence to Mrs Thatcher in 1984. After which 'two events took place: the first was the Government's robust attempt to stop *Spycatcher*; the second was the attack on the integrity of John Stalker, both of whom were dealing in areas mentioned in the file (46).

It is clear now, that because elements within the security forces did not want a political deal with the IRA in the mid-seventies, and the military solution was only possible with a change at the top of the Labour leadership, MI5 and the SAS were prepared to use the same methods the IRA are condemned for civilian deaths, assassinations, bombings and black propaganda - to bring this about. In the last twenty years the only two attempts to find a ceasefire have been undermined by these methods. From the mid-seventies to the killings in Armagh in 1982 (by the SAS-trained RUC E4A units), Loughall, Gibraltar and Omagh, there is strong evidence that the SAS have operated a shoot-to-kill policy, and engaged in a variety of covert and illegal acts. *Ambush* was written to show otherwise but merely succeeds in reemphasizing the need for a book documenting the twenty years of British state and Loyalist dirty tricks, covert operations and assassinations.

**Notes**

1. *The Observer* 15 January 1989
2. *New Statesman and Society* 13 January 1989
4. Bloch and Fitzgerald p.89
5. Geraghty p.65
6. Geraghty p.102
7. Hansard 7 July 87 p. 27
8. Bloch and Fitzgerald p.216
9. Geraghty p. 181
10. Bloch and Fitzgerald p.46
11. Lobster 10 p.3
12. Bloch and Fitzgerald p.216
13. Bloch and Fitzgerald p.216
14. Kelly p.189
15. McArdle p p.62-63
17. Fred Hollroyd letter in Lobster 16 p.8
18. Private Eye 6 January 1989
19. Reed p.220
20. Coogan p.506
21. Lobster 15 p.9
22. New Statesman 4 May 1984
23. Lobster 15 p.8
24. Lobster 15 p.8
25. Troops Out May 1988
27. Republican News 9 March 1989
28. Information from Irish Information Partnership.
29. Irish Times 24 April 1980
30. Lobster 11 p.25
31. The Guardian 24 February 1987
32. The Guardian 24 February 1987
33. Hansard 7 July 87 p.27
34. Kelly pp.239-241
35. Coogan p.485
36. Figures from Irish Information Partnership.
37. Lobster 10 p.6
38. Lobster 16 p.8
39. Coogan p.551
40. Geraghty p.200
41. McArdle pp.97-98
44. Figures from Irish Information Partnership
45. Kelly p.275
46. The Guardian 16 December 1987

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The Pinay Circle and Destabilisation in Europe

David Teacher

In *Lobster* 17 we published two German intelligence reports on a covert propaganda group called the Pinay Circle. In this article we give background and investigate the Pinay Circle's activities.

Member of Parliament 'G': I don't know if it (the Pinay Circle) has any political significance, but, in any case, it has little impact. For me, it seems to have been (sic) a collection of elderly gentlemen doddering around. A few elderly gentlemen sitting over cups of coffee and discussing world developments. What do these fellows want?

MP 'A': These are no elderly gentlemen - they are former CIA and BND people working together.

MP 'X': I feel it is dangerous if we publicize such things. If such matters were to become public, it would damage the general image of the Federal Republic. Therefore we will decide to remove references of any kind to other countries or to connections with State services.

(From a closed session of the Bavarian Parliament's Committee of Investigation into the Langemann Affair, 21 June 1982.) (1)

When Dr. Hans Langemann blew the whistle on a series of dubious BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst Federal Intelligence Service) operations to *Konkret* magazine in 1982 (2), he opened up a whole can of worms whose ramifications go well beyond Germany's borders. His evidence was unassailable. From 1957 to 1970 Langemann was one of the BND's highest ranking officers. In 1972 he was security chief for the Munich Olympics before being purged by the SPD government for being too close to Franz Josef Strauss' Christian Social Union party. Langemann then became top link man for the security and intelligence services within the Bavarian Interior Ministry. It was their confidential documents he passed to *Konkret* in 1982. Published in *Spiegel* at the time and reproduced in *Lobster* 17, the documents give external confirmation of the conspiracy to effect a change of government in Britain, and reveal the European and world-wide links in this conspiracy through the Pinay Circle.

The Pinay Circle (also called the Cercle Violet) is an international right-wing propaganda group which brings together serving or retired intelligence officers and politicians with links to right-wing intelligence factions from most of the countries in Europe. The intelligence community has been represented by SIS Chief from 1978-82 Arthur 'Dickie' Franks, SIS Department Head Nicholas Elliott, CIA Director William Colby, Swiss Military Intelligence Chief of Provisions Colonel Botta, SDECE chief from 1970-81 Alexandre de Marenches, and, last but not least, the man who took over the running of the Circle when Pinay got too old, Jean Violet, a Parisian lawyer who worked for the SDECE from 1957-70. Violet became so much an 'eminence grise' in the SDECE that Alexandre de Marenches had to dispense with his services in order to assert his authority as new SDECE chief in 1970. This episode has however not
prevented them from working together within the Circle. At the time the Langemann papers were written, Franks and Marenches were serving heads of British and French intelligence respectively.

On the political side, Pinay - a former French Prime Minister - forged links with Nixon, Kissinger and Pompidou. The Circle's present members include Giulio Andreotti, former Italian Prime Minister; Portuguese putschist General Antonio de Spinola; former Franco minister and senior Opus Dei member Silva Munoz; and Vatican prelate and BND agent Monsignore Brunello. Paul Violet, Jean Violet's son, is one of Chirac's closest advisors, nicknamed 'the adjutant' by Canard Enchaine. Langemann also reports that Sir Arthur Franks and Nicholas Elliott were invited to Chequers for a working meeting with Mrs Thatcher, after her election. But perhaps the key political figure was the late Franz Josef Strauss, Bavarian Premier and Langemann's boss.

Strauss was a close friend of Alexandre de Marenches and was a frequent visitor to the SDECE's headquarters during Marenches' time. The Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, the political trust attached to Strauss' Christian Social Union party, is an important group in international parapolitical manipulation. Active in Latin America for the Contras,(3) supporting Mobuto in Zaire, involved in the Fiji coup in 1987, it was caught diverting state development aid from Germany into right-wing party coffers in Ecuador in the same year. Strauss and CSU were the main beneficiaries of identified Pinay Circle activities; i.e. the promotion of right-wing European politicians through Brian Crozier, Robert Moss, Fred Luchsinger of the Neue Zurcher Zeitung and Gerhard Lowenthal, anchorman on current affairs programmes for ZDF television, the major German network.

The Pinay Circle has a wide range of contacts and its members interlock with the whole panoply of rightwing/parallel intelligence and propaganda agencies - WACL, Heritage Foundation, Western Goals, ISC, Freedom Association, Interdoc, the Bilderberg Group, the Jonathan Institute, P2, Opus Dei, the Moonies' front CAUSA, IGFM (International Society for Human Rights), and Resistance International. Lowenthal, for instance, is a member of IGFM, Resistance International, WACL, CAUSA, the Jonathan Institute, Konservative Aktion and the European Institute on Security.

The Pinay Circle's significance lies in the fact that it is a forum which brings together the international linkmen of the Right like Crozier, Moss and Lowenthal, with secret service chiefs like Franks and Marenches. Through such contacts it can intervene by media action or covert funding whenever and whereever a political friend is in need of support.

The Langemann papers date from late 1979 and so they do not reveal to what extent the Pinay Circle was playing the last act in the Thatcher conspiracy, but Langemann's November 1979 report stated:

Specific aims within this framework are to effect a change of government

a. in the United Kingdom - accomplished
b. in West Germany - to defend freedom of trade and of movement and to oppose all forms of subversion including terrorism.
The international promotion of the Bavarian Premier was discussed in the Circle's January 1980 meeting: in a follow-up meeting in June the same year, the Circle's attention was turned towards the American Presidential election that was to bring Reagan to power.

Minutes of the meeting of the Pinay Circle held on 28th and 29th June 1980 in Zurich. A further meeting of the Circle was held under the chairmanship of Violet, attended by those present at the previous meeting, including Colonel Botta of the Swiss Intelligence Service and Fred Luchsinger, head of the Neue Zurcher Zeitung.

1. The prospects for positive influence on the election campaign in favour of Strauss cannot be judged to be very favourable. While the many promotional influences in US, UK and Swiss newspapers were welcomed by their readers, their impact on the Federal Republic lagged far behind. Furthermore, it seems doubtful that Strauss will be able to match the dynamic foreign policy initiatives that Federal Chancellor Schmidt has been able to make. In contrast to the situation in the US, where President Carter is confronted with the shattered remains of his foreign policy - difficult to present favourably for the election campaign, even in part - Schmidt has understood how to make clear and prominent political steps which represent an achievable goal for the population's desire for peace. Luchsinger said that he was prepared to produce a series of three leading articles highlighting the tendency of current government policy in Bonn to weaken NATO. Crozier felt that similar steps could be tried again through Moss in London and the Baltimore Sun in the US.

2. Graf Huyn reported on his meeting with the head of the Saudi security service about the establishment of a short-wave radio transmitting towards the Soviet Union. The Saudis were interested, he said, and had guaranteed finance, on the condition that a situation such as that created in Moscow by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty must be avoided at all cost.

3. A discussion was held about a series of appropriate measures to promote the electoral campaign of Presidential candidate Reagan against Carter. Elliott reported that in this context positive contact had been made with George Bush as well.

4. Colonel Botta stated that, in his opinion, support must be given to the Israeli intelligence service. It was noted that, as far as Europe was concerned, the efficiency of this service had diminished considerably. (4)

The contacts in 1980 between George Bush and ex-MI6 and Circle member Nicholas Elliott are even more interesting now that Bush has made it to the top; but perhaps the most significant element in the Langemann papers is the illustration of the international dimension of parapolitical manipulation represented by the Circle's promotional activities. It is becoming more and more apparent that the treatment reserved for Harold Wilson at the hands of the intelligence services was only the UK end of an international phenomenon. Around 1973-75 a surprising number of governments were targeted by their own (or others') intelligence agencies because of their radical policies. If the world political scene in the 1960s was one of decolonisation, then the 1970s was the decade of destabilisation. Among those cases of destabilisation we were already aware of are:

- the UK: the concerted effort by elements in the British intelligence and security services, with CIA and BOSS, to bring down Wilson, Thorpe and Heath;
- the USA: the CIA's Operation Chaos, the FBI's Cointelpro programme and, of
course, Watergate;

- Australia: the loans scandal and other destabilisation of Gough Whitlam by the CIA and SIS
- West Germany: the destabilisation of Willi Brandt because of his overture to 'the other Germany' through Ostpolitilk. The CIA and MI5 suspected Brandt of being recruited by Moscow during his wartime service with the resistance in Scandinavia.

Reflecting on the Pinay Circle and its apparent role as European coordinator of media manipulation, several other avenues for investigation come to mind.

- The UK: the role of Arthur 'Dickie' Franks. Before the publication of the Langemann papers in 1982, Franks' only known connection to the Wilson story was his central role in circulating the typescript of the Pincher/Wright book *Their Trade Is Treachery around Whitehall* in 1980. It was Franks, as MI6 Chief, who warned MI5 and MI6 of Pincher's forthcoming publication. His letter, dated 15 December 1980, was produced as evidence in the *Spycatcher* trial. The Langemann papers show that Franks had a far more active role than simply a channel for backdoor clearance for Wright's leaks. It is astounding that no British newspaper has ever investigated *Spiegel's* 1982 revelation that the serving head of British intelligence was a member of a covert propaganda group whose stated aim was 'to effect a change of government in the UK', and which claimed that this had been 'accomplished'.

Nicolas Elliott's name had also not previously surfaced in reports of the destabilizations. In MI6 counter-intelligence, with postings in Berne, Istanbul, London and Beirut, it was Elliott who confronted Kim Philby in Beirut in 1963, sparking Philby's flight to the Soviet Union. Apart from his Pinay Circle activities Elliott is also a Council Member of the Wilkinson/McWhirter/Ivens group, the Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism. Elliott's memoirs are among the numerous works by former intelligence officers (listed in the *Guardian* 6/6/89) which the government will not permit to be published.

- France: Mitterrand destabilized in 1974? In 1974 Francois Mitterrand made his first attempt to unseat the Republicans who had ruled France since the foundation of the Fifth Republic, losing narrowly to Pompidou's successor, Valery Giscard D'Estaing. The man who controlled French intelligence under Pompidou and Giscard from 1970 to 1981, was Alexandre de Marenches, one of the Circle and a friend of Franz Josef Strauss. In 1978 *Le Monde* alleged that 'under Marenches' leadership, terrorism and also disinformation - the influencing of public opinion - were extensively pursued (by the SDECE). Was there a French connection to the mid-70's destabilisations? Certainly, when Mitterrand finally beat Giscard in 1981, Marenches resigned on the spot and the Action Service rebelled.

The role of Chirac also needs to be clarified. He was Prime Minister under Giscard from 1974 on and liaised with Marenches, Giscard's spymaster, on many matters, including the sale of nuclear technology to Iraq. Marenches and Chirac are further linked through the person of Michel Roussin, who liaised between the SDECE and the Prime Minister's office from 1972-76. Roussin rose to become Marenches 'Directeur de Cabinet' and as such accompanied the SDECE chief on a last-minute trip to Teheran in 1979 to warn the Shah of the
impending Islamic revolution. After being removed from the SDECE in 1982 by Marenches' successor, the Socialist appointee Pierre Marion, Roussin moved over to become Chirac's 'Chef de Cabinet', putting his previous experience of Iran to good use as operational head of Chirac's 1987 hostages cell. (See *Lobster* 16).

Also in on the 1979 Teheran trip was the SDECE's expert, named in Marenches' memoirs as Capt. M. Could this be ex-SDECE Captain Jean-Charles Marchiani, who negotiated the hostages' release in Beirut for Chirac? If so, Chirac's hostages cell was no less than the key officers from Marenches' SDECE Iran desk in 1979. Marchiani had previously been involved in two of the dirtier episodes of SDECE history: he had been a member of the four-man 'Section 6' which dealt with 'honourable correspondents' (most notable example, Jean Violet) that was implicated in the 1970 smear of President Pompidou's wife (the Markovic affair); and the 1971 Delouette affair when an SDECE agent of that name was caught smuggling 44 kilos of heroin into the US. Apart from the fact that Marchiani was Delouette's 'handler', the man who supplied Delouette with the heroin was Marchiani's cousin, Dominique Mariani. The heroin was apparently to be sold to finance SDECE operations in the United States. The SDECE unit compromised by both scandals, Section 6, was widely thought to be hostile to Pompidou because he had betrayed General de Gaulle. Certainly in the subsequent investigation it emerged that Section 6 was close to the Gaullist parallel police, the Service d'Action Civique, founded by Charles Pasqua - Chirac's Interior Minister in 1987 and overall head of the hostages cell. (9) Chirac's links to Paul Violet may also be a lead to future investigation.

- Sweden: Olof Palme. Franz Josef Strauss, a key member of the Circle, set the tone for Pinay Circle concerns when he said: 'We stand before a decisive year, a fateful year in world history. The Reds in power in Moscow know that too. It is not surprising that their pawns in the West, the Socialists so-called Eurocommunists, strive so determinedly to hold their positions...... Brandt's protege Felipe Gonsalez spreads disruption in Spain, financed by millions from the coffers of the Socialist mafia trio: Brandt, Kreisky and Palme (10)

Was Palme the victim of a destabilisation attempt in the mid-70's like fellow Socialist Willi Brandt? Is there a connection to the most plausible of Palme murder theories - action by a right-wing faction within the Swedish intelligence service, SAPO? In 1973 three journalists alleged the existence of such a group with the 03 department of the service, a faction which carried out dirty tricks against radical and anti-Vietnam groups, incited Palestinians living in Sweden to violence, and conducted smear campaigns on behalf of prominent members of the Social Democrat hierarchy. In 1987, the leading Swedish daily paper *Dagens Nyheter* carried an article by Bjarne Moevl which alleged that 03 had organised, if not carried out, the 1986 Palme killing, angered at his policy of detente towards the Soviet Union or perhaps fearful that Palme would uncover and expose the true extent of the Bofors arms deals with Iran and implicate them. (11)

There have also been allegations of SAPO manipulation of the murder inquiry. The entire Kurdish trail, which fruitlessly occupied the Swedish police for over two years, could have been a red herring laid by SAPO to lead the investigators
away from domestic culprits. Self preservation for SAPO is alleged to be behind the 'Ebbe Carisson affair', in which two SAPO officers, Walter Kego and Jan-Henrik Barrling, were involved in the secret continuation of investigations into possible Kurdish origins of the Palme murder. Sanctioned by Justice Minister Anna-Greta Leijon, the two officers assisted a friend of the Minister's, Ebbe Carlsson, in illegally obtaining surveillance equipment to continue investigations into the Kurdish PKK after the investigation had officially been abandoned. When Customs discovered SAPO agent Per Ola Karlsson with the equipment, the balloon went up. In the ensuing 'Ebbe Carlsson affair', Minister Leijon -- the head of the national police and the head of SAPO, Per Goran Nass, all lost their jobs. As a result, impending legislation sponsored by Leijon to bring SAPO under firm political control collapsed. *Le Monde* of 5th June 1989 commented: 'The discovery of this private enquiry exposed the struggle which had been going on for over twenty years between the Social Democratic Party and a faction within the secret service which is undoubtedly beyond government control.'

In any case, it is certain that the conviction of a small time criminal and addict is a smokescreen, with no intelligence or direct evidence save that of Palme's wife to show more than that he was a convenient scapegoat, the only 'delinquent' who could be proved to be in the area at the time.

- **Belgium:** Coup d'etat in 1973? Issue 17 of *Celsius* (from BPO 210, Bruxelles V, Belgium) devotes six pages to the study of a coup d'etat planned by gendarmerie officers and extreme right-wing groups in 1973. The article - 'The big bad look of the 1970s: the destabilisation of the State' - is based on the confessions of Martial Lekeu, a former gendarme who fled to the USA when sought for questioning in the 'Killers of the Brabant Wallon' enquiry. The killers, who specialised in holding-up supermarkets with maximum violence and minimum loot, killed 28 people between 1982 and 1985, always attacking the same chain of supermarkets on the same day of the week with the same kind of car, needlessly gunning people down and then escaping with cash rarely more than a few thousand pounds. Leukeu stated what many suspected: the killers were part of a political psy ops campaign aimed at reinforcing the State structures. Whether there is a link between the 1973 coup plans and the 1980s destabilisations remains to be seen: various parliamentary enquiries and commissions have so far failed to get to the bottom of the affair.

So, did the destabilisation go further than suspected, including France, Sweden and Belgium? What role did the Pinay Circle play in the early 1970s? Unfortunately, apart from the 1972 ISC memo published in *Lobster* 17, the only circle documents we have are the Langemann ones from 1979-80. Perhaps *Lobster's* European readers will come up with some information....

**Notes**

3. For Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung activities in Latin America see Die Contra Connection, Konkret Verlag, Hamburg, 1988
4. Roth pp. 89-90
5. In the person of Peter Wright, see David Leigh's The Wilson Plot, London 1988, p. 230
7. Marencches' memoirs, Dans Le Secret des Princes, Stock 1982, made no mention of his 'extracurricular' activities of course. Their publication was designed to embarrass the newly elected Socialist government. For details of the SDECE careers of Marencches. Violet, Roussin and Marchiani. see La Piscine, Faligot/Krop, Seuil, Paris 1985.
8. Le Monde 24/2/78
9. Re Pasqua and Delouette, see Lobster 12, pp. 22-23.
10.Roth p. 91
11.Dagens Nyheter 10/2/87: Guardian 11/2/87

NOTE: The Lobster 17 article on the Pinay Circle contained several spelling errors of the names of Circle members. The correct versions are given above. The 'Network' book mentioned in the footnotes to Lobster 17 is more easily available under the republished title The General was a Spy, Hohne and Zolling, Pan, 1973.

**Pinay 2: Jean Violet**

Scott Van Wynsberghe

The parapolitical activities of Jean Violet go back to the 1930s, when Violet was supposedly involved with a violent quasi-Masonic movement going under the title of the Comite Secret pour l'Action Revolutionnaire, or CSAR. CSAR was part of a larger far-right phenomenon in pre WW2 France, the conspiratorial members of which were referred to as Cagoulards, or 'Hooded Ones'. During WW2, the top leaders of CSAR - Eugene Deloncle and a certain Filliol - were such enthusiastic collaborators that they were in contact with General Max Thomas, who headed the Gestapo and S.S. Security Service (S. D.) forces in France in 1941. In October of that year, those same leaders arranged for the bombing of synagogues in Paris on behalf of General Thomas. (1)

Even if Violet was part of CSAR, he emerged from WW2 untainted by its actions, and proceeded to make a name for himself as a lawyer. He also fell in with Opus Dei, which may explain some of what followed. In 1951 he was approached by Antoine Pinay, who was a cabinet minister at that point. On behalf of some Swiss lawyer Pinay sought to clear up the matter of a Geneva-based firm that had seen its factory in Germany seized by the Nazis during the war. Violet resolved the problem and Pinay was so satisfied he recommend him to the new French intelligence organization, SDECE. Violet duly became an SDECE operative, utilizing a global network of contacts to assist that agency in its work. (2)

Violet's early post-war deeds also featured a Roman Catholic priest, Father Yves Dubois. Both men figured in the creation of an Institute d'Etudes Diplomatiques, whose student body featured a young Yugoslavian refugee by the name of Jovanovitch. This individual would later acquire U.S. citizenship, call himself Daniel Boyer, and specialize in advising US and French businessmen interested in operating overseas. He would also cross Violet's path at regular intervals. (3)
The Violet-Dubois combination proved durable and effective. As the Cold War raged, the pair acted as a conduit for SDECE funds used to maintain clandestine Vatican networks in Eastern Europe. During the Algerian war of independence (1954-62) Violet turned up at the United Nations, as part of the French delegation, and worked to shore up the support for France in the course of its traumatic struggle with Algerian nationalists. Not surprisingly, Father Dubois was also present, as part of the Vatican delegation, and he coordinated initiatives with Violet. Finally the man now known as Boyer was in the background; he has admitted to being in contact with Violet during this period.(4)

The Violet saga took a new turn in 1965 when a Belgian count, Alain de Villegas, teamed up with an Italian inventor, Aldo Bonassoli, for the first of several crack-pot schemes that would climax with the notorious 'sniffer-plane' fraud in France. The actual extent of the criminality of this pair is difficult to determine, because they did exhibit a genuine eccentricity, professing interest in everything from alchemy to flying saucers. On a somewhat more sober level, de Villegas was known to mutter darkly about communism. At some point he joined the Pan-European Union, a Brussels-based organisation with a history going back to 1923, and a tendency towards the right, if not the far-right. On account of this membership, de Villegas reportedly could count on the support of Antoine Pinay. In any event, the first escapade of de Villegas and Bonassoli centred on a desalination project in Switzerland. It was a fiasco. They then turned to the first of their two 'sniffer' capers, this involving an airborne device to detect underground, fresh-water reservoirs.(5)

By the early 1970s de Villegas and Bonassoli had encountered Violet and the duo became a trio. It is worth noting that this occurred at about the time Violet suffered a setback in his own machinations. One way or another his work for SDECE had always consumed considerable amounts of that agency's money and SDECE at last severed the expensive relationship in 1970. Whether or not this was what inspired Violet to champion de Villegas and Bonassoli, he introduced the latter to another of his powerful contacts, Italian financier Carlo Pesenti. Pesenti was intrigued by the water-detection idea, but the early 1970s was a bad time for him, as his business empire was under attack by the endlessly carnivorous Michele Sindona. With the help of Philippe de Weck, chairman of a Swiss bank, the Union de Banque Suisse (UBS), Pesenti beat back Sindona's take-over attempts, but was left too weakened for highly speculative ventures.

Violet's relationship with Pesenti must have survived this disappointment because he helped the Italian not long afterwards when the latter was seeking to expand his US operations. In fact, he recommended Daniel Boyer. Boyer himself was becoming noticeably more spooky in this period and, on his own admission, was in touch with the UNITA rebels of Angola in 1976.(6)

In the wake of the oil price shock of 1973, Violet and his partners hit upon their final 'sniffer' scheme: instead of fresh water, they were now after petroleum. They first approached South Africa but Pretoria was unimpressed. Success actually lay much closer to home, in the form of the French state oil firm, the Societe Nationale ELF Aquitaine, or SNEA (often just referred to as ELF). Even taking into account the newly elevated price for oil at the time, ELF proved remarkably gullible when Violet, de Villegas and Bonassoli claimed they could outfit planes with oil-detection gear. The first contract between the two parties was signed in 1976 and ELF plunged about US$120 million into the sorry business before finally admitting in 1979 that it had
been conned. Only half the money was ever recovered. (7)

The flow of money in the 'sniffer-plane' affair is the most revealing aspect of the scandal. A Panamanian firm set up by der Villegas, called Fislama, was used by the count to receive ELF payments. It was administered by none other than Philippe de Weck, the UBS chairman who had saved Carlo Pesenti. The conduit for the initial payments was a second firm, based in Zurich, Ultrafin AG. Ultrafin was subordinate to Banco Ambrosiano Holdings, itself a tentacle of Banco Ambrosiano, the Italian financial institution then being looted by its own chairman, Roberto Calvi, and P-2. Indeed, P-2 Grandmaster Licio Gelli kept an enormous account at de Weck's UBS, and other UBS accounts popped up throughout the Banco Ambrosiano affair. Nor should one forget that Violet's Vatican ties were mirrored by the role in the Ambrosiano looting played by the Vatican's bank, the Instituto per le Opere Religione (IOR).(8)

Presiding over the final stages of the 'sniffer-plane' fraud was the ubiquitous Daniel Boyer. Violet first drew him into the morass by introducing him to a son of de Villegas, Fernand, in June of 1978. That, at least, is how Boyer has 'related it. Even without that entanglement, Boyer was becoming more and more fascinating every year. In 1978 he took on the leadership of those members of the US Democratic Party resident in France, and held that position until 1982. His Vatican ties were such that, by the early 1980s, he was running a firm printing French-language editions of art books based on Vatican collections.

None of this, however, prevented the final debacle over at ELF. In Boyer's version of events, a period of great anxiety and tension among the 'sniffer-plane' gang climaxed in December 1978, when de Villegas dismissed Violet as his representative, and asked Boyer to replace him. Boyer did so, supposedly without comprehending that the airborne oil-detection business contained not the slightest amount of serious technology. Violet was agreeable to the new arrangements, but kept in touch with Boyer regarding further developments. When ELF cried fraud in 1979, Boyer did what he says was his best to recover as much of the ELF funds as possible. (9)

The aftermath of the 'sniffer-plane' farce was eventful. ELF opted for a cover-up, and the facts of the case remained unknown until 1983, by which time President Giscard d'Estaing had been replaced by Francois Mitterand. Authorities did pursue the matter behind the scenes, but did not get very far. For instance, Swiss banker de Weck refused to answer any questions, invoking the confidentiality of his client, de Villegas. In 1982 Banco Ambrosiano collapsed in the wake of the mysterious death of Roberto Calvi. The Vatican appointed a commission to explore IOR complicity in the collapse which was notable mostly for its refusal to acknowledge that IOR was responsible for what happened. One of the commissioners was de Weck.(10)

Notes

1. Naylor p. 258; Anderson pp. 224-229; Delarue pp. 238-9, 242
3. Guetta
4. Faligot and Krop pp.195-8; Guetta
5. Naylor p. 258; Singer; Yearbook of International Organizations 1981
6. Faligot and Krop p.195; Naylor p. 259; Guetta
7. Naylor pp. 260,267; Perry; Guetta; Yallop p. 321
8. Yallop pp.320-21; Naylor p. 260; Gurwin p. 17; Cornwell p. 58
Gordon Winter: *Inside BOSS* and After

**Introduction**

Intelligence officers who blow the whistle get attacked by their erstwhile employers. Agee, Stockwell, Marchetti, Wallace, Holroyd, Jock Kane, Cathy Massiter - they all have variously suffered for their decision to go public. Their allegations and their characters are rubbished; operations are mounted to discredit them and disrupt their lives - and worse.

Gordon Winter is an Englishman who was recruited by BOSS. His 1981 book *Inside BOSS*, was the first (and only) inside account of South Africa's intelligence agency. The book was not reprinted after its first edition after a number of libel suits were issued against it. (NB our statement in *Lobster* 11, ref. 3, that the book had been withdrawn was wrong.) As a result, the status of Winter and his book is still a matter of dispute. Among those who were libelled it is suspected of being, in part, a disinformation exercise. While we were putting this issue together one of those who were libelled began corresponding with us about it - this, it should be noted, was entirely a coincidence: the person concerned had no idea we were planning to publish this piece - and, as a result, we now know a good deal more about the details of the book's history than we used to. We will publish some of this in a future Lobster.

For the moment, however, we are not convinced that *Inside BOSS* was deliberate disinformation. We still think this is one of the most important political memoirs. Even if elements of the book were included to disinform, as some believe, *Inside BOSS* still contains an invaluable piece of the covert history of Britain in the sixties and seventies. Winter described offensive intelligence operations inside the UK on a massive scale.
The book is extremely hard to find second-hand but libraries will have it - or will get it. It should be read. In the meantime, here are some of Winter's reflections on the book its reception, and his life since it appeared. (This piece was written at our invitation.) To our knowledge, this is the first time anything of Winter's has been published in the UK since the book was published. We may prove to be wrong, but for the moment we are still of the opinion that the British liberal-left ditched Winter too quickly.

Robin Ramsay

I don't really want to write this. It's not really worth it. I'm not getting paid for it - so why should I risk another good hiding? I still bear the mental bruises from the 'magnum opus' I wrote about spies and spying. But here I am, banging out these words for Lobster - for three reasons.

• One: I respect the way Lobster handles the subject of spies and spying.
• Two: I have a few things I want to get off my chest.
• Three: Inside all of us (particularly writers who have been well and truly smeared) there is that quite natural wish to be understood.

My big problem as a journalist was that I always leaned backwards to see the other man's point of view, even the enemy's. This made me a good journalist (and spy) but not much cop as a human being because most of the time I was a hypocrite to myself and didn't even know it. Which brings me to British Intelligence. You can't blame them for keeping tabs on possible subversives. That's what the name of the Intelligence game is all about - being intelligent. They would be stupid if they didn't keep those kind of files, wouldn't they? That's what 'Need to Know' is all about. They need to know about people who might constitute a danger to the (their) Realm, so that they can do something about it before the clever ones get too smart-arse and start rocking the boat with their free-thinking shit.

Question: why is it that hardly any publicity has been given to that part of Peter Wright's book *Spycatcher* which discloses that British Intelligence (GCHQ) computers can intercept any phone call and telex messages going in and out of Britain? Also studiously ignored by the mass media - even though it's a great news story - is that British Intelligence has long had a really marvellous portable X-ray device which enables them to 'read' the combination inside super modern 'thief-proof' safes.

Please don't think that I am trying to glamourise my book *Inside BOSS* by associating it with *Spycatcher*. There is no comparison whatever. Compared with Peter Wright I was very small fish as a spy. He really was big time, Don't believe for one moment those smears that he was a nobody. He knows more secrets than any 20 British intelligence operatives who spend their time sitting at desks poring over secret reports. Peter Wright was out in the field - doing spectacular things. And don't believe those smears that he's a 'traitor' to the land of his birth. He's still a violently anti-Communist right-winger who firmly believes in Queen and country. He wrote *Spycatcher* for the simple reason that he and his wife were going broke - because those idiots in Curzon Street's Leconsfield House failed to give him the pension they promised, the 20-year pension he had earned with the Admiralty but lost when he joined MI5.

If he had been one of those scores of titled gentlemen who work for British Intelligence, whether on staff or freelance, you can be sure he would have got that
pension. That's what hurt him most. He finally worked it out that they had discriminated against him just because he was a lower-middle class nobody who never went to a 'proper school' and was not 'one of them'. I mention all this about Wright because he had the 'cheek' to write a book which disclosed intelligence secrets. So did I - British Intelligence secrets as well as South African. Peter Wright has been well and truly smeared by most sections of the British press, although any half-intelligent person can - after reading *Spycatcher* - quite easily work out that most of the British newspapers spread vicious lies about him. And that is why I would like you to go to your public library, get a copy of my book, read it, and then decide for yourself.

Let's examine one claim I made in that book, that British Intelligence breaches the secrecy of the ballot box by monitoring all votes cast for British Communists. On p. 419 I explained that most people in Britain believe that their vote is sacrosanct, that nobody can possibly discover how you voted. Not so. When you enter a polling station your name is automatically checked on the voters' roll. This gives your home address. Then, so you can register your vote, you are given a numbered counterfoil and the person who gives you that counterfoil writes down your voters' roll number on the counterfoil stub which bears the same number. Whatever they may tell you, this means that after you have marked your voting slip and popped it into the ballot box that slip can later be identified, by relating it to that (numbered) counterfoil stub which gives your number on the voter's roll. And this in turn gives your name and address.

When my book mentioned this fact, you simply would not have believed the nonsense some newspapers published in order to knock it flat. One newspaper said my claim was ridiculous because all voting slips are destroyed after the election. Not true. After an election these voting slips are boxed and stored in buildings belonging to the Lord Chancellor's department in west London, where they are stored for one year before being destroyed. Most newspapers stressed that the boxes containing the voting slips are 'sealed'. So what? I remember BOSS telling me (in the late sixties) that they had stopped using their (heavily sealed) diplomatic pouches to send top-secret material to Pretoria by air from London. Why? Because a British Intelligence operative (an extreme right-winger who admired South Africa) had tipped us off that the back-room boys in Whitehall had found a way of opening our (and all other) 'dip' pouches. The much simpler seals on the voting boxes would hardly cause them a problem. Another newspaper said that it would be a ridiculously difficult task for 'any person' to scrutinise the voting slips. This is a clever misuse and deliberate twisting of words. Of course it would be difficult for 'one person' to do. But I never stated that one person monitored the voting slips. I said British Intelligence did it. Another newspaper said it would be impossible for anyone to get these voting slips because there were 'locked up'. You have to laugh. Your voting slips are not even locked in modern safes. They are kept in boxes, in a locked room.

But the award of the year went to that revered Establishment newspaper *The Times*. In their issue of Monday 26th October 1981, they ran a lengthy story about my voting slip claims, a knocking story aimed at reassuring their civilised readers that British Intelligence would not be so uncivilised as to read other peoples’ voting slips. In the story's second paragraph reporter David Nicholson-Lord described me as 'a South African spy and disinformation specialist suggesting to the reader that this claim about voting slips is just disinformation. *The Times* then went on: 'A person wanting to know how another voted would have to break into the place where the voting papers are stored.' There you are, another newspaper is using that 'a person' trick again. *The Times* continued: 'The intruder would also have to find the voting paper and its
counterfoil, which bears a pencilled number. He would then have to find this number on the electoral roll to discover who marked the cross ......'

Hang on a minute though. British Intelligence would send more than one man, wouldn't they? And surely they would not be so ham-fisted as to tell their 'intruder' to 'break into the place' would they? Surely British Intelligence would have the intelligence to get the key for the door? And, in any case, the British Intelligence operatives 'breaking in' wouldn't have to do all their searching through voting slips in that room, would they? Couldn't they take all the papers away with them and do it at leisure? They have a whole year to do it in, haven't they?

In their article *The Times* then wrote: 'Although the correlation of voting slips and electoral rolls is acknowledged to be technically possible, given the access, one local authority source consulted by *The Times* described it as "an unbelievably arduous task to sift through the slips in the ballot boxes. It would be an extremely tedious and difficult job even if anyone wanted to do it."'

Having made that quite definite statement, *The Times* destroyed the whole picture they had painted by stating in the next paragraph: 'it would be simplified, however, by virtue of the slips being bundled up in groups of 50, with the candidates name and sorting colour at the top.' As a former journalist I laughed when I saw that wonderful paragraph in *The Times*. How can one paragraph say that a thing could be 'unbelievably arduous' and 'extremely tedious and difficult' and then, in the very next breath, show that the voting slips were bundled together in groups of 50, with the candidates name and sorting colour at the top. My goodness, all the votes for a Communist candidate are bundled together? And with a special sorting colour at the top! Well, that really would 'simplify' that 'unbelievably arduous, extremely tedious and difficult task' somewhat, wouldn't it?

Knowing the newsroom of *The Times* quite well, I realised they would spot this thunderous error. They certainly did. So what did they do? They went to the trouble of rejigging that whole page for their next edition. And they took out that very unhappy (for them) paragraph. As it happened I was grateful to *The Times* because I then flew to Amsterdam and Brussels to give several press conferences there. And at the end of each question and answer session, I invited the journalists to gather round and compare the different editions of *The Times*. To say those Dutch and Belgian reporters were appalled is putting it mildly. The respect they had previously held for the prestige *Times* took a deep nosedive.

*The Times' version 1:*

Although the correlation of voting slips and electoral rolls is acknowledged to be technically possible, given the access, one local authority source consulted by *The Times* described it as an 'unbelievably arduous task to sift through the slips in the ballot boxes.' It would be an extremely tedious and difficult job even if anyone wanted to do it."

*The Times version 2 :*

Although the correlation of voting slips and electoral rolls is acknowledged to be technically possible, given the access, one local authority source consulted by *The Times* described it as an "unbelievably arduous" task to sift through the slips in the ballot boxes. Shortly after an election, the sealed boxes are dispatched to buildings
It would be simplified, however, by virtue of the slips being bundled up in groups of 50; with the candidate's name and sorting colour at the top. Shortly after an election, the sealed boxes are dispatched to buildings belonging to the Lord Chancellor's department in west London where they are stored for a year before being destroyed. According to the Home Office, the seal can only be broken by an order from the House of Commons or the Privy Council.

To further knock my claim, *The Times* published another very significant paragraph. This stated: 'Senior Ministers told *The Times* last night that they had never heard of the secrecy of the ballot box being broached.' Now that really was unbelievable and incredible. Those 'senior ministers' certainly did not know what was going on in the outside world because there was noting at all new in the claim that British Intelligence could monitor Communist votes in British general elections. The British Communist newspaper *The Morning Star* had repeatedly mentioned this very same subject in its columns for many years - long before my book was published.

In mentioned the subject in my book for another reason. This is what I wrote on p. 419:

>'The most astonishing allegations I heard about British Intelligence and its links with BOSS was that the names of all people who voted Communist in British general elections were passed on to South Africa and other anti-Communist countries. This was told to me in confidence by General H.J. van den Bergh in 1968. This was invaluable to South African Intelligence. When British Communists visited South Africa they were automatically monitored at all times in case they were involved in underground politics.'

After disclosing this fact in my book I ended the chapter by repeating something else van den Bergh (the head of BOSS) had told me on the subject: 'Those black boxes contain the names of people who voted communist. In intelligence terms that's like knowing where there's several thousand of tons of gold which can be stolen without anyone knowing. Can you imagine British Intelligence not scrutinizing those voting slips? They'd be stupid if they didn't.' I am sure that the head of BOSS was speaking the truth when he told me about this. In any case, I have seen the computer print-outs in BOSS headquarters in Pretoria. On the other hand, to be absolutely fair minded, let's presume that he lied to me. Perhaps he told me that to cover up the fact that his BOSS men in Britain had somehow managed to steal all the names and addresses. But I'm quite sure van den Bergh did not deceive me. During those 16 years I spied for him, I was one of his top favourites and he never once lied to me, to my knowledge.

Anyway, I leave it to you to decide who is telling the truth. And don't be too hard on *The Times* because they published that terribly biased article on the voting slips. Maybe they did it because they are true blue patriots who just did not want to let the side down.
That used to be my game, too. In *Inside BOSS* I explain that, as a hatchet man for South African Intelligence, one of my jobs as a journalist propagandist was to attack any book which criticised the South African Government or the policy of apartheid. One of the most dangerous disclosures I made in my book was that BOSS had a top secret 'death squad' known as the 'Z-squad', which was formed to kill Pretoria's known enemies, particularly those living in exile outside South Africa. This expose was treated with ridicule when my book came out. But the world's newspapers obviously believe me now because they invariably name South Africa's 'Z-squad' as the culprit when a South African exile is mysteriously murdered overseas. Since I made that disclosure literally dozens of South African political exiles have been shot or blown up in Tanzania, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Botswana - most of them members of the ANC. Apart from the parcel bomb killing of senior ANC member Ruth First, the car bomb maiming of the liberal South Afriran lawyer Albie Sachs, in Mozambique last year, and the shooting down of the ANC representative in Paris, Mrs Dulcie September in 1987, few of these cases have been given much publicity.

When I wrote *Inside BOSS* I made one great mistake. I did not take any political stand. Naively believing I could now really write without 'slanting' (for a change) I spared no side. I tried to put all sides. And, so that my readers could understand why the South African Government behaved like it did, I gave Pretoria's point of view about the ANC, Pan-Africanist Congress (RAC), the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the Blacks, the Coloureds, the Reds, and yes, those pinko langoustine liberals too. This didn't go down very well at all. Anyway, BOSS came up with a great gimmick. They put the rumour out to their secret agents (dozens of them being journalists in South Africa and elsewhere) that not to worry, Gordon is still a loyal BOSS agent. Ignore his book, it's just a cunning cover for something else he's doing. Now you have to give credit where credit is due. BOSS deserves a pat on the back for that brilliant disinformer. It was such a humdinger that the whole of Fleet St., the BBC and TV networks fell for it. So much so that in all the eight major TV interviews I gave the commentator always ended up by suggesting that I might still be working for BOSS or the CIA or the KGB.

When I handed my *Inside BOSS* manuscript, and a big bundle of secret BOSS documents to Penguin Books, I dealt with their Editor, Neil Middleton. He's a terrific guy and I liked him a lot. I warned him that BOSS would try to get into Penguin's offices, to get advance details from my book. I didn't have to worry though as the man who brought out Philip Agee's *A CIA Diary* (Penguin 1975), Neil Middleton knew what security was about. But that didn't stop the spooks. Someone still managed to steal (from Penguin's offices) all the BOSS documents and various other papers which substantiated claims I made in my book. I still had all my personal copies, but that's not the point. Whoever stole those documents then had advance knowledge of what would appear in my book. Forewarned is forearmed. This meant the spooks had plenty of time to plot and connive in ways ways of reducing the danger potential in my book. Based on information I gathered later from journalists (and spies), I am quite sure I know the identity of the man who stole those documents. And he certainly was not a BOSS man.

Another interesting thing. Months before *Inside BOSS* was published, I discovered that page-proofs of the book had been in the hands of at least one senior South African journalist. And he had never left Johannesburg. Did he get them from BOSS? And, if so, how on earth did BOSS get those page-proofs? Could it be that British Intelligence passed them on? In July 1980, before my book was published, three senior members of
the BBC's Panorama programme flew from to London to interview me in Dublin. One of that team was Tom Mangold - and he's nobody's fool. He gave me a rare old grilling and I could see I needed to pull one out of the hat to convince him. But I managed it. In the mid-1970s, when the Jeremy Thorpe scandal was hitting the front pages. Tom Mangold flew to America and obtained an exclusive interview with Jeremy Thorpe's old pal, the late Peter Bessell, the former Liberal MP for Bodmin. (Peter Bessell, as well as an self-admitted agent for the United States, presumably for the CIA, has also been described as a source for MI5's 'F' branch. See Private Eye 15 May 1987). During his interview with Tom Mangold, Peter Bessell said something sensational: 'Thorpe did have a scene with the male model, Norman Scott'. Tom Mangold flew back to London with a major story (on tape) in his briefcase.

But as it was libellous at the time, the BBC decided it could not use that interview. A transcript of the tape was sealed in a safe at the BBC. Within ten days of that transcript being placed in the safe, the Head of BOSS had a full copy of it. And because one of the pages (p.19) mentioned my name, he gave me a copy, so that I could defend myself against the British press if the story ever came out. It didn't, but I kept that page 19. Some four years later, as Tom Mangold was quizzing me at that interview in Dublin, I asked him if his interview with Peter Bessell had ever been used by the BBC. When he said it hadn't, I asked him if the transcript of his interview was still locked away in that BBC safe. He said it was. So I pulled p.19 out of my suitcase and asked Mr Mangold how on earth the Head of BOSS could have given it to me. Tom Mangold was so flabbergasted that he flew back to London, asked the BBC to get that transcript out of their safe and then compared my copy of p.19 with the original. It was identical, even down to small creases and photostat lines on the paper. Who do you think got into that BBC safe?

Here's another puzzle for you. On 24 February 1976, when the Jeremy Thorpe case was about to erupt, the Young Liberal Peter Hain sat down and typed out a five-page memorandum in which he mentioned the fact that I was a suspected BOSS agent. Hain handed this memo to Jeremy Thorpe who - knowing full well that I was responsible for setting up the whole Norman Scott homosexual scandal - quickly handed it to Premier Harold Wilson. Within ten days 'HJ', head of BOSS, had a copy of it. Later I sent Peter Hain a copy of his memo. He's still wondering how BOSS obtained possession of it.

Here's yet another puzzle. In 1976 Harold Wilson, just after retiring as Prime Minister, secretly assigned two freelance BBC reporters, Barry Penrose and Roger Courtiour to mount an investigation into the Jeremy Thorpe/Norman Scott scandal to discover how deeply BOSS was involved in It. Wilson quite categorically named me as a 'known BOSS agent'. During one of his talks with Penrose and Courtiour, the BBC's Director General, Sir Charles Curran, was present in Harold Wilson's home. 'The four men agreed that their discussions should be kept top secret after Mr Wilson said he distrusted the British Security Services - which, he claimed, were 'riddled with operatives who were pro-South African'. This is amusing when you know that it has been alleged that Sir Charles Curran was, for years, a top British Intelligence operative. (Izvestia 20/12/68, based on information supplied by Kim Philby.) Within a couple of days of this 'top secret' meeting the head of BOSS called me over to his Pretoria office and told me exactly what had been said in Mr Wilson's home. He gave me this advance warning because he knew that the two BBC reporters would be telephoning me at my home in Johannesburg and he wanted me to be ready for their attack. But for some reason H.J. van den Bergh told me that when the BBC men
telephoned I could kick them in the teeth by disclosing that I knew all about their secret meeting in Harold Wilson's home. And when Barry Penrose did phone me, I did give him that kick. His reaction was: 'My God, you really are well-informed. How on earth did you know about that?' Barry is a super sleuth but he still doesn't know exactly how BOSS obtained full details of that top secret conversation with Harold Wilson.

But I know how Lord Wilson was so clued-up about me and my involvement in the Thorpe/Scott scandal. One week before Britain's general election in February 1974, on the instructions of BOSS, I gave the Sunday People my complete dossier on Jeremy Thorpe. This dossier included some 50 letters typed on House of Commons notepaper and several tape recordings, all of which I had compiled while interviewing made model Norman Scott for two weeks in my London flat. After delivering this dossier to the offices of the Sunday People, I went downstairs to the 'Stab' - a pub used by most of the journalists in the IPC group - and sat at the bar having a drink with a former girl friend, Jill Evans of the Daily Mirror. Ten minutes later, a large-nosed man came up to the bar and offered to buy me a drink saying, 'I've been skimming through the stuff you just brought us on Jeremy Thorpe and must congratulate you. It looks a great story.' Highly flattered, I thanked him. But then the hair on the back of my neck started prickling when 'big nose' started 'pumping' me for information about Norman Scott, particularly his whereabouts. This made me clam up and become rather frosty. When he departed I asked Jill Evans who 'big nose' was. She replied, 'That's Sydney Jacobsen, Deputy Chairman of the IPC group - you're in the big time now, boyo'.

But that prickling sensation on the back of my neck had been quite right. Later I discovered (from a reliable political reporter on the Daily Mirror) that dear old Sydney Jacobsen had made copies of everything in my Thorpe/Scott dossier and carried it over to Downing Street. For this, and other possible acts of friendship, mister Jacobsen was given a title. And when I tackled him on this later, he didn't even try to deny it. 'You did your duty and I did mine', was all he said - with a condescending sneer. I can disclose this now because Lord Jacobsen died in 1988.

Although I was the man who started that Scott/Thorpe scandal, I felt sorry for Jeremy Thorpe when he was toppled from power. He really did take a thousand kicks in the groin from the media - just like I did when Inside BOSS was
published. But not just from the media. The ANC and their friends in the South African Communist Party also gave me a terrific hiding. Months before my book came out, they set up a first class 'think tank' in London and did a brilliant spoiling job on the book. Not that I blame them one jot. I did enough damage to them during my years as a spy on the Black beat in South Africa. The anti-apartheid people in London must have been delighted when I named secret agents who worked for BOSS. But here's something crazy: at least half of the agents I named in my book are still operating, doing the same things I accused them of doing.

After *Inside BOSS* came out I wrote a sequel, entitled *Secret Agent for South Africa* a 547-pager published in Dutch for a really delightful chap called Rob van Gennep. In that book I named many more agents who worked for BOSS. And not one of them dared to sue. When they contacted the van Gennep publishing house, and started the same old threats they had applied to Penguin in London, Rob van Gennep was not at all scared. He told them, 'You want to sue us? OK, come to Holland. We will pay your air fare and your hotel bills. Come to court and see what happens to you.' Not one of them did. Now that's a real warrior - and I love him for it. My Dutch book received 93 whole pages of publicity in Dutch and Belgian newspapers and magazines in the space of two weeks, and not one of them published a lie or a distortion. They played it down the middle, reporting the facts - and leaving their readers to decide for themselves. Holland is definitely the most honest and just society I have ever encountered.

The success of my Dutch book pleased me immensely. But I still could not get over the way my own country had beaten the stuffing out of *Inside BOSS*. So, in a big sulk, I took my wife and kids off to Greece in an old coal van - to write an even better book for the German market. But the ANC even managed to sabotage that - on the very day I was due to sign a juicy contract. This left me broke. So we returned to Ireland in the 18-year-old coal van and my wife took a job as dish washer and general dogsbody in a posh country hotel. I was hired as general handyman and potato peeler (two big buckets full every day).

Instead of being paid a wage I earned our free occupancy of a little two up and two down cottage in the grounds of the hotel - with free water trickling down the walls. That rather humbling experience did me a world of good. There's nothing better for a big head than being brought down to size, not that I enjoyed it much at the time.

That's why I finally tore myself way from those buckets of potatoes and, with some money from my mother-in-law, took my family in that same old coal truck all the way to my old hunting ground of Tangier in Morocco. There I wrote a guide book to that city which provided me with enough money to sit down and start writing a film script for an American company. When I was spying in London for BOSS under cover of being a deportee from South Africa, a short notice appeared in the Personal Columns of *The Times* on 18th March 1969. It asked volunteers to reply to a box number if they were interested in working for a worthy cause. It was carefully worded to appeal to people of a liberal frame of mind and - to discourage chancers - made it clear that there would be no financial reward. The head of BOSS instructed me to answer this advert, saying the man who had inserted it had some connection with South Africa. Only later did I discover that, as per routine, British Intelligence monitor all unusual Personal Column notices. I mention this because it later became obvious that British Intelligence had tipped off BOSS about that advert.

Anyway I wrote to the box number and found myself in a plot to rescue the ANC
leader, Nelson Mandela, from prison in South Africa. I infiltrated the plot and became
leader of the group in London which was to be responsible for recruiting suitable
people. BOSS was delighted by all this and helped me in a hundred ways so that
Mandela's escape could be achieved. As I explain in Inside BOSS, BOSS was most
keen to help Mandela escape. Then they could shoot him dead in a lovely 'recapture'
operation and, in an equally lovely show trial, they could jail all the Britons who had
taken part in the plot. One of them was to be Miss Sheila Scott, the most famous
British solo aviator of her time, who was to fly Mandela out of South Africa in her
two-seater plane after his escape from jail. (Little did she know that Mandela would be
shot as he ran to board that plane on the landing strip of a farm near Cape Town.)
Sheila Scot would have given BOSS fabulous world headlines when she stood in the
dock accused of complicity in Mandela's 'escape'.

This plot and counter plot really would have worked because BOSS had even supplied
me with a warder in the Robben Island jail where Mandela was held. But then
something went wrong. The mastermind of the rescue plot, Mr Gordon Bruce, an
employee at a Johannesburg dynamite factory, made contact with an eminently
respectable man in London, an old friend of his, a man he knew he could trust
absolutely. For the time being I will call this man by his official codename, 'Mr Chips'.

Gordon Bruce told this completely trustworthy 'Mr Chips' about the escape plan. He
even told him my name and mentioned that I had managed to get a warder on Robben
Island who would assist in the escape. But, unknown to Gordon Bruce, 'Mr Chips' was
a British Intelligence pal. And, of course, he tipped off British Intelligence. They took
a dim view of me recruiting Britons to take part in a plot in which we all knew (we
being BOSS and British Intelligence) would end in them all being arrested in South
Africa by BOSS. So British Intelligence quietly complained to the Head of BOSS that
this sort of thing was not on. And so, eventually, our 'escape' plot was called off - for
which Nelson Mandela, from the bottom of his heart, can thank British Intelligence -
and 'Mr Chips'.

When I defected from BOSS in 1979, I contacted Peter Hain in London and told him
about the Mandela Escape Plan - and how 'Mr Chips' had smashed it by telling British
Intelligence. Peter Hain did not believe me. He said he knew 'Mr Chips' well enough
to know that the role I gave him in the plot was quite preposterous. So I gave Peter
Hain various letters and documents which made it abundantly clear that 'Mr Chips'
really had been privy to the plot. I take my hat off to the documents, and told him that I was going to disclose the whole Plot in
my book. The first thing 'Mr Chips' asked Peter Hain was: 'Is Gordon Winter going to
tell me in his book, or will I be referring to me by the codename 'Mr Chips'?' When
Peter Hain indicated that he did not know, 'Mr Chips' then said: 'You can tell Mr
Winter that if he does not mention my real name, I will not deny his story'.

Now you know why I did not name 'Mr Chips' on p. 279. It just wasn't worth
disclosing his name and being denied. But I can disclose his name now. 'Mr Chips'
was Sir Robert Birley, the former Headmaster at Eton. I can tell you that because he
can't deny his role - he died at his beautiful home in Somerset in 1982. Many of
Britain's liberals will be shocked to hear that the immensely respected and trusted Sir
Robert Birley was a British Intelligence pal, because he was privy to many secrets
given to him by Black leaders - some of them very left-wing - from all over Africa.
But I'm not at all shocked, I reckon he told British Intelligence because was a true blue
English patriot. Isn't that what Eton is all about?
When I wrote about the Mandela Escape Plot in my book, I fully expected to get a hiding because the whole thing sounded like something from a boy's adventure book. Yet, incredibly, all the people involved in that plot had the moral calibre to stand up and admit that I was telling the truth. Even the flier Sheila Scott. To ensure that her comments were strictly on the record, she gave a press interview in front of her lawyer, during which she confirmed that everything I had said was the truth.

Sheila Scott died of cancer in a London hospital in October 1988. When she started life she was a bit part actress and, during talks with her years ago when she was a world-famous flier, she mentioned with a tinge of regret - that she really would have liked to have had just one starring role in a big film. It's too late to tell her now, but she will. Because that film script I mentioned earlier has just been bought and a Hollywood set-up is now busy making a full-length film about the Mandela Escape Plot.

Footnote
What happened to Gordon Bruce, that delightful but unlucky man (unlucky because he trusted me and Sir Robert Birley), who masterminded the admirable but ill-fated Escape Plot? Nothing happened to him. He's still living in South Africa with his wife (who happens to be blind). BOSS couldn't arrest him and bring him to court - even though they had hundreds of letters and documents proving his guilt. Because by doing so it would have proved - beyond a shadow of a doubt, in a court of law - that I was a BOSS agent.

And that, to this day, BOSS still denies. But BOSS got its revenge on Gordon Bruce in 1988 when his son, along with hundreds of other young Whites, refused to serve in the South African army. They picked Gordon's son out and sent him to jail for six years.

Telecommunications at the End of the World

Jan Rockett

Michael Ryan's outburst at Hungerford in 1987 caused the Telephone Preference Scheme to be put into operation for the first known time in twelve years. (1) The system seems to have been less useful than might have been hoped. Other telephone voice communication systems, already in place but generally unavailable, could be used in a civil emergency. One, designed to lie fallow until transition to war, is partly funded by local authority emergency planning departments.

The Telephone Preference Scheme

The Post Office Telephone Preference Scheme (TPS) was instigated during the last war and standardised in 1953 as part of the nuclear war preparations. (2) It was described in Home Office circulars to local authorities in 1962 and 63, then updated and re-described in Home Office Circular ES5/1975. The relevant documents were marked 'RESTRICTED'. ES5 carried the additional warning:

'The information contained in these documents is not to be
communicated directly or indirectly to the Press or to any person not
authorised to receive it.'

Since the circular was headed 'Communications in War', the level of secrecy was predictable. In the mid-70s most County Emergency Planning Officers were gentlemen of a military background, accustomed to plotting the survival or destruction of the civilian population in total secrecy. By the mid-1980s the situation had changed; in July 1987, following extensive 'leaks' about TPS (by this time renamed GTPS or Government Telephone Preference Scheme), the details were declassified. (3)

Under GTPS, the telephone system is divided into three categories. Category 1, roughly 2% of the system, applies to 'those lines vital to the prosecution of war and to national survival after an attack on the United Kingdom'. Category 2, a further 8% or so, covers 'those additional lines necessary to maintain the life of the community during civil emergency'. The rest of us are on Category 3, 'lines for which there is no entitlement to any preference'.(4) There are exceptions both official and unofficial to the preference percentages. Within the Whitehall CBX complex, provision has been made for between 10 and 15 percent of outgoing lines to be put on Category 1. Where a PBX (private exchange) is concerned, more preference lines may be given where there is spare capacity at the public exchange or where it is possible to arrange 'out-of-area' lines to another switchboard. Doctors in some areas have been placed on Category 1 by individual telephone engineers.

The decision on Category allocation is made by each relevant Government department, with the Cabinet Office as final arbitrator. Responsibility for lines relevant to local government (County bunkers, emergency and community centres, refuse collection and sewage works) has been delegated to Local Authorities. Nationalised industries are similarly able to make their own recommendations; private industries were, prior to declassification, allocated fines without their knowledge. Following declassification and denationalisation they may now be on the same footing as local authorities. (5)

The 'Restricted' approach to TPS led to a fiasco after Local Government reorganisation. British Telecom requires that relevant numbers be nominated annually; otherwise the lines are put back onto Category 3. Unfortunately the new local authorities were considered to be separate bodies from the old, so Telecom felt unable to disclose which lines were already on TPS (and why). Emergency Planning Officers were left in something of a quandary. A further oversight affects PBX systems. Although several extensions from a private exchange may be placed on TPS, the civil service has generally avoided pointing out to the owners of the switchboard that the extensions will not function without either mains or back-up power. A designated organisation attempting to use its premises for emergency coordination during a flood or hurricane could find itself unable to communicate with the outside world unless its co-ordinators were to make all calls from the switchboard itself.

The decision to activate TPS in an emergency is theoretically under the control of Telecom and central government. There is no official provision for a local authority, for example, to demand level 2 working in a local crisis such as the Manchester Airport crash. However, as with requests for military assistance, the focus may be shifting towards the police. It is known that at Hungerford, the Thames Valley force made the approach to British Telecom.
According to J B Hopkins (6):

>'In some circumstances, the need for control of telephone traffic can first
become apparent to those agencies who are 'managing' any peacetime
emergency. Consultation with BT could result in actions, one of which
might be the implementation of the Preference facility, as indeed
happened at Hungerford' (emphases added)

Apparently BT is able to decide for itself, so far as peacetime implementation is
concerned, what action to take. It seems anomalous that a private company is able to
overrule, perhaps on commercial grounds, those responsible for emergency co-
ordination.(7) Mr Hopkins wrote his letter two months after the declassification of
GTPS. He still felt it necessary to mark it 'IN CONFIDENCE'. Oddly, as he goes to
say:

>'It goes without saying that we would, if circumstances were moving
toward a Preference activation decision, try to warn all customers likely
to be affected of the possible action eg, via a local radio announcement'.

Confidentially, of course.

There seems to be some degree of schizophrenia attached to BT's regulations. Mr
Hopkins' letter continues:

>'And the decision to activate would be taken objectively and at a very
senior level. But many instances escalate to crisis level so quickly that
the immediate action is obvious and is often taken by the first engineer to
recognise the crisis.'

At the request of the police, or by management decision, or on the whim of a local
operative? Perhaps all three: according to the engineers concerned, about 50 local
exchanges were put on to Preference 2 during the October 1987 hurricane. Decisions
were reportedly ad hoc: and effected without specific authority. Does the system
work? So far as civil emergencies are concerned, the answer seems to be no.
Implementation of the scheme cuts off 90% of those wishing to dial-out. It does not
prevent 'busying-out' of the switchboard by incoming calls. Neither does it guarantee
that those who most need to use a telephone in the particular circumstances will be
able to do so. Further, if the power is down, telephone exchange reserve batteries may
not last long. (8) As the journal Civil Protection said of the hurricane emergency:

>'Communication was dealt a body blow by the storm and greatly added to
the chaos. There was a shortage of information on the state of public
services, telephones did not work, radio and TV stations had difficulty
broadcasting and even the emergency services had problems. The
disruption was mainly caused by damaged telephone lines, loss of power
to switchboards and exchanges, damage to aerial systems and radio
networks and power problems with radio systems - for example when
back-up batteries ran out within a matter of hours.' (9)(10)

**The Cellular Telephone Networks**

When the police at Hungerford discovered that the telephone system was effectively
inoperative despite the instigation of Preference working, they took a further step. Unannounced and without reference to the customers, a part of the Racal Vodafone system was allocated to the constabulary. (11) So far as is known, no part of the cellular telephone network has been used in this way before, though it is understood that its use in transition to war is currently being considered. There seems to be little reason that it could not be included in formal civil emergency planning. Vodafone seem to have been pleased to have been of assistance in providing telephones and eliminating problems. In this particular case, provision may have been influenced by the fact that the company headquarters is located in nearby Newbury.

Emergency Manual Switching

Those actively involved in dealing with a civil emergency might feel that a dedicated telephone system running parallel to the normal one but reserved for their use would be mightily useful. It would be hugely expensive to install and to maintain; it would involve the laying of a new country-wide network of cables and the installation of separate switchboards immune from jamming by the public at large. Such a system would run on landlines, to avoid atmospheric effects. It would connect, for example, County Emergency Centres, the emergency services, the WRVS, airports, the headquarters of British Rail and underground railways, nuclear facilities and chemical works and so on: perhaps, at the fringe, the armed forces in case of need. But who would pay?

In the early 1970s, the military realised that transition to war and to Preference Level 1 working would have limited effect. Public exchanges might be sabotaged; telephone engineers could prefer being with their families to being at work; and one nuclear electromagnetic pulse (NEMP) could effectively take out every electronic exchange in the country, as well as destroying the microwave facilities upon which a great deal of communications equipment depends (12). For once, the cheap low-tech answer was the one chosen for the Ministry of Defence. Called EMSS or Emergency Manual Switching System, it consists of landlines separate from the normal telephone network and connected by old-fashioned 'doll's eye' switchboards situated in the basements of major exchanges. Sabotage of or damage to above-ground equipment will have no effect. Use of manually operated switchboards removes the problem of high-voltage pulse damage and cuts the overall electricity consumption needed, ensuring that the system will be sustainable on battery power for long periods of time. EMSS allows communication only between wartime facilities. Although the list is similar to that devised for Preference Category 1, the number of lines available is much smaller. Whilst GTPS serves about 2% of telephone users, the emergency system has enough lines to serve about 0.04%. A city the size of Sheffield is likely to have an exchange consisting of no more than 200 lines; a county market town might have one switchboard with 50. It is not certain exactly when EMSS was installed. ES5/1975 gave the impression that the entire system was in place. Evidence given to the author indicates that major installation was still proceeding five years later. About half the lines are permanent rented connections. The rest would be taken from the public network 'during the pre-attack period'.

Although the wiring is in place, the main exchange boards are not manned. So far as is known, the system has never been tested, even during joint military/civilian exercises. It is believed that, immediately after installation of the circuits, Telecom 'lost' or destroyed all records on grounds of security. This has rendered impossible any
maintenance of the rapidly-corroding underground system; telephone engineers simply
do not know where it is.

The costs of EMSS appear to be covered by the rented-line charge, typically about
1000 a year. By comparison, BT have quoted a rent of 50 for provision of an ex-
directory line on the understanding that it is not normally used. The result is that
County Emergency Planning Units are currently paying a large proportion of their
budgets to British Telecom for a service which is unavailable. If charges for hired
teleprinters and duplex equipment normally found in the bunkers is included, costs are
typically in excess of 30,000 per annum.

**Priority Operator Service**

A hybrid scheme based on the familiar 999 call has been devised for wartime use. As
the ES circular says in paragraph 15:

'During and immediately after an attack, when the normal functioning of
the public telephone service would be severely disrupted, the preference
scheme.... might not ensure that vital calls reach the switchboard.

Consequently a complementary facility has been provided, which enables a small
number of Category 1 subscribers to obtain priority attention from operators having
access to the EMSS network, if the direct dialling system is not functioning. In the
latter stages of a crisis letters would be sent by general managers to local telephone
areas to selected preference subscribers, giving them a particular telephone number
to dial to reach the EMSS operator. This number terminates on the switchboard and
would receive priority attention over all other calls. The lists are compiled by general
managers of local telephone areas in consultation with Home Office Regional
Telecommunication Officers. (13)

Amongst the installations described as 'in the priority list for this facility' are county,
district and London Group and borough wartime headquarters. The original issue of
the circular insisted that county councils and chief police officers should inform the
local telephone manager of their needs. The relevant sentence is absent from the
revised version. In a letter sent to the Association of Metropolitan Authorities in July
1983, H. D. Hallett of the Department of the Environment referred to the Priority
Attention Facility. By September of the following year, the facility seems to have
disappeared. A letter to 'All Principal Councils in England', which concerns
nominations for telephone preference, fails to make any mention of priority answering.
(14) It does, however, claim to supersede those paragraphs of ES5/1975 which refer to
such service. Priority answering may or may not still exist. It is believed that the
original scheme would have related to some two per cent of GTPS Category 1
subscribers - about the same number of people as are intended to have direct access to
EMSS. Either provision has been withdrawn from local authorities; or it has been
withdrawn totally; or else the Home Office Telecommunications Directorate has taken
sole responsibility for nominations. In any case, in wartime conditions the facility's
usefulness would be marginal. If the main switchboards had been knocked out by
NEMP, dialling-in to any operator would be impossible What the system would have
allowed was the making of long-distance calls where the local switchboard was still
working
Private Lines

A final facility is the existence of privately-rented long-distance lines. These are held by emergency services and by many other large organisations. Commercially-held private wires are routed with the normal cables, and go in and out of exchanges on the main distribution frame, normally in the basement, without passing through the vulnerable switching gear. In wartime, it is likely that they will be amongst the lines usurped for EMSS. Private lines rented by the military are similarly connected at exchanges. However, they are otherwise 'routed to avoid potential target areas' and 'can be made independent of mains power supply.'(15)

Public Interest and Public Emergencies

The existence of emergency telephone systems has apparently been kept hidden to allow war planners their customary secrecy. This attitude has resulted in the provision of powerful networks that could be, but are not, applicable to peacetime emergencies. Telephone Preference working existed in one form or another for more than forty years, but was not fully usable until the Home Office eventually decided to declassify it. Even after allowing public knowledge, the Government has expressed the view that its existence should be kept 'low-profile'.(16) No press or radio report has mentioned its emergency use.

GTPS cannot work efficiently if only one switchboard is affected, since the exchange can still be swamped by incoming calls. This problem can be overcome to a certain extent by the computerised System X exchanges, which can be pre-programmed to select or reject specific groups of incoming or outgoing lines (17). Unfortunately, System X is itself particularly vulnerable to damage. A reliable source has informed the author that the entire Whitehall CBX went down during the 1987 hurricane, and that back-up systems failed to work properly.

The problem could be avoided by the use of EMSS. The system is installed, could be maintained, and could easily be extended by permanent connection to trunk lines and by providing lines to emergency services which are not presently connected. In many areas of the country there is existing spare trunk capacity for the first of these tasks.

If EMSS were backed-up by assured access to existing private lines (a simple wiring job) and by imaginative use of the cellular networks, the country could have, for very small expense, a great asset. The military planners would also benefit; their precious but unused system would be regularly tested and properly maintained.

References

1. Confirmed by letter dated 9 Dec 87 from Ian Smith, Force Communications Officer, Thames Valley Police.
3. Letter dated 20 July 87 from M J Dudding, Shipping Policy & Emergency Planning Directorate, to local authorities. It is interesting to note that the (civil defence) Government Communications Network (GCN) has been renamed as the Emergency Communications Network or ECK
4. The full details of TPS are contained in Cabinet Office General Notice GEN 74/87, issued on 1 November 1974.
5. But not necessarily. Rest, refuge and casualty centres continue to be nominated.
and put on priority without the knowledge of their peacetime users. The same may apply, as was the case before 1987, to private industry.


7. According to a spokesperson for BT's Defence Division in November 1988, the fines of authority have not changed with privatisation. The Government remains 'our customer' for GTPS, and final responsibility continues to lie with the Home Office Directorate of Telecommunications, with OFTEL playing 'a role'.

8. Telecom has 'standby generators in all but the smallest of exchanges'. It also has a range of mobile generators varying in capacity from 10 to 600 kilowatts. Details are held on a 'national register maintained on a closed user group on Prestel' - D N Dick, Manager, BT Engineering & Technical Support Service: 1987 lecture to the Association of Civil Defence and Emergency Planning Officers.


10. According to the Joint Service Manual of Home Defence, JSP 349, Ministry of Defence, 1979, para 1310(d): Exchange batteries normally last for a maximum of 24 hours unless recharged. Even if the preference scheme was implemented battery life could be extended to only five days. There seems to be some discrepancy here between military theory and civilian practicalities.


12. The British have come late to this one. Full details on NEMP are contained in Chapter 11 of Glasstone and Dolan's The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (third edition published in the UK by Castle House, 1980). Five years later, the Final Report of the Working Party on Civil Defence Communications recommended 'that the Directorate of Telecommunications, together with the Home Office Scientific Research and Development Branch, should continue with their own investigations into NEMP protection [and] that these investigations should be followed up, when practicable to do so, by the initiation of a firm work programme involving the hardening of emergency communications equipment.' (Home Office, July 1985, para 82) (published January 1987). Protection systems currently approved by the Home Office for civil bunkers and the BT public exchanges are tested to NATO standard. This envisages a pulse from a tactical weapon exploded at a distance which allows for human survival typically two miles from ground zero. At this point, the electromagnetic effects are considerably less than those from a high-yield high-altitude explosion.

13. There were two versions of ESS/1975. The first (typescript) edition carries the full text: the second (printed) has been edited to omit the italicised words.


17. Telecom are planning the use of the 0800 'Linkline' for calls to emergency centres. System X is able to extend this concept by programming for:

- Timelink - connecting to (eg) 12 offices during the day and one at night:
18. Daylink - for instance to one office at the weekend:
19. Arealink - routing calls to the nearest emergency centre:
20. Distributionlink - routing to (eg) the largest available office:
21. Commandlink - pre-programmed changes for (eg) more offices in bad weather.

PRINT

Colin Wallace

On the Colin Wallace front, the big event since issue 17 has been Paul Foot's book, *Who Framed Colin Wallace?* (Macmillan, 1989). With this book Paul Foot has re-researched and synthesised all the previous work and produced what is likely to remain the definitive account of Wallace's biography, his allegations and - most interestingly - the attempt by the British state to discredit him. With a couple of notable exceptions, the book has had wonderful reviews. The exceptions are the *Guardian*, for whom Clive Ponting wrote a very odd, almost evasive review (2 June 89); and the *New Statesman and Society* (21 July 89) in which Duncan Campbell tried to undermine Wallace and denigrate the book - presumably because it was a story he had first go at and didn't pursue. The important positive reviews in the national press are:

- *Daily Telegraph* 15/7/89 by Mark Bonham-Carter.
- The *Scotsman* 3/6/89 by Tam Dalyell MP.
- The *Independent* (10/6/89) by Godfrey Hodgson. This included a disparaging reference to the David McKittrick smear in this paper in September 1987 and is tantamount to an apology for it.
- The *Spectator* (10/6/89) by Robert Kee ('exciting, brilliant and profoundly disturbing').
- *London Review of Books* (6/7/89) by R. W. Johnson. This is two complete pages plus, a brilliant summary of the text as well as the best account of the weight of the Wallace material -'The British Watergate'.

The Foot book was raised in Parliament by Ken Livingstone (Hansard 27/6/89 columns 943 - 952) and by Tam Dalyell (Hansard 8/6/89 columns 428- 431). Both were met with variations on the government's basic theme of 'It's all been investigated and there is nothing to be said'.

Lord Stockton, the head of the Macmillan group which published the book, called for a full judicial or parliamentary inquiry into the book's allegations. (*Sunday Telegraph* 23/7/89)

Magazines

*Extra!* - the journal of FAIR (Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting) - was mentioned in *Lobster* 17, but I forgot to put in their address. It is FAIR 130 West 25th Street, New York, NY 10001. *Extra!* is an acute analysis of the American media, its ownership, control and biases. No information on the cost of foreign subscriptions is given, so write and ask if outside the US.

*Top Secret* is the English-language version of the German parapolitical magazine *Geheim*. So far only the first issue, 0/88, has come our way, though a second issue is
said to have appeared. (A free sample copy of issue 0/88 might be had from Nick Wright, 34 Woodnock Road, London SW16 6TZ.) Last I heard he had some left. Send an A4 addressed envelope with 40p worth of stamps on it.) The first issue was marred somewhat by very poor proof-reading - a fault which will be corrected in succeeding issues by Wright. This is very much Agee country anti-CIA, naming names etc..

The first issue of the **Study Group on Intelligence Newsletter** has appeared. This 'Study Group' is a group of British academics working in spook country, and how widely they are willing to release their newsletter is unclear. The first issue is rather good, containing a survey of British courses which include an intelligence component, a list of forthcoming conferences and seminars on the subject, a review of the FBI file on Burgess and Philby, and a long list of recent and forthcoming intelligence publications. The newsletter is published by Robert Aldrich, Department of Politics and Contemporary History, University of Salford, M5 4WT, UK, to whom inquiries should be addressed.

**Freedom Research** is an anonymous 'monthly summary of the activities of UK based organisations supporting Marxist "liberation movements' and regimes.' I have issue No 8 of volume 2 (January 1989). This 16 pages, word-processed, fully-documented. Somebody is putting a lot of work into producing this, scouring the British and Irish press (local and national) for names and organisations. Without going back to all the original sources it is not possible to decide if these reports are accurate or not but I suspect they are. It is produced by Freedom Research, BCM Box 9200, London WC1N 3XX. No price is stated.

**British Briefing** is also anonymous, without even a box number, and is therefore illegal under British law. On the first page it is stated: 'British Briefing will not necessarily be available on request and is not available by subscription. Those on the receiving list are asked to treat this publication as confidential. Specifically, while recipients may make free use of the information therein, they are asked to refrain from mentioning it, or its existence, and from direct quotation.' I have issue No 12, 1989. It is 18 pages, word-processed and its contents list includes: Another Gospel?, Charities, the Anti-Economic League Campaign, the London Co-op Society Political Committee, Facing up to the Future (on the CPGB's recent discussion document), and so on. This is reminiscent most of the now defunct Common Cause Bulletin which fronted material from MI5's F Branch. Some of its preoccupations are really quite bizarre. There is, for example, nearly a page about a sculpture of the late communist MP, Willie Gallagher. To whom could this conceivably be of interest outside Gallagher's patch in West Fife? Information on and other copies of both **British Briefing** and **Freedom Research** would be much appreciated.

**The Keys of Peter** is the 'bimonthly paper faithful to the authentic teaching of the Church'. Every once in a while it includes something of interest to us. In issue 129, for example, there is a long account of, and attack on, Catholic groups which support the Nicaraguan government against the contras; issue Sept/Oct 1989 is entirely devoted to Austrian opposition to Hitler, and begins, 'The Masonic peace of 1919' (!) KOP is 4.00 per year, from 157 Vicarage road, London E10 5DU. KOP also has an interesting, if somewhat cranky mail-order catalogue.

**Briarpatch** is a radical magazine from Saskatchewan, Canada. It regularly prints interesting parapolitical articles by one of its members, George Martin Martz. The issue of November 1988 has a detailed account of the network of support in Canada
for UNITA; that of February 1989 has a long account of the South African government's propaganda effort in Canada. (Both appear to have been reprinted in issue two of Top Secret which arrived as this was being type-set and which I have not had time to read.)

*Briarpatch*, 2138 McIntyre St., Regina, Sask. S4P 2R7, Canada. 1 year overseas sub. is $29.00 (Canadian).

*Corruption and Reform - An International Journal* is a newish (into its third volume) and a rather interesting development for academic journals. The issue I have seen (Vol. 3 number 3) is entirely devoted to political scandals: papers included are 'Studying political scandal', 'Scandals in American political life', 'Political scandals in West Germany', 'The dynamics of scandals in British politics', and so on. Where it differs from a parapolitical approach is in the way the academic authors concerned treat the 'scandals' as if they were straightforward, entirely understood 'data'. Thus, for example, on p. 253 there is a reference to Chappaquiddick and the fact that *The Reader's Digest* ran a large piece on it, reopening the story. But there is no reference to the Digest's post-war activities on the political right, let alone the recent allegation by Fred Landis, that it has been working with the CIA. On p. 255 the author states: 'the details of Watergate hardly need retelling' - as if anyone is actually clear what was really going on. (Anyone who thinks that obviously hasn't read Jim Hougan's *Secret Agenda*.)

This is the central point: this journal - to be precise, the solitary issue I have read - isn't actually concerned about 'what was really going on' (or even the interesting problems about whether it is possible to know when you reach 'what was really going on'). The result is rather odd: 'scandals' are analysed and classified, common themes are sought, 'dynamics' identified; yet in almost all of the 'scandals' referred to in this volume what was actually going on (being done by whom) is entirely unclear.


*Zeta* In these generally dismal times for the 'radical' press, it has been no little pleasure to come across an intelligent, readable and forceful American monthly. *Zeta* is published by the Institute for Social and Cultural Change (whoever or whatever that might be), and calls itself 'an independent political magazine of critical thinking on political, cultural, social and economic life in the US. It sees the racial, class and political dimensions of personal life as fundamental to understanding and improving contemporary circumstances, and it aims to assist activist efforts to attain a better future.' So we're not exactly talking *Reader's Digest*. Each issue I've seen has contained over 100 pages of good quality material on, for example, US foreign policy, ecology, and the US media. *Zeta*'s contributors include the likes of Sheila Rowbotham, Joel Kovel, and the consistently excellent Noam Chomsky. Highlights of the issues I've seen include pieces by John Stockwell on US foreign policy/destabilisation; Edward Herman on 'freedom of speech' in the U. S. media; and an interview with Philip Agee. *Zeta* has also published quite the most comprehensive and intelligent piece I've seen on the European 'Autonomen', written by George Kastificias, the author of last year's excellent 'Global Imagination of the New Left'. All in all, it's excellent, and for an insight into the domestic and international implications of the Reagan-Bush doctrine, pretty well invaluable. It is also a good deal more optimistic and radical than one might expect any US journal to be deep in the trough of the Reagan/Bush years. The only major criticism I'd make is that it's nigh on impossible to get hold of a copy.
in this country. I sent my subscription money about six months ago and have had to send a couple of reminders to get the four copies I've got so far. But yes, I'd say it's worth it. 150 West Canton St., Boston, Ma 02118, USA. 1 year's overseas subscription is (US)$45.00.

Dave Stamp

**Covert Action Information Bulletin** No 31 is devoted to domestic surveillance in the US. Of particular interest to UK readers is a piece about the International Freedom Foundation (IFF) which is operating in Britain. The entire issue is up to CAIB's usual standards of documentation. (And no, they still haven't found Lobster worthy of a mention yet!) P0 Box 50272, Washington DC 20004, USA.

**Catalogues**

Although Tom Davis Books (PO Box 117, Aptos, California 95003) is the best single parapolitical mail order catalogue, M and A Book Dealer, (PO Box 2422, Waco, Texas 76703) has a very large, more specialised collection of material on American assassinations from Lincoln onwards. Kennedy assassination buffs in particular should have a look at their catalogue.

**Non print media**

*Spybase*, Daniel Brandt's computer data base on spooks and things parapolitical is now available in Britain, via the Shareware network, for the very low price of 15.00 for 6 disks (5.25 inch disks) from: Richard Alexander, CGH Services, Cwm Gwen Hall, Pencader, Dyfed, Cymru, SA39 9HA. (Telephone enquiries to Pencader 574.) (NB this offer only applies to UK readers. Non-UK readers should contact Daniel Brandt, Box 5369, Arlington VA 22205, USA.) *Spybase* includes an index of Lobster from issue 9 onwards (as well as practically everything else you could think of.)

*Archives on Radio* is the project of one Dave Emory. Parapolitics by radio? I have only heard one of the cassettes on which Emory, with a colleague, discusses a theme and reads extracts from newspaper articles. At first it seemed strange to be listening to people reading me newspaper articles. Then it dawned on me that most of the clippings they were reading would be immensely difficult to get hold of outside the USA. Audio quality is good. If this reminds you of the late Mae Brussell's radio programmes, be advised that while Emory is a fan of Brussell's, his tapes (on the basis of hearing just one) are more intelligible and less speculative than Brussell's were.

Mae Brussel died of cancer last year. Her archives are now in the hands of the Mae Brussell Research Centre (PO Box 8431, Santa Cruz, Ca 95061). I only heard odd fragments of her output (17 years of radio broadcasts) and it was variable in the extreme. Most of it was undigested junk, but every once in a while she would see something months - even years - ahead of anyone else. The Research Centre is going to produce newsletters, clippings etc.

**Help Wanted**

1. Peter Jordon was convicted some years ago of being part of a conspiracy, with members of INLA (if memory serves), to assassinate a British Army officer. Whether he was guilty or not (or what he thought he was doing) I have no idea. Upon his arrest the police confiscated all his research materials -- all from
public sources -- and won't return them. Jordan has been through the usual channels (NCCL, MP etc) without success. Being in prison doesn't make it any easier. Is there a Lobster reader, preferably with legal knowledge willing to help him try and get his materials back? It hardly needs stating that the power to confiscate research material is bad news for lots of us. Write to Lobster first.

2. Information is being sought on the following individuals, most journalists, many possibly connected to various state-sponsored media/newspaper enterprises of the 50s, 60s and 70s.
   - Ernest Ray Lewis
3. Andrew Marshall
4. Dennis Warner
5. Michael Derek Carr
6. Jennifer Hale
7. John Epstein
8. Ian Dunlop
9. James Partington
10. E.C. 'Jim' Brown
11. S.J.W. 'Jack' Coles
12. David Hay Neave (deceased)
13. Douglas Evans

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