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## **Irangate and Secret Arms-for-Hostage Deal**

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

RE: MAJOR MEDIA RELEASES STORY ON ORIGINS OF IRANGATE IN SECRET ARMS-FOR-HOSTAGE-DELAY DEAL BETWEEN IRAN AND THE 1980 REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

*THE NATION* (June 20, 1987 & July 4, 1987); *IN THESE TIMES* (June 24-July 7, 1987); *MIAMI HERALD* (April 12, 1987); *SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER* (April 12 & 25 (from *LONDON OBSERVER*) & July 15, 1987); *L.A. WEEKLY*, March 27-APRIL 2, 1987; HAVE JUST PUBLISHED ARTICLES DOCUMENTING THE SECRET DEAL BETWEEN IRAN AND THE 1980 REAGAN-BUSH PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN: A REAGAN PROMISE OF ARMS AFTER INAUGURATION FOR IRAN'S PROMISE TO DELAY RELEASE OF THE 52 AMERICAN HOSTAGES UNTIL AFTER THE NOV. 4, 1980 ELECTION - AND THEN FURTHER TO INAUGURATION DAY - TO ENSURE A CARTER DEFEAT.

By Barbara Honegger, White House Policy Analyst, 1981-82

Updated with input from former SAVAK Chief, Mansur Rafizadeh, June 1987

There is growing evidence from a number of major sources, cited below, that the 1980 Reagan-Bush Presidential Campaign actively interfered with Carter's attempts to free the 52 American hostages in Iran: by dealing with Khomeini's regime to delay release of the hostages until after the November 4th election in exchange for a promise of arms after inauguration, and by secretly aiding and abetting sabotage of the April 24, 1980 desert rescue attempt. That growing body of evidence, with all citations, follows.

On April 12, 1987, Knight-Ridder newspapers - including the *Miami Herald* and *San Jose Mercury News* - ran headline accounts of a secret meeting in early October 1980 between a claimed emissary of the Khomeini government and the chief foreign policy adviser of the Reagan-Bush Presidential Campaign, Richard V. Allen, at which a deal was discussed to hold the hostages until after the election ensuring Carter's defeat. Also at the meeting were Allen's aide, Laurence Silberman, and Robert McFarlane, then an aide to Senator John Tower of the Senate Armed Services Committee and later Reagan's third National Security Adviser and a key figure in Irangate. An earlier but less detailed report of this same meeting ran in the *Washington Post* on November 29, 1986 (Robert Woodward and Walter Pincus). The meeting took place in a Washington, D.C. hotel not long after the Reagan Campaign had learned, in late

September 1980, that President Carter was negotiating for a pre-election release of the 52 hostages (Peter Hannaford, *The Reagans: A Political Portrait*, p. 285). Allen wrote a memo summarising the meeting, which he now alleges he cannot find; and his answers to questions posed by the *Miami Herald* make it likely that Reagan and his Campaign Manager, William Casey, were briefed on the meeting after the fact.

Iran's President during the hostage crisis, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, has confirmed that two of Khomeini's closest advisers dealt with the Reagan Campaign: Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, then Interior Minister and now Speaker of Iran's Parliament, later intimately involved in Irangate; and Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, then a member of the ruling Iranian Revolutionary Council (*Miami Herald*, *San Jose Mercury News*, April 12, 1987). Bani-Sadr said that the deal discussed was to delay release of the 52 hostages until after Reagan became president - both to defeat Carter and to claim false credit for the hostage release to mark the beginning of a "Reagan era." Bani-Sadr said that following the November 4, 1980 election, top levels of Reagan's Transition team dealt with these same Iranian representatives to delay release of the hostages until inauguration day, 1981 (*San Jose Mercury News*, same cite).

There is also evidence that the 1980 Reagan campaign did not just respond to an offer from Khomeini's representatives, but initiated the deal with Iran to ensure Carter's defeat at the polls. Captain Gary Sick, Carter's Iran expert at the National Security Council throughout the hostage crisis, has publicly noted that the Carter White House was aware during the 1980 campaign that "one group attempted to initiate a swap of military parts for the 52 hostages through an individual close to one of the presidential candidates" (*All Fall Down*, by Gary Sick, Note, p. 422).

Though Allen, Silberman and McFarlane now allege that Reagan and Khomeini did not cut a deal to effectively fix the 1980 election, considerable evidence - some of it from Richard V. Allen himself - supports quite the opposite conclusion, opening the possibility that the Reagan government is illegitimate.

Reagan's chief campaign adviser on foreign policy in 1980, Richard V. Allen, commented on a major national television news program about "the deal" between Reagan and Khomeini. On November 7, 1986, only a few days after news of Irangate broke, Allen recalled on the MacNeil-Lehrer Hour that on the day after Reagan's first inauguration - on January 21, 1981 - Allen, who then had just become National Security Adviser, informed Reagan that the wife of a former classmate of Allen's, Mrs. Cynthia Dwyer, was still being held in Iran - the "53rd hostage". Mrs. Dwyer, who had been taken captive in May of 1980, was not among the 52 hostages who had then just been released. Allen told the MacNeil-Lehrer audience that Reagan responded, "Get the word out that the deal is off" unless she's also released (see attached transcript).

It is vital to recognise that this "deal" Reagan referred to in his response to Richard Allen on January 21, 1981 could only have been an agreement between himself and Khomeini, not between Carter and Khomeini. By the time Reagan made this remark to Allen, all aspects of President Carter's deal with Khomeini had already been consummated: The 52 American hostages had left Iranian soil and billions of dollars in Iranian funds had already been unfrozen and electronically deposited in an account in Iran (*All Fall Down*, by Gary Sick). Reagan therefore must have been referring to a separate deal between himself and Khomeini, his own deal - in all likelihood the completion of an agreement originally discussed at the secret October 1980 meeting between his top foreign policy adviser, Richard V. Allen, and the Iranian emissary.

There is additional evidence from inside the Reagan Campaign that Richard Allen was in fact involved in negotiating a pre-election deal with the Khomeini regime to delay release of the hostages until after the election. According to a Reagan Campaign aide on the Research Staff for the candidate's plane whose duties required her to be in the campaign national headquarter's "Operations Center" communications centre in Arlington, Virginia, on or around October 24-25, 1980, at approximately 11:05 p.m. a jubilant staffer said, "We don't have to worry about an October Surprise (the Reagan Campaign's code name for a pre-election release of the hostages). Dick cut a deal." The staffer insists that "Dick" could only have referred to Richard V. Allen ("Larry King Live," Dec. 4, 1986, phone-in call from 1980 Reagan Campaign aide Barbara Honegger.) In response to a question from King, King's live guest the night of the Honegger call-in, Carter's former White House Chief of Staff, Hamilton Jordan, said, "I have no information that would contradict what she has just said."

If Reagan and/or Richard Allen contacted Iran on January 21, 1981, as Allen implied in the MacNeil-Lehrer interview cited above, threatening to break off "the deal" with Iran unless Cynthia Dwyer was released, a record of that phone call, or other communication, may still exist. After Irangate broke, Larry Speakes, then White House spokesman, revealed at a press briefing that some presidentially-initiated phone calls to foreign heads of state are recorded using a "patching system" onto an audio tape machine in the White House basement Situation Room. On November 28, 1986 Speakes said the White House would make any such taped records available to official investigators (*San Francisco Chronicle*). As of April 13, 1987, the *Washington Post* reported that both the House and Senate Committees investigating Irangate and Special Investigator Lawrence Walsh have requested new documents and evidence dating back to the beginning of Reagan's first presidential term - that is, to the very day that Richard Allen has reported Reagan told him to "get the word out that the deal's off" unless hostage Cynthia Dwyer was also freed, and when a tape recording of a call to Iran may have been made. According to a memo by White House Counsel Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., a new White House records search in response to the Congressional and Walsh requests, to determine the true origins of Reagan's arms-and-hostages dealings with Iran, includes a search for all relevant audio tape recordings (*Washington Post*, 4/13/87).

If Reagan's side of a pre-election deal with Khomeini was to explicitly or tacitly authorise secret Israeli and/or "private" arms shipments to Iran once in the presidency, and if he ordered that Iran be informed the day after his inauguration that the deal was off unless Mrs. Dwyer was released, as Allen told MacNeil-Lehrer, it should be expected that clandestine arms shipments did flow to Iran, but not until Mrs. Dwyer was released. In fact, this appears to be the case. Mrs. Dwyer was not released until February 9, 1981 - after Secretary of State Alexander Haig said that the outcome of her case would affect U.S. policy toward Iran (*In These Times*, June 24-July 7, 1987, p. 13) - and Israel began secret shipments of U.S. arms and spare parts to Iran, approved by Haig, immediately after, in mid-February/March 1981 (*San Jose Mercury News*, 4/12/87, p.21; *Miami Herald*, 4/12/87; *Los Angeles Times*, 1/25/87). Future investigations should determine the exact relative dates of Mrs. Dwyer's release in Iran and the first U.S.-approved Israeli shipments of weapons and spare parts to that country.

Once Mrs. Dwyer was released, Administration-approved arms shipments started flowing to Iran from Israel and continued for approximately 10 months - plausibly as Reagan's part of a pre-election deal with Khomeini. In January 1981, Reagan's first

Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, met with Israeli Defence Minister Ariel Sharon to discuss the upcoming arms shipments to Iran (*Newsweek*, 12/8/86). According to a close Haig associate, permission for the shipments came through Robert McFarlane, then counsellor to Haig at the Department of State - the very man who had arranged the secret October 1980 meeting between Reagan's foreign policy chief Allen and the Iranian emissary to discuss the deal that the shipments would fulfil (*Washington Post*, 11/29/86). On February 20, 1981, Haig was briefed on the proposed Israeli sales of U.S.-made arms to Iran for his meeting with then Israeli Foreign Minister, Yitshak Shamir. According to the written minutes of the meeting, Haig gave approval for the shipments (*Newsweek*, 12/8/86; *Wall Street Journal*, 12/12/86, p.54), after having said publicly that the resolution of Mrs. Dwyer's case would affect U.S. policy toward Iran. According to the *Washington Times* (December 16, 1986, p. 10 A), Michael Ledeen, then State Department consultant to Haig and McFarlane, and Howard Teicher, chief of politico military affairs for the National Security Council, also supported the approval of the Israeli shipments of U.S. arms to Iran that then began in February of 1981. Both men were also later centrally involved in Irangate.

At the end of the first ten months of American arms shipments, Israeli Defence Minister Ariel Sharon travelled to Washington to ask Secretary of Defense Weinberger for a continuation, who reportedly said no. Sharon then went to Haig who had McFarlane handle the matter. McFarlane spoke with Israeli official Kimche and shortly another \$10-\$15 million in military spare parts and fighter plane tyres moved from Israel to Iran (*Wall Street Journal*, December 12, 1986; *Washington Post*, November 29, 1986).

There can be no question that the Reagan Administration knew what it was approving in those first ten months of his first term. In a May 1982 interview with the *Washington Post*, Israeli Defence Minister Ariel Sharon said that Israel had informed the Administration in advance of each of its 1981 arms shipments to Iran and that the U.S. did not object: "We gave them (the Reagan Administration) the lists. They knew exactly (what was being sent)," Sharon told the Post.

In the first ten months of the Reagan presidency, a second series of U.S.-made arms shipments to Iran occurred simultaneously or near-simultaneously with the Administration-approved Israeli shipments, organised by Iranian exile Cyrus Hashemi. According to the *Los Angeles Times* (June 12/13, 1987), Hashemi claimed that the 1981-to-early-1982 arms sales "were part of an effort necessary to get the (original 52) hostages released." Claiming to be a cousin of Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Rafsanjani (though this alleged blood relationship is questioned by former SAVAK chief Mansur Rafizadeh) who (Rafsanjani) had been involved in reported pre-election and pre-inauguration dealings with the Reagan Campaign, Hashemi offered to open back channels to obtain release of the 52 hostages in 1980, and in 1981 oversaw the second series of U.S. arms shipments to Iran in the first ten months of Reagan's presidency (*Washington Times*, 12/17/86; *San Francisco Chronicle*, 1/6/87, from the *Washington Post Wire*). The Administration knew of and made no effort to stop the shipments (*Washington Times*, 12/17/86). Because of their timing, the Hashemi shipments may have been part of a Reagan Campaign quid-pro-quo for Iran's delaying release of the 52 hostages, ensuring Carter's defeat. According to the *Los Angeles Times* cited above, a U.S. government informant who worked closely with Hashemi said that U.S. Customs officials informed him that Hashemi was murdered by government agents to prevent him from talking about the link.

A September 16, 1986 affidavit by Paul R. Grand, attorney for former Khashoggi counsel Samuel Evans in a New York arms sales conspiracy case related to Irangate, contends that the 1981 Hashemi shipments had been secretly approved by the Carter Administration (*Washington Times*, 12/17/87). This, however, is extremely unlikely. First, ex-President Carter has denied categorically authorising or sending any arms to Iran during his term in office (*ABC News*, Feb. 11, 1987). Second, though Carter's National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, has stated in his memoirs that Carter did secretly offer Iran weapons for the freedom of the 52 hostages, Brzezinski also notes that the attempt failed because the Israelis were already selling arms and F-4 tyres to Iran, effectively sabotaging the effort (*Time*, July 25, 1983, p. 27). Those Israeli arms shipments to Iran had in fact begun after the May 9, 1979 execution of the leader of the Jewish community in Tehran, Habib Elkhanian (*Los Angeles Times*, Nov. 22, 1986), and were discovered by U.S. intelligence and reported to Carter in the spring of 1980, (Jody Powell, syndicated column, *Houston Post*, Jan. 14, 1987; *San Francisco Examiner*, January 16, 1987). Carter's attempt to bargain arms for hostages with Iran in October 1980 therefore failed because competing Israeli shipments were still ongoing. In October 1980, as he was attempting to bargain with Iran, the CIA detected the latest Israeli shipment of arms from the port of Eilat, which caused Carter to "go off the wall". (*LA Times*, 11/22/86 and *All Fall Down*, by Gary Sick). Secretary of State Muskie complained about the sales - of spare tyres, wheel and brake assemblies for Iran's American-made F-4 Phantom fighter jets - to Prime Minister Begin. Begin at first denied the shipments, but, when given an ultimatum by Carter to cease and desist, acknowledged the tyre deliveries and promised that they would be stopped. Though the F-4 part deliveries were stopped, U.S. intelligence sources told *Time* magazine that Israel continued to sell tank parts and ammunition to Iran through the election in direct contravention of Carter's ban, thereby scotching his attempt to deal with Iran directly (*Time*, July 25, 1983, p.27). It wasn't until immediately after the election that a top official of the key Israeli lobby, the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, Morris Amitay, approached Reagan's foreign policy adviser Richard Allen about resuming sales of the F-4 wheel and brake assemblies stopped by President Carter (*San Francisco Chronicle*, 11/29/86, from the *Washington Post Wire*).

For all of the above reasons, it is unlikely that Paul Grand's affidavit in the above-mentioned New York criminal case related to Irangate, is accurate - i.e. that Carter secretly initiated Cyrus Hashemi's arms shipments to Iran, which continued some 10 months into the Reagan presidency. It is far more likely that the Hashemi shipments were initiated by the CIA, plausibly in conjunction with the secret "intelligence operation" inside the Reagan Campaign (see below).

Later, in 1985, Cyrus Hashemi was also intimately involved in laying the foundation for Reagan's Irangate deals. In June 1985 he met with Iranian go-between Manucher Ghorbanifar, Saudi businessman Adnan Khashoggi, and Casey associate Roy Furmark in Hamburg, West Germany at the very beginning of discussions on the Irangate deals, and the next month, July 1985, met with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Khashoggi when they first discussed the same deals (*San Francisco Chronicle*, 1/6/87, from *Washington Post Wire*). Shortly before his death in July 1986 - which many believe to have been murder (*Executive Intelligence Review*, August 1, 1986, p. 47; *Los Angeles Times*, June 12/13, 1987) - Hashemi also offered to help the government gain release of the American hostages in Lebanon, and was allegedly working with the Administration on a sting operation which resulted in the above-mentioned New York arms conspiracy case when he suddenly died (*Washington Times*, 12/17/86).

If Reagan, Richard Allen and William Casey did cut a secret deal with Iran in October 1980 to delay release of the 52 hostages until after the election in exchange for authorising U.S. arms shipments to Iran after inauguration, one would expect the Iranians to have dropped their initial demands for arms to the Carter Administration. That is, if a future Reagan Administration had bound itself to authorise weapons shipments, Iran could afford to drop that part of its demands to Carter and focus on unfreezing its financial assets. In fact, this is precisely what happened. Early in the negotiations between the Carter Administration and Iran, Iran insisted on receiving the \$300 million worth of weapons and military spare parts that it had purchased under the Shah and was still owed by the United States.

On October 10, 1980, Carter received a demand from Iran, through Germany, for an inventory of all the military goods the Shah had already paid for; and on October 11, 1980, Carter's Iran crisis core group drafted a message for his approval offering Iran a package of aircraft and spare parts that could be made available upon the safe release of the 52 hostages (*All Fall Down*, by Gary Sick, p. 369-370). After that date - and probably just after the Washington, D.C. meeting between Reagan's campaign representatives and Iran's emissary - Iran suddenly and inexplicably changed its tune 180 degrees, leaving all discussion of military shipments completely out of its demands (*All Fall Down*, above cite). By October 22, 1980, Iran's Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Rajai explicitly excluded shipments of military equipment and spare parts from playing any role in the negotiations with Carter for release of the hostages (*All Fall Down*, by Gary Sick, pp. 371-372).

Similarly, if the Reagan Campaign cut a deal with Iran to hold the 52 hostages until after the 1980 election, one would expect there to have been a significant change in the date Iran was prepared to release the hostages. In fact, there was such a major change. On Sept. 9, 1980, when Rafsanjani, Khomeini's son Ahmed, and Ahmed's son-in-law Sadeh Tabatabai first met to outline Iran's demands to free the hostages, their release was planned by -that is, on or before - election day, November 4, 1980 (*All Fall Down*, by Gary Sick, p. 364). To do so, however, would have given Carter his "October Surprise", which the Reagan Campaign feared as certain defeat. Within a month, Reagan's top aides were meeting in Washington with an Iranian emissary to discuss delaying release of the hostages until after the election.

It is probably no coincidence that the very men involved in and knowledgeable about the secret October 1980 discussions between the Iranian emissary and the Reagan Campaign moved into precisely those positions in the new Reagan government from which to authorise U.S. arms sales implementing the deal. Richard V. Allen, the principal participant in the original October 1980 meeting with the Iranian emissary, became Reagan's first National Security Advisor. Robert McFarlane, also a participant in the October 1980 meeting, became Counsellor to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, from which post he encouraged Haig to approve Israel's shipments of U.S.-made arms to Iran in the first 10 months of the Reagan presidency. From his post as the new Director of the CIA, Reagan's former Campaign Manager, William Casey, made no effort to halt Cyrus Hashemi's U.S.-made arms sales to Iran in the first 10 months of the Reagan presidency (*Washington Times*, 12/17/86). Michael Ledeen, later involved in initiating the Irangate deals, became Special Adviser at the Department of State reporting to McFarlane, from which post he too encouraged Haig's approval of the Israeli shipments. When Ledeen was asked by Barbara Walters on ABC's "Nightline" (12/18/86) whether he was present at the "original 1985 meeting" on the Irangate deals, he cryptically answered that "There is some question as to how early the 'first

meetings' were". Richard Secord became Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Near East and South Asia, the chief Middle East arms sales adviser to Secretary of Defense Weinberger, from which post he was positioned to authorise the Israeli arms shipments out of the Pentagon. Secord had also headed planning for the sabotaged (see below) Desert One/Eagleclaw hostage rescue attempt in April 1980 (Secord's testimony in the Irangate hearings; *San Jose Mercury News*) playing directly to Reagan's benefit in the campaign for the presidency. Oliver North, who had worked with Secord and the CIA in Laos, worked with him again on the Saudi AWACS vote and was quickly moved to the National Security Council in August 1981 after only a year at the Naval War College (*Wall Street Journal*, 12/12/86, p.54; *Chicago Tribune*, 3/15/87). From this post at the NSC, North discovered the possibly-planted \$1,000 in Richard V. Allen's safe resulting in Allen's forced early exit as NSC Adviser and then inherited Allen's safe (*Time*, 1/5/87, p.45). As a result of North's "find", William Clark, inexperienced in foreign affairs, moved into Allen's position as NSC Adviser, quickly bringing McFarlane and Donald Fortier from the Department of State to work hand-in-glove with North. As Senate Committee aides, McFarlane and Fortier had worked closely together when McFarlane arranged the original October 1980 meeting between Richard Allen and the Iranian emissary.

Richard Allen, Laurence Silberman and Robert McFarlane allege to have no recollection of the identity of the Iranian emissary with whom they met in October 1980 to discuss a deal to release the 52 hostages on Reagan's terms and timing. This is not believable. It is more likely that they are unwilling to reveal his identity because to do so would make the link to Reagan's later Irangate deals all too clear. From information now available, three likely candidates emerge for the Iranian who met with Reagan campaign aide Richard V. Allen and McFarlane in October 1980:

- a. Cyrus Hashemi Hashemi, at the time, 1980, fitted the description given by the *Washington Post* (11/29/86) of the go-between who met with Richard Allen and McFarlane in October 1980: "a high-level Iranian exile". He was a former banker (President of the now-defunct First Gulf Bank and Trust); a claimed cousin of Iranian leader Rafsanjani (*Los Angeles Times*, 12/28/86; this alleged blood relationship is questioned, however, by former SAVAK chief, Mansur Rafizadeh, personal communication); with ties to the CIA (*Washington Times*, 12/17/86); to Israeli Irangate dealer David Kimche and Ariel Sharon (Israeli publication *DAVAR*, Nov. 24, 1986); to Israeli intelligence (*DAVAR*, 11/24/86) and partner with Irangate money man, Adnan Khashoggi in the World Trade Group (*Los Angeles Times*, Dec. 28, 1986, "The Iran Deception"). As Hashemi offered to set up back channels to Iran in 1980 (*Washington Times*, 12/17/86), claimed to have done so and sold U.S. arms to Iran in 1981 and 1982 as part of a deal to obtain release of the 52 hostages (*Los Angeles Times Wire*, in *San Jose Mercury News*, June 13, 1987, p.21A), and was close to Israelis Kimche and Sharon who arranged for Haig's authorisation of Israel's arms shipments to Iran in February 1981 following Mrs. Dwyer's release, Hashemi is the prime candidate for the Iranian who met with Allen and McFarlane in October 1980 - which may explain his reported murder by government agents to prevent him from talking (above cite, *San Jose Mercury News*). Before his death in London on July 21, 1986, Hashemi was in contact with Oliver North's Irangate network (Jack Anderson column, Jan. 26, 1987; *San Francisco Chronicle*, Jan. 6, 1987, from the *Washington Post Wire*). As noted earlier, the Reagan Administration knew of Hashemi's shipments of U.S.-made arms to Iran in the first 10 months of Reagan's first term, and did nothing to stop them. Only years later, in July

1984, was Hashemi indicted by the Reagan Justice Department for the 1981 shipments, but the CIA intervened, and Hashemi's attorney, Elliot Richardson, argues that, had he lived and had the charges against him not subsequently been dropped, Hashemi's defence would have been that the 1981 shipments were authorised by the CIA - i.e. by William Casey, Reagan's 1980 Campaign Manager (*Washington Times*, 12/17/86).

- b. Manucher Gorbani A second likely candidate for the man who met with McFarlane and Richard Allen in early October 1980 to offer the Reagan Campaign a deal to release the 52 hostages after the election is Manucher Gorbani, who later figured prominently in the Irangate deals as go-between inside Iran. We know that Gorbani was likely in contact with the Reagan Campaign and/or Reagan post-election Transition Team before Reagan's January 20, 1981 inauguration because a key piece of disinformation for which Gorbani has been identified as the primary source - that Gadhafi was planning to assassinate Reagan in 1981 - was the key topic at Reagan's first National Security Council meeting on his first full day in office - January 21, 1981 (*San Jose Mercury News*, Seymour Hersh), the same day Reagan told Richard V. Allen, his new NSC Adviser, to tell Iran that "the deal is off" unless Mrs Dwyer was released. The second major topic at that first NSC meeting was Iran (*Washington Post*, 2/20/87).

In late 1980, according to ex-SAVAK Chief and CIA double agent Mansur Rafizadeh, retired CIA agent George Cave, then once again under CIA contract, asked Rafizadeh if Gorbani could help to gain the release of the 52 hostages through "back channels" (*Time*, Feb. 2, 1987, p. 22). Cave was later involved in the May 1986 trip with McFarlane to Iran arranged on the Iranian end by Gorbani.

- c. Albert Hakim A third likely candidate for the man who met secretly in October 1980 with Reagan Campaign aides and McFarlane is Richard Secord's business partner, Albert Hakim. At the time of that meeting, Hakim was an Iranian citizen living outside his country and so fitted the *Washington Post's* description (11/29/86) of the emissary as a "high-level Iranian exile." Hakim did not become a naturalised American citizen until 1983 (*San Jose Mercury News*, Jan. 31, 1987; other reports, however, say Hakim became a naturalised citizen in 1984).

## **The October Surprise Group and the Iran Deal**

"October Surprise" was the code-name the top levels of the 1980 Reagan Campaign gave to the dreaded possibility that Carter might bring the 52 hostages home before the election, and win due to a last-minute gratitude vote. As early as March 1980, Richard Wirthlin, Reagan's pollster, had determined that an absolute condition of a Reagan victory was that an "October Surprise" not happen (*Hidden Power*, by Roland Perry, pp. 123 and 124). Using the Campaign's sophisticated computerised polling forecasting system called PINS, he had calculated that Carter would pick up 5-6 extra percentage points if he brought the hostages home at any time before the election, and a whopping 10 percentage points - for a dreaded sure victory - if he could bring them home during a crucial window of opportunity that opened between October 18 and October 25, 1980 (*Hidden Power*, by Roland Perry, p.144). In response to this finding, in August 1980 Wirthlin ordered his assistant, Richard Beal, to work up a counter

strategy to an "October Surprise" (*Hidden Power*, by Roland Perry, p.124), and, by the time of the October 1980 meeting between Richard Allen and the Iranian emissary about a deal to delay release of the hostages, Richard Allen had been appointed to head Reagan's crucial, 10-man "October Surprise Group" (*San Jose Mercury News*, 4/12/87, p. 21A; *Albosta Committee Report* on the Carter Debate Briefing book investigation, Vol. I, pp. 47-48; and *New York Times*, Oct. 7, 1980).

Though it may seem unlikely in retrospect in light of the 1980 Reagan landslide, in October 1980 the Reagan Campaign appeared to be in jeopardy. The candidates had been in a dead heat since Labor Day. Carter had assaulted Reagan on "war and peace" issues and a serious Reagan gaffe on pollution had focused press attention on his intellectual qualifications for the presidency. Because Wirthlin had determined that a clear win in a debate, which Reagan could also lose, would give Reagan at most only a 1 to 2 percentage point boost, and because Reagan at the time was only predicted at 6-7 percentage points ahead of Carter projected for election day, when Reagan Campaign leaders met on October 16 and 17 to decide whether or not to debate Carter, it had to be clear to all concerned that if Carter could return the hostages, Reagan should not debate (*Hidden Power*, by Roland Perry, p. 144). Yet the decision made at that meeting was to debate. The clear deduction is that the leadership of the Reagan Campaign, at least as early as the October 16/17 decision to debate, was acting with confidence that the hostage release would be delayed until after the election. At this point, Richard Allen, leader of the "October Surprise" Group, and Robert McFarlane had met with the Iranian emissary to discuss precisely such an arrangement.

Further confirmation that the inner circle of the Reagan Campaign had certain knowledge - probably from its own dealing - that Iran was not going to release the hostages until after the election comes from William Casey's comments at the Thursday, October 30, 1980 morning meeting of the "October Surprise" group. With Casey (Reagan's Campaign Manager), Ed Meese, campaign "intelligence operation" acting head Admiral Robert Garrick, Pete Daily (Reagan's ad man), and Richard Wirthlin (Reagan's pollster) in attendance, Wirthlin reported that the just-completed October 28 debate had brought Reagan up only 2 percentage points in the polls projected for election day, for a total projected 7-point lead, but that because an "October Surprise" could still bring Carter 5-6 percentage points, Reagan might lose the election. At this point in the conversation, Campaign Manager William Casey dispelled any concern on account of an October Surprise: "Well, (if Carter wins) it won't be because of the hostages (release)!" (*Hidden Power*, by Roland Perry, p.153). It is vital to realise that Casey could not have said and meant what he said given Wirthlin's projections, which every participant in that meeting placed ultimate confidence in from experience, unless he had certain knowledge that Iran could not or would not release the hostages until after the election - precisely the claimed offer the Iranian emissary had made to Richard Allen, head of the "October Surprise" Group.

Though it would not have ensured a debate victory, the decision by the Reagan Campaign to debate would have been positively affected if its leadership knew at the October 16/17 meetings what Carter was going to say in the debate. In fact, Carter's 100-page debate briefing book had been obtained from a Carter White House mole and brought into the Reagan Campaign by one of a tight group of ex-CIA agents working for Reagan-Bush, several of whom had come with debate team director Jim Baker from the Bush side of the campaign and were working with Casey's "Intelligence Operation" (*Hidden Power*, by Roland Perry, p.144). It is therefore likely that Carter's debate briefing book was an unexpected windfall of the "October

Surprise" intelligence operation, whose primary purpose was to obtain information from inside the Carter White House about the President's hostage rescue and negotiation plans.

## **The Reagan Campaign's "Intelligence Operation" and Sabotage of the Desert One Rescue Attempt**

It is well known that Ronald Reagan owes his election victory in 1980 to public revulsion at Carter's perceived weakness in the continuing Iranian hostage crisis. This sense of weakness stemmed from three major sources: Carter's lack of success in the negotiations to bring the hostages home, his loss of the October debate, and the failure of his April 1980 attempt to rescue the hostages. To this point, we have reviewed evidence that the Reagan Campaign actually created the grounds for Carter's failures and perceived weaknesses in the first two instances: in all likelihood cutting a treasonous secret deal with Khomeini agents to delay the hostage's release until after the election, and using stolen debate briefing books to gain an illegal and unfair advantage over Carter in the October debate.

We must now ask whether the Reagan Campaign might have gone so far as to actively participate in sabotaging Carter's attempt to rescue the hostages. Considerable information points in that direction, in particular a number of links between Reagan Campaign Manager William Casey's "intelligence operation" and the secret group of covert military and intelligence operatives involved in planning and executing the "failed" rescue attempt. Details of those links follow. But first, some necessary background.

### A. The EagleClaw/Desert One Rescue-Intelligence Operation: Secret CIA Links

During the 1979-80 hostage crisis, the U.S. Army set up a special "Intelligence Support Activity" unit in Iran that was so secret many of Carter's top CIA officials did not know of its existence (*Rebel*, Jan. 1984). The key mission of the new, top-secret "Intelligence Support Activity" (ISA) team was Operation Eagleclaw - the classified code name for the failed, and probably sabotaged, attempt by President Carter to rescue the 52 American hostages beginning with a three-helicopter landing in the desert some 200 miles outside of Tehran in April 1980. The more public name for the Operation was "Desert One". Eagleclaw's Air Force component was from the Air Force Office of Special Plans, which carries out its secret activities under joint control with the CIA (*San Jose Mercury News*, Dec. 12, 1986, p. 23A).

### B. The Reagan Campaign's "Intelligence Operation": Secret CIA Links

Reagan Campaign Manager William Casey first used the term "intelligence operation" to describe the Campaign's organised efforts to thwart a Carter hostage surprise at a breakfast meeting with Ed Meese and reporters on the second day of the Republican National Convention in Detroit (*Washington Star*, July 15, 1980). That "intelligence operation" consisted of a network of active and retired intelligence and military officers (*Hidden Power*, by Roland Perry; Albosta Committee Reports on the Carter Debate Briefing Book Investigations, Vol. 1, p. 52), including some active CIA men, a number of ex-CIA operatives who had been laid off or fired by Carter's CIA chief, Stansfield Turner (*The Rebel*, January 1984, "A Question of Treason") and associates of

Casey's from his days in the World War II O.S.S., predecessor of the CIA. The ex-CIA men working with Casey in the campaign were known as the "CIA Cowboys" - "the ones who run around and do things" (*Rebel*, Jan. 1984). (Casey's law firm, Rogers and Wells, which represented the Shah's family fund, The Pahlevi Foundation, was also riddled with ex-CIA agents who had served with him in the O.S.S. and who were available to assist the campaign (*The Rebel*, Jan. 1984).

The operative head of the campaign's intelligence network, Admiral Robert Garrick, reported to Ed Meese; Meese reported to Casey. Casey ordered Garrick to "use all the military contacts you have" and all the CIA men who had come to the campaign from the Bush side (*Hidden Power*, by Roland Perry, p. 131; *All Fall Down*, by Gary Sick, p. 371; and *New York Times*, 7/7/83). Garrick's operation had as its primary goal to gain advance intelligence on, and influence, any attempt by Carter to release the hostages before the November 4th election. On October 24, 1980, Meese ordered Garrick full-time on special assignment for the "October Surprise" operation (*Albosta Committee Reports*, Vol. I, p. 50).

Acting as head of the intelligence operation, reporting to Garrick, was Stephan Halper, son-in-law of former CIA Deputy Director Ray Cline, who (Cline) was also a close Reagan Campaign adviser (*Rebel*, January 1984). Through Cline, Halper had far-reaching access to both active and inactive CIA sources and covert operators, among them Robert Gambino, former CIA Director of Security (*Albosta Committee Reports*, Vol. I, p. 49; *New York Times*, 7/7/83). Gambino was one of four rotating officers in charge of the Reagan Campaign national headquarter's nerve centre, the "Operations Center." The other three were Davis Robinson, Michel Smith and Montcrief Spears - all from the Bush side of the Campaign (*Albosta Committee Reports*, Vol. I, p. 36).

### C. Links Between The Two Operations

The question naturally arises, was the Casey-Garrick-Halper-headed Reagan Campaign intelligence operation, which included active as well as former CIA operatives, in communication with, in cooperation with, or even secretly giving directives to whomever staged the "mechanical failures" that caused the Operation Eagleclaw/Desert One rescue attempt to fail? Considerable evidence supports the conclusion that it was:

- a. Though many of Carter's top CIA officers did not have advance knowledge of Eagleclaw, Reagan's Campaign Manager and mastermind of his intelligence operation, William Casey, did. He was in communication with Air Force General Richard Secord, who headed the secret planning team for the rescue Operation (Secord's testimony to the Irangate hearings; and Daniel Freed, "A Question of Treason", *The Rebel*, Jan. 1984).
- b. Both the Eagleclaw Operation and the Reagan Campaign's intelligence operation included active CIA operatives; and the CIA's Iran Desk was rabidly pro-Reagan and anti-Carter at the time of the 1979-80 hostage crisis and U.S. presidential campaign (*Witness*, by former SAVAK Chief Mansur Rafizadeh, p. 346). Eagleclaw's Air Force component

came from the Air Force Office of Special Plans, which operates in cooperation with the CIA (*San Jose Mercury News*, Dec. 12, 1986, p.23A). A staffer on the Senate Intelligence Committee, Angelo Coderilla, told the Albosta Committee investigating the Carter Debate briefing book matter that he had been told that Reagan Campaign agents included active-duty CIA operatives. Reagan's "October Surprise" team head, Richard Allen, kept a campaign phone log which included references to Coderilla's intelligence about the hostage situation (*Albosta Committee Reports*, Vol. I, p. 52). It is therefore likely that Coderilla's source for his information about Reagan's active-duty CIA-agent moles was Richard Allen himself, who later met with the Iranian emissary about a hostage-delay deal (*Miami Herald*, 4/12/87). Mrs. Cynthia Dwyer, the "53rd hostage", told Rev. Charles Moore just after the failed rescue attempt in Iran that the CIA had intentionally made the operation fail (Rev. Moore, personal communication).

- c. Five years after Eagleclaw, four of the then-retired military officers who helped plan it were back working with then-CIA Director Casey overseeing Reagan's Iran and Contra arms operations: Ret. Air Force Major General Richard Secord, Ret. Air Force Lt. Col. Richard B. Gadd, Ret. Air Force Col. Robert C. Dutton, and Army Special Forces Master Sgt. John C. Cupp (*San Jose Mercury News*, 12/12/86, p. 23A). At the time of Eagleclaw, Gadd and Dutton worked with the Air Force's Office of Special Plans, which carries out operations under joint secret control with the CIA (*San Jose Mercury News*, above cite). Cupp was the non-commissioned officer in charge of selection and training of Intelligence Support Activity personnel for Eagleclaw, and now works with Gadd's private company, American National Management Corporation in Vienna, Virginia. When Hasenfus's plane, "Fat Lady", crashed in Nicaragua in October 1986, a radio code manual with the name "Dick G." was found aboard the plane together with documents linking it to Oliver North and the White House - "Dick G." standing for Richard Gadd (all references from *San Jose Mercury News*, above cite). All three men will testify before the House and Senate Select Committees investigating Irangate, and should be asked about these links.
- d. Prior to the April 1980 rescue attempt, the acting director of the Reagan Campaign's intelligence operation, Robert Garrick, was in close contact with John Coale, a Washington, D.C. attorney who represented the 13 hostages released early from the American Embassy in Tehran (*Albosta Report*, Vol. I, p. 54).
- e. On Sunday, April 20, 1980, two days after Carter's decision to go ahead with the rescue attempt and only 96 hours before the April 25th mission, a close O.S.S. associate of William Casey's, Miles Copeland, published an article in the *Washington Star* outlining nearly every major aspect and some details of a "hypothetical" Eagleclaw operation, including the location of rescue planes in Oman and the likely location of waiting ships and the desert helicopter landing site. In the article, Copeland states that he had participated with the "Kings of Covert

Action" from his O.S.S. (predecessor to the CIA) days - a thinly veiled reference to O.S.S. top operative William Casey - in planning an attempt to rescue the 52 hostages (*Rebel*, Jan. 1984, "A Question of Treason"). Copeland thereby implied that the failed Eagleclaw/Desert One rescue attempt was the result of secret collaboration between Secord and his operatives and Casey's "October Surprise" intelligence operation which included active-duty, Reagan-loyalist CIA operatives.

- f. Copeland's article is by no means the only major instance of the Reagan Campaign's link to press reports designed to sabotage Carter's attempts to bring the hostages home. On October 15, 1980, WLS TV station in Chicago, an ABC affiliate, ran a story that Carter was discussing a deal to send military spare parts to Iran in exchange for release of the hostages. During the Albosta Subcommittee investigations on the Carter debate briefing book matter, a witness testified that the source of that report was a top active officer in U.S. intelligence linked to the Reagan-Bush Campaign who wanted it publicised to sabotage consummation of a possible deal by which the hostages might be released before the election. "The suggestion (from the witness) was that publicising the secret hostage negotiations would have delayed a pre-election release of the U.S. hostages in Iran, to the benefit of the Reagan-Bush Campaign." (*Albosta Committee Reports*, Vol. 1, p. 57). The WLS reporter, Larry Moore, refused to disclose his source's identity to the Albosta Committee, but might be convinced to testify in the Irangate hearings. It is probably no coincidence that on the same day, October 15, 1980, the Reagan campaign's foreign policy adviser, Richard V. Allen, wrote a memo referring to his "ABC-xyz" source (*Albosta Committee Reports*, Vol. I, pp. 51 and 52). WLS TV is an ABC affiliate station.
- g. Robert McFarlane, instigator of the October 1980 meeting between Reagan Campaign "October Surprise Group" leader Richard Allen and the Iranian emissary, was appointed to head the whitewash investigation of the "failures" of the Eagleclaw rescue attempt. At the time, McFarlane was Senator John Tower's man on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee. He held the post from 1979 to 1981. In the investigation, McFarlane covered up collaboration by the inner circle of the CIA with the Khomeini regime, and, in all likelihood, with the inner circle of the Reagan Campaign's intelligence operation as well.

## **The Rescue Attempt Was Sabotaged and Iran Was Given Advance Knowledge**

There is no question that the Desert One rescue attempt was sabotaged and that Iran had advance warning because of Copeland's article. It was repeatedly broadcast by Iran Radio up until the day of the April 25th rescue attempt. Commander of the Eagleclaw operation, Charles Beckwith, noted that there was a sudden and suspicious increase in desert traffic the night of the attempt, and later told *Newsweek* that a number of the CIA's agents stationed in Tehran pulled out early, as if they had known in advance that the rescue mission would "fail." Iran's police and military had also been pre-alerted, and were waiting to kill all American hostages, agents and diplomats had the operation gone forward (*Rebel*, Jan. 1984).

The Rev. Charles Moore, then of Houston, Texas, was in Tehran at a prayer meeting during the Eagleclaw rescue attempt. He reports (personal communication) that when the three helicopters crashed in the desert outside Tehran, sirens immediately went off and the mullah leading the prayer session announced, "Your plane has crashed in the desert." Moore visited the crash site, the next day on April 26, 1980, with his guide, Josann.

Mrs. Cynthia Dwyer, the "53rd hostage" for whom Richard Allen got Reagan to call Iran on inauguration day to threaten that "the deal's off" unless she also was released, spoke with Rev. Moore in Tehran just after the failed rescue attempt and told him that she knew the attempt had been sabotaged by the CIA. "You don't think the helicopter crash was legitimate, do you?", Moore reports Mrs. Dwyer as saying. "The U.S. engineers made it fail." (Moore, personal communication). Shortly after the aborted rescue attempt, Mrs. Dwyer was arrested, charged with espionage and jailed in Iran, not to be released until February 9, 1981, shortly before Israel began shipping Reagan-Administration-approved arms to Iran, in February 1981 - probably as a quid pro quo for Khomeini's delaying release of the 52 hostages until after the election. In his recent book, *Witness*, former Chief of the Shah's SAVAK security police, Mansur Rafizadeh, states that after the November 4th election, the CIA influenced the Khomeini government, through Iran's Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, a secret CIA agent, to further delay the release of the 52 hostages until inauguration day itself (*Witness*; and *Miami Herald*, 4/12/87). In her conversation just before being taken hostage in Iran after the failed Eagleclaw rescue attempt, Mrs. Dwyer told Rev. Moore that Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh himself "was CIA" - an assessment seconded by Rafizadeh in his recent book.

It should be noted that Carter began preparations for a second desert rescue attempt immediately after failure of the first, but plans were quickly dropped when another helicopter, in one of the rehearsals in a Utah desert simulation area, crashed, killing one serviceman and wounding six others (*New York Times*, May 13, 1981, "Shah's Admission to the U.S. Linked to Misinformation"). According to Jack Anderson (syndicated column, June 22, 1987), Carter also planned to invade Iran, but cancelled the preparations when Soviet tanks massed at the Iranian borders in response.

## **Reagan Campaign Disinformation Designed to Sabotage Unknown Rescue Attempts**

The Reagan Campaign not only worked to sabotage Carter's planned rescue attempt through active measures and strategic press "leaks", like the Copeland article and the Moore broadcast, where the Campaign had obtained advance knowledge of actual rescue plans and negotiations. In addition, it put out pre-emptive false stories - disinformation - about an "October Surprise" using reporters who were effectively acting as Reagan Campaign agents. In this way, if a genuine surprise rescue materialised, it could be played up after the fact as being motivated by Carter for political ends. A memo from the Reagan Campaign's Director of Communications, Robert Gray, to Ed Meese stated: "If we leak to news sources our knowledge of Carter-planned events, we can get the press to say Carter is politicising the issue (the hostage crisis)" (*Albosta Committee Reports*, Vol. I, p. 51). Those relied on most for this purpose were George Will, who later participated in preparing Reagan for his debate with Carter; Evans and Novak; and Jack Anderson (*Rebel*, Jan. 1984).

On August 18, 1980, the media began increasingly negative coverage of Reagan. Not

coincidentally, beginning that very day and running for four days, Jack Anderson ran a series of columns claiming he had received a document showing that Carter had ordered a mid-October invasion of Iran (*Rebel*, Jan. 1984). This information was totally false (Carter, *Keeping Faith*; and *All Fall Down*, by Gary Sick) and designed to interfere with any "October Surprise" about which the Reagan Campaign might not have gained advance intelligence.

On October 15, 1980, a Chicago TV station falsely reported that five U.S. Navy cargo planes loaded with aircraft spare parts were due to arrive within 48 hours in Iran - a claim Carter's White House and State Department had to repeatedly and emphatically deny. The TV report gave "military reserve pilots" as its source - in all likelihood those military reservists reporting to Admiral Garrick as part of Casey's campaign "intelligence operation" (*Albosta Committee Reports*, Vol. I; and *All Fall Down*, by Gary Sick, p. 371).

On October 31, 1980, George Will, who had just days earlier participated in Reagan's rehearsal for the debate with Carter, reported during a taping of Agronsky and Company out of Washington, D.C. that U.S. military spare parts had been loaded and were on their way to Iran and that Carter had struck a deal to release the hostages. Finding that the story was completely false, Agronsky did not run that portion of the show's taping (*All Fall Down*, by Gary Sick, p. 372).

During the last few days before the November 4, 1980 election, Evans and Novak put out a fake "inside report" of a Carter deal to exchange military spare parts for release of the 52 hostages (*Rebel*, Jan. 1984).

## **Political Motives**

Surely, there can be no doubt that Ronald Reagan has proven himself capable of initiating secret and illegal deals with Iran. It is common knowledge that he authorised secret and probably illegal arms-for-hostages deals with Iran in 1985 and 1986, when stakes were far lower than they were before the 1980 election. Much of the Irangate dealing as the 1986 Congressional elections approached, in fact, was for motives as political as those that guided Reagan's strategy during the 1980 election - to bring the hostages held in Lebanon home before the elections in an attempt to retain the Senate for the Republicans ("*Larry King Live*", with Tip O'Neil, February 1987). In his testimony before the Irangate hearings, Iranian-American arms dealer, Albert Hakim, said that North was "extremely eager for all the U.S. hostages to be released before the November congressional elections to enhance the position of the President" (*Time*, June 15, 1987, p. 18). Adnan Khashoggi, interviewed by the *Washington Times* (March 19, 1987, p. 5B), said that when he met with Israeli Nir and Iranian go-between Ghorbanifar at the Churchill Hotel in London in the early period of the development of the Irangate deals of 1985 and 1986, Nir said that the deals were because "The Americans are in such a hurry to get these guys out before the congressional elections." To which Ghorbanifar responded, "You're telling me that this whole thing hinges on the American elections?! This is madness!" (above cite).

Administration actions in Irangate ruled by transparently political motives include:

- The 26-day Reagan-Poindexter-Meese-Webster delay, beginning on October 20, 1986, of investigations into arms shipments to Iran and the Contras by Southern Air Transport, conveniently moving any revelations until after

- election day (*San Francisco Chronicle*, 3/4/87; *Los Angeles Times/A.P. Wire*, 1/14/87). It is significant that the Administration expected more than Jacobsen's freedom in time for the election (*San Jose Mercury News*, 1/31/87).
- The desperate, last-minute trip by Oliver North to Beirut four days before the November 4th election, on October 31, 1986, in an attempt to arrange freedom for all three American hostages prior to the vote (*Washington Post*), during which 5-day pre-election period Lebanese Ambassador John Kelley's conversations with North and Secord were kept secret even from Secretary of State Shultz, his superior (*Time*, 12/22/86, p. 17).
  - Oliver North's interventions in two Custom's Service investigations of Contra/Iran arms supply flights shortly before the 1986 elections.
  - And reports, still unverified but not disproven, that profits from the Iranian arms deals were channelled into a political slush fund set up to influence the 1986 Congressional elections (*Time* 12/22/86, p. 14).

Reagan has thus clearly shown that he is capable of arranging secret deals with Iran for transparent political motives. He did it in 1986, when far less was at stake than before the 1980 elections. He has therefore shown himself morally capable of having wilfully taken similar action in the 1980 presidential election campaign.

## **Implications for Understanding Irangate**

The real possibility therefore exists that the Reagan Administration continued to ship arms to Iran, both through Israel and "direct", because of six years of effective blackmail by the Khomeini government - i.e. "If you stop the arms sales, we'll talk." This explanation provides the missing motive for both the origin and the continuation of the 1985-86 arms shipments despite their clear lack of efficacy in producing the repeatedly promised release of our hostages in Lebanon. Recently, it has been revealed (*The London Observer*) that Robert McFarlane met with Rafsanjani during his May 1986 trip with North to Tehran, and that one of the deals they discussed was a promise by Iran not to reveal the information it had obtained about the CIA's Middle East network extracted from hostage William Buckley under torture in exchange for Reagan's providing arms and sensitive U. S. intelligence (*San Jose Mercury News*, May 4, 1987). The further possibility exists that a second purpose for the May trip and for the meeting between McFarlane and Rafsanjani was to agree on the price for Iran's continued silence about a 1980 deal with the Reagan Campaign. After all, it was McFarlane himself who had arranged the October 1980 meeting between Khomeini's representative and the Reagan Campaign, according to Bani-Sadr with the input of Rafsanjani from the Iranian side (*Miami Herald*, April 12, 1987). In this light, it may be no coincidence that many of the Iranians involved in the original 1979 hostage taking and negotiations also participated in the May 1986 meetings with McFarlane and North in Tehran: Khomeini's son-in-law, Sadegh Tabatabaei (*San Francisco Examiner*, Nov. 15, 1986), who was a key figure in the 1980-81 negotiations for release of the 52 hostages; and Hossein Sheikholeslam, in 1986 Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran but during 1980 a leader of the student group which overtook the American Embassy and took the original 52 hostages captive (*Houston Post*, Nov. 28, 1986, p. 23A).

## **Who Were Reagan's Moles?**

The question remains, who was or were the Reagan Campaign's "moles" inside the

Carter White House and Administration? It is clear that Reagan's "October Surprise" intelligence operation had agents high enough in the Carter White House to smuggle out his debate briefing book. Mole(s) at that high a level would also have had knowledge of Carter's hostage rescue plans and negotiations with Iran for release of the hostages. There are a number of candidates for the mole(s) and informer(s) who worked with the Reagan Campaign's "October Surprise" intelligence operation to sabotage the Carter campaign:

- a. Officers of Carter's National Security Council, possibly including Robert Owen and/or Gary Sick.

Carter's Iran "Core Group", under the direction of then-Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, from September 20, 1980 on, included Captain Gary Sick, Carter's Iran expert at the NSC, and Robert Owen, legal adviser to the State Department at the time. Sick later authored a key book on the crisis, *All Fall Down*, in which he notes on page 422 that he was aware of an attempted hostage deal between representatives of one of the presidential campaigns and the Iranians before the election. To have known this, Sick had to have had lines of communication inside the Reagan Campaign organisation, flowing in one direction or the other. A "Robert Owen" later worked with Secord, Gadd and Hakim on Reagan's private aid network to the Contras and arms sales to Iran in 1985-86. It should be determined whether this is the same Robert Owen who served on Carter's Iran "core group" during the 1980 hostage crisis.

Herbert Cohen of the Hoover Institution, a member of the Carter Administration's Hostage Task Force and a consultant to the FBI and Justice Departments on the hostage negotiations in 1980, met with Reagan Campaign Manager William Casey in the New York City Plaza Hotel in September 1980 and provided him with 4 to 5 reports and assessments on the hostage crisis. The documents were prepared for Carter's National Security Council, probably in close cooperation with Carter's NSC Iran Desk expert, Captain Gary Sick (*Albosta Reports*, Vol. I, p. 56). Cohen had met with Sick in May of 1980 (*Albosta Committee Reports*, Vol. 1, p. 56). Cohen also gave George Bush's brother, Prescott Bush, sensitive hostage-crisis information over lunch, which was relayed to the Reagan Campaign (*Albosta Committee Reports*, Vol. I, p. 55). Prescott Bush told Reagan Campaign official Jim Baker that Cohen had a "reliable source" on Carter's National Security Council; and Cohen told the FBI that he did work for the NSC (*Albosta Committee Reports*, Vol. I, pp. 55-56).

The Reagan campaign's national security adviser, Richard V. Allen, on ABC's "Nightline" on July 6, 1983, confirmed receiving Carter White House materials from an "NSC source." And a former high-level Reagan Campaign adviser told the *Washington Post*, reported on July 1, 1983, that Richard Allen received copies of portions of Carter National Security Adviser Brzezinski's daily NSC staff reports prepared by senior NSC aides. Brzezinski described these daily reports as "sometimes extraordinarily sensitive" (*Albosta Committee Reports*).

- b. Active Carter CIA agents working for the Reagan Campaign.

A staffer on the Senate Intelligence Committee, Angelo Coderilla, told the Albosta Committee investigating the Carter Debate briefing book matter that

he had been told that Reagan's moles included active-duty CIA agents. Reagan's "October Surprise" team head, Richard Allen, kept a campaign phone log which included references to Coderilla's intelligence about the hostage situation (*Albosta Committee Reports*, Vol. I, p. 52). It is therefore likely that Coderilla's source for his information about Reagan's active-duty CIA-agent moles was Richard Allen himself, who later met with the Iranian emissary about a hostage-delay deal (*Miami Herald*, 4/12/87).

c. The Carter State Department.

At some point in the 1980 Campaign, probably in October, Carter's top State Department officials began informing the Reagan Campaign directly about details of hostage negotiations and possibly also rescue plans. In his book *All Fall Down*, Captain Gary Sick notes that on November 2, 1980, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher called both President Carter and Reagan Campaign official Ed Meese to inform them of the latest developments in the hostage negotiations in Iran (*All Fall Down*, by Gary Sick, p. 373). This policy may have commenced considerably earlier than November 2.

d. H. Ross Perot. Carter's top-secret group that met with NSC Adviser Brzezinski to plan the sabotaged April 1980 desert rescue attempt, called the "Military Committee", consulted regularly with H. Ross Perot, who had worked closely over the years with Reagan's Campaign manager, William Casey (*The Rebel Magazine*, January 1984, "A Question of Treason").

In light of what we now know, statements made by Reagan and Bush during the 1980 presidential campaign take on new meaning and irony. In his debate with President Carter, Reagan said, "No-one wants to say anything that would inadvertently delay, in any way, the return of those hostages" (*All Fall Down*, by Gary Sick, p. 377). In response to a question from Barbara Walters in the Carter-Reagan debate of October 28, 1980, Reagan said, "I have been accused lately of having a secret plan with regard to the hostages ... My ideas require quiet diplomacy, where you don't say in advance what it is you're thinking of doing" (*All Fall Down*, by Gary Sick, p. 377). And on election day, November 4, 1980, a reporter quoted George Bush to Reagan at Reagan's polling place in Pacific Palisades: "George Bush says you're in like a burglar" (*Hidden Power*, by Roland Perry, p. 162).

## Colin Wallace - an assessment

I began writing this at the beginning of August. It was then some 8 months or so after Colin Wallace's release from prison. Some kind of summing up seemed appropriate.

A great many journalists have now looked at his allegations - a handful in some detail - and, so far, they have all stood up. Not a line of his allegations has been falsified. The documents he claimed were written in 1974 (some of them were discussed in *Lobster* 13) have been forensically examined by Dr. Julius Grant, the leading 'paper and ink' person in the world and turned out to have been written in or around 1974. His claims to have been working with Airey Neave on anti-Labour speeches have been substantiated: the letters between them and press reports of the speeches Neave made with Wallace's material were shown on Channel 4 News.

Despite being unable to find holes in his story some journalists remain suspicious of him. They accuse him of being 'too professional', or 'too pat', 'too well rehearsed' and so on. What they seem to forget is (a) he was once a P.R. man for the British Army, and was a good one by all accounts, and (b) he has now told the same stories to literally hundreds of journalists. Of course it sounds well rehearsed. How could it not do so? Other journalists have found him disconcertingly open, talking to anyone and everyone who comes to see him. Nobody gets exclusive access (not even if they offer money: neither he nor Fred Holroyd have taken more than bare expenses from the press in the past 8 months of intensive dealings with the media). There is also a perceptible dis-ease engendered in British journalists by the simple fact that he is a willing informant from inside the British secret state. There hasn't been one before, least not of Wallace's significance. I suspect they can't quite believe its real.

This anxiety occasionally surfaces in public. Take the Leigh/Lashmar piece in *The Observer* (5 July 1987). Having reported that Wallace's handwritten notes had been confirmed by Dr. Julius Grant as being written in or close to 1974, as Wallace had claimed, the Leigh/Lashmar team then overlay this with a great dollop of paranoia about him, going so far as to quote a single (unnamed) British Army source in Desmond Hammil's dreadful book about Northern Ireland, *Piggy In The Middle*, to the effect that Wallace was running amok in Northern Ireland; and also describing him as a "self-confessed fantasist"! Neither claim is true and, on one of their better days, no doubt Leigh and Lashmar would acknowledge the fact. It may just be a coincidence of course, but this *Observer* piece appeared just after the rumour ran through the little group of journalists then working with Wallace that the BBC *Panorama* team were going to do a hatchet job on him. Chances are that Leigh and Lashmar were just hedging their bets in case Wallace turned out to be a 'wrong 'un'. In the event, the *Panorama* piece was dumped and the journalist leading that investigation, John Ware, had to unload his hostility to Wallace in the pages of *The Listener*, making a complete fool of himself in the process. (See the *Tribune* article reprinted at the end of this section.) This animus against Wallace may not be totally unconnected with Ware's time in Northern Ireland working on *The Sun*. If Ware persists in these baseless attacks on Wallace we may be forced to spend a morning in the Colindale Library digging out Ware's articles on Northern Ireland.

One of the oddities about all this has been the fact that Wallace has been the subject of far more professional scepticism and paranoia on the part of our journalists than either Cathy Massiter or Peter Wright. This I find curious. Cathy Massiter was never available to the press: access to her was always tightly controlled and these days she is wholly unavailable. She gave up very little in real terms: some information on surveillance which anyone not asleep at the wheel has taken for granted for years; some fragments on the MI5-MOD-Tory Party operations against CND; and one (conveniently dead) alleged MI5 agent, Harry Newton. Yet no journalist to my knowledge has ever got paranoid about her, seriously wondered if she was part of some wider operation. (I don't think this, incidentally.)

All of which is true of Peter Wright. As I write this I still haven't read *Spycatcher*, but I did have a quick flip through the section on the 1970s plots to see if they were different from the extracts printed in the *Sunday Times*. They aren't. And even on a quick skim those extracts are clearly dubious. Wright's account of an unwilling MI5 having James Angleton's paranoia about Harold Wilson thrust upon it wouldn't withstand an afternoon's research by any of the journalists who have so enthusiastically recycled Wright's allegations. And are we really to believe Wright's

'Three Wise Monkeys' act when confronted by the MI5 officers plotting against Wilson? Are we alone in finding that totally incredible? And how interesting it is that despite the evidence from other people - Wallace, Gordon Winter - *and* the evidence of the events themselves that the mid 1970s operations were directed not only at the Labour Party but also at the Liberals and the Heathite Tories, that Wright refers only to the anti-Labour Party end of things. Wright claims to have learned of the operations by reading newspapers. If so - and I don't believe this for a minute - how could he miss all the anti-Liberal activity (Thorpe, Hain, for example)? Wright manifestly isn't telling us the truth yet he has been treated as if he were totally reliable. Dale Campbell-Savours MP, the Parliamentary end of the Wright-Greengrass-Observer chain, has cheerfully rehashed Wright's allegations in the House of Commons without any means of verifying them, but has yet to even *talk* to Wallace.

In the mid 1970s there was some discussion here about how a Watergate-type situation would be handled. As I remember the discussions, the conclusions were that the British media would do OK but such a situation would never arise anyway, what with the secrecy of our society, the Official Secrets Act etc.. In reality, of course, a Watergate-type situation *was* going on, the Prime Minister of the day (Harold Wilson) said so, and nobody believed him. Now that the original mid 1970s story is finally leaking out we can actually see how the British system has handled it. Only the *Observer*, *Sunday Times*, *Guardian* and *Channel 4 News* can be said to have taken the story even half seriously. More importantly, what has been demonstrated so far is that the British political system is incapable of dealing with something like this. As a number of people have pointed out, were this America there would be half a dozen Congressional Committees, with large budgets and subpoena powers chasing down the details. In this country, after more than a year of stuttering revelations (*Lobster 11* was April 1986) neither of the opposition parties - as institutions - have yet shown any evidence of even being aware of what the story is.

This is particularly galling, if unsurprising, to me as a member of the Labour Party. It isn't surprising because politics is about power: the truth is neither here nor there, and, to date, no-one has managed to persuade the Labour Party leadership that this story isn't (a) complex (and who needs more complex material?) and (b) difficult (and liable to backfire on anyone trying to use it). The chorus of abuse from the Tory Party and its friends in the media which greeted Ken Livingstone's speech on this subject will hardly have encouraged the grey middle-aged men in the Labour Party Shadow Cabinet that this is an area they should be getting into.

Livingstone's speech is reproduced below. He may have been met with howls of execration but not a word in this speech was falsified. But then Ken Livingstone had done his homework, and it shows. It is hardly new material: most of Fred Holroyd's allegations were made nearly *4 years ago* in the *New Statesman* and on *Channel 4's Diverse Reports*.

There is a major whispering campaign going on against Colin Wallace. One journalist working on the story has heard variations of the "Wallace as Walter Mitty" theme from 5 different sources, only one of them definitely a British spook. How far this campaign has penetrated the Palace of Westminster I just don't know. The major sub-theme in these whispers is about the Ulster Citizens' Army. This is what the British state seems to be relying on to finally discredit Wallace. And it is quite a clever smear, difficult to check out without effort and some fairly specialised knowledge (or access to it). Hence what follows.

# The Ulster Citizen Army smear

The story of the Ulster Citizens' Army (UCA for the rest of this essay) is a tiny fragment in the intricate history of Protestant politics in Northern Ireland in the mid 1970s - so tiny that none of the general accounts I have looked at even mention it. But the UCA lingers on: it is currently being used to smear Colin Wallace.

What was the UCA? On this there is no agreement. Some journalists who were in Northern Ireland at the time remain convinced that it was nothing more than a British Army/intelligence operation, a 'funny'. Some suspect it to have been a psy ops job, possibly even run by Wallace himself. Although this view is intelligible given what we now know of psychological operations during this period, I believe it to be mistaken for two main reasons.

In the first place the available evidence in the shape of press accounts from the time indicates that whatever journalists may have thought of it, other Protestant groups at the time believed the UCA to be a real group. At one stage the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) issued a public threat against the UCA. (*Times* 6 October 1973). It was only later, after the smear against Wallace had been initiated, that the notion that the UCA was a British 'funny' was put about by some of the other Protestant groups.

Secondly, the British authorities themselves treated the UCA as a real organisation. I have seen two 1974 documents, one a straightforward briefing paper, and the other an Information Policy paper, which discuss the UCA as a real if somewhat mysterious group. (According to Wallace the Information Policy paper was written by Jeremy Railton, sometime head of Inf Pol, the secret psychological operations unit for which Wallace worked.)

It could be argued, of course, that were the UCA a psychological operation the British state forces would do precisely this. But the Inf Pol paper is an account of the UCA *and the uses made of it by Inf Pol*. That is, while the public manifestations of the UCA - leaflets, statements, and threats - were genuine, Inf Pol was stirring the pot with unattributable briefings to the media trying to exploit themes suggested by the UCA's own propaganda.

It is also possible to argue that this Inf Pol briefing on the UCA is itself also a phoney. But then it is possible, in principle, to argue that almost anything is a phoney. Such scepticism is easy but ultimately futile. My inclination is to accept the Inf Pol briefing as true (a) because its account of the UCA makes sense both of the initial reaction of other Protestant groups that it was real *and* the later reaction of journalists that it was a 'funny' - both were correct; and (b) because of one sentence in the document: "As far as is known this project was cleared through H. Mooney, the FCO (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) Information Adviser." Mooney was the IRD (Information Research Department) officer involved in the creation of the Information Policy Unit and his name is to be found very rarely indeed. I just do not believe that a phoney briefing document on the UCA would so casually (and senselessly) reveal the identity and role of Hugh Mooney. (1)

The evidence is that, at least in its early stages, the UCA was a genuine group of some kind. But notice, a genuine group in a strictly limited sense, that its public statements were *not* the work of the British state. The point here is that the UCA seems to have

done nothing beyond issuing some statements and leaflets. No personnel ever identified themselves, no activities were publicly undertaken (no assassinations, bombings or beatings were every claimed for example); there were no marches, rallies or newspapers.

The journalists who were and are sceptical about its existence have good cause: the UCA looked like a ghost group, and the experts at ghost groups were the British state. However the evidence is that the UCA began life as a Protestant ghost group which was quickly exploited by the experts at Information Policy. If so, whose ghost group was it in the first place?

The origins of the UCA appear to lie in the schisms that afflicted the Ulster Defence Association in 1972. Both of the Army briefings say this without being certain. One of them names the three men believed to have been behind the UCA: Ernie 'Duke' Elliot, Dave Fogel and Tommy Herron. Early press reports named these three as the instigators of the UCA (*Belfast Telegraph* 5th October 1973, for example), and suggested that the UCA was a left-wing faction in the UDA. Certainly the UCA's early rhetoric had left tinges - an October 1972 statement from it said it was composed of "the more socialist-oriented and class-conscious members of the UDA". (*Belfast Telegraph* 18 September 1973). But how seriously this should be taken is impossible to evaluate. Tommy Herron as socialist leader sits uneasily with the widespread reports of Tommy Herron leader of East Belfast's UDA extortionists.

Elliot and Herron were both assassinated by persons unknown. The British state and other Protestants have both been accused of the murders. Dave Fogel fled to England, gave a number of press conferences about the in-fighting inside the UDA, dropped a few hints about the left orientation of Herron and Elliot, and disappeared. (See, for example, *Sunday Times* 28 January 1973)

At various times the UCA were said to have been in discussions with the Peoples' Democracy group, the Official IRA, the British and Irish Communist Group and the Communist Party. The truth of these reports is impossible to evaluate.

This is an extremely complicated episode in an extremely confusing period. The best published account of the period I know is in *Political Murder in Northern Ireland* (Martin Dillon and Dennis Lehane, Penguin 1973), especially chapter 12. My best estimate is that the UCA was indeed a leftish organisation at the beginning, but quickly deteriorated into becoming a vehicle with which one UDA faction attacked another. It is also worth pointing out that from its inception in 1972 through to mid 1974 the UCA seems to have been largely ignored by the other Protestant groups. If it was a nuisance it was a minor one.

In mid 1974 this changed: the UCA began issuing leaflets accusing named members of the UDA and UVF of being responsible for assassinations. The UCA suddenly became the object of increased interest, interest heightened by its anonymity. For several months the UDA leadership did nothing but then on 15th November 1974 it issued a statement accusing the British Army of being behind the UCA and announcing that it knew the identity of the UCA's "leader". The attempt to smear Colin Wallace began here. (see *Irish Times* 16 November 1974) (2)

The UDA apparently knew the identity of the UCA's leader because one of the UDA's leaders, Andy Tyrie, claimed to have been tipped off by a young British journalist,

Keith Hamilton. Hamilton, it was said, had been given an interview with the leader of the UCA in a pub. He was an Englishman named Ron Horn, a former British soldier living in Northern Ireland. (Why Horn was foolish enough to identify himself at this stage, putting himself at risk, appears not to have been explained.) At this point it begins to get very complicated.

In the first place Keith Hamilton denied the meeting had taken place - as did Ron Horn. (*Daily Telegraph* 7 December 1974; *Guardian* 6 December) Hamilton had served for a year as a very junior press officer for the Army in Northern Ireland, but by the time of the alleged meeting with Ron Horn had left the province and was working for a newspaper in Southampton. But according to the *Guardian* (6 December 1974) he had returned briefly to Northern Ireland in August, and this, according to the *Guardian* report, was when he was said to have tipped off the UDA. Either way it looks very odd. If Hamilton's denial is believed (and he denies it today), who did tip off the UDA (if anyone actually did)? And if Hamilton's denial is not believed, and he did tip the UDA off in August, why did the UDA apparently do nothing until mid November, allowing the UCA to issue its most damaging leaflets of all during those months?

Looking at the press clippings on this episode today, what seems to have happened is this. Andy Tyrie rings McKittrick of the *Irish Times*, one of the best-informed journalists then working in Northern Ireland. McKittrick goes to see the alleged head of the UCA, Ron Horn. He meets Horn and his wife who deny all knowledge of the affair. (Horn was a peripatetic music teacher at this time and in his fifties.) McKittrick then takes the tip from the UDA about Ron Horn to Colin Wallace at the Army's press office. Wallace says it all sounds very fishy. McKittrick then publishes an account of this, without naming Ron Horn, on 16th November.

Nothing much happens then but on December 4 Robert Fisk in *The Times* reports the basics of the story, including (again) the UDA claim to know who is behind the UCA. On December 5th a story similar to that of Fisk's appears in the *Daily Telegraph* written by Christopher Bramwell and Gerard Kemp. They report the basics of the piece - the tip-off, the ID on Horn, Horn's denial (but not Horn's name) - then add some new pieces. First they report the (unnamed) Horn commenting on a previous visitor asking the same questions (presumably the visit of McKittrick). This visitor, says Horn, asked him about a pub called the Pig and Chicken where he (Horn) is said to have been seen (and where Keith Hamilton is supposed to have had his meeting with the head of the UCA). Horn, a teetotaler, denies ever setting foot inside the Pig and Chicken. Curiously, however, messers Bramwell and Kemp proceed to the pub where "one of the bar staff gave an extremely accurate description of the man we had just left." Either Horn is lying or a pretty sophisticated disinformation operation is being run here.

The next day, December 6, Derek Brown chips in in *The Guardian*. His opening paragraph goes thus:

"The search for the author of an "Ulster Citizens' Army" leaflet linking Loyalist militants with sectarian murders has disclosed a curious link with British military intelligence. Leaders of the Ulster Defence Association, some of whom are named in the latest Citizen Army statement, say the author is a middle-aged Englishman living in Antrim Town. It emerged yesterday that he was married about six months ago to

a local woman, formerly a friend of a senior civilian employee in the Army Intelligence department at Lisburn. This man is closely concerned with collecting information on obscure organisations like the Citizen Army."

This *Guardian* piece is followed the next day by a piece by the Bramwell half of the Kemp/Bramwell team in the *Daily Telegraph*. This rehashes the same information but adds that:

"the couple (the Horns) said that the intelligence man was upset by their marriage."

So, enter Colin Wallace - identified if not named - and enter, in my opinion, the point of this entire charade. For these references to the (unnamed) Wallace's "unhappiness" at the Horn's marriage form the basis of the smear which resurfaced during his trial for manslaughter in 1981 and which is doing the rounds again today. The smear varies a good deal, as I show below, but essentially is this: Ron Horn stole Wallace's girl, so Wallace leaked the information that Horn was UCA to the UDA. In a fit of jealous pique Wallace tried to get Ron Horn assassinated.

What are we to believe? Wallace denies the story in its entirety. The Horns deny that Ron Horn had anything to do with the UCA and no-one now seems to believe this, if anyone actually did at the time. (David McKittrick told me that the UDA knew, at the time, that Ron Horn had nothing to do with the UCA.) Keith Hamilton denies being the individual who tipped off the UDA and denies knowing or meeting Ron Horn. Wallace denies being upset by the Horn's marriage, something confirmed by a former colleague and friend who recently told another researcher that, on the contrary, Wallace had been rather relieved that the woman had married Ron Horn as he had been neglecting her for some time: as all reports agree, for Wallace his job was all-consuming.

In the midst of this muddle a number of things stick out. Someone suggested to the UDA that they should allege that Ron Horn was the leader of the UCA; and someone very close to Wallace told the press about his prior relationship with the then Mrs Ron Horn. This second piece of information was the key because without the link, via his wife, to Wallace, Ron Horn qua leader of the UCA made no sense. But with the link to Wallace and the British Army press office - already the subject of considerable rumour-mongering - Horn made an initially plausible candidate. He was ex British Army and he did have a connection to Wallace, albeit a tenuous one. But put like this, of course, the whole scenario looks more like an attempt to drag Wallace personally or the psy ops unit (or both) into the limelight than an attempt to identify the head of the mysterious UCA. This impression is strengthened when you add (a) that Andy Tyrie originally told David McKittrick that Keith Hamilton (or his impersonator) had phoned the UDA from the Army press office, and (b) that McKittrick received a letter, apparently from the UCA, telling him to lay off the story - a letter posted in Lisburn, site of British Army HQ. As Wallace comments in one his notes on this episode, it looks as though someone was laying a paper chase leading back to the Army.

To this puzzle I return below. At this point, however, it might be worth showing the way the smear was developed in the press.

**Version 1**

Sources: *Guardian* 6 December, *Daily Telegraph* 7 December 1974.

Hamilton tips off Tyrie. (By inference) Wallace, unhappy at the Horn's marriage, has fed the information to Hamilton.

## Version 2

Source: Kenneth Clarke, *Daily Telegraph* 21 March 1981 (the day Wallace was convicted of manslaughter).

UCA an invention of Wallace's. (By inference) Wallace tips off the UDA about Horn. (There is no mention of Keith Hamilton in this version.) This version is part of a thorough "Wallace-as-Walter Mitty" piece, the overall tone of the smears which have been running since Wallace was convicted. Clarke turned up at our press conference in the House of Commons in April 1986 to launch *Lobster* 11 and bad-mouthed Wallace then.

## Version 3

Source: Keith Miles, *Daily Mail*, March 21 1981

Wallace "had been courting a local girl who had rejected him for a 51 year old ex-soldier, a band leader and schools inspector. Wallace "whispered" that the man was the leader of a new (sic) paramilitary group and posed as a journalist to inform the hard-line Ulster Defence Association that the man had implicated them in 13 murders of Catholics."

This piece also runs the "Walter Mitty" line, actually talking of Walter Mitty, as does Clarke (above). Miles, please note, is now married to the new editor of the *News of the World* which in July ran a grotesquely inaccurate editorial blaming Wallace for the Ken Livingstone speech (printed in this issue). The real source for Livingstone was Fred Holroyd and a TV programme by RTE. Wallace has never spoken to Livingstone about these matters.

## Version 4

Source: Jim Campbell, *Sunday World* (Belfast) March 22 1981.

In this one Wallace "tried to have an Antrim man assassinated because he was having an affair with the man's wife"..."Senior UDA men revealed that Wallace had tipped them off that the man he wanted murdered was a communist agent trying to infiltrate Loyalist paramilitaries ... Wallace has pretended to be a press man when 'tipping them off that the Antrim teacher was the leader of the so-called Ulster Citizens' Army - an allegedly communist-inspired Protestant group that was a figment of his imagination."

The virtue of this version is that it does explicitly what the others (numbers 2 and 3) only hint at; namely, linking the manslaughter case and the Ron Horn story:

"During the trial which ended on Friday, it was revealed that Wallace was having an affair with the victim's wife. The UDA

claim that when he tried to set up the Antrim school teacher in the early seventies he was having an affair with his wife as well."

The striking thing about the current generation of Ron Horn/Wallace/UCA stories is who is telling them. One source is a former colleague of Wallace, now working for the World Wildlife Fund, and, in my opinion, a British spook. Another is James Miller, the former UDA intelligence officer who emerged earlier this year in the *Sunday Times* (22 and 29 March 1987) to reveal that he had been an MI5 agent inside the UDA. When he first contacted the *Sunday Times* it was the Ron Horn/UCA story he was most keen they should print. A third is Andy Tyrie of the UDA. And a fourth is another UDA man, James McMichael, who came across from Northern Ireland earlier this year to tell the Ron Horn saga to Merlyn Rees, former Labour Home Secretary and Northern Irish Secretary.

While it isn't difficult to see why a British spook would want to discredit Wallace, the role of these UDA men is more difficult to understand. Officially, the UDA are locked into a power struggle with the British state over its policies towards the province. Wallace's allegations generally are extremely damaging to the British state, especially those sections of it which have been involved in Northern Ireland. On the face of it you might assume that the UDA would welcome Wallace: my enemy's enemy is my friend. Apparently not. The best hypothesis - and it is only that - I can offer to explain the UDA's enthusiasm for running the UCA smear is that the UCA remains a severe embarrassment to the UDA. There have been a number of well-informed suggestions that the assassins of Tommy Herron and Ernie Elliot were, in fact, other Protestants, other factions in the then feuding UDA. If this is true, then the UDA leadership in 1974 had a considerable vested interest in attributing the UCA to the British Army. If the UCA was a psy ops job, the argument might run, Herron and Elliot were not part of it and, with a kind of logic, the UDA had no reason to assassinate them: or, perhaps, were right to assassinate them. And having committed themselves to this position in 1974 with the Ron Horn-Wallace nonsense, the UDA today is stuck with the story - a story which will only seem plausible if they can discredit Wallace. Thus, in 1987 as in 1974, the *political* interests of the UDA leadership and the *political* interests of the British state (or a section of it) coincide. But this is no more than speculation. The UDA's motives in running this transparent rubbish are mysterious to me.

As with the manslaughter charge, Wallace really doesn't have a case to answer. There was no evidence that he killed Jonathan Lewis; and there is none that he had anything to do with the Ron Horn story. In the Lewis case it is obvious to me that Wallace was the victim of what Fred Holroyd calls "an opportunity frame-up". With the Ron Horn story something much more deliberate took place. For the explanation of the event which makes the most sense is that the entire charade was mounted to discredit either Wallace personally or the psy ops unit (Information Policy) for which he was working.

For reasons unknown Andy Tyrie was persuaded to take part in a hoax 'tip' about Ron Horn. The 'tip' was revealed to have come from the Army press office; either, in version 1, from Keith Hamilton; or, in version 2, from Wallace himself. The journalists put onto the story by the UDA were then told about Wallace's prior relationship with Mrs Horn and duly recycle this information leaving the readers of the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph* to draw the obvious conclusion. Without ever actually naming Wallace as the guilty party, the smear was established. Whoever organised this operation went to some trouble to do so, down to having someone who looked like Ron Horn hang around in the Pig and Chicken for the bar staff to identify

when asked. The conspirators also had access to pretty personal information about Wallace's life - his relationship with the woman who became Mrs Horn.

The outstanding candidate for the role of organiser of the Ron Horn smear is MI5. All this took place just after Wallace had (a) refused to proceed further with the MI5-directed operation Clockwork Orange 2, and (b) had written his memorandum of 8th November expressing his concern about the lack of action by the RUC and Northern Ireland Office over the continuing assaults on the inmates of the Kincora Boys Home. (The text of that memorandum was printed in *Lobster* 10). By these two acts Wallace had, unwittingly I presume, become a problem for the new MI5-controlled regime in Northern Ireland - as Fred Holroyd did some months later.

In the absence of other information at the moment my conclusion would be that MI5 organised this little caper in an attempt to discredit Wallace and get him removed from Northern Ireland. Although it failed, another scheme was run a few weeks later and the objective accomplished. Meanwhile, the UCA smear had been established and was available for future use such as feeding to sympathetic right-wing papers (*Daily Mail* and *Daily Telegraph*) during Wallace's manslaughter trial.

Ever since Wallace came out of prison we have been waiting for the UCA story to surface in print. As I write this, it hasn't so far, merely being used as part of the whispering campaign. I have gone to considerable and, perhaps, tedious lengths to explain the UCA saga in the hope that by laying it out as I understand it other journalists who come across the UCA story will think a little before accepting the British state's version of events. At the minimum I hope I have done enough to make journalists wonder why the UDA are so keen to discredit Wallace. (They might also be curious enough to ring Andy Tyrie and ask him which version of the story he would have us believe now: a tip-off from Keith Hamilton or from Colin Wallace?)

The British state has got a major problem on its hands with Wallace. Having taken the decision in the mid 1970s to deny that the psy ops unit existed and that Wallace actually was working in it, the British state cannot now prosecute Wallace for breach of the Official Secrets Act. Officially the line *has* to be that Wallace is making it all up - the "Walter Mitty" line so assiduously peddled by messers Miles and Clarke at the time of Wallace's trial in 1981. Discrediting Wallace, and thus his allegations, is all the British state can do. So far they have managed to frame him for a killing he didn't do and have run a massive disinformation exercise against him. With each new step in the state's suppression of the Peter Wright allegations, Wallace's importance increases.

## Notes

1. Mooney's first little action was to issue an unattributable brief saying that Loyalist organisations were looking for Reds under their beds. This was 30 September 1973. Mooney was trying to use the UCA's left rhetoric and create splits. But how appropriate that the resident IRD man should find the perfect pretext to hang IRD's anti-communist obsessions on.
2. These leaflets came at the end of a period of charge and counter-charge, threat and counter-threat between UCA and UDA/UVF. In a sense the UDA's naming the leader of UCA was simply the latest step in this (minor) war of words. It might also be noted that whether the UCA leaflets naming UDA/UVF assassinations were genuine or not does not appear to have an answer. The

Information Policy account of its uses of the UCA does not go as far as this period, ending at May 1974.

*Tribune* 21/28 August 1987

## The smearing of Colin Wallace

**Robin Ramsay**

JOHN WARE is an investigative reporter, widely regarded, by his peers, as one of the best television journalists working in this country. He worked with *World in Action* and is now with BBC's *Panorama*. It was to John Ware that *Panorama* entrusted its investigation into the Wilson-MI5 plots after the BBC embargo on the subject was lifted a couple of months ago.

Like all the other journalists interested in this story, Ware went to see Colin Wallace, eventually spending four days going through Wallace's biography, his allegations, and photocopying some of his documents.

Then three things happened. First, the little group of journalists interested in the story began picking up rumours that Ware and *Panorama* were actually planning a hatchet job on Wallace. What this would consist of wasn't at all obvious.

Then, some weeks later, the *Panorama* investigation of the MI5 plots was scrapped by management.

Thirdly, John Ware, with his investigation knocked on the head, wrote an article for *The Listener* (August 6, 1987) on the whole Wilson-Wright-Wallace-MI5 story. In this Ware does the hatchet job on Wallace he was said to be preparing for the camera, and a very strange job it is. Ware does two things: he makes elementary errors, and he creates insinuations. First the errors.

- Wallace "was fired from his job as a civilian Army information officer." This is not true: after appealing, he was allowed to resign.
- Wallace "claims ...that his prosecution (for manslaughter) was aided and abetted by MI5". This is not true. Wallace may suspect this - I certainly do - but there is no evidence to substantiate one's suspicions and, to my knowledge, Wallace has never alleged this.
- "In an account he claims to have written in 1976 as evidence of his intimate involvement in the intelligence world, Wallace talks of an MI6 operative he knew. In fact that document reveals an event - the death of a policeman - that actually occurred in December 1981."

I think I've read most of Wallace's output and the only document I can think of from the period Ware is talking about is an essay on the work of "Bunny" Dearsley. There is no mention of a dead policeman in this document. I talked to Wallace: he is equally baffled as to the document Ware is referring to. I challenge Ware either to name or to produce this document.

- Wallace was "on the press desk with a background briefing role which, inevitably, gave him limited access to intelligence people".

This is the big lie. In a statement to the Civil Service Appeals Board in 1976, when Wallace was appealing against his dismissal from the Army (appealing successfully), his former boss, Peter Broderick, Head of Army Information Services, said of Wallace: "He had constant and free access to information of high classification and extreme sensitivity."

Ware is able to make this preposterous claim only by completely ignoring the fact - which he must know very well - that Colin Wallace worked for the secret psychological operations unit, Information Policy. Broderick's 1976 statement to the Civil Service Appeals Board mentioned Information Policy, letting the cat out of the bag. As a result his career in the civil service came to a halt.

As well as these elementary errors of fact, Ware also delivers a number of potentially damaging innuendoes.

- He calls Wallace "a civilian Army Information Officer". This is technically true, but Ware omits the information that Wallace was a commissioned officer in the Ulster Defence Regiment, working for it part-time, in addition to his Information Officer and "psy ops" roles; was commander of the Army's free-fall squad, The Phantoms; and lived for part of the time in Northern Ireland in barracks. Wallace was a soldier, not a civilian.
- Ware says that "Wallace's reputation in Ulster was as something of a Walter Mitty", and that he has "harvested a rich crop of fantasies".

As evidence for these claims, Ware offers the story of the 1976 document (discussed above) and Wallace's allegations of an operation called Clockwork Orange Two.

Through General Sir Peter Leng, Ware confirms the existence of a "Clockwork Orange One" ("hare-brained", according to Leng), but tells us that "today, in Wallace's mind, 'Clockwork Orange' has become a more sinister Mark Two which ... went beyond destabilising the IRA; it was aimed at mainland Labour politicians - which just happens to dovetail with similar allegations, raised in Parliament from an entirely independent source, namely Peter Wright."

This really is extraordinary. In the first place, Wallace talked to Steve Dorril, and gave him documents about Clockwork Orange Two, when Dorril visited him in prison in 1985 and 1986, before anyone had heard of Peter Wright. (Indeed, *Lobster* 11 and the *Tribune* adaptation of it, both about Clockwork Orange Two, appeared before Peter Wright's allegations had been made public.)

The insinuation in Ware's last sentence that Wallace cobbled this together to fit Wright's allegations is completely false - and Ware knows this. In the second place, Wallace's allegations about Clockwork Orange Two go far beyond Ware's "mainland Labour politicians". As Ware must know, Wallace claims that MI5 wanted him to smear Labour, Liberal and Tory politicians in Clockwork Orange Two.

Ware can get away with this disgraceful distortion only by completely ignoring the Wallace handwritten notes - based on MI5 information - which, as he knows, were confirmed forensically as being written in or around 1974. Pooh-poohing Wallace's allegations, Ware can't even bring himself to report them accurately.

The final irony is that, unwittingly, Ware has assisted Wallace's campaign in the long

run far more than his smears will damage it. Quoting General Leng as confirming the existence of "Clockwork Orange", Ware has taken the story a long way forward. For, before Ware's article, apart from the luckless Peter Broderick's statement in 1976 (discussed above), no Ministry of Defence official at any level had confirmed the existence of psychological operations in Northern Ireland, let alone the name of a specific operation.

What Ware doesn't seem to be aware of is the nature of the underlying problem Wallace presents to the British state. In 1976, when they were trying to get rid of him, the British state decided to deny the existence of both the Information Policy "psy ops" unit and Wallace's job in it. With the exception of the Broderick statement, that has remained the official line ever since. Wallace and Information Policy were "deniable" - and have been denied. But having no official existence, Wallace can hardly be prosecuted for revealing official secrets: officially such secrets don't exist.

It is this awkward position which has forced the British state to attempt to discredit Wallace. The "Walter Mitty" theme established during his trial is the logical response of the British state to the situation. Since (officially) the "psy ops" unit and Wallace's job in it didn't exist, Wallace must be making it all up - a "Walter Mitty".

This Orwellian line had survived, battered but intact, from 1976 until General Leng's blunder was reported by the uncomprehending John Ware. Nice one, John.

## **Clockwork Orange 2 Jottings**

Here is another, previously unpublished section from Wallace's 1974 jottings for the aborted operation 'Clockwork Orange 2'.

### Can Politicians Be Trusted?

1. N. St. Stevas: homosexual - boyfriend of Elton John's manager - cocaine user at parties
2. Homosexual relationships - Heath, Van Straubenzee, St. John Stevas, Thorpe
3. Child prostitution: William McGrath, Van Straubenzee, Clifford Smyth
4. Wilson's affair with Marcia Williams (Secretary) in Moscow
5. Finance: Maudling, Thorpe, Wilson, Short etc.
6. Fianna Fail: Charles Haughey - IRA/drugs link. Bill Fuller 'Old (illegible) Hotel'
7. Norman Frank Butler/Sammy Smyth UDA
8. Jackie Watson: Billy Hull LAW funds
9. Paisley: transfer of funds to USA, Australia and S.Africa
10. John Hume: funds for relief ex USA passed to PIRA and own bank account
11. David O'Connell/Marie Maguire affair
12. Jeremy Thorpe: misuse of party funds
13. Funds from East Germany to finance Wilson's campaign
14. McGrath/Paisley/McKeague
15. Are Labour deliberately damaging the economy to assist USSR plot against West?
16. Psychoanalysis: Wilson, Benn, O'Connell, Paisley
17. Treasury study shows economy on verge of collapse
18. Jo Richardson, Joan Maynard
19. USA connection Biaggi, Kennedy, Ribicoff, McCarthy etc

Information Policy Brief on the Ulster Citizens' Army  
 The Ulster Citizens' Army (UCA) is a breakaway group from the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). It was formed in 1972 following the rioting in East Belfast. The UCA is a Communist party oriented group and is a part of the world Federation of Democratic Youth.

1. The UCA is a Communist party oriented group and is a part of the world Federation of Democratic Youth.
2. The UCA is a breakaway group from the UDA.
3. The UCA is a Communist party oriented group and is a part of the world Federation of Democratic Youth.
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17. The UCA is a Communist party oriented group and is a part of the world Federation of Democratic Youth.
18. The UCA is a breakaway group from the UDA.
19. The UCA is a Communist party oriented group and is a part of the world Federation of Democratic Youth.
20. The UCA is a breakaway group from the UDA.

# Information Policy Brief on the Ulster Citizens' Army

## Background

1. Following the rioting in East Belfast in October 1972 when the late Tommy Herron declared war in the British Army, there was increasing disquiet among UDA ranks. On 14<sup>th</sup> October 1972 a manifesto was issued on behalf of a breakaway group calling itself the Ulster Citizens' Army. This manifesto stated:

"The Ulster Citizens' Army has decided to officially declare its existence as the UDA becomes more weak, ineffectual and incapable of defending Protestant workers and working class homes against attacks by the Security Forces.

Composed of more socialist orientated and class conscious members of the UDA, the Army came into being as a result of growing dissatisfaction and frustration within UDA ranks.

From 2400 hours thereafter on the 14<sup>th</sup> October 1972 active service units of the Ulster Citizens' Army will be on organisational standby in the Belfast area for the protection of Protestant workers and working class areas."

This statement was signed by J Moore, Commandant 'B' Area. (Completely genuine). Press cuttings at Flag A.

2. Following the assassination of Tommy Herron in September 1973 the Belfast Newsletter dated 18<sup>th</sup> September 1973 published an obituary for him claiming him as an Area Commander of 'C' Area, Ulster Citizens' Army. (completely genuine).

**Press Cutting at Flag B.**  
**Chronology of the IP Use of UCA**

3. After the assassination of Herron, a decision was taken by IP to conduct a low level campaign to highlight intimidation, extortion and assassination within the Loyalist extremists ranks using the UCA title as a cover. As far as is known this project was cleared through H. Mooney, the FCO Information [... extract ends]

**HANSARD**

## **Northern Ireland Act 1974**

Cols 231-238 7 JULY 1987

6.22 pm

**Mr. Ken Livingstone** (Brent, East): I shall start by praising my predecessor. Mr. Reg Freeson. There are some who may be surprised at that. Our differences were political and I do not think that anyone would suggest that he did not serve his constituency as well and as excellently as any other hon. Member. Therefore, I praise his record in this place, although I played some part in ending his presence here. Given how bad the post is currently, I cannot report that I have had a letter of congratulations from him yet. I shall notify the House when I do. I would not urge right hon. and hon. Members to hold their breath.

I want to thank all the officials of the House, including the police, for their assistance. I cannot recall anywhere that I have been where there is such a degree of helpfulness, general good humour and pleasantness. I am certain that other new Members think the same. I do not know why that should be. Perhaps close proximity to 649 fellow politicians induces this state of good humour, or perhaps there are those who have a private joke that they are not telling the rest of us.

I wish to start by making clear my position on violence. I condemn without equivocation all acts of violence, but I am not prepared to be uneven-handed. I do not believe that we should condemn the violence of the IRA and produce a less strident condemnation of the violence of other extra-legal organisations. Nor do I believe that we should be any the less outraged when those who operate on behalf of the British state and security forces go beyond the law or the conventions of decency, as has occasionally happened. Either we condemn all violence or we are not placed to

condemn any of it.

Like many others, I do not believe that direct rule is a workable option for Ireland. I believe that nothing short of a united Ireland will bring about an end to the troubles that have assailed our involvement with that island over hundreds of years, with an especial viciousness over the past two decades. Throughout my parliamentary career I shall continue to press at every opportunity for a withdrawal of Britain from Ireland and the opening to a united Ireland in which the Irish People can decide how best to govern themselves.

There are many inevitable contradictions - I am sure that many right hon. and hon. Members will not share this view - in what I perceive as a colonial situation. As in the past, it is inevitable that problems will arise when one power occupies wholly or in part another nation with a separate culture and identity. With the best intentions in the world, the occupying power is led into abuse of its authority, and in so doing alienates key sections of the community.

I should imagine that much the most effective method of recruitment into the IRA has been the consistent abuse of power over decades by those who held the whip hand while Stormont existed through 50 years of misrule. The only thing that is remarkable is that it took 50 years before the present violence erupted. That suggests a degree of patience and tolerance on the part of the minority of Northern Ireland that I do not think many other peoples around the world would necessarily have been prepared to equal.

There have been many instances when the present Government's policies and their agents have been ideal recruiting agents for the IRA. The attitude of the Government towards the hunger strike did more to boost support for those pursuing a violent solution for Northern Ireland than anything that they could have done themselves.

There is no doubt in my mind that the Royal Ulster Constabulary had a shoot-to-kill policy. That has been successfully covered up, but it came close to exposure when Mr. John Stalker was set to investigate it. When it became clear that he was not prepared to be corrupt and that he would not do a whitewash job to let the RUC off the hook, the British establishment, through all its usual means, ensured that he was removed from his task. I wish that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland would pursue the inquiry with the same vigour that he condemns the terrorists and ensure that the results of it are brought to the Floor of the House as rapidly as possible as a matter of public debate. As long as the minority in Northern Ireland believes that there is one law and one tone of condemnation of violence for one section of the community but not the other, we shall not be able to achieve any real progress towards peace.

Representatives of the unionist parties have talked about double standards, and these cannot be denied. We have heard since the Gracious Speech that the British Government intend to continue with the policies that they have been pursuing in the north and possibly to sharpen them to end discrimination against the minority in employment. I welcome that, but if it is good enough for Northern Ireland, why do the British Government do everything possible to prevent Labour councils in Britain that wish to adopt similar policies from ending discrimination against minorities in Britain? We shall not be able to unite the people of Northern Ireland while we have a policy stance for them that is different from that for the rest of the United Kingdom. That makes a mockery of the idea that this is a united kingdom.

One of the greatest problems to arise during the present troubles has been the backlash against the Irish community in Britain, which my constituents in Brent have suffered. Far too many innocent people are subject to harassment by the use of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. It has been used in a way which was never intended. Still today not 1 per cent. of those detained and harassed by the security forces - I am talking about individual Irish women and men making their way backwards and forwards between the two countries - is ever convicted of any form of crime. The Prevention of Terrorism Act is being used by agents of the British state to harass those who actively campaign for a united Ireland. Every time they do it a nail is driven further into the concept of our remaining with any hold in Ireland.

As many other nations have found - for example, the French in Algeria - it is inevitable that if we set out to hold a nation against its will, however good our intentions, abuses of power will occur. I wish to draw attention to that by referring to one specific instance.

During my election campaign in Brent, East, there was an unusual public meeting. An individual was invited to it who has never been a Socialist, who will never be prepared to vote Labour and who thinks that the Tory party is the natural governing party of Britain. He was invited to share a platform with myself and some of the relatives of those who have been subject to miscarriages of justice by the British courts over issues of bombing here in Britain. We invited Mr. Fred Holroyd. For those who do not know, Mr. Holroyd served in Northern Ireland with distinction. As I said, he is no Socialist. He comes from a military family. He went to a Yorkshire grammar school. His whole objective in life was to serve in the British Army. He believed in it totally. He enlisted as a private in the gunners, and three years later he was commissioned into the Royal Corps of Transport. He volunteered for the Special Military Intelligence unit in Northern Ireland when the present troubles began, and he was trained at the Joint Services School of Intelligence. Once his training was finished, he was stationed in Portadown, where, for two and a half years, he ran a series of intelligence operations. I quote him so that there can be no suspicion that he might be a secret member of the Militant Tendency or a secret republican. At the public meeting, his words were that he believed that the Army officers and men with whom he worked were

"genuinely honest men trying to do the best job in the circumstances.  
They were in a no-win situation."

When he was recruited as an MI6 officer, he said of them that they were not disagreeable; their ethics were reasonable; they were seeking a political solution. His complaint, which eventually led to his removal from the Army and an attempt to discredit him, which has been largely successful, was made when the MI6 operation was taken over by MI5 in 1975 - by many of the same people who are dealt with in Peter Wright's book, and many of the same people who are alleged to have been practising treason against the elected Labour Government of the time. He said that once the MI5 took over, the reasonable ethics of MI6 were pushed aside by operatives in the intelligence world who supported the views of Mr. Kitson and the policies and tactics of subverting the subverters. I recommend Brigadier Kitson's words to those who are not aware of them. His attitude was to create a counter-terror group, to have agents provocateur, to infiltrate, and to run a dirty tricks campaign in an attempt to discredit the IRA.

Mr. Holroyd continued to believe that what he was doing was in the best interests of

the British state until early in 1975, when Captain Robert Nairac, who, as many hon. Members will know, was later murdered by the IRA, went into his office, fresh from a cross-border operation - something that of course is completely illegal - and showed him the colour photographs that had been taken by Captain Nairac's team. Captain Nairac had crossed the border with some volunteers from the UDF. He had assassinated John Francis Green, an active member of the IRA who was living south of the border. As an agent of the British Government operating across the border as an assassin he had brought back photographs as proof of that operation. When Captain Nairac showed the photographs, Mr. Holroyd started to object, not because he objected to an active member of the IRA being assassinated in a highly illegal cross-border raid but because he realised that once the British state started to perpetrate such methods there was no way that, eventually, Britain would not alienate vast sections of the community and eventually lose the struggle for the hearts and minds of the Irish people.

Holroyd then started to object to the use of such illegal methods by MI5 officers. He was immediately shuffled to one side by the expedient method of being taken to a mental hospital and being declared basically unfit for duty. During the month that he spent in the British mental hospital, the three tests that were administered to him were completely successfully passed. Certainly, over a decade later, having met him, I can see no evidence whatsoever that he was in some sense mentally unbalanced. He was a spy who realised that the operations of the British Government were counter-productive. He started to object, and was pushed to one side for his pains.

I raise the link with Captain Robert Nairac because, as I said, Fred Holroyd had qualms about this but was not particularly shocked; these things happen in a war. The matter needs to be investigated. I cannot prove the claims but allegations are being made extensively here in Britain, in republican circles and on Irish radio and television. A particularly horrifying incident that many hon. Members will remember was the murder of three members of the Miami showband - completely innocent musicians with no political affiliations whatsoever. It took place in the midst of the cease-fire that had been negotiated by the then Labour Government and the IRA. The right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) pushed it through and sustained it, although there was considerable opposition from within the security services and within many political parties. The Labour Government did everything possible to make the cease-fire work, but it was not wholly accepted within the apparatus of MI5 - our operatives who allegedly were working on behalf of the British state in Northern Ireland.

What is particularly disturbing is that what looked at the time like a random act of maniacal violence and sectarian killing now begins to take on a much more sinister stance. It has begun to emerge that Captain Robert Nairac is quite likely to have been the person who organised the killing of the three Miami showband musicians. The evidence for that allegation is forensic and members of the UDF are prepared to say that they were aware of the dealings between members of the UDF gang who actually undertook the murder of the Miami showband musicians. The evidence is quite clear. The same gun that was used by Captain Nairac on his cross-border trip to assassinate John Francis Green was used in the Miami showband massacre.

Earlier this year, the radio and television service of southern Ireland, RTE, showed a documentary in which the makers - not myself; no one could accuse RTE of being pro-IRA - that allege they have now had contacts with members of the UDF in that

area who say that Captain Nairac passed the explosives and the guns to the UDF and set up the killing of the Miami showband musicians. If that is true, it needs to be investigated. The allegation was made on the broadcasting networks of southern Ireland. It is supported by men who served on behalf of Britain as spies in the area at the time. It needs to be investigated and disproved, or the people behind it rooted out. If one wanted to find a way of ending the cease-fire that had been negotiated between the Labour Government and the IRA, what better way to do so than to encourage random sectarian killings? I believe that that was happening.

It is likely that many of the officers mentioned in Peter Wright's book who were practising treason against the British Government at home were also practising treason against the British Government in Ireland. If the allegations are true, they were prepared to murder innocent Catholics to start a wave of sectarian killing which would bring to an end the truce that the Labour Government had negotiated with the IRA. No democratic society can allow that sort of allegation to go uninvestigated. It is made by people who served on our behalf as intelligence officers in the area.

We saw in last Sunday's edition of *The Observer* that another intelligence officer, Colin Wallace, who was closely linked with Fred Holroyd in a campaign to expose what is going on, has been dismissed as irrelevant by the British Government. We see now that *The Observer*, using forensic tests, has been able to demonstrate that the notes that he wrote were not written in the past couple of years by somebody who is embittered and is trying to cash in on what has started to come out. A clear analysis of the ink that was used in the notes shows that they were written in the early 1970s. Slowly, it all begins to pull together.

The interesting thing about the Peter Wright case is that in his defence in court he said that he was a loyal servant of Britain, and that he sought only to expose corruption and spies in Britain and an establishment that covered them up. One of the arguments by which he demonstrated his loyalty to Britain was when he said in his book that he did not deal with what he knew about operations in Ireland because that could still be damaging to the British Government.

One needs to take together the accusations of Wallace and Holroyd and link them clearly to what is being said by Peter Wright. There was not just treason by some MI5 officers in Britain. Treason was also taking place in Ireland. Those employed by the British state are alleged to have been responsible for killing innocent civilians in order to end a cease-fire with which they disagreed because their political objectives were different from those of the Labour Government of the day. That is a most horrifying crime.

Wallace and Holroyd are making these quite specific allegations. They are now drafting a book that will expose much more, and we need to ask why the British Government take no action to stop them or to silence them. They pursue Peter Wright, but they are terrified that if they take Wallace and Holroyd to court they will expose in court things that will shake the Government to its foundations.

A stupid thing happened when the British Army decided to get Holroyd out and discredit him. The officer put in as his replacement, and who was unaware of what had been going on, arrived in the office and assembled all of Holroyd's papers into a large container and dispatched them to his home. Before the British Government start rubbishing Holroyd too flamboyantly, they should be warned that he retains almost all

the case papers that were in his control. They deal with his operations and his work and they are safely out of this country and beyond the reach of the Government.

We must have a full investigation. Before I could happily vote for this extension of direct rule, I want to see some evidence that the Government are prepared to ensure that these abuses are exposed. I want them to guarantee that similar abuses are not continuing. The whole series of events about which I have spoken must be investigated. Very soon we must have the full evidence about the shoot-to-kill policy of the RUC because I have no doubt that that is being covered up. It would have been most useful if John Stalker had been able to conclude his inquiry after the attempt to discredit him had been exposed and overturned by the local police authority.

We have to examine other allegations made on RTE that MI5 officers were engaged in undermining the power sharing Executive set up by the Government of the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath). We have to look again at the allegations by Colin Wallace about the Kincora boys' home scandal. It has been suggested that young boys in a home effectively controlled by MI5 were buggered so that Protestant politicians could be blackmailed and silenced by MI5. That allegation cannot continue to drift around. It must be investigated and the truth exposed. The longer the British Government cover up and deny all this and refuse to investigate, the more the impression will be created that they know full well what has been going on and that far too many members of the Government are the beneficiaries of these acts of treason by MI5 officers in Britain and abroad.

I do not believe for a minute that these things could have been going on without members of the Conservative party being kept informed in the generality if not in specific details. It looks increasingly likely that Mr. Airey Neave was in touch with some of these officers, and it is certainly the case that Airey Neave delivered a speech that had been -

**Mr. Gow:** On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. It is with very great reluctance that I intervene during the maiden speech of the hon. Member for Brent, East (Mr. Livingstone), but will you please make it clear to him, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that references to Airey Neave of the kind that we have heard are deeply offensive?

**Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harold Walker):** Order. Hon. Members making their first speech in the House are usually heard without interruption. So far I have heard nothing in the speech of the hon. Member for Brent, East (Mr. Livingstone) that is out of order.

**Mr. Livingstone:** May I make it clear to the House that I am reporting allegations that hon. Members have read in newspapers and that are reported on radio and television both here and abroad. They are made by intelligence officers who served at the time in Ireland on behalf of the British Government. It may well be that the allegations are all a tissue of lies, but can we imagine any other Western Government who would allow such damaging allegations to circulate month after month and year after year and not move to lance the boil? They would either deal with the allegations or demonstrate that they were untrue. The Prime Minister's day-by-day refusal to investigate what was happening in MI5 at that time can only lead a large number of reasonable people both here and abroad to believe that there is some element of truth in the allegations now circulating.

If Conservative Members are shocked that allegations are made about Airey Neave,

they should join me in demanding a full investigation so that Airey Neave's name can be cleared. Why just Airey Neave? The allegations that I have outlined to the House about Captain Robert Nairac should also be investigated, as should the allegations about the Kincora boys' home. They should be investigated by a Committee of the House so that we can know the truth. As long as the Prime Minister continues to resist this, and as long as it is quite obvious that she was the main beneficiary of the work of these traitorous officers in MI5, many reasonable people cannot avoid the conclusion that she was kept informed to some degree via Airey Neave who had close links with the intelligence services. He made a speech for which false information was provided by Colin Wallace, and Colin Wallace now admits that.

There is something rotten at the heart of the British security services, and we will not have a safe democracy until it is exposed in its entirety and dealt with.

6.47 pm

## US involvement in the Fiji coup d'etat

**This article presents an analysis of United States involvement in the coup in Fiji. The authors support the demands made in Washington by deposed Fijian Prime Minister, Dr Bavadra, for a Congressional investigation of American involvement.**

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The one-month-old Labour Coalition government of Fiji was terminated on May 14 1987 in a coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, third-in-command of the 2,600-strong Royal Fiji Military Force.

Rabuka established a provisional government including Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, prime minister in the Alliance Party which had governed Fiji since Britain granted independence in 1970.

Obviously there were a multitude of influences leading to the coup. There is an apparently eternal triangle in Fiji - European capital, Indian labour, and ethnic Fijian land ownership. This manifests itself in all sorts of conflicts, especially between ethnic Fijians and Indo-Fijians. All these issues were involved in the coup, but there is growing evidence that the US encouraged and exploited them to bring about the coup.

For the Americans the main issue in the April election was Labour's nuclear-free policy. Originally Fiji had been one of the leaders in the movement to make the Pacific nuclear-free. It had co-sponsored with New Zealand a United Nations resolution for a South Pacific zone in 1975, and banned nuclear warships long before New Zealand did. Then in 1983 the US persuaded Mara to drop the ban. This was a contributing factor to the formation of the Fijian Labour Party a couple of years later.

The US regards nuclear-free policies as an even bigger threat in the South Pacific than the Soviet Union. In 1982 an earlier ambassador to Fiji, William Bodde Jr, summarised the US attitude at a luncheon in the Kanala Hilton, Hawaii.

"The most potentially disruptive development for US relations with the South Pacific

is the growing anti-nuclear movement in the region ... a nuclear free zone would be unacceptable to the US given our strategic needs ... I am convinced that the US must do everything possible to counter this movement ... It will not be an easy task, but it is one that we cannot afford to neglect," he said.

In 1986 Admiral Ronald J Hays, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) said: "I am concerned about the growth of the Fiji Labour Party." (*Guardian Weekly*, May 24 1987)

The Heritage Foundation's Richard Fisher saw Fiji's return to a nuclear-free policy as presenting "a very significant opportunity to the Soviets for increasing their presence in the Pacific". In July 1986 he urged Washington to undertake an expanded programme to rebuild support for Anzus in New Zealand.

The US State Department said it "concerns us because the proliferation of nuclear-free zones ... could affect our ability to deter the Soviet Union". After the election Washington showed its displeasure with the result by failing to send the traditional note of congratulation to the new government.

### **State Department 'gratified', Pentagon 'delighted'**

Since May 14 the US has been careful not to express too much enthusiasm for the coup, and just as careful not to condemn it. The State Department position, first expressed on May 15 was to "affirm" to Rabuka "the importance of respect for democratic traditions and processes" without suggesting that he had shown any lack of such respect.

"The US was gratified that there had been no bloodshed," a spokeswoman said.

Unofficially the US military have been far less guarded in their gratification. The *Sydney Morning Herald*, a "quality" conservative paper quoted an unnamed Pentagon source as saying: "We're kinda delighted ... All of a sudden our ships couldn't go to Fiji, and now all of a sudden they can ..." (*Sydney Morning Herald*, May 16 1987)

Mara claims that no less a person than Secretary of State Shultz has "given his blessings" to the post-coup provisional government and assured him that the US was "on standby to help if needed". These claims are vigorously denied by the US embassy in Fiji. (*Evening Post*, May 26 1987)

### **The 1982 election**

American involvement in the previous election sets the scene for interpreting what was behind the coup. Outside involvement in the July 1982 election is relatively well documented, thanks to Mara's allegation that the opposition had received a million dollar donation from the Soviet Union.

The single piece of "evidence" was a letter supposedly written by then opposition leader Siddiq Koya. It is now widely known that this letter was in fact forged by Leonard (now Sir Leonard) Usher, former mayor of Suva and editor of the *Fiji Times*, widely involved in production of Alliance Party propaganda.

A Royal Commission of Inquiry was set up after the election to investigate Mara's

claim. It also looked at more substantive complaints from the opposition. Mara panicked and withdrew his allegations part way through the commission's sittings, so its main role was to document the opposition claims.

However the commission, headed by retired New Zealand High Court judge Sir John White, produced what was basically a white-wash. The original expose by Australian television's *Four Corners* (*National Times*, July 4-10 1982) is actually far more informative.

What was exposed was that Mara's election strategy had been mapped out by a US consultancy firm, Business International. Boasting offices all over the world Business International was described by the *New York Times* as doing contract work for the CIA. (*New York Times*, December 27 1977)

Business International came to Fiji thanks to a wealthy businessman and friend of Mara. Motibhai (Mac) Patel enlisted the consultants supposedly to aid his business. It was only as an afterthought that they were "lent" to Mara, with Mac supposedly paying the bill. Business International had previously been active in Australia, especially in helping to ease Bob Hawke, "America's man" into the leadership of the Australian Labor Party.

For the Fiji job they sent along an Australian, Alan Carroll, a graduate of Georgetown's School of Foreign Service. This provided cover to bring in an American CIA employee, Dr Jeffrey Race, who operated under a business cover called Asian Strategy based in Bangkok. The aptly named Dr Race was a specialist in Malaysian politics, which had a racial basis somewhat similar to those promoted by Mara (an ethnic Fijian).

Among scenarios proposed by Race was one called "Malaysian replay" because of the "uncanny likeness" between the political situations facing Mara and Tunku Rahman in Malaysia. "Strategies" proposed included one aimed at a Nationalist leader - "either buy him off or take him out of the running". One against another Ratu (chief) said "since he is going to jail anyway, best to pile all effort on and accelerate prosecution so he cannot run".

Carroll held a public opinion survey to identify the issues most suitable for exploitation in Fiji. He picked an Australian journalist to generate election propaganda for Mara. The job was to report back to Business International on campaign progress from a supposedly non-political position in Fiji's somewhat Orwellian-sounding Ministry of Information. The White Commission report subsequently described the Business International recommendations as "morally repugnant".

## **United States grooming of Mara**

The relationship between the US and Mara had begun earlier. Back in 1982 the vocal and vigorous Fred Eckert was appointed US ambassador. Eckert was the supposed mastermind behind the Koya forged letter affair.

After the election, Eckert accompanied Mara on a celebrated "confidential" visit to CINCPAC in Hawaii. Mara was appointed to the Standing Committee of the US-sponsored and dominated Pacific Islands Development Program (PIDP) and later became its chairman. Set up as an alternative to less co-optable bodies such as the

South Pacific Forum and South Pacific Commission, PIDP is located at the East-West Centre in Honolulu. This in turn is financed by USIA and the Asia Foundation, the latter at least occasionally a CIA front. Two foundation representatives visited Wellington in June 1987 on a "fact-finding mission" sponsored by the US embassy.

In 1983 Mara responded to the overtures by announcing that nuclear ships were again welcome in Fiji. Later that year he became the first South Pacific head of state to get a full-scale red-carpet welcome at the White House.

Reagan praised his "political courage" in allowing nuclear warships into Fiji. Secretary of State Shultz told him: "Your decision to restore access to United States naval vessels to your ports was both bold and wise, and peace in the Pacific is more secure because of it."

Mara was declared "Pacific Man of the Year" by the US AID-financed and allegedly CIA-influenced Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific.

In 1985 he was back in Washington to open a Fiji embassy. Among the guests was James Lilley, documented as a senior CIA career officer (*New York Times*, November 16 1981) and currently US ambassador to South Korea.

### **Aid money to boost Mara**

The US also attempted to boost Mara's popularity while he was in Washington in 1983. They announced that Fiji would become the first South Pacific country to get handouts from the US. This started off with about \$300,000 per year under the Weapon Standardisation Program, mainly for the purchase of small arms.

Justifying such lavishness DoD's Paul Wolfowitz told Congress that Fiji was a particularly deserving ally because it had "reopened its ports to all our US navy ships" and "gives the US particularly strong support on a number of important international issues, including Grenada, the KAL (shootdown) incident, and Afghanistan".

This was followed by about \$2.5 million a year in non-military aid, so that Fiji, already the richest country in the South Pacific (apart from Australia and New Zealand), now gets far more US funding than any other country in the region. The head of the Asia Bureau of US AID noted that the Fiji programme "reflects the geopolitical nature of our interests" (rather than any particular need on the part of Fiji).

To administer the non-military aid, AID set up a South-east Pacific Regional Office within the Suva embassy, currently headed by William Paupe. He was reportedly involved in covert/special operations in South-east Asia in the Vietnam war years when US AID was a conduit for CIA programmes such as "strategic hamletization" and the training of South Vietnam police.

Paupe was allegedly later involved in training Marcos palace guards together with British soldier of fortune Graeme Gibson, now director of Tropic Images, a Sydney-registered possible CIA front company. US AID money administered by Paupe supposedly ends up on island projects carried out by Tropic Images.

These days Paupe is more important around Suva than the US ambassador. He accompanied Mara to a PIDP meeting in Honolulu on April 27-28 (1987), when Mara

is believed to have been making arrangements for the coup. He also sat in on the meetings Vernon Walters had in Suva.

American AID is particularly valuable to the US for penetration of the Fiji bureaucracy. According to US AID regulations, recipient countries must open up their bureaucracies and books to allow verification of the use of US funds.

## **Pacific Democratic Union**

Another channel for assisting Mara has been the so-called Pacific Democratic Union (PDU) a US-sponsored grouping of right-wing political parties, financed by the National Endowment for Democracy, which in turn gets funds from USIA. The PDU has financed travel for Alliance Party functionaries as well as the New Zealand National Party.

On the day of the coup, Mara was co-chairing a PDU meeting at Pacific Harbour outside Suva. At this meeting were Brian Talboys, Sue Wood and Barry Leay, all of the National Party, and Neil Brown, Australian Liberal Party deputy leader and foreign affairs spokesman.

The PDU meeting provided a kind of alibi for Mara, and both Talboys and Brown lent support to Mara's claim that he was not involved in the coup. Brown also caused a minor political storm in Australia by offering support to the coup (*The Australian*, May 16 1987).

Another vehicle for US penetration of Fiji is the Pacific Basin Democratic Development project. Funded by NED, it is run by the National Republican Institute for International Affairs, the wing of the US Republican Party supposedly promoting American-style democracy overseas. The Pacific project, with \$15,000, is undertaken in co-operation with the PDU. (*Sydney Morning Herald*, May 19 1987)

## **Business and government corruption**

Corruption was rife within Mara's government. There is little doubt that the threat of exposure provided strong motives for Mara, his cabinet and certain business interests (particularly Australian) to support the coup. The new government was threatening to open the books. Mara himself had most to fear, having accumulated a fortune of \$4-6 million on his salary of \$100,000 a year. (David Robie, *New Zealand Sunday Times*, May 31 1987)

Among the reasonably well-documented scandals, garment manufacturers had paid \$52,000 to Mara to ensure workers' wages would not be raised. The Australian Kerry Packer group (now Alan Bond) allegedly paid kickbacks to Mara to obtain a 12 year monopoly on television broadcasting.

Emperor Gold Mines were reportedly paying hush money to Apisai Tora and the Taukei movement to cover up various land and other swindles. Emperor is owned by Western Mining (of Australia) which in turn is linked to Baron Offshore. The authors understand that 51 percent of Emperor Gold Mines is owned by New Zealander John Spencer of Caxton Paper Mills. *Time* magazine (*Time*, June 1 1987) related that an oceanographic ship donated to Fiji by Australia under its Defence Co-operation Program, carried a load of Israeli Uzi machine guns to Fiji shortly before the coup, and

that Baron Offshore provided bridging finance for the weaponry. According to other sources the ship itself formerly belonged to Baron and the consignment consisted of 2000 machine guns.

A major figure in the corruption scene has been Peter Stinson, Mara's Minister of Economic Development. New Zealand PM David Lange claimed on May 30 that covering up Stinson's dirty dealings was a prime motive for the coup.

Initially Stinson was on Colonel Rabuka's council of advisers but was later dropped from the provisional government because of his tainted reputation. Stinson himself said he joined Rabuka's coup because of the threat from Libya. He admitted there was corruption in Fiji, but on a far lesser scale than in the Australian state of New South Wales. (*The Dominion*, May 21 1987)

According to journalist David Robie and others, the Fiji National Bank had, at government request, written off a \$3-4 million loan to Stinson-Pearce, and further debts of about \$14 million were still outstanding with Stinson's firm.

Stinson and his father Charles were principal developers of the immense Pacific Harbour tourist complex, constructed while Charles Stinson was Minister of Finance.

One of the principal financiers was Adnan Khashoggi, (*The New Zealand Listener*, March 5 1977) famed Saudi billionaire gun-runner and beneficiary of Lockheed bribes, commissions and kickbacks, also involved in the Iran-Contra scandal. Khashoggi has reportedly since pulled his money out, but still has links with Mara. His private DC-9 airliner was most recently seen in Fiji in November 1986.(*IB*, December 1986)

## **Cultivation of Fiji's military elite**

Fiji is unique amongst the South Pacific island states for its relatively large military force. About half of this force is permanently stationed in the Middle East - 600 soldiers with United Nations peace-keeping forces in Lebanon and 500 with the US-sponsored multi-lateral force in the Sinai.

Desert duty in particular provides for much fraternising between Fijian and US soldiers. Fiji was the first ally to "offer" troops for the Sinai, presumably by prior arrangement. In addition the US has two programmes - PAMS and IMET - aimed at cultivating a working relationship with the Fiji officer corps.

Most important are the Pacific Armies Management Seminars organised by the Western Command of the US army from Fort Shafter, Hawaii.

These lavish ten-day events held in expensive hotels involve typically less than three hours of working sessions per day. Sightseeing tours, luncheons, dinners, cocktail hours, happy hours, parties and picnics make up the rest of the time. About half the officers present are US army. The rest come from "allied and friendly" armies around the Pacific Basin and the Indian Ocean.

The US army justifies these seminars by noting that the officer elites involved often are or become "the dominant political as well as military force in their respective countries".

General Forrester, who formerly headed the PAMS programme, said in 1982 that PAMS was directed at young majors and colonels "because they'll be in their services for a long period of time". Friendships formed at PAMS were useful to the US because, years later, if you need "old Joe" to facilitate something for the US, all that is needed is to "call him on the phone, or you write him a personal note, and Joe, because he knows you, will be helpful".

Colonel Rabuka, then a major, attended a PAMS in Manila in 1981. Among the more interesting speakers at that seminar was General Fabian Ver, the Philippines Chief of Staff, later found responsible for the assassination of Benigno Aquino, and sponsor of the aborted July 1986 coup against Cory Aquino.

## **Pentagon programmes**

The other way to cultivate the Fijian military has been through Fijian participation, since 1983, in the Pentagon's International Military Education and Training Program. The US spends \$125,000 a year putting Fijian officers through US military staff colleges and courses (about twice what it spends on IMET in Papua New Guinea). A US JCS "Military Posture Statement" (US JCS "Military Posture Statement", 1984) claims that "IMET training significantly increases the probability of establishing and maintaining long term co-operative relationships through military-to-military contacts..."

A table printed in the 1984 statement showed that 25 heads of state around the world had previously trained in US military colleges.

## **Subversion of trade unions**

Fiji is unusual among South Pacific countries for its high degree of unionisation. From about 1982 the US has been actively penetrating and subverting Fijian unions and attempting to undermine Pacific Trade Union Forum support for a nuclear-free Pacific.

This began with the setting up, through the right-wing US trade union confederation AFL-CIO, of a "Labour Committee on Pacific Affairs" originally involving US, Australian and New Zealand unionists. It held its first full meeting in Sydney in December 1983 with PNG and Fiji unionists in attendance.

It was described as "the vehicle by which the Right of the union movement in both Australia and the US will attempt to influence union movements, not just in developing Pacific nations such as Papua New Guinea, but also in New Zealand". (*The Australian*, January 12 1984) This turns out to be exactly what happened.

LCPA's most visible form of activity has been organising trips to the US for unionists for indoctrination on the Soviet threat and so forth, in briefings at various right-wing think tanks.

On the surface it did not seem to be particularly successful - Fijian guests complained about pro-US and anti-Soviet biases.

The whole effort was devastatingly exposed in New Zealand (*New Zealand Times*, October 30 1983) where LCPA was shown to have a number of clear connections to documented CIA front organisations and individuals. These included the Labour

attache at the Wellington embassy and covert action protagonist Roy Goodson of the Georgetown International Labor Program.

## **CIA money for Suva**

By 1984, LCPA was inactive, presumably as a result of the bad publicity, which forced New Zealand unionists to drop out. Many of its activists were resurfacing however in the Asia-America Free Labour Institute (AAFLI) which has similar CIA connections.

Meanwhile the focus seemed to concentrate more on Fiji, with New Zealand apparently regarded as a lost cause, at least for the time being. AAFLI had been operating in Fiji since the early 1970s, wooing the Fiji trade union movement with small grants, free travel and other hard-to-trace favours.

It got into the big time in September 1984, opening an office and holding a seminar in Suva. Initially the office was operated by Valentine Suazo, with well known CIA connections, an expert in subverting Latin American trade unionists, and exposed by ex-CIA agent Philip Agee.

The Suva office was funded by NED "to act as a liaison on publications, education and membership services for a number of unions" (HR Ctee For. Aff. Appropns f86-7 for DoS, USIA etc, p498) Congress was told.

Fiji activities of the LCPA were exposed in the *Sydney Morning Herald*. (*Sydney Morning Herald*, June 17 1986) Documents obtained under the US FOIA showed that the Suva office had spent \$1 million in the previous two years, and had claimed responsibility for defeat of a nuclear-free Pacific resolution before the PTUF.

After the *Sydney Morning Herald* expose the Suva office closed down in September 1986. The public explanation was that it was more efficient to run the programme from Hawaii, and conditions were made difficult by "the formation of an anti-government political party by the principal unions in Fiji". (*Honolulu Star Bulletin*, January 10 1987) Unofficially it was said that AAFLI withdrew because of the bad publicity in the Australian press.

In retrospect it is now obvious that AAFLI was withdrawn because its work was completed - an infrastructure had been set up in Fiji for control of trade unions, and once it was built, the visible part of it - the office - was removed, leaving the concealed nine tenths still in place.

Before, during, and after the coup this infrastructure functioned reasonably smoothly, with no visible US involvement. In particular, the pleas from Fiji to end the Australasian trade union ban on trade with Fiji were orchestrated by the FTUC secretary, James Raman, an AAFLI recruit. Similarly, at the Australian end, attempts by ACTU assistant secretary Gary Weaven and others to end the ban owed much to years of AFL-CIO involvement in Australian unionism.

## **Rabuka's role in the coup**

There has been much debate as to the extent to which Rabuka was solely responsible for the coup. Mara's political opponents all believe the former prime minister was

involved if not primarily responsible. But there is little *direct* evidence for this apart from the celebrated pre-coup golf game between Mara and Rabuka.

Most commentators assume that Mara and other Alliance personalities were involved. The *Sydney Morning Herald* reported that the Australian Government had received information suggesting prior knowledge by both the Governor-General and the former prime minister. (*Sydney Morning Herald*, May 19 1987)

"Ratu Mara was in it from the beginning," said one source. *The Times on Sunday* said that while initial intelligence advice was that it was a narrowly based military coup, within a few days evidence was available to the Australian Government that the coup "was backed by the entire Fiji power elite". (*Times on Sunday*, May 24 1987)

Rabuka told journalists that advance knowledge of the coup was widespread in Suva. In fact the coup came as a surprise to all. Prior knowledge may have been restricted to as few as 60 military people. (*The Age*, May 20 1987) One of these, Lieutenant Colonel George Korote has emphasised the narrow military participation:

"It is a funny thing. If you study military coups all over the world, normally the leader rallies the troops before he executes the plan. It was the opposite in this case. The Colonel carried out the coup and then rallied his men," he said. (*Sydney Morning Herald*, May 22 1987)

Another foreign influence in Fijian politics has been the Hans Seidel Foundation, the foreign arm of Franz-Josef Strauss' Christian Social Union, which has an impressive building in Suva. HSF functions as a West German version of NED/PDU, works closely with the Heritage Foundation, and in Fiji has been involved in aid projects, television programming, and assistance to the Alliance Party.

The foundation is regarded with considerable suspicion in Fiji. It is credited with spending millions of dollars on a Fijian grassroots cultural revival which has been thin cover for fostering the Taukei movement.

## **Were Freeman and Jays involved?**

A possible covert action group that needs to be investigated is the Wellington-based Dundas Maritime Services/Dundas Publications. Major Dundas has had long involvement with the New Zealand National Party and the New Zealand SIS.

Reportedly working for him in Fiji are Paul Freeman and Rohan Jays, who were both involved in a destabilisation action against a New Zealand Labour government in 1975. Whether Jays, a former New Zealand SIS agent, is now in Fiji is not established, but Freeman is definitely there and involved in shady and reportedly very successful business ventures. Freeman was in Western Samoa during the Fiji elections and met with cabinet ministers. He went from there to American Samoa, and then back to Fiji. After the coup he was having daily meetings with Peter Stinson.

## **United States military preparations**

Since around 1982 there has been a big increase in US military and other activities in the South Pacific. This intensified after the 1984 New Zealand election. Although

most of this activity was not specifically related to Fiji, much of it was probably useful there.

Most important was the construction of a State Department communications relay in American Samoa - a DSCS military satellite terminal connected to a high frequency station - to provide "rapid, reliable, and secure ... means of communicating policy issues, political reports ... [and] dealing with emergency-type situations".

It was opened in December 1986 and so far the Suva embassy is the first and only facility to be hooked up to it. Thus it provides a back-door channel of communication to Hawaii and Washington invulnerable to accidental or intentional eavesdropping by Fiji telecom operators or the Fiji Police Special Branch.

There has also been a modest but significant build-up of US combat readiness in the South Pacific, again centred on American Samoa. Here the US army presence has been upgraded from detachment to company size. If Rabuka's coup had gone wrong, these troops would have been available to "protect the lives of US citizens", Grenada-style.

### **"Red Orchestra" conference**

The Hoover Institute's now infamous March 1987 Red Orchestra conference in Washington (to which Sir Ewan Jameson and Frank Corner were invited) was attended by several of the peripheral actors in the Fiji coup. It may have helped provide them with background useful when the coup happened. Among participants were:

Joiji Kotabalavu - former Fijian secretary of Foreign Affairs, now involved with PIDP and the Consultative Committee in offshore prospecting, a Mara supporter.

Michael Easson - right-wing Australian trade unionist, former LCPA secretary, active in Fiji before coup and in breaking the trade ban in Australia afterwards.

John Whitehall - Australian chief of the US-based Christian Anti-communist Crusade, who claims to have been in Fiji during the coup, and was on a lecture tour of New Zealand after it.

Colin Rubinstein - right-wing academic at Monash University, who has been reporting articles attributing the formation of the Fiji Labour Party to a conference held in Prague in 1958. Whitehall has also peddled a similar line.

### **The 1987 election**

Surprisingly, there is little evidence for US involvement in the election itself, apart from all the stroking of Mara already described. However at the time of the coup the Bavadra government was investigating material which indicated that the US embassy, via William Paupe, was funding Apisai Tora, Mara's Minister of Transport. Tora is a leader in the Fiji-for-Fijians Taukei movement, which functioned as a right-wing to the Alliance Party.

More recently Bavadra has publicly charged in Washington that William Paupe had paid \$200,000 to Tora to stir up riots, Jim Anthony adding that Paupe had been carrying on like a "barefooted Ollie North".

There are also allegations that Tora and Paupe were involved in joint misuse of about \$1 million of AID funds for their personal enrichment.

After the election the Taukei movement organised violent protest rallies, barricades and firebombings in a campaign of destabilisation which prepared the way for the coup.

As a result Apisai Tora was arrested for sedition. Mara's son Ratu Finau and many other Alliance people were also involved. These disturbances appear to be the main Alliance contribution to the coup.

Photocopies of a letter purportedly from the Iranian ambassador to Thailand addressed to Ahmed Ali, Mara's Minister of Information, have been leaked to the press. The letter says that \$125,000 in an unspecified currency has been put in an Alliance account "to assist you in your efforts to carry out Allah's work in Fiji". Another \$125,000 would be contributed "nearer to election time".

Most people who have seen copies regard the letter as a forgery, possibly intended to create divisions between Hindus and Moslems. Any such division would have worked to the advantage of Mara.

### **After the election - Mara visits Honolulu**

A week after the election, Mara made a trip to Honolulu, accompanied by William Paupe, to attend a PIDP Standing Committee meeting at the East-West Center.

While there they reportedly met with retired Admiral Lloyd Vasey of the allegedly CIA-financed Pacific Forum think tank. Formerly in naval intelligence, Vasey was in Task Force 157, and was a talent scout for the CIA-front bank, Nugan Hand. He visited New Zealand late in June 1987 on a "study tour" of the South Pacific.

### **United States coupmaster visits**

A few days after Mara was in Honolulu and two weeks before the coup, General Vernon Walters arrived in Suva. He is regarded as having been involved in more coups than anyone else still in US government service. Some highlights of his resume are:

- 1941 Walters joined US army as private. He attended Military Intelligence Training Center where he was taught techniques of interrogating prisoners of war. Walters stayed with the army for 25 years in a variety of assignments, mostly with Defence Intelligence Agency and retired a General in 1976.
- 1953 The General admits to being involved in the coup against Mossadegh which resulted in the Shah taking over in Iran.
- 1960-62 Military attache in Rome, helping CIA distribute funds to right-wing parties.
- 1964 In Brazil. Described as "lynchpin" in General Branco's bloody coup against Goulart. Branco was a friend of 20 years' standing.
- 1972-76 While still in the army Walters was deputy director of CIA and helped The Service through Watergate and the Pinochet coup against Allende in Chile. He was involved in the assassination of Allende's former defence minister,

Orlando Letelier.

- 1976-81 Employed apparently in the private sector, Walters worked for an arms dealer called Environmental Energy Systems Inc, exporting arms to Morocco. He also worked for Morocco Travel Advisers, thought to be a cover for aiding Moroccan invasion of West Sahara.
- 1981 Apologist for brutal Guatemalan military dictatorship.
- 1981 Became ambassador-at-large for Reagan and was deeply involved in setting up contra forces against Nicaragua.

In February 1984, Walters made a still mysterious visit to New Zealand, stopping in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. The ostensible reason was to "dispel myths" about Nicaragua.

- 1985 He replaced Jeanne Kirkpatrick as US ambassador to United Nations and continued her mission of wrecking it.

Walters' career as a "crypto-diplomat and terrorist" is described in detail in the summer 1986 issue of *Covert Action*.

## **What Walters did in Fiji**

The official reason for visiting Fiji was to discuss provision of troops to the United Nations force in the Middle East. In fact this was not discussed at all. Interviews with Fiji officials indicate that Walters had at least three roles:

- Boosting the phoney Libyan scare (see below).
- Assessing the political sympathies, vulnerabilities and potential corruptibility of various Fiji leaders, in particular Bavadra's Foreign Minister, Krishna Datt. Some of the Americans present at these meetings appeared to be psychologists monitoring the conversations for meaningful hesitations and so forth.
- Inducing a mood of complacency within the Bavadra government. He reassured them that the US would not intervene, saying he was "relaxed and relieved" to learn that the Bavadra government did not yet have a hard and fast policy on nuclear ship visits.

Little seems to be known about what else Walters did in Fiji. There is no evidence that he was actively involved in coup preparations. His visit may also have served to distract the Bavadra government from what was happening in Fiji.

## **The Libyan scare**

What Walters did on the way to Fiji was probably much more relevant to the coup. He visited Australia, Papua New Guinea, Solomons, Western Samoa and Tonga on the way to Fiji, spreading a trail of disinformation about Libyan activity in the Pacific.

His visit to Australia probably prompted Foreign Minister Bill Hayden to make a highly publicised "secret" dash, a few days later, across the Tasman to talk with David Lange about Libya, within the high-security confines of Ohakea airbase.

After Walters' visit to Samoa, the country's Prime Minister said that thanks to the Anzus breakdown, Samoa and Tonga could rely no longer on New Zealand and would have to turn to the US for defence. The friendly reception the South Pacific Forum,

and the Melanesian states in particular, gave to the coup doubtless owes something to Walters' trip.

Walters also visited Vanuatu, where Secret Service men in his entourage discovered two "Libyans" in the foyer of the Intercontinental Hotel. They broke into the hotel manager's office to inspect the guest register to identify the "Libyans" as "spies".(*Christchurch Star*, May 5 1987) The scare that preceded the coup was clearly orchestrated.

British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe also contributed during his visit to New Zealand. He used every opportunity to heavy this country about the nuclear-free legislation.

At a press conference in Sydney, Admiral "Ace" Lyons, commander-in-chief of the US Pacific Fleet, threatened use of naval forces against any Libyan activity in the South Pacific.

In fact there was no justification for the scare-mongering apart from the presence of the two Libyan businessmen in Vanuatu who "proved" their guilt by insisting they really were businessmen.

The scare served the coup in two ways. First it provided a justification for the coup (as utilised by Peter Stinson in particular). Second it provided a diversion. While journalists were busy booking air tickets to go looking for Libyans in Vanuatu, none of them noticed that a coup was brewing in Fiji.

## **The CIA in Suva**

According to Peter Samuel, often regarded as a mouthpiece for US disinformation, "the CIA has no station in Fiji, but relies on Australian, British and New Zealand intelligence. There had been some moves to establish a one-man CIA station in Suva but this had not happened for budgetary reasons".(*The Australian*, June 21 1987)

In fact there seems recently to have been a big burst of US embassy and CIA activity in and around Suva. In Suva the normal CIA establishment is generally considered to consist of one person - currently Edrick Sherman, the deputy Chief of Mission. Sherman lives close to the cabinet minister official housing area and was reportedly seen accompanying Rabuka on several occasions after the coup, in particular on his first visit to the radio station.

The CIA team was strengthened prior to the coup. According to a very senior source in the Bavadra government, four CIA officers arrived at Nadi airport two or three days before the Taukei marches. They were immediately sequestered in Nadi business premises of the same Mac Patel who had brought Alan Carroll to Fiji for the 1982 election.

The building was cleared of all workers for the occasion, and Patel himself was involved in the discussions, which presumably concerned the forthcoming pre-coup riots and firebombings.

According to the *Sydney Morning Herald* (*Sydney Morning Herald*, May 18 1987) quoting "a senior intelligence source in Suva" (probably Special Branch) there were

five CIA employees active in Suva, one of whom was in parliament at the time of the coup. These five were probably the same four who were at Patel's, plus Sherman. The *Sydney Morning Herald* quoted another source as saying that three of the CIA officers arrived in Nadi about May 7.

David Robie claims that two of the CIA men were identified by the Fiji Special Branch at the now-famous Sunday golf game between Roman Catholic Mara and Methodist lay preacher/born-again Christian Rabuka a week before the coup, at Peter Stinson's Pacific Harbour complex. (David Robie, *The Dominion*, May 26 1987; *New Zealand Outlook*, June)

## **Summarising United States involvement**

Over the last six or so years Fiji has been the target of the most intensive "cultivation" by the US so far seen in the South Pacific. Despite this Fiji managed to elect a government that intended to be non-aligned and nuclear-free. The US intervention during those six years had three principal thrusts:

### **1. Political**

Cultivation of, and support for, Mara and the Alliance Party by means of aid money. White House receptions were coupled with assistance in election campaigning. This cultivation was not unlike that which the US has practised with some Latin American dictatorships.

### **2. Military**

Cultivation of the Fijian military through officer- to-officer contacts and military aid money. It is significant that although in general the South Pacific is a preserve of the US navy, in Fiji the army is the US service most involved. The US army is also the American service most active in Latin America.

Therefore it is not surprising to see that Fiji military relationships with the US resemble those of Latin American countries. PAMS, especially, is very similar to what has been going on for years at the US Army School of the Americas in Panama, where several generations of Latin American military elites have been befriended, pampered, and trained in coup-making techniques (disguised as "counter-insurgency" or "internal warfare" training).

### **3. Subversion of trade unions**

Subversion of trade unions has been carried out by US government-funded and directed AFL-CIO fronts. This is very similar, although on a vastly smaller scale, to what the CIA has been doing for many years in Latin America, as documented in particular by Philip Agee.

Morris Paladino, who helped set up LCPA and AAFLI, was originally exposed as a CIA officer controlling the Inter-American Regional Labor Organisation (ORIT), a forerunner of and model for AAFLI. Valentine Suazo, who set up and ran the Suva AAFLI office, is documented as involved in CIA subversion in Chile.

Overall, what the US has been doing in the last six years might be described as "Latin Americanisation of the South Pacific", or, taking into account the island-and-ocean nature of the region, Caribbeanisation.

The coup in Fiji might be seen as the first fruits of such Caribbeanisation - the creation of a Caribbean-style military dictatorship which will be more responsive to US needs than a post Mara democracy would have been.

### **How responsible for the coup was the United States?**

US intervention in Fiji over the six years prior to the election is all well documented and incontestable. The one exception is the alleged US funding of the Taukei movement, which may well prove to be true. But at present there is not enough known to be able to document conclusively the extent to which the US was responsible for the coup.

One important clue is the apparently consummate skill with which the coup was carried out. It seems that none of Fiji's neighbours, including Australia and New Zealand, had the slightest inkling that a coup was being prepared.

About the only thing that went wrong in the whole operation was when the Governor-General managed to make a broadcast over FM radio deploring the coup, but even this may have been part of the script, given the Governor-General's subsequent collaboration.

Otherwise Rabuka did everything right - he secured the acquiescence of the rest of the military and juggled the police hierarchy to his benefit (police collaboration was not a foregone conclusion, thanks to its multiracial makeup). He also muzzled the media effectively and maintained remarkably good law and order. At the very least, someone in the US government must have provided him with a list of everything that needed to be done.

### **The Walters diversion**

One would imagine that Vernon Walters was there merely to assess the situation, provide a diversion, and perhaps give the final go-ahead for US involvement. It is hard to imagine he actually gave directions to the leading Fijian actors in the drama about to unfold. If Walters were the playwright then he would surely have written the script so that the action didn't start until well after his visit to Fiji had been forgotten. But as things turned out the coup took place uncomfortably soon after his departure.

On the other hand there are a number of events, apparently orchestrated to accompany the coup, which suggest that the US did much more than just provide a few of the stagehands. These events include:

- Admiral Lyons' press conference in Sydney.
- 4. Bill Hayden's flight to Ohakea airbase.
- 5. Sir Geoffrey Howe's Libya-bashing visit to New Zealand.
- 6. The "discovery" of Libyans in Vanuatu.
- 7. The definitely CIA-directed Taukei marches and firebombings.

## 8. The PDU meeting (Mara's alibi).

On balance, the authors conclude that the US *was* responsible for the coup. Rabuka was probably identified by a US talent scout as a suitable coup-maker. Mara had ample connections with the US government for him to make requests for assistance, or for the US to make offers of assistance.

By all accounts William Paupe had the background and skills to head, or at least front for, the US task force. If World Anti-communist League leader and Iran-Contra player John Singlaub was involved then we can assume the coup was a US-initiated and directed project. Without Singlaub it still looks as though there was a considerable degree of US assistance.

# Policing the Future

## Martin Walker

### Preface

This paper was written for the History Workshop 20 in Leeds, during November 1986. In the workshop which I gave, I introduced the paper by pointing out that the arguments within it were very general and the paper itself entirely polemical. I explained that each of my last three books contain detailed case histories and stories from people 'in their own words'(1). For the History Workshop, however, I felt that it was important to look more closely at the developing role of the police, their philosophy and social context, and thereby to draw some very general conclusions about the nature and meaning of police power.

I suggested that the audience might bear one very simple criterion in mind when considering the changing nature of police power, namely the high level of arrests over the last few years: 10,000 during the miners' strike; 200-400 during various single peace movement demonstrations; between 400 and 500 during each of the two 'Stop the City' actions; 300 arrests, often after dawn raids, in the months immediately following the conflict at Broadwater Farm housing estate in Tottenham; 1,000 over the period of the Wapping dispute.

This high level of arrests during various kinds of protest are an indication of the shift by the police from crime control to a more military and 'political' style of policing. They tell the story as well of a shift from policing the criminal law to a more general policing which is often beyond statute or legal precedent. Other indices of the new areas of repression in our present society are the sudden and phenomenal rise in the level of the prison population since the late seventies and the ever growing backlog of cases waiting to be tried (2). Government ministers, senior police officers and even some sociologists will tell us that these statistics are illustrative of a society beset by rising crime. I would argue the case that increasingly they have more to do with expanding police powers and a constantly broadening criminalisation of the employed and non-working class and marginalised people.

## **Introduction**

This paper argues very generally that the police at the present time are gaining greater powers both with the backing of the law and beyond its accepted boundaries. And that this power is exemplified and will be manifest in the future in three main ways: *firstly* with greater and more general 'military' tactics and organisation, *secondly* by an increasingly clear division between a 'civilianised' or ordinary policing system and that of a 'standing army', and *thirdly* by an ever more intrusive police control of everyday life and the civil structures under which we live.

The paper hints at a general development within the police force away from crime control and towards a deeper political consciousness which sees social control as its main purpose. This direction could be seen as a consequence of a continuing criminalisation of political views and actions which are a threat to the ideology and culture of the State and not simply a specific threat to different kinds of property relations. The paper makes the point that the increasing politicisation of the police leads to a targeting of certain *identities* as enemies both of the police and the State. Finally the paper presents the view that although the police are increasingly becoming an autonomous power, they, like the government of the day, are the servants of the changing needs of capital.

I am going now, to draw together a number of themes which have preoccupied me over the last decade and which I believe are important to an understanding of policing in the future. I would like to do this under a number of sub-headings.

## **Policing the Changing Means of Production**

The fact that in 1986 I was asked to talk about the policing of the miners' strike in Yorkshire, suggests to me that even now, many people have not grasped the meaning of the miners' strike, let alone the various mechanisms which were employed to defeat it. Somehow, we have to divest ourselves of the myth that the miners' strike was a seminal *turning point*, either in the history of the working class and its resistance to the State, or in the policing of our society. If the miners' strike represented anything in an absolute sense, it was the point at which the working class were forced to forsake their origins in the industrial revolution and move into the post-industrial era. With the crossing of this line, there comes a qualitative change in the strategies employed by the State, which should be followed by a new consciousness and organisation of class struggle.

Despite a number of individuating phenomena which I will mention later, the miners' strike has to be seen within the historical context of deindustrialisation, deskilling and deunionisation; within the context of capital's need in the face of international competition and decreasing resources, to cut its wage bill, make continual technological advance and hence keep up the rate of profit. Naturally the miners were not the first or only group of industrial workers to be affected by this historical process. The years from 1970 to the present are littered with the skeletons of the older industrial social base; the dock workers were attacked in the early seventies, as were the ship builders; the car workers' strength and militancy were gradually eroded throughout the seventies; and the steel workers were attacked at the close of the decade. But perhaps the most continuous and most embattled position was reserved for print workers, especially within the newspaper industry. It is here in the printed word that the massive and sudden change from older machinery to new, high technology,

has presented the owners of capital with an immediate answer to overmanning and the unprofitability of carefully guarded craft deployment of skilled workers. By a means quite different from that used by generations of miners, the print workers managed for years to stave off a final confrontation in their industry. Internal agreements within the industry rarely needed support from other industrial workers and printers came to be seen as a 'race apart'. Now, at Wapping, they are paying the price for this means of preserving their own powerful craft base. And much more clearly than during the miners' strike, the tactics which they are using are shown to have little effect against the post-industrial State.

Rather than the miners' strike being a watershed of industrial conflict, or the most seminal period of policing history, we have to see both these aspects within the broader context of State policies over the last decade and a half. In most periods the State realises its future needs in a more articulate and co-ordinated way than those who resist it. Preparations for policing an industrial conflict of the type which the miners' strike represented had been going on since the late sixties (3). Perhaps more seriously than this, the culture and philosophy of the State institutions which legitimised police organisation had also been prepared. I would suggest that the fulcrum of this police organisation did not depend upon any new or break-away strategies, it did not represent some *apex* of police power in the way that it has been represented. It appeared this way to many trade union leaders because more than any other group these people have been blind to the way in which the State has reorganised its cultural messages and its means of repression. Carefully guarding their patriarchal and craft based power, many elements within the trade union bureaucracy have paid scant interest to what has been happening to marginalised groups and particularly to the unemployed. Had the leadership of the NUM had a better grasp of this slow change in police organisation and State philosophy between Saltley and 1984, they might have employed different tactics during the strike (4).

The most important and the simplest view of policing the miners' strike rests upon the recognition of well-proven historical strategies: sheer power of numbers and an increased rationalisation of para-military formations, discipline and organisation. In the second of these, we saw a return to the military tactics, not only of the early nineteenth century when the police were still heavily influenced by the military, but to later periods of colonial resistance against a British army and police presence.

Having said this, there *were* distinct and idiosyncratic policing developments which came to fruition during the miners' strike. Firstly, as in all wars, technology and strategy advanced apace. After a relatively quiet period in terms of lengthy mass confrontations on the mainland, the year of the miners' strike provided the State with an anvil for technological advance, not only in hardware but in the expression of its new philosophy and in organisation (5). The second 'new departure' was only new in relation to the period. As has periodically happened before during times of crisis, the State wove together a variety of strands of the criminal law. These various facets were not new, but combined at one time, and heightened by the crisis, they formed for the first time, a structured whole; a new matrix of criminal law to be used in mass confrontation and later to be drawn up and included in statute (6).

I will sum up this section by saying that the period of change from the older industrial and labour intensive means of production to the new, high technology and labour atomised means, has been characterised by a series of industry-based mass struggles between labour and capital, at the workplace and in the community. Those struggles,

such as the miners' strike, which took themselves beyond the factory or the workshop, have been policed in a certain way. The more specific needs of the criminal law have been set aside and replaced by very general rules. The police officer has increasingly become 'the law' rather than acting upon it, charges and trials simply expedient justifications for this power. To this understanding we have to add the fact that the *language* of industrial struggles has radically changed. The traditional language of a working class in ascendancy, of strikes, pickets, scabs, has been replaced by the culture of a strong post industrial State. This new language pervades our everyday life and inculcates new values based upon property relations. During the miners' strike this new cultural language was not resisted by any new political culture expressed by the predominantly male NUM members (7).

It appears unlikely that in the present climate there will be any mass struggles as well organised or as long as the miners' strike. The State's organisation against the miners, however, and particularly the police strategies employed, will continue to be used in other mass confrontations not based around the means of production. What singles out all these conflicts is the fact that they are primarily conflicts which could be resolved politically, but which are predominantly resolved by the employment of the police and the criminal law. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act now gives the police powers to surround areas and put up road blocks and we have seen a number of circumstances since the miners' strike in which the police have diverted traffic and used news censorship. Future large scale confrontations between the police and the people will be characterised by the increasing use by the police of military type tactics, edicts, organisation and hardware.

## **Public Order Policing**

Here, I would like to focus upon small scale public order situations and examine them within a social context (8). As capitalism rationalises its productive forces, just as it did in the early nineteenth century, not only does the whole administration of capital and the State become more centralised, but choice for large groups of discarded industrial workers and smaller groups within the community is eroded. Decreasing productive work and the loss of the wage that this previously provided marks out growing numbers of people, not only as impoverished, but as personally and politically powerless. It is this latter factor, the distance of individuals from any location within the structures of the State, its culture and ideology, rather than simple poverty, which leads to them being considered enemies of the State. Those whom the State casts out from its enclave, it also comes to fear.

Demands for collectivity, for skilled work, for the conservation of community and for economic autonomy; demands for sexual preferences and the expression of different identities - essentially the demands of human community and individuality against a State enforced alienation - create a myriad small conflicts. Against these more organic demands from the population is ranged the centralised, machine-like nature of the State and its dehumanising message. Given this condition, it is important that we understand what the State and the police mean by 'Public Order'; we might easily imagine that this encompasses both democratic consensus and the peaceful and non-violent expression of dissent (9). But it is not just the affray, the riot or the disorderly crowd which the State sees as problematic. The way in which the police and the State perceive public order has little to do with the public and much more to do with a new vision of 'order'. The police perceive order in a far more total manner than do individual groups within the population. The idea of *order* needs definition just as

much as the concept of the *public*.

Increasingly the State conceives of order in a manner which attempts to reduce the human individual to an object stripped of feeling. At the same time, the personnel of certain State agencies, particularly the police, conceive of order in an individually personal and subjective way. Disorder is that which hampers or fails to facilitate the advancing philosophy or the smooth running of a high technology productive process. This includes: diverse cultures; diverse expressions of sexuality; styles of dress and appearance; life style attributes such as drug-taking or nomadic travelling; personally held philosophies and political positions; and even more conservative views such as an insistence on the use of cash rather than cheques or credit (10). All of these things militate against order in the strictest sense of the word because while some of them express individuality or extreme states of feeling, others challenge the generally accepted property relations upon which capitalism is built.

Public order in the post-industrial society comes to have more to do with life style and therefore 'identity' (11) and less to do with violence or the physical collective which might destroy property. Deviation from that order, designed by the State, is also deviation from the philosophy of order articulated by the police and comes to be synonymous with subversion.

To sum up under this heading, we can describe the role of the police in the future in relation to the two words which make up the expression *Public Order*. With respect to the *public*, which is to the State and the police an *alternative* public, not the one of which they are a part, we can expect the police to become preoccupied with disassembling this mass, this group with a common voice. In order to do this, and perhaps as a first imperative, they have to control what has historically been considered *public* space, whether it be within the community, at the point of production, within points of exchange and consumption such as shopping centres, or at any symbolic political locations.

In relation to the word *order*, we can expect the police to play an increasingly intrusive role in the organisation of our personal habits, views and leisure behaviour. Policing in fact begins to inhabit an area of social discourse which was historically occupied by morality; a morality which was laid down and then policed in different forms by the Church and various agencies of the State. The question to be addressed here is to what extent this new morality is first articulated by the personnel of the State's central institutions and to what extent it has become purely a product of police philosophy. The question is important in that its answer hints at who holds power (12).

If you detect within the last section of this paper an analysis which suggests that those most open to police attack and control are those who are marginalised, culturally different and without productive work or any power in the State, you would be right. However, I personally would not draw the conclusion from this that it is necessarily from these groups that there comes the most substantial or *organised* resistance to the State. The question of who is most open to attack from the State is a quite separate question from that of who is able to organise the most effective opposition to the State (13).

## **The Policing of Crime**

It is not surprising that I come to this subject after discussing changes in the means of

production and public order. For a number of reasons I believe that this area of policing has become the least important to the police themselves. Perhaps the most central reason for this is that those who have committed crime for hundreds of years are not usually antagonistic to either capitalism or the State. As the police develop increasingly and specifically in defence of the State, they show less and less political or professional will to be involved in crime control except where that 'crime' threatens the State (14).

A major concern in any discussion about policing is that we understand the changing police response to 'crime' as well as changes in the composition of the 'criminal' community itself. Although a State police force has always appeared to be concerned with protecting property relations regardless of class, and although it came into existence in part as a response to the growth of urban crime in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, we have continually to remind ourselves of the State's changing definition of crime.

The State is now, and has always been, concerned only with that crime which threatens its power. It has been concerned essentially with those modes of organisation which present autonomous economic, political or organisational threats to its hegemony of power, or to less organised crime which because of its large scale nature seriously threatens the persons or property of State institutions. So it can be said of the early nineteenth century, as it is said today, that the State and its law enforcement officers were not concerned with the breaking of any *universal moral laws* which they designated as crime, but with containing or liquidating only that crime which represented a threat to the State.

In the early nineteenth century the police did not descend upon the working class ghetto in order to find the person who had stolen Mrs. Smith's wages (it was probably Mr. Smith anyway!). Apart from murder, the violence of which is always a serious threat to the State (15), the police only went into working class areas in search of those who had roamed beyond the boundaries of the ghetto and carried out attacks upon the industry, the organisation or the person of the middle class.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the police developed a very definite relationship to this kind of crime. In order to steal or rob effectively, working class people and a few better educated but disaffected members of the middle class, organised. The period from the middle of the eighteenth century through to the nineteen sixties and seventies was a period marked by the sudden growth and slow decline of *a criminal class, a dangerous estate*. This society had as many professional aspects, organisations and rules of membership as the middle class society which it mirrored.

The growth and development of this subterranean society mirrored also the growth of all capitalist production; first individual craft work, then a more collective and labour intensive base and finally monopoly and administration. The police grew and developed alongside of this increasingly organised and professional society; the relationship was very exact. Dickens, on the inception of the detective police in the 1860s, described certain detectives whose whole lifetime was spent in controlling only *one* very specific kind of criminal activity. As these two republics - the detective and the professional criminal - grew dependent upon each other, there were many crossings of paths and many bridges built between them. This was not simply so that information might be gained by the detective but also so that the detective could gain financial advantage through crime and so that criminals could gain social advantage by

being associated with the law. In effect, both these 'societies' had the same vested interest in the continuing culture and ideology of the State.

This period of *classic* crime is now in its death throes. Its twilight between 1970 and 1980 saw the demise of the last organised firms with long criminal histories, the armed robbers who densely populated those years. These firms were made up in the main from criminals trained in the fifties. Changes in money security and the means of production, and an economy drifting deeper into crisis, allied with increasing police powers, make it now virtually impossible to be a young trained criminal with a professional heritage.

What has happened within the criminal world seems to me to be relatively straightforward. The older and more established criminal firms which served their apprenticeship in the fifties have now forsaken robbery and theft, and even to some extent fraud, for more legitimate business. This last statement should be qualified by saying that legitimate business hides dealings in illegitimate commodities, such as drugs. A few serious professional criminals who saw the sign of the times moved into new technology. However, I think that one could say that a great deal of professional crime is now all but masked by the legitimate organisation of capitalism and the culture of the State.

If the professional criminals have moved on or have been incorporated into more legitimate business organisations, what has become of the professional police officers who shared their world? Some have accompanied the criminals with whom they were working into quasi-legitimate business; others have moved on into social control, politics and the policing of subversion. All of this has had the most serious consequences for the current generation of marginalised or dispossessed youth in the inner cities, where much crime is now characterised by a lack of training or professionalism, considerable alienated violence and a lack of respect for the class, age or sex of the victim.

The modern inner city law breaker is unable, because of a lack of training, and because older structures are in chaos, to leave the ghetto and join any wider and more socially mobile criminal fraternity. That former criminal community, which committed crimes beyond the boundaries of the ghetto against the middle class population, is now trapped within the ghetto.

The disintegration of a more professional criminal world which grew up through an apprenticeship and which was based upon certain defined *modus operandi*, together with the co-operative organisation of different skills, is mirrored by a prevailing lack of *professional* detective policing at the base. In turn these officers now perpetuate a new philosophy which does not equip them to catch by scientific detection, or even *get close to*, those who commit crime. A further aspect of this burgeoning gulf between the police and the youth of the inner city areas is an ever widening cultural gap, primarily around the power and philosophy of the State. The detective and the 'criminal' today have much less in common than they did 10 or 20 years ago. There is a decreasing dialogue and little exchange of information. The two groups have ceased to be 'cops and robbers' and have increasingly become participants on truly separate sides in a political war for and against the preservation of the State.(16).

The police answer to the deprofessionalisation of urban crime has been the increasing use of military and blanket type operations, or prejudicial rather than scientific

investigations, which have little intention of discriminating between honest and dishonest individuals, violent or peaceful individuals. Over the last twenty years or so, the whole of the working class and the whole of the marginalised or non-productive population have slowly become criminalised. There is a war now, not against crime, but against both the pauperised and the productive working class of the inner cities *per se*. This war is not against crime but against those whose culture and philosophy, whose 'identity', clashes with the culture, philosophy and State orientated identity of the constable (and ultimately of the State).

To sum up under this head, we could say that broadly speaking the most successful criminals of the latter period of industrialised society have become incorporated within the world of legitimised business and State institutions, and that much of the professional policing service has turned its attention to 'political' control. What we have left at the base is not a policing of the criminal law, or the apparent traditional protection of property relations, but an organised military and disorganised subjective response of power, to the poor, propertyless and increasingly powerless younger generation within the inner cities.

## **Police Intervention in the Civil Administration**

This is the last of my far from exhaustive list of sub-headings in this paper. The historical inadequacy of the police in catching those who now break the law, written and assumed, within the inner cities has led recently to the police making a serious intervention in civil administration.

With links to the working class, and especially the *new* designated criminal community, denied them, the police have moved in parasitically upon the structures of civil administration and welfare which have been built over many years with sound municipal intent, if not always with success. This attempt to enter democratic administration by the back door and turn the instruments of municipal welfare into instruments of social control has been resisted by the most far-sighted and progressive of the Labour dominated authorities. The constituents of other authorities will come to rue the day that the police were ever allowed to take part in their civic organisation because, like an ever growing parasite which kills its host, the police have their aspirations firmly set upon the actual administration; no longer a means to an end but an end in itself (17).

Conversations about multi-agency policing and the sharing of information, which take place now between local authority officers, politicians and well groomed, seemingly socially aware police officers, will result within the not too distant future in police officers controlling the administration of many of the municipal functions which we presently see as the domain of political administration. The most serious dangers in this are twofold; firstly police philosophy is always conservative and state orientated; secondly, the objectives of the police force as a direct employee of the central state are inimical to community democracy and welfare (18).

Before summing up this paper, I have to mention the role of judicial administration and law within this whole process. When the State police force came into being in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the power of the constable was mediated by the Justice, what we know today as the Magistrate. It would be naive to pretend that the Justice imposed severe limitations upon the power of the constable, or that *he* acted on behalf of the people (19). They appear, however, to have been an

administrative and inquiring tier rather than a military one (20), they settled disputes between labourers and masters, as well as policing many commercial relations and arbitrating conflicts within the community. The Justices of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century are thought of now as the early form of the local authority.

Unlike the present local authority, however, the Justice did have the power to fine and discipline the constable, to interrogate him in court, to inquire into his investigations and to question the propriety of his evidence. When not *in league* with the constable, he did provide some measure of accountability, an accountability which was more real because it was worked out on the ground during the investigation and the hearing of legal cases (21). Over the last fifty years, the rising power of the police force (vouchsafed by the parliamentary middle class) and its increasing proximity in culture and ideology to the State itself, rather than either the law or any judicial or legal tier, has brushed away the power of the magistracy and overtaken it. This has exact parallels in the way the police are now attempting to usurp the power of the local and county authority.

The police now have a tacit power over the Magistrate's Court rather than the other way round. If we add to this the new power of 'cautioning' which allows the police to virtually try individuals within the police station (22), and a growing number of summary offences which either do not go to court, or go before magistrates rather than juries (23). And then, if we look to the other end of the judicial scale and see that the jury system itself is increasingly being eroded (24), we can understand that not only are the police gaining political and moral power on the street and within the civil administration but they are also cleaving off and assuming to themselves great chunks of judicial and legal power.

## Conclusions

I have called this paper 'policing the future' and perhaps the picture that it paints is a depressing one, with the State and its agencies slowly consolidating new power. We should not however be depressed by realistic appraisals of the State and its developments but should constantly remind ourselves of the objectives which the State has in mind. We should increasingly formulate our resistance to the State on the basis of these objectives.

My first conclusion, then, is that we should always be aware that the direction of the police, their organisation, ideology, culture and technology, is not separate from, nor can it be divorced from, the demands of the State. This should affect our attitudes and strategies to the police and the State in everyday life as well as large scale confrontations at the point of production. Although the police appear to be most prominently involved at the 'front line' of any conflict or contradiction, at the point of a picket for example, we have to understand that the ambit of their power and the power of their culture exists within a much wider radius than this. Recognition of this extensive protection which the police offer the State and *vice versa* should determine other tactics of opposition as well as those of mass physical confrontation.

Recognition that the role of the police is dictated by the objectives of the State should also warn us against being drawn into small scale inquiries into the more intrapersonal aspects of police behaviour. Much more concentrated work has to go into examining the nature and strategies of the State in post industrial society, as well as the mediating institutions and culture which the police are bound up with.

The direction of the police will be dictated by the objectives of the State and it is these objectives which we must address; we should not fool ourselves that in tinkering with the policing system, inside this or that local authority, this or that community, that we can radically affect capitalism's means of repression.

The future of policing will inevitably mirror the changes in the means of production. If the means of production are to be scattered and almost invisible rather than labour intensive and based upon the socialisation of a class, then policing will pursue a programme of social control which makes this means of production effective. We can expect the police to be concerned with collective and communal philosophies and movements, we can expect them to try and isolate and individuate us. They will do this increasingly by making incursions into public and private space and ultimately into our personal being, our identity. This power will begin first by extending itself to the control of domestic space with such things as curfews.

The present period is characterised by an ever growing surplus population. This surplus population, because it is pauperised, has no control over productive forces and is propertyless, is a constant threat and an irritant to the order of the State. A great deal of policing in the future will be political rather than criminal in that it deals with this population *per se* and not simply those amongst that population who break the traditional statutes.

At the base of this policing system for the future is information, exactly as the new means of production is based upon information technology. What the police previously learned just about criminals, through members of the criminal world such as the informer, they will now try to learn about the whole population through those who share the new philosophy of the State. They will approach, for example, a Director of housing services. They will also collect information through 'invisible' informers such as listening devices and computerised records. All strata of the civil administration which collect and collate information will sooner or later be forced to turn that information over, as a matter of course, to the police (25). Policing will become more and more to do with social control and social engineering and less to do with traditional crime control.

A number of police researchers have already pointed to the growing politicisation of the police; few have suggested where this politicisation is heading. It seems fundamental to me that developing political ideologies and cultures grow from and look for structures of power through which they might express these philosophies. The journey of the constable from the early nineteenth century to the present day has been a journey from servant to master. With the public unveiling of ACPO (the Association of Chief Police Officers) during the miners' strike, we can see a vanguard police institution which is in the process of integrating itself into the structure of the State.

Finally, we can expect much talk in the near future of the need to differentiate between the paramilitary police and the more ordinary constable (26). To my mind, this will not simply be a replay of the debate over a 'third force' which took place in the fifties and sixties. It would appear much more probable that large parts of the lower echelons of the police will be replaced by civilianised or privatised workers, or even voluntary citizen workers, while the major concentration of police personnel and organisational capability in the future will be turned towards *militarised* and *political* policing.

Whatever the reasons given for the further militarisation of the police and the

separation of this force from those employees involved in the community, we should be aware that both arms of the police have exactly the same final objectives. The strategies and the degree of force available may be different at any time but their aims are identical, and always have been, increasing State order and control of our everyday lives.

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## Notes

This paper was originally quickly written to be read at the History Workshop Conference. When people asked for copies, I decided to add a number of notes in order to explain and extend some of the arguments.

1. *State of Siege* with Jim Coulter and Susan Miller, *A Turn of the Screw* and, most recently, *With Extreme Prejudice*. These books are all published by Canary Press and are available from: Canary Press, BCM Canary, London WCIN 3XX.
2. The prison population has risen by 4,000 in the last six years, from 44,000 to 48,000. The number of prisoners in custody on remand has doubled since 1979. There is periodic discussion about an amnesty for many prisoners and those awaiting trial, so that overcrowding and backlogs might be resolved.
3. See *State of Siege* by Coulter, Miller and Walker. Also the State Research publication on the formation of the SPG and other para-military units.
4. At Saltley in 1972, a mass picket which had marched through the outskirts of Birmingham forced the police to lock the gates of the coke depot. The police were massively outnumbered and outflanked, not only by miners led by Arthur Scargill, but by other workers who joined the march. The new Tory right which began organising around 1974 saw this physical confrontation as symbolic of the weaknesses of the Heath administration. At Orgreave, which elements of the NUM saw as a replay of Saltley, the police deployed over 6,000 officers thoroughly trained in para-military formations; the miners, on the other hand, failed to change their strategies even marginally. Not only that but many area officials vacillated even over the use of traditional strategies and withdrew their members from serious confrontation.
5. Although new technology, new language and new formations had been developed through the various inner city disturbances and smaller industrial conflicts such as Grunwicks and the NGA dispute in Warrington, these advances were consolidated and refined during the miners' strike finally coming to fruition in the ACPO Training Manual.
6. See *State of Siege* by Coulter, Miller and Walker. The elements of this legal overview are too many to mention, but close observation of legal cases over the previous decade would have given clues to them all. Curfews attached to bail, for example, were used in a number of public order cases in the seventies; road blocks and car searches had been going on in some black communities, such as Stoke Newington, for a number of years; aspects of processing, such as the taking of polaroid photographs, the fabrication of verbal evidence, etc. had a

history, particularly in London. The new Public Order Act of 1986 put into statute many of the controls which the police had used against pickets during the miners' strike.

7. Beatrix Campbell argues that the women involved in the strike did break with the old language of industrial struggle, but that they were never in control of the strike, or even allowed to be equal participants. See "Proletarian Patriarchs and the Real Radicals" in *The Cutting Edge: Women and the Pit Strike*, Lawrence and Wishart, 1986.
8. I have always considered the expression 'Public Order' to be a typical example of State distorted language. The use of this expression for situations of potential disorder hints at the idea that the public is policing itself, and that there is a consensus amongst the public about their own order. For the police it is a safer expression than 'public disorder' since the latter exposes a contradiction in which the public could appear as a majority. What the police and the State mean by a 'Public Order' situation is in fact a situation in which there may be a need for the State to impose order; a 'State order' situation.
9. Quite obviously there is still room in our present society for the expression of dissent. However, in any conflict between public interests and the private interests of the State, dissent is allowed only as long as it is impotent. In the final analysis, dissent and protest, however peaceful, are stopped (said to be anti-democratic) if they appear to be influential or effective.
10. Some facets of diverse behaviour are countenanced and even advanced by capital and by business while the police still act to repress them. There exist now, and have been since the early nineteenth century, contradictions between a police ideology with its need to control, and capital, the continuation of which sometimes necessitates diversity. The police have recently begun to understand that diverse cultural interests can in fact help them with control and they make apparent attempts to work within and respond to the needs of smaller cultural groups. However, even within these groups, they still face the central problems of those who show an allegiance to the culture and ideology of the State and capitalism and those who, whether simply younger or more particularly revolutionary, are intent upon struggling against post-industrial culture. These contradictions between State institutions, capital and the police are diminishing as the police move closer to the centre of power in our society.
11. By 'identity' in this context, I mean a central and unified personal view which is in part opposed to capitalist property relations and also to post-industrial culture. This identity is ideologically defined, even though it might have grown as a consequence of disaffection, rebellion, or even alienation. It challenges the State in a most total way, unlike, for example, the identity of the criminal who reserves a faith in the property relations of capitalism while simply having an illegitimate mode of work.
12. This question relates to the contradiction mentioned in footnote (10). There are clear examples of this in Manchester in the struggles between less legitimate business interests and the Chief Constable. Capital's interest in the State nationally and its philosophy of *laissez faire* determines that little restriction is placed upon the production of soft porn, its exchange and distribution. The

policing interests of the Chief Constable, James Anderton, however, and his personal morality, have meant a crack down on this kind of commercial business over the last ten years.

13. This is clearly the case where large numbers of criminals are concerned because although there appears to be a serious conflict between capital and those who pursue property crime, the ideology, philosophy and culture and language of the two groups are often identical; there are simply conflicting structures for capital accumulation.
14. It is possible that in the future the policing of large parts of 'crime' will be civilianised, privatised or organised by communities with aid from the State. I have not touched on this in this paper but the emergence of Neighbourhood Watch Schemes, as well as the handing over of certain policing functions to private security firms, does suggest that this is a trend. If this were to happen in the future, it would leave the police free to act politically in defence of the State.
15. The primary power of the State is physical and material. It is not only the violence of murder which is a threat to the State, it is also the fundamental 'lack of respect' which murder shows for the physical being of the individual. Bourgeois ideology and bourgeois power in both industrial and post-industrial society is founded primarily upon the inviolability of the physical, male, bourgeois individual. There are also contradictions here which are illustrated by the indolence with which the police respond to racial killings and the killing of women in our society.
16. The drifting apart of detective and law-breaker is a complex phenomenon which is not simply based upon culture or class but perhaps even more importantly on ethnicity. The detective of the 1950s was a *counterpart* of his socially mobile working class adversary. The modern detective is part of a white, male, employed lower middle or even professional middle class, which is highly antagonistic to the marginalised, often black and/or female, unemployed, low paid or unskilled worker.
17. After I had given this paper, someone raised a point about police intervention in schools. Certainly this is a part of what I describe as intervention in the civil administration. Those interested in this area should contact the Police Committee Support Units in London boroughs such as Hackney and Greenwich, the Police Monitoring and Research group of the London Strategic Policy Unit and the City Monitoring Unit in Manchester. These units have been occupied with the various aspects of this intervention and in the formulation of policies to defend Service Departments and ratepayers against encroaching police powers. Unfortunately much of this vital work has not permeated the academic or sociological debate about policing.
18. There are those who argue that the local State only mirrors the culture and ideology of the central State. Although this may often have been true in the past, the recent contradictions which have emerged between left Labour councillors, the Central State and even their own State orientated parliamentary party, gives some hope for optimism.

19. E.P. Thompson and other contemporary historians appear to me to have over-argued this case simply in structural terms, with no concern for the *real* or very diffuse social and cultural State power which emanated from these officials. Besides which in non-structural terms my reading of history finds no female Justices who might have acted on behalf of the female part of 'the people'. There are, however, a massive number of examples of men, fathers and brothers as well as employers, taking women before the Justices. These accused persons were generally given very short shrift, being consigned in droves to mental institutions and prisons, often for 'moral' offences which needed no legal proof
20. Even this can be seriously questioned, because from the inception of the office in the 13th century, the Justice was empowered to raise, co-ordinate and deploy the militia.
21. It should be borne in mind that from the inception of an organised State police force in 1829 until 1945, the representatives of the bourgeois State were profoundly mistrustful of the police force. The bourgeoisie were concerned that a powerful, organised and armed group might at any time forsake the side of the State and take the side of the employed and unionised part of the working class. This mistrust can clearly be seen in the constant attention paid by the middle class to their civil rights in the detection and apprehension of 'criminals'. This mistrust first came to a head in 1911 when the police struck (mutinied) for better conditions and wages. The century from 1829 to 1930 can be understood as a period in which the middle class disciplined the police with some severity, inculcating in them the culture and ideology of the State.
22. With the advent of cautioning in 1984, the police became able, if the suspect admitted guilt, to hear certain cases and administer punishment (a caution) within a police station. During the administration of a caution the senior officers involved wear their uniforms.
23. Interestingly, many of these new powers are in their initial stages linked to motoring law. ACPO has recently begun to campaign for the imposition of curfews on young drivers.
24. The new Criminal Justice Bill is a concerted attack upon the system of trial by jury, not only doing away with the preemptory challenge of jurors but also designating more offences upon which the defendant can not opt for trial by jury but has to be tried within a magistrate's court (a police court).
25. This process could be seen initially in the clause within the original Police and Criminal Evidence Bill. This demanded that general practitioners and other professionals turn over all their records to the police in the event of a crime in a certain geographic area.
26. This has been expressed recently as: 'One minute we are expected to fire guns and the next minute we are expected to be the ordinary copper on the beat in the community.'