British Army 'hit' parade of 1976

British spooks "Who's who" part 2
Kitson, Kincora and counter-insurgency in Northern Ireland
Anthony Summers' search for "Maurice Bishop"
Captain Fred Holroyd: a statement
Jim Hougan on Terpil and "Deep Throat"
Editorially

Another Lobster at last. If they appear less and less frequently, they are getting bigger and bigger. (And this one could have been 36 pages if we could have afforded to print it. A lot of interesting copy, including long and interesting letters from MK in Brighton and Bob Turner in the Tyneside area, had to get chopped.

The price increase is partly to pay for the increase in size and partly just because at 75p we were loosing money. A financially realistic figure would be near £2 but we still live in hope that we will one day get a larger readership.

The only other thing worth mentioning is the change in type-faces in this issue. No 9 was typed on a large expensive word processor. That, alas, was ripped off. This one was done on an electronic typewriter -- not as good but just about adequate.

We have put up the subscription charges proportionally by reducing the number of issues per sub.

Lobster dangles from a very thin shoelace and if there is anyone out there with loads of money -- we'll take some of it.

*Steve Dorril/ Robin Ramsay*
Kitson, Kincora and counter-insurgency in Northern Ireland

Robin Ramsay

Part 1

Issue 24 of the Covert Action Information Bulletin (Summer 1985) is chiefly devoted to recent activities of U.S. government agents and agents provocateurs inside radical and labour organisations: the 'sanctuary movement', the Native American movement and one industrial dispute, are analysed as case studies. They are preceded by a long essay, The New State Repression, by Ken Lawrence, a frequent CAIB contributor and member of CAIB's Board of Advisors. In his essay, a kind of theoretical framework for the case studies which follow it, Lawrence seeks to document "striking advances (which) have emerged in the functioning of the (U.S.) secret police." For Lawrence,

"By the end of the sixties it was clear to the establishment that its traditional methods of social control were weakening, and that its repressive apparatus was insufficient as a backup. A new approach was needed, one that started from scratch and challenged some of its own most fundamental beliefs about social order. The person who responded to the needs was ...(British) Brigadier Frank Kitson ." Kitson's book, Low Intensity Operations (London 1971) is "the basic manual of counter-insurgency method in Western Europe and North America."

At this point in his essay Lawrence starts to get things wrong. He begins with Part 1 of Kitson's three-stage sketch of the typical insurgency, The Preparatory Period.

"Kitson says the police and the army have to take advantage of the first stage of popular struggle to deploy themselves, to infiltrate the enemy. That is when people are not on their guard, when the police can get their spies and provocateurs, 'in place' so that when open rebellion develops, as he says it must, agents are already there."

This really isn't an accurate sketch of Kitson's Preparatory Period. Kitson writes:

"Looking in retrospect (emphasis added) at any counter-subversion or counter-insurgency, it is easy to see that the first step should have been (emphasis added) to prevent the enemy from gaining an ascendancy over the civil population, and in particular to disrupt his efforts at establishing his political organisation." (p67)

Kitson is thinking here of British operations in Kenya and Malaya in the 1950s in which he played a minor part. But, in retrospect the 'Preparatory Period' of each of these campaigns was certainly not what Lawrence describes as "nothing is happening; all is calm". In practice, as Kitson notes, his suggestions for the P.P. are "difficult to achieve because for a long time the government may be unaware that a significant threats exists." (p67)

The central difficulty for Kitson-type theorisers is distinguishing between the
preparatory stages of insurgency and ordinary political activity: they may look the same. Precisely because this is so Kitonesque ideas are dangerous. Unable to distinguish readily between genuine subversion in embryo and ordinary non-subversive political actions, it is rational for the state to treat all critical political activity as potentially subversive. But it is important to grasp that Kitson doesn't advocate this: he just doesn't address the problem, assuming that a 'significant threat' can be readily identified early on.

For Kitson, the Army - and the book was written for and about the Army, not the police - "should become involved as soon as a threat is detected." Notice that Kitson is talking about 'subversion', defined by him as "all illegal measures short of armed force taken by one section of the people of a country to overthrow those governing the country at the time, or to force them to do things they do not want to do", and 'insurgency', "the use of armed force by a section of the people against the government" (pp 3/4, emphases added). This is hardly Lawrence's "the police ... prepare themselves and start penetrating the opposition" in a period when "nothing is happening, all is calm." Kitson is much more circumspect than Lawrence's account suggests.

Lawrence's loose interpretation of Kitson's writing extends to his version of Kitson's biography:- "the commander of British counter insurgency forces in the North of Ireland for many years" - actually he was commander of a single battalion in Belfast for just two years, 1970-72; and to the sources of Kitson's book - "most of his examples.....are drawn from Britain's war in Ireland and the US war in Indochina" - which just isn't the case. The examples he uses are from all over the world, particularly from Britain's post WW2 colonial experience. Northern Ireland hardly gets a mention. How could it? Kitson wrote his book in 1970 when the British Army had been in Northern Ireland for a year, a year Kitson had spent at Oxford University reading the literature on counter insurgency.

Lawrence makes much of Kitson's advocated use of the 'pseudo' or 'counter' gang, "which he (Kitson) claims to have invented in Kenya." But in the first place this isn't true. Kitson is very careful in his memoir Bunch of Five (London 1977) not to claim this:

"There was in fact nothing original about the idea itself, variations of which have been used in countless wars throughout history." (p49) (1)

And in the second place, although Kitson claims that the 'counter gang' was important in the war against the Mau Mau in Kenya, it takes up a tiny section of Low Intensity Operations - half of page 100 as far as I can see, and then in the context of an insurgency (defined above). This is a very long way from Lawrence's view of 'pseudo gangs' as an "excellent example of the way repressive forces attempt to criminalise their political opponents." (emphasis added)

Lawrence's fragmented and inaccurate account of Kitson's complex proposals is offered as the explanatory framework for some recent U.S. developments - basically the work of one Louis Guiffrida. Lawrence quotes one section from a manual written by Guiffrida which, he says, "borrows from Kitson." This is the first section of that "borrowing".

"Most students of the revolution would agree that "peaceful dissent" is
the first step towards revolution and that this trend signals the opening phase of the "new revolution". These issues be they social, cultural, political or economic, snowball and often appear to the casual observer as being full of truth and at least justified. In short it is fashionable to direct smears, threats and even open hostility towards the policeman. He is, symbolically, at least, everything which is wrong with our society. WHEN THE NECESSARY RESPECT AND REVERENCE ARE DESTROYED, VIOLENCE, AS WE KNOW IT, WILL BE HEROISM".

"Despite the widespread and continuing application of Kitson's strategy on both sides of the Atlantic" - for which he offers no evidence - "it has failed to stem the tide of insurgency where it has been applied most diligently and for the longest time, Ireland, and has suffered setbacks elsewhere. " (Where for example?)

At this point in his essay Lawrence introduces another book by an English Army officer with experience in Northern Ireland: Robin Evelegh's *Peace Keeping in a Democratic Society* (C. Hurst and Co., London 1978). This, says Lawrence, is "the most persuasive critique and proposals to modify Kitson's basic strategy".

Here things begin to get pretty confusing. Evelegh gets Lawrence's 'Kitson treatment' and his 170 pages are boiled down to three basic proposals: compulsory ID cards, steps to make it easier for informants to be generated, and soldiers being given the right to demand the production of driving licenses and vehicle documents.

These fragmented and really quite inaccurate accounts of Kitson's and Evelegh's ideas are used by Lawrence to present the U.S. as pursuing a "two track strategy" employing Evelegh's and Kitson's ideas simultaneously. The evidence for these large claims?

"At the same time as apparently benign Evelegh-type policies are being implemented such as requiring every child on welfare to have a Social Security number, the more draconian Kitson methods are also advancing mostly under the banner of counter-terrorism." Viz. "new super-secret counter-terrorist units in various branches of the military ... new policy ... of pre-emptive strikes against suspected terrorists...the obliterat(ion) of any distinction between domestic and international terrorism ... strange military forces ... every time a militant anti-war protest is held... every police force worthy of the name has been thoroughly militarised with SWAT teams, tactical squads, helicopter patrols, infra-red night vision paraphernalia and the like."

This catalogue's links with Kitson's ideas seem to me to be tenuous in the extreme. The U S. have had 'special forces' for decades; having an anti-terrorist group tells us nothing about how many of Kitson's ideas they have adopted; SWAT teams were developed in the 1960s, weren't they?

Perhaps I have made my point. Perhaps, also, I have laboured the whole business. But these are important issues and it seems important to me that the details are given. It should be clear to the reader that the kindest interpretation of Lawrence's use of Kitson and Evelegh is that he is simply playing the old game of picking out a few bits and pieces which support the thesis you fancy at the time. Which is not to say the Lawrence's thesis is wrong - I really don't know - just not proven, and hardly made
more plausible by his cavalier way with his material.

Quite why Lawrence wants to impose this flimsy Kitson/Evelegh structure on recent U.S. trends is unclear to me. There is little, if anything, in the case studies which follow Lawrence's piece that can't be found in abundance in the domestic history of the US. The agent provocateur has been a routine tool of US capital for at least half a century. (Don't I remember Dashiell Hammet being one for the Pinkertons before becoming a writer?) There are examples of the U.S. state setting up phoney radical organisations - 'pseudo gangs' in Lawrence's sense. Think of Lee Harvey Oswald's bogus branch of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. And Athan Theoharis' recent paper on the FBI's use of the American Legion membership as domestic informers is testimony to an informer network which I'm sure Kitson and his ilk in Northern Ireland would have given their eye-teeth to have. (2) (Incidentally, Kitson himself wrote in *Low Intensity Operations* that "the United States is well ahead in thinking on the overall direction of counter insurgency and counter subversive operations." (p52)

Lawrence's central problem is the apparent lack of any evidence of the specific influence of Kitson's ideas outside the UK. But then it is not obvious to me that Kitson's ideas are anything more than they appear to be: a synthesis of a wide range of counter-insurgency experience. Kitson happened to do the synthesis but any bright graduate student could have done the same. (3)

The extent to which Kitson's book was merely a synthesis of previous experience becomes very clear as soon as you read, say, an account of the Malayan 'emergency'. A version of this - as seen from the top of the British administration in Malaya - is contained in the recent *Templer: Tiger of Malaya*, by John Cloake (London 1985). Reading this after re-reading Kitson and Evelegh, what struck me most forcibly was the extraordinary powers that Templer had as combined High Commissioner (civil administration) and Director of Operations (military administration). Templer was an absolute dictator, and as dictator was able, eventually, to achieve the kind of comprehensive and coordinated intelligence, police, military and propaganda operation which is at the heart of Kitson's thesis, but which was never really achieved in Northern Ireland.

One of the striking sections of the Templer book is an excerpt from a letter Templer wrote in 1954:

"In the areas to be skimmed of troops I propose to use special squads of jungle fighter ... they will really be "killer squads" (though I can promise you I won't call them that, with a view to the questions you might have to answer in the House). They will be at the disposal of the Special Branch ... to use on any good information which comes in. We have always set our face against the use of "killer squads" in infantry battalions or the police generally, since it has a bad effect on the fighting morale of all those who are not in the "killer squads" since they never get a proper crack. This new conception is, however, quite different." (emphasis added) (p260)

Curious that he thought it a new conception. Very similar things had been done in Palestine by the British in the late 1940s. (4) In these Palestine operations an 'anti-terrorist' squad was set up under the leadership of one ex SOE and one ex SAS man.
"The squads consisted largely of ex-soldiers rather than experienced police or intelligence personnel", and their overall commander used them "to exploit existing intelligence to capture or kill insurgents themselves."

(5)

In contemporary Northern Ireland the SAS and E4A, the Royal Ulster Constabulary's Mobile Support Unit have had a similar role. (6)

The Palestine 'killer squads' grew out of a unit called the Police Mobile Force and one of their operations which has been documented involved the use of a laundry van as cover. In one of those curious historical parallels, one of the British covert operations in Northern Ireland, the so-called Military Reconnaissance Force (MRF) also used a laundry van as cover until it got 'blown' and several MRF personnel got killed. The MRF is the best documented example of a 'pseudo gang' we have from Northern Ireland. (7)

In The Kitson Experiment (London/Dublin 1983), the French journalist Roger Faligot makes a reasonable case for the proposition that some of Kitson's synthesis was tried out in Northern Ireland. But his claim (p21) that 'from 1975 onward (Kitson's ideas) were totally implemented " (emphasis added) sits uneasily with post 1975 reports of competing and conflicting counter-insurgency and intelligence operations in Northern Ireland. (8)

Evelegh's book, in essence, is a series of arguments for specific proposals which would lead to an approximation of Templer's coordination-through-dictatorship in Malaya. Two of Evelegh's main proposals - compulsory ID cards and the easier use of informers - are taken directly from Templer's campaign, and Evelegh makes it quite explicit that his desire for an "overall coordinating authority" is based on Templer's demonstration of what that could achieve and Evelegh's experience in Northern Ireland where such coordination did not exist. (9)

Evelegh's suggestion for such a coordinating authority in a counter-insurgency campaign on the British mainland is a civilian structure based on a reintroduction of the World War 2 "Regional Commissioners" who would be "the executive head of all military, police and civil departments " (10). This is in contrast to both Kitson's plans in Low Intensity Operations and the Army Land Manual (See note 3 above) which both foresaw a parallel civil and military structure. Such a two-track structure already exists in civil defence planning for 'Home Defence Regions' (civil) and Regional Military Commanders (military). To my knowledge Evelegh's proposed fusing of the two has not been adopted. (11)

Evelegh's proposals are, if anything, more draconian than Kitson's. In a sense, as Lawrence suggests, they are a modification of Kitson's ideas in the light of experience of Northern Ireland. But, as I have tried to show, Evelegh's solutions are to be found in earlier British counter-insurgency campaigns.

In retrospect it is not surprising that the British state, whose experience of counter-insurgency was of rural societies, should find life in Northern Ireland a more complex proposition - even without the complication of the "enemy" being white and English-speaking.(12) If the war in Northern Ireland is a 'colonial war', by the standards of other British colonial wars it has not been waged as one. Evelegh's book is a long wistful look at the powers available in previous real colonial wars not available in
Northern Ireland.

Nor is it obvious to me that even with Evelegh's proposed new powers the Provos would be defeated. The British state would still be a long way from having the kinds of powers available in Malaya which included widespread curfews, collective punishments for villages believed to be aiding the insurgents, and the relocation of whole communities.

The area of the British state's social control assets where colonial methods *have* been introduced wholesale is policing. As the BBC TV programme 'Brass Tacks' on the police assaults on the miners at Orgreave and the students at Manchester University showed, the British police have now adopted the public order/crowd control and dispersal methods, not of Northern Ireland, but of Hong Kong. (13)

Roy Henry, until recently Hong Kong's Commissioner of Police, described Hong Kong's use of force by the police in four stages, culminating in the use of firearms.

> "You never use automatic fire, of course, and you never deliberately aim to kill. You aim for the knee. And you give a very clear and distinct warning first." (14)

This makes quite an interesting contrast with the Royal Ulster Constabulary's Mobile Support Unit's methods. The Deputy Chief Constable of the RUC is quoted as saying that MSU members "were not trained to fire at peoples' legs but at their bodies to put them permanently out of operation."

The MSU were trained by the SAS and "many were ex members of the British Army and rushed through the formalities of police training."(15) Cf Palestine above.

Continuities ....

The MSU are a counter-insurgency group and not a riot police, of course. Even so, they are - nominally at any rate - a *police* counter-insurgency force, and a British one at that. A very significant step has been taken.

Discovering that the British police began acquiring Hong Kong methods in 1981, the only surprise, surely, is that they had waited so long.

Kitson's 1970 survey of the counter-insurgency operations around the world is essentially a survey of defeats for state forces or temporary successes followed by political defeat. Northern Ireland is going down as another defeat, and not just because of the British state's failure to defeat the military aspects of the insurgency there.

In an interesting recent paper, Don Parsons shows how far from *just* being the victims of same Kitsonesque campaign by the British state, the Protestant/ Loyalist and Catholic/Nationalist communities in Northern Ireland's urban areas have taken control of large areas of community life - what might be called the local welfare state - areas, the control of which both Kitson and Evelegh saw as essential to any successful counter-insurgency operation. Parsons offers this, from one John Oliver, a senior civil servant in Northern Ireland among his evidence:

> "A well-meaning but dangerously vague concept of community action is offered as a replacement (to party politics). Potentially more dangerous
still is the astonishing new growth of community associations some with
dubious connections (ie the paramilitaries - Don Parsons) but nonetheless
intent upon imposing their will on housing, roads, development,
community hall, libraries and so on to the virtual exclusion of elected
politicians and of rational argument, financial considerations, ordered
priorities and the other realities of public administration." (16)

The shootings and bombings of the past 15 years in Northern Ireland may have been
less significant than the failure of the British state's social and economic policies. If
what we have seen in the past ten years is, as Faligot claims, a coordinated counter-
insurgency campaign - and I don't believe this - then both military and civil wings of
that campaign have been failures. The British state is withdrawing from the north of
Ireland.

Robin Ramsay

Part 2

In the present political climate the news of yet another (the fifth) inquiry into the
Kincora Boys Home scandal must be assumed to be yet another holding operation by
the British state. Even if the British state would now find some of the dirt buried there
useful to use against the Loyalist politicians in Northern Ireland, the ramifications are
so enormous and so dangerous that the entire episode remains a total 'no-go' area.

Below we reproduce two long articles, one directly related to Kincora and one which
throws some light on the milieu in which the scandal took place. These articles are,
literally, just the tip of an iceberg of colossal dimensions. When - if - all this comes
out it will make Watergate look relatively insignificant.

However, for the moment all we can offer is these two pieces, and it is appropriate that
it is the Ramsay half of the Lobster who is trying to write this introduction, because I
find the entire Kincora episode extremely difficult to get a grip on and suspect that
almost everyone else reading this does, too. This, then, is a beginner's introduction to
Kincora, written by a beginner.

There are three major strands in the early part of the story. There was a boys home in
Belfast, called Kincora. Several of the male staff running Kincora were homosexuals
and assaulted some of the boys. Complaints were made as far back as 1967 but
nothing was done. One of the staff was William McGrath, who is the second strand.
McGrath tried to set up his very own Protestant paramilitary group called TARA.
Quite what TARA did, and whether it was McGrath's idea alone, or something cooked
up by British intelligence, is not clear to me. TARA does look rather like what I can
only call a would-be paramilitary group. The second of the two documents refers to it
never getting beyond the planning stages. Whose planning isn't clear.

The British state's "security forces" are the third strand. They heard about the events at
Kincora (presumably through their contacts with the Loyalist-dominated Royal Ulster
Constabulary) and found it of interest (a) because of TARA qua paramilitary group;
(b) because in the little world of Orange politics McGrath knew many of the leading
figures; and (c) because, homosexuality being an offence in Northern Ireland, Kincora
- and its related events - offered potential for blackmail by the security forces.
Intimately involved in this was Colin Wallace, whose biography is given in the first of the two documents. Wallace worked in/with - which isn't yet clear - the Psyops department of the British Army in Northern Ireland, appears to have become disgusted with some of the things that were going on there, got forced out of his job and eventually convicted of manslaughter. He claims he was framed. As the material below shows the Psyops operations were directed against both Republican and Loyalist groups.

The second of the two pieces below is a reprint from the Irish Times of an internal review of the Kincora episode written by Wallace while still working for the British state. This document alone proves that all the subsequent official denials of a 'coverup' of the Kincora events are lies.

The first of the pieces is by, and about, Captain Fred Holroyd. Like Wallace he was involved in, and became disgusted by some of the things that he witnessed in Northern Ireland, and has subsequently blown the whistle on them via articles in the New Statesman with Duncan Campbell and on Channel 4 TV. To some extent the Wallace/Holroyd/Kincora stories are now interlinked.

The political significance of all this is impossible to exaggerate. The British public (and many of its politicians) are still almost totally ignorant of the things that have been done in Northern Ireland by the British state. As far as I am aware only Roger Faligot (see above) and Kennedy Lindsay have produced substantial accounts of some of the counter-insurgency operations in Northern Ireland, and these fragments from Wallace and Holroyd serve to show that even Faligot and Lindsay's accounts are still scratching the surface.

If Holroyd's account of battles within the British intelligence services hardly supports Faligot's claim that an integrated Kitsonesque regime was introduced in Northern Ireland, the activities he describes here speak of a campaign savage enough. Holroyd's reference to cooperation between the British intelligence and security forces and some of the Protestant paramilitary groups shows one operational response of the British state to the problem of being 'piggy in the middle' - they joined forces with the side which was, supposedly, 'loyalist'. My enemy's enemy is my friend.

If, at a micro-level, the 'Loyalist' paramilitary forces have on occasion been co-opted by the British state, at a macro level they have mostly been an obstacle in the way of any kind of solution to the 'problem'. How the British government will deal with this 'problem' now that the deal has been struck with the Republic remains unclear. The recent arms charges against a group of Protestants in Glasgow, and the appointment of ex-SAS men to the top three positions in the British Army in Northern Ireland might suggest that one's assumption of a serious clamp-down on the Protestant paramilitaries will turn out to be correct.

If there was ever a political poisoned chalice, it is the one currently being proffered the Dublin Government by the British state.

**Captain Fred Holroyd writes:**

Captain Fred Holroyd, whose revelations of unlawful activities by members of the Security Forces in Ulster in the early 1970s initiated an RUC and Garda inquiry, is currently in correspondence with Mrs Thatcher. He has pointed out to her that the
Ulster Director of Public Prosecutions' statement that "there was insufficient evidence to bring charges against anyone" is simply not true. The Special Investigation Branch (SIB) of the Royal Military Police carried out their own investigation of Holroyd's allegations and found them to be true. Ministry of Defence officials decided that only a minimum of cooperation would be given to the RUC team in the hope that the investigations would be dropped. This aim appears to have been achieved. However, the case will not go away. The New Statesman, which published Holroyd's allegations after checking them out with TV's Diverse Reports programme, has received a statement, made in 1978, which not only confirms the allegations made, but also describes how MI5 was responsible for a campaign of denigration against Holroyd after he resigned his Commission in the Army.

This statement, which is highly detailed, was given to the safekeeping of a Surrey solicitor in 1980 by none other than Colin Wallace, the civil servant employed at Headquarters Northern Ireland until 1978 as 'Head of Production Services' in the notorious "black propaganda" unit, Information Policy.

Wallace is now aware that the RUC detectives who came to the Lewes Prison to interview him on his knowledge of the Kincora affair, frequently left him to interview Holroyd before returning to Ulster. These detectives were aware that Wallace knew the background to Holroyd's case, and could independently support his allegations, but never once asked him to make a statement, nor indeed ever even mentioned Holroyd. Wallace's independent evidence was never mentioned by the RUC team to Holroyd; in fact the detectives went to great lengths to try and convince Holroyd that they could find no supporting evidence for his allegations. This extraordinary behaviour by Superintendent George Caskey and his subordinates Inspectors Ronnie Mack and Edward Cooke has not been explained, and can only lead to grave suspicions of yet another cover-up of events of a politically embarrassing nature.

In January of this year (ie 1985) Wallace sent a comprehensive dossier to Mrs Thatcher which included the material relating to Holroyd's allegations. At this time the RUC investigation had been going on for over two years and the Ulster Director of Public Prosecutions' decision to terminate it with no prosecutions was made on exactly the same date as the Prime Minister's office acknowledged receipt of the dossier. The decision was made before the DPP could see the contents of the file. This sudden decision, after two years, before the RUC had to accept the evidence independently corroborating Holroyd's allegations, appears to support the belief in a Government-inspired cover-up.

Captain Holroyd was an officer in the Royal Corps of Transport, who, after volunteering for "special duties", was trained at the Joint Services of Intelligence (JSSI) at Ashford in Kent as a Military Intelligence Officer (MIO). After three months at JSSI at Templer Barracks (also the Depot of the Intelligence Corps), he was posted to Ulster for three years. His unit was called the Special Military Intelligence Unit (Northern Ireland) (SMIU, NI). Controlled from an office next door to the Head of Special Branch RUC, at RUC HQ, Belfast, it was commanded in the 70's by Lt. Col. Brian Dixon and then Lt. Col. John Burgess, both of the Intelligence Corps.

These Commanding Officers, with a small staff, controlled a Military Intelligence Officer (MIO) and his assistant, a Field Intelligence NCO (FINCO) attached to each RUC Division, and a number of Liaison Intelligence NCO's (LINCO) perhaps fifty operatives overall.
The prime role of the unit members was the passage of information and intelligence between the Army and the RUC at all levels up to Brigade. However, some of the successful operatives were recruited by Mr Craig Smellie of MI6, to operate on cross-border duties. Holroyd was one of this small group.

*John Colin Wallace*, an Ulsterman from Ballymena, was a civil servant employed at Headquarters Northern Ireland. Initially his first contact with the Security Forces was in the late 1960s when he gave up his job in pharmaceuticals and became a Public Relations Officer (PRO) with the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR). When the present troubles started in earnest he worked at HQNI at Lisburn. He was promoted and became, in effect, the key officer at PRO.

In the early 1970s General Frank Kitson's theories of information control in a counter-insurgency situation became very fashionable and there developed a period of reorganisation in the PRO set up. Hugh Mooney of the Information Research Department (IRD) was posted to Stormont to advise on the setting up of a secret department to be used for psychological operations (PSYOPS). This unit was called Information Policy and was given a legitimate role as a cover for its secret role. Lt. Col. Jeremy Railton was the Commanding Officer (CO) and Colin Wallace was ordered to attend a rigged application interview for the job of "Head of Production Services". (The interview was necessary to conform with Civil Service regulations.)

Production Services, having comprehensive printing facilities, provided forgeries of various sorts - driving licenses (Holroyd's Eire driving license in a false name, for example), CIA identity cards, posters, press ID cards, bank statements and so on.

Information Policy (Inf Pol) went into the psyops arena with smear campaigns against political figures and other individuals selected by MI5 (Denis Payne) and MI6 (Douglas Allen) working at Stormont. As so often happens in this kind of unaccountable work, as time went on more and more senior people wanted tasks done, and conflicts of interest caused Wallace - as the man in the middle - problems.

Ultimately he had to face the problem of the MI5 officers wanting to use the "dirty tricks" facilities, not to defeat terrorism in Ulster, but against legitimate politicians in England. He also had to live with the knowledge of the Intelligence link with the Kincora Boys Home, and his unauthorised briefings of the Irish press (albeit encouraged off the record by disgusted Army officers) led him to become regarded as a threat to some members of the Intelligence community.

Fred Holroyd was also having problems with his contemporaries in the Brigade area centred on Lurgan. His written Army charter clearly laid down that his prime loyalty should be to the RUC Special Branch, but 3 Infantry Brigade Commander, Colin Wallis-King, and his Intelligence Staff, saw Holroyd as a "Trojan Horse" who could penetrate RUC Intelligence and pass it on for Army Brigade to exploit. After seeking advice from his CO at SMIU (NI), Holroyd refused to be used in this way, incurring hostility and subsequently non-cooperation from HQ 3 Brigade.

Holroyd, although strictly obeying his charter, was aware that his RUC colleagues were far from being impartial policemen. Time after time Loyalist terrorists would operate without any serious attempt by the RUC to impede or catch them. On the few occasions when Loyalists were caught red-handed, police action was minimised and the culprits were soon back in action. One specific Special Branch officer handled
Loyalist terrorist affairs. His lack of impartiality was commented upon initially in an unfavourable way by HQ 3 Brigade. But in the middle 1970s the covert SAS troop based at Castledillon, and controlled by 3 Brigade, were operating hand in glove with this officer. This was at a time when murders and political assassinations became rampant and "own goals" like the bomb which went off at the ambush of the Miami Show Band, revealed the participation of Loyalists from Portadown.

Holroyd also became aware of a series of "dirty tricks" being carried out by HQ 3 Brigade - weapon "planting", arms cache booby-trapping, blackmail and coercion, kidnapping and the like. After making known his feelings about these activities, Holroyd began to experience a series of odd incidents, remarkably similar to those experienced by Colin Wallace, who had also been making the point that unlawful activities, especially those involving innocent people, were absolutely counter productive to the forces of law and order and would eventually lead to a lack of belief in their credibility.

It would appear that the element of MI5 at Stormont and HQNI, who by 1975 had taken control of intelligence in the province after a bitter struggle with MI6, decided that either Holroyd and Wallace became implicated with the "dirty tricks" exponents, or, alternatively, they would have to be removed, and, if necessary, discredited so that any revelations that they might make, would not be believed. Both men were approached and asked to carry out unlawful tasks. Holroyd was given an unattributable weapon by WO2 Eric Hollis, Intelligence Collator at HQ 3 Brigade and asked to plant it on a victim. In fact he handed it to the RUC Special Branch. Wallace was asked to prepare a paper codenamed Clockwork Orange 2, a feasibility study designed to be used to discredit British politicians in England. (Clockwork Orange 1 was a study of methods of discrediting Ulster public figures, used most effectively by the Security Forces.)

Wallace's prevarications led to what can be considered stage 2 of MI5's policy: both Wallace and Holroyd were informed quite separately that their "covers" had been blown and that they were in grave danger of assassination. It was suggested to them both that it was in everyone's interests if they left the Province and returned to England. Holroyd was able to prove to the staff of HQ 3 Brigade, who were the executor's of MI5's plan in this case, that this proposition was nonsense. Wallace, who also realized that no new events pointed to his being assassinated, also made objections to being posted.

More extreme measures were called for and now MI5 decided that whatever was necessary to be done, would be, in order to remove the perceived threat of these outspoken critics of MI5's policies.

Part 3

This report originally appeared in the Irish Times in June 1985, as part of a series of articles by Ed Maloney and Andy Pollak - to whom all credit for taking this story seriously.

The report was written by - the original is initialled by - Colin Wallace in November 1974. The editing out of names was done by the Irish Times. As their introduction to the piece said, it "sharply contradicts every British Government assurance that there was no cover-up of the affair nor any knowledge of it in British military circles."
Confidential

to: - (---)November 8th 1974.
"TARA" - Reports Regarding Criminal Offences Associated with the Homosexual Community in Belfast.
Reference A: Attached RUC background paper on "TARA"
Reference B: Attached RUC report on the death of Brian McDermott.
Reference C: Your request for a press investigation into the matters referred to above.

1. Reference A adds nothing of real significance to what we already know of the background to "TARA". Furthermore, it contains a number of inaccuracies and there are various items of important information missing from it. It is difficult to say whether these flaws are the result of poor Intelligence or whether they are disinformation provided for our consumption.

2. If we are to interest the press in this matter with a view to exposing what has been taking place and thereby stopping further assaults in these hostels, then I would strongly advise that we make use of our own background information and exclude the rather contentious and, indeed, politically suspect material contained in the above. As you know I did try to develop press interest in this matter last year but without any success. I also feel that it is difficult to justify our interest in what is purely a police and political matter because, in my opinion, TARA is no longer of any security interest.

3. In theory TARA was basically a credible concept from a loyalist paramilitary point of view, but it never progressed beyond the planning stage. Such a body could, no doubt, have made good use of the Orange Order's normal selection and "vetting" system for screening potential recruits, and it would have had ready-made facilities for clandestine training by making use of the Orange halls throughout the province. The idea failed for a number of reasons, mainly because of William McGrath's rather strange political views which are more akin to Irish Nationalism than Unionism, and the fact that other organisations which appeared to be more in keeping with the needs of the loyalist community at that time, sprang up during the period.

4. Reference A deals with McGrath's background in considerable detail but it is inaccurate in a number of respects. The Kincora hostel in Newtonards Road where he works was opened in 1959 under the control and administration of Belfast Corporation welfare department. He does not, as the paper claims, "run the hostel" - he is employed as a "housefather". The warden of Kincora is Joseph Mains and the deputy warden is Raymond Semple. Mains was appointed in 1959 and Semple in 1964. Both men are known homosexuals. Indeed various allegations of homosexual assault on the inmates were investigated by senior ------ ----- in 1967 but no action was taken against anyone. (See notes of a report by Mr ---- at flag 'N")

5. It is untrue to say that allegations of assaults on the inmates of Kincora "began shortly after his appointment". As I have pointed out in para 4 above, allegations were made as early as 1967 and there is also evidence that assaults may have taken place as early as 1959, soon after Mains was appointed.

6. Reference A claims that McGrath "is a known homosexual" but it avoids any
mention of his links with other key figures in the local homosexual community, other than to insinuate that a number of well known political personalities with whom he came into contact were also homosexuals. For example, in para 6 of reference A, it is claimed that McGrath left his previous employment "........" whereas our information would tend to indicate that .......... is well known in unionist party circles (see also..........) and was for some time.......... (see flag "M") .......... and McGrath .......... and .......... has been actively engaged in trying to have McGrath removed from Kincora’s own version of events (see flag "0") is, of course, very enlightening, but I would suggest that it should be treated with caution until it can be substantiated because of the antagonism between them. It would also appear that many of the RUC source reports on this matter after 1971 originated from ..........  

7. McGrath was himself the subject of an internal investigation by the Belfast Corporation welfare department in 1972-73, following allegations of more homosexual assaults on the inmates of Kincora. One of our own sources confirmed in 1972 that a number of complaints had been received about his behaviour and that although the complaints had been passed to .......... and to the RUC, no action had been taken against him. This would appear to be confirmed, to some extent, by Mr....... (see flag "R") in 1973. There were of course similar allegations relating to other hostels during this period (see Bawnmore, Westwinds, Burnside etc) and this conflicts with reference A's assertion that the allegations were confined to Kincora.  

8. It should be remembered that the 1967 Sexual Offences Act does NOT apply to Northern Ireland and homosexual intercourse between adults or with minors is a criminal offence. The apparent lack of interest, therefore, by the welfare authorities and the RUC is quite remarkable. Furthermore the claim made by Mrs ..... (see flag "Q") that key individuals in the ...... were themselves homosexuals and thus .......... but also covered up the offences that took place and protected the offenders, requires very serious examination. In particular, I view her allegations about Joss Cardwell with great concern because it illustrates the political difficulties we are likely to face if we become involved.  

9. Reference B which deals with the circumstances surrounding the murder of Brian McDermott last year puts forward the theory that the killing had both sexual and witchcraft overtones. The only link that can be identified between the murder and the homosexual community is via John McKeague (see flag "S"). McKeague's own statements raise more questions than they answer. Certainly his boast that he will not be prosecuted because "he knows too much about some people" merits serious investigation, but I suspect that he will not be prepared to talk until he is released. It is also rather remarkable that no charges have been preferred against him ......  

Our own investigations of instances of alleged witchcraft or other satanic rites in the province would tend to dismiss the RUC's theory that Brian McDermott's murder could be part of these activities. In the past "black magic" practices etc have been mainly confined to groups operating from republican areas, with the possible exception of three cases in C. Antrim. I think, however, that from a press point of view we would be very foolish to give any credence to such claims without the most convincing evidence. The forensic reports on the
McDermott murder (see flag 'T') would tend to indicate that someone tried to dispose of the body by cutting it into pieces and burning them. The insinuation made in the document regarding the boy's disappearance, and the proximity of .......... is dangerous nonsense.

10. Reference A claims that a number of key personalities in the political arena "are aware of the Kincora situation and, in particular of McGrath's background." It does not explain the extent of their awareness nor of each individual's involvement with McGrath. In summary it would appear that the document is claiming that:

   a. ... ... of the Grand Orange Lodge are aware of the situation because of the discussions and correspondence relating to McGrath within the Orange Order. It is further alleged that ....... and ........... have blocked any action against McGrath.

   b. ............ is aware of the situation but has failed to take any action because of the possible blackmail pressure owing to his connection with McGrath,....... and John McKeague. On the face of it the statements made by ............ and ........... (see flag "F") would tend to support only part of such a claim. There are also a number of inconsistencies: McGrath would appear to be strongly anti-communist and anti-UVF and this conflicts with the document's views on links with Tommy Herron, Ernie 'Duke' Elliot, 'The Ulster Citizens Army' etc.

   c. Various public and political figures who hold positions of power and who are also homosexuals protect each other from prosecution. The claim of a prostitution ring involving juveniles is not really substantiated other than by .........'s own personal account. It would be interesting to check, however, the number of charges brought against people involved in homosexual activities in greater Belfast area in the last 5 years. I also think the RUC report on drug abuse in this connection merits close examination because this is a natural area of fund raising of terrorists. There is, of course, the obvious problem of security with the possible blackmailing of civil servants, politicians etc.

**Conclusions and recommendations**

I am very far from happy with the quality of the information on this matter, and I am even more unhappy because of the, as yet unexplained, failure of the RUC or the NIO to take on this task.

I find it very difficult to accept that the RUC consistently failed to take action on such serious allegations unless that (sic) had specifically received some form of policy direction. Such direction could only have come from a very high political or police level. If that is the case then we should be even more wary about getting involved.

On the other hand, if the allegations are true then we should do everything possible to ensure that the situation is not allowed to continue. The youngsters in these hostels almost certainly come from problem families, and it is clear that no one will fight their fight unless we do. Those responsible for the murder of Brian McDermott must be brought to trial before another child is killed, and if it can be proved that there is a
connection with this homosexual group, then the RUC must be forced to take action irrespective of who is involved.

I would therefore recommend that:

a. We make one final attempt to get the RUC to investigate the matter or at least discuss the matter with RUCLO.

b. We obtain very clear and unambiguous authority from London to proceed with a press disclosure.

c. We approach a responsible journalist whom we are confident will make a thorough investigation of the matter and not simply write a sensational type story purely on the information he is given.

d. We continue to look for additional information on this matter to ensure that we are not just being used as part of some political disinformation scheme.

J.C. Wallace (Senior Information Officer)

Notes

1. In Internal Security Defence Review No 1 (March 1983) p 45, the anonymous authors quote from an account of the wars against the American Indian, suggesting that the use of 'pseudo gangs' goes back at least as far as the 1870s.

2. The FBI and the American Legion Contact Program, Athan Theoharis in Political Science Quarterly Summer 1985

3. It is worth noting that Kitson's book appeared after the revised Army Manual: Land Operations Vol 2 (counter revolutionary operations) appeared in 1969. I haven't seen this and have no way of knowing how much, if any, input into it Kitson made. The manual is briefly discussed in State Research October/November 1978 pp20-21. The outline given there suggests that it is similar, in broad terms, to the Kitson/ Evelegh view of the world.


There is, quite clearly, a study to be written of the continuities through the experience of SOE to the post-war counter-insurgency operations. To give just one example, some of the people imported into the Malayan operation came from Palestine and were (apparently) resented as 'the Palestine mob'. Charters shows one example of SOE methods being (wrongly, in his view) used in a counter-insurgency situation.

5. Charters - see note 4

6. On E4A, most recently and accessibly, see Chris Ryder, Sunday Times 11 August 1985.

7. On 'Four Square' see Faligot's The Kitson Experiment p 30/31. The MRF is openly acknowledged as an army 'counter gang' both by William Seymour in his British Special Forces (London 1985) p308, and by Tony Geraghty in his Who Dares Wins (London 1980 pp 193/4.)

8. This is extremely complicated. There is little doubt that between 1969 and 1974 something akin to chaos reigned in the British counter-insurgency efforts in Northern Ireland. All accounts agree on this, and also that from around 1975
the chaos was reduced. How this was done, and how effective it was in practice is difficult to determine in any detail. Faligot describes lots of bits and pieces, many of which look like aspects of a Kitsonesque coordinated counter-insurgency campaign. But, to give just one recent example (and there are others in Fred Holroyd's piece here), the Belfast Sunday News 21 July 1985 reports the existence of SAS-trained 'ghost squads' of armed civilians, squads whose existence had not been notified to the RUC.

The essential difficulty for any integrated counter-insurgency campaign in Northern Ireland has always been that Northern Ireland is part of the British state and so all the civil arms of that state are present and, as far as I am aware, unwilling to surrender their powers over to the Army. Solving this particular problem is one of the main threads of Evelegh's book.

9. See Evelegh, especially around p 110

10."Regional Commissioners" are a part of current government Emergency Powers proposals on the stocks in case of an international crisis (ie the threat of war). These "Regional Commissioners" would be junior Cabinet Ministers. (see Duncan Campbell in New Statesman 6 September 1985). It isn't clear to me if this represents any kind of adoption of Evelegh's proposals. But then it isn't clear to me exactly what the relationship is between these 'Emergency Powers' and possible mainland insurgency. If anyone has information on this I would like to hear from them.

11.The lack of clarity mentioned in note 10 above extends to my understanding of the relationship between the Civil Defence structure and possible reactions to insurgency in the UK. This whole area is - looks like - a complicated muddle. If someone could clarify it they would be doing us all a big favour.

12."The Army's counter-insurgency doctrine ... was not designed for domestic use, that is, for a semi peace-keeping role between two warring communities within the UK." David Charters, "Intelligence and Psychological Warfare-Operations in Northern Ireland" in RUSI journal, September 1977 p 25 Nor, of course, was it designed to combat people capable of highly sophisticated technical operations. On the Provos use of intercepts of British signals see Sigint Used by Anti-state Forces by Frank Doherty in War and Order ed. Celina Bledowska (London 1983)

13.The essence of the programme is in The Listener, 31 October 1985

14.in Listener (above)

15.Chris Ryder in Sunday Times see note 6 above.

16.Don Parsons, Politics Beyond the Point of Production: class struggle and regional underdevelopment in Northern Ireland in Review of Radical Political Economy (New York) Summer 1985

Shorts (KAL 007 & JFK)

Paul Johnson, former editor of the New Statesman turned 'new right' Thatcherite, turned his hack hand to KAL 007 in a review of Alexander Dallin's Black Box KAL 007 and the Superpowers (University of California Press 1985) in the Times Literary Supplement (August 23 1985).

Johnson asks the question: "How could a Korean pilot skilful enough to land a damaged airliner on an unknown frozen lake, make what was described as "the worst navigational error in modern aviation history?" (Johnson is referring to a previous incident, of course.)
His answer? 'We know that they (sic) could, because they did.'

Johnson wants to explain the 'mistake' by 007's pilot by referring to a previous 'mistake'. As well as begging two questions at once - the status of both 'mistakes' - Johnson's logic is familiar to students of the dreadful Edward J. Epstein. In his Legend he says something to the effect that the best evidence that Oswald's rifle could fire three shots in the time allotted is that he did, in fact, fire three shots.

Johnson's most spectacular recent outburst is his "Flights of Dark Fantasy" in the Daily Telegraph 16 March 1985. In a bizarre attack on 'conspiracy theorists' Johnson equates Marx, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, Hitler, Kennedy assassination buffs and Tam Dalyell MP. "Conspiracy theory is a modern superstition, a poor substitute for angels and devils."

Like others of his ilk, Johnson seems to be blissfully unaware that their beliefs about the Soviet Union are frequently conspiracy theories in their purest form, and theories with a good deal less substance than is the case with most of the beliefs held by Tam Dalyell about the Belgrano, or the JFK buffs. But then this is axiomatic. If the conspiracy theories around these events - and this is to ignore the question of how much of them are conspiracy theories - were just the nonsense Johnson and his ilk keep telling us they are, they wouldn't need to keep telling us, would they?

Johnson, who was a participant at the 1983 Jonathan Institute conference on Soviet-inspired terrorism (See his Wanted: World War on Terror, in the Times 10 August 1984), really has done a Sidney Carton number. No greater sacrifice can a man make than he lay down his brain for a cause.

Brian Crozier (see review of his novel in this issue) was also at that Jonathan Institute conference.

In Lobster 2 the Ramsay half of the team half-seriously speculated that the assassination of JFK might have been the result of a plan to fake an assassination attempt which got hi-jacked by, and provided the perfect cover for, a real assassination.

In Norman Mailer's latest novel, Tough Guys Don't Dance, he has a character say at one point:

'That always happens with master plans .... The better the plan, the more you can count on something unforeseen getting in to bend the works. I'll tell you the real story of how Jack Kennedy got killed someday. It was supposed to be a miss! What a set of accidents! The CIA didn't know anus from appetite that day. " (p123)

A Lobster reader writes that he repeatedly finds that photographs taken of military installations come back from the developers/printers blank - ie the frame before and the frame after the military installation perfect, but the middle blank.

Has anyone else experienced anything like this, and is there an explanation? A "film fogger" near sensitive installations?
Afterword: the search for "Maurice Bishop"

Steven Dorril

See note (1)

David Phillips, the former CIA officer considered by the Select Committee on Assassinations as a possible candidate for the true identity behind the cover name "Maurice Bishop" -(2)- reacted strongly when this book was published in the summer of 1980. He contacted top executives in newspapers and television, making himself available to counter passages in Conspiracy concerning him. As a result, I took part in discussions with Phillips on prominent television programs.

In the course of these approaches to the press, Phillips contacted the editor of the Washington Post. Subsequently, when a reporter -(3)- was assigned to the story, Phillips revealed the real identity of former CIA officers whose identities were protected by pseudonyms in Assassinations Committee reports and in my book. Phillips observed that "Cross", the case officer who believed Phillips had indeed used the name "Bishop", was a heavy drinker, implying that he was prone to getting his facts wrong. -(4)- Shortly afterwards, when a Post reporter visited "Cross" at home, he found that Phillips had been on the phone to him only a short time earlier. Whatever had passed between them, "Cross" stood by his assertion that the name "Bishop" had been used in the Miami CIA office, and that he believed it was used to refer to Phillips.

"Cross" admits that he was formerly a heavy drinker, but - as noted earlier - has shown that his recall of names and details other than "Bishop" is accurate. In a further conversation, with this author, in 1981, "Cross" seemed upset by the interest his statements have caused, and complained the Assassinations Committee gave it "undue emphasis". He agreed, however, that he has been correctly quoted. A subsequent check with congressional investigators revealed that "Cross" originally linked the name "Bishop" with that of Phillips promptly and spontaneously.

The Washington Post reporter was also able to talk to Phillips' former Miami assistant "Doug Gupton". -(5)- He said, much as he had said to the Committee 'I never used the name "Bishop" to my recollection'. Finally the reporter visited "B.H." -(6)- the former CIA covert operative who told the Committee he had met "Bishop" in the past, but whose testimony prompted a skeptical reaction from the Committee investigator.

"B.H." a short, dark man of Cuban origin, is belligerent - not least about the way the CIA has been treated in recent years. He told the Committee that Phillips was a "personal friend", an officer he worked with closely on a "day-to-day" basis on Cuban operations between 1960 and 1964. Interviewed by the Washington Post in 1980, B.H. stated that after Phillips testified to the Committee, but before he himself was formally interviewed, he discussed the Committee inquiry with Phillips. In his Committee interview "B.H." was asked simply whether he had known anybody named Maurice Bishop. After replying that he had, "B.H." responded to Committee questioning. "Mr Bishop was in the organisation but I had no personal day-to-day open relationship with him. Phillips, yes; Bishop, no. I knew them both."
"B.H." appeared in his replies to be stressing that he remembered "Bishop" as being somebody other than Phillips. There are notable discrepancies between what "B.H." told the Committee and what he said to the Post. He told the Committee he encountered "Bishop" "two or three times". He told the Post he met him only once. He told the Committee that he encountered "Bishop" between 1960 and 1964. In his Post interview, he said it was probably after 1964 - after the time most relevant to the Veciana allegations. "B.H." told the Committee he worked closely with Phillips between 1960 and 1964. In the conversation with the Post, he claimed that he did not work with Phillips until after 1964. "B.H." accounts for these differences by claiming that his comments were "wrongly recorded".

The Assassinations Committee investigator of the "Bishop" case suspects that the "B.H." scenario may be a red herring, designed to confuse the trail. Such justifiable suspicions might have been resolved had the Committee management given the "Bishop" case the attention it deserved. Sadly it did not. While Phillips did testify, the Committee failed to take testimony on oath from "Cross", "B.H." or "Gupton". "Cross" who told two investigators he believed "Bishop" was Phillips, was not even subjected to formal interview. There were no systematic interrogations of relevant CIA officers who might have further confirmed the use of the name "Bishop". The Committee failed to follow up a key lead provided by Veciana - the identity of a prominent Cuban who may have originally proposed Veciana to "Bishop" as a promising candidate for CIA recruitment. -(7)- The Cuban's name was known to the Committee, and is known to the author. Other leads received cursory treatment.

The Committee never tried to trace a vital witness whose name was provided by Veciana months before the Committee wound up its inquiry. Veciana had spoken, from the start, of a go-between whom he had used during his association with "Bishop" .......

The person who helped arrange meetings between "Bishop" and Veciana is a woman, a prim grandmother in her fifties, who works as a minor functionary in a U.S. government administrative department. She has requested anonymity, and will be identified here only as "Fabiola", a Cuban exile who left Havana in autumn 1961. She worked, until that year, as Veciana's secretary at the Banco Financiero, and was there at the time Veciana claims he was recruited by a "Bishop". While she says Veciana never mentioned a CIA contact, Fabiola recalls details which fit his story. She recalls a time when Veciana started going to "language courses" in the evenings. Veciana, in his earliest interviews, spoke of attending nightly US intelligence briefings in an office building which houses, on the first floor, the Berlitz School of Language.-(8)- Fabiola says she did become aware that Veciana was involved in subversive activities. He once produced a huge sum of half a million dollars, which he asked her to safeguard until he retrieved it. Veciana has always said he worked with "Bishop" on a "program that resulted in the destabilisation of the Cuban currency". In Cuba, Fabiola decided not to ask awkward questions. Politically, she sympathized with him, and later - in exile - collaborated actively when Veciana became leader of Alpha 66. - (9)

He asked her to act as an answering service for him when he was travelling, and in the months to come Fabiola became familiar with the name of a caller from the mainland United States. The name was "Bishop". When I interviewed Fabiola I threw out a number of names, including that of "Bishop". "Bishop" was the only name to which she responded, and it stirred in her the memory of another name. "Bishop" is firmly linked in Fabiola's mind with a second person - "Prewett". For her, the two names are
A check of American press directories turned up Virginia Prewett - (10) - a Washington journalist who has specialized in Latin American affairs all her life. She has written extensively about the struggle between Fidel Castro, whom she characterized as a "betrayer", and the Cuban exiles, whom she describes as "patriots". In summer 1963 Prewett attended a conference on Cuba co-sponsored by Freedom House and the Citizen's Committee for a Free Cuba. Her report on the conference, later inserted in the Congressional Record, began by quoting a call by Freedom House "to remove both Fidel Castro and the Soviet presence from Cuba without delay."

For many years Prewett wrote for the North American Newspaper Alliance (NANA), a syndication organization founded by Prewett's friend Ernest Cuneo, also a veteran of the CIA's forerunner, the Office of Strategic Services, who arranged for Prewett to work for NANA. In 1963 NANA was severely criticized in a Senate Committee Report, for syndicating pro-Chiang Kai-shek propaganda written by a paid American lobbyist.

In spring 1963, seven months before the Kennedy assassination, Prewett was assailing the administration for its opposition to the raids mounted against Cuba by Antonio Veciana's Alpha 66 guerillas. On April 2, in the Washington Daily News, Prewett lambasted a Kennedy spokesman who had "called the daring and gallant Alpha 66 raids on Cuba irresponsible acts". Prewett called this "an all-time low in pronouncement of US foreign policy", and mocked the notion that "unless we stop the Alpha 66 raids against Communist Cuba, there'll be nuclear conflict." Three weeks later, after President Kennedy ordered strong measures against would-be exile raiders, Prewett rushed to support the exile leadership and berated the Kennedy White House for assuming it had "carte blanche to create a foreign policy outside the nation's popular consent." These Prewett articles were read into the Congressional Record.

The Alpha 66 raids, which so embarrassed President Kennedy and which pleased Virginia Prewett, were the very attacks which - according to Alpha 66 leader Veciana - were carried out on specific instructions from CIA officer "Maurice Bishop". As Veciana tells it, "Bishop's" intention was to cause further trouble between Kennedy and Russia - within months of the Missile Crisis which had brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. His purpose was "to put Kennedy against the wall in order to force him to make decisions that will remove Castro's regime."

In the company of a Washington Post reporter, I talked to Virginia Prewett in 1980. She agreed that she had contact with Alpha 66 in the early sixties, and accepted that Alpha 66 was "probably" backed by the CIA - even if its leaders were not formally told so. Prewett made it clear she was once familiar with the work of the group's leader, Veciana, and asked, "Where is he now?" Later in the interview, however, she said she had never met Veciana. Veciana, for his part, says he did know Prewett, and refers to her as 'Virginia'. He asserts he met her at her hotel in Puerto Rico more than once, and "probably in Washington."

When the name "Bishop" was first raised with Prewett, in the context of the CIA and
Cuba, she said, "Well, you had to move around people like that." When the name came up again, she said, 'I didn't personally know him," and later, in response to a direct question, she said she did not know "Bishop". Prewett also said she had never met Phillips. Phillips - asked about Prewett - contradicts her. He says he once knew Prewett quite well, specifically recalling meetings in the Dominican Republic.

Contacted by this author in early 1981, Phillips was asked whether he stood by his denial that he was "Maurice Bishop", or indeed knew a "Bishop", a denial formally recorded in the Assassinations Committee Report. - (11) - Phillips repeated that he neither was "Bishop", nor "connected in any way", and said that any such intimation was "an outrageous accusation." As for Veciana, the source of the "Bishop" allegation, he also repeated to this author that "Bishop" was not Phillips.

Notes

1. 'Afterword' is taken from the American paperback edition of Anthony Summers' *Conspiracy* (1980) It wasn't included in the British (Fontana) edition. When Summers finished the book he continued to follow up certain leads, particularly those connected with "Maurice Bishop" and Oswald in Mexico City.

This new information was to appear in a series of articles, "The conspiracy that nearly led to holocaust" for *The Observer*. Unfortunately, owing to continuing legal difficulties with David Phillips, they were never officially published. Much of the material appears now in Afterword and the following notes (which are the responsibility of *The Lobster*).

Our thanks to Anthony Summers for permission to reprint Afterword.

2. "Maurice Bishop" is the intelligence officer anti-Castro leader Antonio Veciana claims met with Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas in late August or the first days of September. (See *Conspiracy* pp352-361)

The fullest treatment on the possibility that "Bishop" is ex-CIA officer David Atlee Phillips is Gaeton Fonzi's "Who Killed John F. Kennedy" in the *Washingtonian* magazine (November 1980). Much of this area remains controversial and depends to a large extent on your opinion of Veciana himself. However, the evidence continues to mount against Phillips - though there is no more evidence that "Bishop" met Oswald. In recent years other leads on "Bishop"/Phillips have appeared:


b. (b) In 1983 Jim Hougan, author of *Spooks* and *Secret Agenda*, spoke with ex-CIA man Frank Terpil. He told Hougan that he knew Phillips but only under the cover name "Bishop". Terpil says he met "Bishop" (who, he insists, is Phillips) in Miami in 1967/68 while in the company
of journalist Hal Hendrix. (On Hendrix see *Conspiracy* pp134/5. We understand that the House Select Committee on Assassinations confirmed that Hendrix was a CIA contract agent.)

Terpil says he was living with Hendrix's daughter at this time. He checked "Bishop's" name with the file of cover names at the CIA's Office of Security in Miami. Obviously Terpil is not everyone's idea of a reliable informant.

c. (c) A number of Phillips' colleagues, other than those mentioned in *Afterword*, have indicated that the Phillips/"Bishop" identity "holds water." They include the Naval Attache in Cuba.

3. The reporter mentioned here was David Leigh of *The Observer* who was on a year's sabbatical with the Washington Post. He came to the conclusion that Phillips was probably "Bishop" following his contacts with the CIA agents involved in the Post inquiry. He didn't enjoy the experience, though. It all became "heavy" and he was glad to get back to the "normality" of England. Unfortunately he didn't keep his notes.

4. "Cross" is the pseudonym of Ross Crozier. Crozier worked on covert activities in Guatemala and Cuba in the 1950s and in Mexico in the early 1960s. He worked in Dallas for the Public Survey Corp. and the JM/Wave operation of the early sixties. He was also responsible for setting up the DRE anti-Castro group (Directoria Revolucionario Estudiantil). The DRE set up a branch in New Orleans, but, according to Crozier, it was not done by him. Head of the New Orleans branch was Carlos Bringuier. DRE received backing from Clare Boothe Luce.

5. "Grupton" is William Kent, assistant to Phillips in psychological warfare. An employee of Kent's ran the anti-Castro propaganda station, Radio Swan.

6. "B.H." is Barney Hidalgo, now living in retirement, working as a fireman, and breeding Japanese goldfish in his spare time.

7. He is believed to be the Cuban banker and sugar king Julio Lobo who now lives in Spain. Lobo gave financial backing to Crozier's DRE. Veciana was trained in the offices of the Mao Bay Mining Corp by a "Mr Melton". Mao was a CIA front company, as, it is believed, was a subsidiary, the Freight Sulphur Company. Mao representatives attended a meeting with Earl Smith, then US Ambassador to Cuba, in early December 1958.

Businessmen used as contacts and in intelligence activities were crucial to the CIA's efforts in Cuba. One of the pilots of the Mao Bay Mining Corp. was Pedro Diaz Lang, a close friend of Frank Sturgis.

"Bishop" also gave the name of Wayne S. Smith to Veciana in Cuba. Smith, born 16 August 1932, speaks Portuguese, Russian and Spanish. He served in the Marine Corps 1947-52, studied in Paris in 1955, and served for the CIA in Havana and Washington in 1957.

8. Veciana also received intelligence training at the Berlitz School of Languages
which would appear to be used as a CIA cover.

Melvin Beck, a CIA officer in Cuba, attended a language course at Berlitz whilst he was in Havana in the late 1950s, early 1960s. (See his Secret Contenders: the Myth of Cold War Counterintelligence, Sheridan Square Publications, NY 1984 pp 22/27)

More interesting is the fact that the recent Director of the Berlitz School in Madrid was none other than CIA officer Alberto Cesar Augusto Rodriguez Gallego, who from 1961-72 was responsible for the photographic surveillance of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. This includes the period of "Oswald's" visit. (On the Madrid item see Intelligence/Parapolitics (Paris) April 1985.)

Surveillance pictures of visitors to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City were taken by a pulse camera which was automatic. If, as Phillips says, it broke down on the day "Oswald" paid his visit it would not matter. It seems there was a back-up camera for such emergencies. As revealed in Lobster 6, Winston Scott, CIA station chief in Mexico City for a number of years, had a copy of the "Oswald" photo. It was a right-hand profile, taken from above when "Oswald" visited the Cuban Consulate. Scott apparently knew that Oswald was not 'Henry' and believed Oswald wanted 'help' as well as a visit from the Consulate.

In a long memorandum or manuscript Scott refers to "a photo of Oswald". Three CIA officers claim to have seen it whilst two others claim to have heard of it. They are: Philip Agee, Daniel Stanley Watson, Joseph B. Smith, Joseph Piccolo and Daniel Niescuir. According to one of them, it was Angleton who cleaned out Scott's safe, though other evidence has suggested it was an officer called Kirkpatrick.

CIA officer Ann Goodpasteur is believed to have told an untruth to the HSCA about a picture taken at the Soviet Embassy on October 1 1963. She says delay until October 10th in informing headquarters was because of the unsuccessful efforts to identify the "unidentified man" - possibly a Russian sailor. The October 10th teletype was, in fact, doctored, according to evidence developed by the HSCA investigators.

Phillips also told untruths. He said that Herbert Manell's wife Barbara prepared the cable. Manell signed off on it. Phillips claimed it was delayed because of its 'Cuban content'. The HSCA developed information that there was no Cuban content. Phillips was not in Mexico City on October 10th.

The man responsible for CIA surveillance operations in Mexico City was George F. Munroe, a fervent right-winger and ex-FBI agent. He was responsible for the wiring of the Soviet Embassy and Cuban Consulate. According to HSCA information there were also human contacts with two spies within the Cuban consulate, but no one inside the Russian Embassy. (See Lobster 6 for possible source in the Soviet Embassy).

There was plenty of audio and visual surveillance. Eight telephone conversations at the Soviet Embassy were tapped and eight transcripts made. Two conversations on the 27th September 1963 were in Spanish, several others
in Russian. They were translated by Mr Tarasov and his wife but not sent to headquarters until October 10th. Before the assassination the CIA concluded that all related to "Oswald" but not reported to Washington. Only the Soviet Embassy was apparently tapped, not the Cuban Consulate.

9. Alpha 66 is believed to have been run by Henrich Heckshen and operated in Mexico City with "eight German-speaking Jewish representatives")

10. Prewett, whose husband Henry was in the CIA, was a CIA asset handled by Phillips. She recently worked for 'The Council for Internal Security'. Its board includes Robert Morris, a leading light of the old and the latest 'new right'. See forthcoming Lobster for more on Morris and the extreme right's connection to the JFK assassination.

Another journalist who worked for the CIA-linked NANA was Priscilla Johnson (now McMillan, author of Marina and Lee - see Lobster 7). In November 1959 she was the NANA representative in the Soviet Union and was asked by her "colleague" in the US embassy in Moscow, John A. McVickar, to see the defector Oswald. McVickar, an assistant counsellor in the Consular section, is listed in the unreliable East German Who's Who in the CIA as a CIA officer:


Another of these "colleagues" was Mrs G. Stanley Brown. Could this be the wife of Gordon S. Brown?

Gordon S Brown, born 24 February 1936, speaks Arabic, French. 1957-60 US Army, 1961 State Department, CIA. Served Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo.

McVickar's immediate superior was Richard E. Snyder, long suspected of being an American intelligence operative, most likely CIA. He denies this but he had in fact previously served as an intelligence officer for the State Department. Of course the East German Who's Who may be wrong. But since the KGB are believed to have compiled it, then we can speculate that they assumed Oswald, whilst in Moscow, was in contact with several CIA-linked American citizens. The American embassy would have been under constant surveillance of one sort or another.

11. According to a colleague, Phillips was guilty of serious professional lapses during his period in the CIA, including the loss of top secret documents. He was obliged to resign not retire in 1975.

Even if Phillips is not "Bishop", he deserves close investigation because of his activities in Mexico City and those of other CIA officers there during his period of duty.

In Mexico City there were five CIA disinformation agents, four of them run by Phillips: Dr Luis Conte Aguerro, Herman Portell-Villa, Angel Fernandez Varela, Nestor L. Carbonel and Eduardo Borrel Nouvarros. Phillips also had two other agents: Salvador Diaz Verson and Emilio Nunez Portundo.
Diaz Verson had been Carlos Prio's Chief of Military Intelligence during Prio's Cuban Presidency 1948-1952. He was on the steering committee of the World Anti-Communist Congress for Freedom and Liberation (which became the WACL) which held its preparatory conference in Mexico City in March 1958. On November 20th 1963 Verson went to Mexico City to attend the International Federation of Journalists' convention. According to Philip Agee, this organisation works closely with the CIA.

Diaz Verson would later tell Dr. Angel Fernandez Varela (one of the CIA's disinformation agents) that while in Mexico City he had learned that the Mexican Federal Police had arrested a Mexican citizen, Sylvia Duran, an employee of the Cuban Consulate, because of her connection between Oswald and the Consulate. He further said that Oswald had stayed at the home of Duran and subsequently met with the Cuban Ambassador in Mexico City at a restaurant called Caballo Bavo, accompanied by Duran. The Federal Police reportedly had turned over the information concerning Oswald to the US authorities in Mexico City. (See Warren Commission CH XXVI 413)

Another Phillips disinformation exercise? One who may know is Raymond E. (Speedy) Gonzalez who was responsible for the CIA's deception operations in Mexico City. He now works in Washington.

"Oswald" attended a party held by a relative of Sylvia Duran. "Oswald" wore a black sweater and was accompanied by two companions one of whom was tall with short brown hair. It is rumoured that Duran and "Oswald" were close and may have been having a sexual affair. The CIA had pre-assassination files on Duran, most of which have been withheld, including verbatim interviews. In 1979 Duran admitted that Oswald was probably not the man in the Mexican City Cuban Consulate. In 1963 the CIA headquarters in the U.S sent messages to the Mexico City Station saying that Americans were to be discouraged from talking to Duran.

In 1964, after the publication of the Warren Report, a Mexican woman, Elena Garro, came forward with the allegation that Oswald and two companions had attended a party at the home of a relative of Sylvia Duran. US intelligence agencies failed to investigate this allegation. In 1978 Garro said that she wanted to come forward with her story immediately after the assassination but was told not to and was sequestered in a hotel by one 'Manuel Calvillo'. (See Conspiracy p 585/6)

A State Department report in 1969 described her as a 'professional anti-communist' HSCA 111 291). Former associates in Mexico City told Anthony Summers that they suspected her, on quite separate matters, of liaising with and acting on behalf of US intelligence - in the propaganda field. The HSCA found that its Garro inquiry was "inhibited by the refusal of the CIA to make available sources...on the allegation."

A State Department officer who tried to investigate the Garro matter in 1969 was later mistakenly dismissed and eventually committed suicide. (HSCA Report p124 111 285/293) He was Charles William Thomas who wrote a memo (25 July 1969) to the Secretary of State concerning the Garro affair. He is listed in the unreliable East German Who's Who In the CIA. Born 20 June
1922, spoke French, Spanish. 1943 US Navy; 1951 studying in Paris; 1952 State Department; 1957 alleged CIA. Postings in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Accra, Tangiers, Port-au-Prince and Mexico City, where he presumably heard the Garro story.

The HSCA discovered that Garro did stay at the Hotel Vermont in San Luis Potosi. She was held for eight days. This is confirmed by Hotel records. The person who took her to the hotel, Manuel Calvello, it was determined was a CIA agent. He was unavailable for questioning by the HSCA. It was found that it was Garro who had tipped off the Mexican Police about Oswald's attendance at the party. A female friend of Garro who shared a house with her in 1967 was a CIA employee who had worked for Winston Scott in 1963. "Miss Y" in the HSCA volumes is June Cobb.

A Mexican professor of philosophy involved in the Garro story was made Mexican Ambassador to East Germany in 1978. He was a personal friend of Duran and appears to have held seminars in her home. Which neatly dovetails with p 124 of the HSCA report: "This, the Committee speculated, might explain why 'Oswald' contacted Contreras - after he had attended a meeting in the philosophy department." (See Conspiracy p375, 582/3 for more on the Contreras episode.)

'Oswald', it would appear, was believed to be infiltrating left-wing groups in Mexico City. Melvin Beck's book (see above) gives evidence of such CIA counterintelligence efforts amongst students in Mexico City.

The American Ambassador in Mexico, Thomas Mann, had thought in 1963 that Castro was responsible for the JFK assassination. He had wished to have Nicaraguan Gilberto Alvarado sent to the US for questioning but the request was denied. He believed that the cover-up with regard to Duran was because US agencies were embarrassed about something. He also believed that Scott was furious about the cover-up. Mann further believed that Oswald had made two trips to Mexico City.

In the light of new evidence concerning Mexico City it might be worth re-considering the story of Richard Case Nagell who claimed to have been involved with Oswald just before he went to Mexico. (See Gallery March 1981). Anthony Summers was informed that the Los Angeles Police Department carried out an investigation into Nagell's claims. Where they could be checked they apparently checked out.

Steve Dorril

From National Lampoon (spotted by Wendell Maas.)

MY OTHER CAR IS JIMMY HOFFA
Genesis, the First Book of Revelations
David Wood
Baton £15

This is the second big seller in Britain on the Rennes mystery and others are on the way. Holy Blood and the Holy Grail by Henry Lincoln and co. started the craze by proclaiming the existence of a secret masonic society - the Priory of Sion - which claims to have operated various fronts for at least 900 years, including the Knights Templar and the Rosicrucians. The big secret is, of course, the preservation of the bloodline of Jesus, whose descendants allegedly intermarried with European monarchs and whose centre amongst the gnostic Cathars of Southern France was destroyed in 1209 by the Pope's Albigensian Crusade.

It is in an archaeological site in this area (near Rennes) that Wood stakes his claim towards a solution of the mystery. He is less concerned with the J.C. bloodline (one might ask what it would matter nowadays anyhow) than with the secrets the stones betray and what artists, cranks and conspirators down through the ages have gleaned from them.

Briefly, the buildings and rock formations form a "temple" of precise geometrical symbols of gods worshipped by the Egyptians, and possibly others before them. These gods - Set, Isis, Osiris and Nephthys - were worshipped as the gods of Creation and also spell SION. The creation story is linked to the theory of cosmic catastrophe wrecking the Earth's surface thousands of years ago - an event which myths throughout the world seem to allude to. Wood argues that this is recorded at Rennes as a warning to posterity.

The ancients used geometry because as the 'language of the gods' it is the least perishable.

Wood's 'crown jewel' is his location of a ruin, unrecorded by archaeologists, which he argues (again with his geometry) marks the burial place of something very secret and important, which could explain what all the fuss has been about. Naturally he has urged Mitterand to start digging. (1)

His linking of the Atlantis myth in the paintings of Poussin and Leonardo with the Rennes geometry is fascinating. But his belief in the Atlantis myth and its extra-terrestrial origins (!) he should have kept to himself, since despite being a crank he has done some useful research.

Since the Rennes forest seems to be full of masonic symbols, and since the Priory of Sion - if it exists (2) - is plainly masonic, it's hard not to wonder if there might be a connection with some faction of mainstream Freemasonry. Wood has a chapter on how the Rennes geometry corresponds with measurements of Solomon's Temple carried out by Hiram Abiff, the celebrated martyr of the Masons. Stephen Knight, in The Brotherhood, reveals the Masonic Secret to be the "shocking" and "unchristian" worship of Osiris and Baal in the higher degrees. Alex Mellor, in Our Separated
Brethren, says that the arcane knowledge passed on in the higher degrees can only be grasped by the individual privately: 'Those who know do not speak' - even to other Masons. So all those Catholic exposes whose sources are failed seekers of the 'Big Secret', are largely guesswork and Knight's book is just the latest in this tradition.

Apologists for the Masons (such as Mellor) trace the movement's origins back to the building trades in the late Middle Ages and their need then for trade secrets - the myth of 'operative' masonry preceding the 'speculative masonry' of the Renaissance.

This myth has been well bombarded by everyone from De Quincey in the early 19th century to the Catholic polemists of the 1950s. More reputable researchers like Frances Yates and the marxist Christopher Hill have pointed out that the Renaissance founders of science were not rationalists but Hermeticists, Alchemists, Magi and Caballists who relied on secret societies to exchange ideas and protect each other from the Inquisition. Yates gives evidence of links between such groups as the Rosicrucians and 'Scottish Rite' Freemasonry. (3)

Lincoln and co.'s selling of the idea of conspiracy to create a new world monarchy is so unconvincing that you get the impression that they are more interested in the cheap thrills market. Inextricably tied to the bourgeoisie, the various factions of masonry sold their occult souls to rationalism and the needs of industry long ago. Their conspiracies wrested all the power they could handle from Feudalism centuries ago (P2 notwithstanding). The establishment today, be they masons or trappists, are too busy conspiring to preserve the present crumbling world order to do much work on the Fifth Monarchy and the Second Coming.

If Wood, Lincoln et al really are selling the secrets of the establishment elite, all well and good - power needs demystifying. George Orwell, writing on the connection between French Fascism and the Occult wrote, "the very concept of occultism carries with it the idea that knowledge must be a secret thing, limited to a small circle of initiates." (4) But there is need for less wide-eyed amazement. Occult and religious secrecy merely serves the needs of political and economic elites whose contributions to humanity ceased to be useful long ago.

Two other books, The Holy Grail Revealed, P and L Fanthorpe (Newcastle,U.S., £5.95) and The Treasure Maps of Rennes, Stanley James (Seven Lights, US, £9.95) concentrate on the 'buried treasure' theory concerning Abbe Sauniere who was paid millions by the Vatican after he unearthed some ancient coded scrolls in his church which may have led him to Visigoth gold. Both books add little in the way of new and solid information.

David Black

Notes

1. Someone may have already dug. Wood doesn't mention it, but there is an old mine marked on the map just a few hundred yards from the ruin.

2. In the late 19th century Leo Taxil conned a massive reading public and Pope Leo XIII into believing his wild tales of a Masonic/Satanist body called the Palladium. Eventually he told a massive religious rally in Paris that he'd fabricated it all to further the cause of anti-clericalism. See Satanic Mask by

Could the current Grandmaster of the Priory of Sion, M. Plantard, be another Great French Hoaxer? *Holy Blood* with its dubious sources, certainly smells of this possibility.


*Quite Right, Mr Trotsky!*

*Denver Walker*

*(Harney and Jones, London 1985)*

*The sub-title of this book is "Some Trotskyist Myths Debunked; and how Trotskyists today hamper the fight for Peace and Socialism"*

To be fair, this is an amusing book at times and easy to read. In view of the fact that the author traces the development of Trotskyite organisations in Britain, this is no mean feat, as most publications dealing with this subject matter manage to tie themselves in knots. Walker succeeds in explaining the emergence and development of a bewildering plethora of factions, tendencies, groups etc., in a comprehensive and comprehensible way.

"Quite Right, Mr Trotsky!" utilizes some very amusing cartoon illustrations to get its points over and it's paperback format is of a very high professional standard. It runs to 140 pages, of which 3 pages constitute a very useful Glossary of Trotskyist organisations and publications; and the 6-page Index of organisation, publications and individuals is also very useful.

I would recommend anyone interested in the somewhat murky doings of the British far-left to read this book as it helps to make sense of what they are about. I do have reservations about the Soviet/USSR apologisms, but at the cost of £1.00, this publication represents astonishing value for money. In case your ordinary bookshop can't get it the publisher is: Harney and Jones, 119 Falcon Road, London SW11.

The author, Denver Walker, is a member of the Communist Party and a journalist with "The New Worker".

*John Clayton*

*The Andropov Deception*

*John Rossiter*

*(Sherwood Press, London 1984)*

'John Rossiter' is Brian Crozier, long-time asset of British and American intelligence agencies. (see Times 29 October 1984), and this is quite the worst - and worst-written - thriller I've read (even worse than *The Spike*).
Rather like The Spike, the Andropov Deception is supposed to be a kind of roman 'a clef, revealing, in fictional form, information the author is unable or unwilling to reveal overtly. In this instance, from what I picked up from a nose-holding skim, Crozier is trying to tell us about a high-placed Soviet mole within the West German government (wow!), KGB control of 'world terrorism', KGB influence in the West European 'peace movement'.

Sadly, Crozier has nothing of interest to say on these subjects you couldn't pick up from reading the *Daily Telegraph*, and succeeds merely in suggesting things about himself and his ilk.

Before the 1970s feminist movement appropriated the expression 'sexual politics', it was shorthand for a collection of ideas - loosely post-Freudian, essentially Reichian - which claimed a connection between political beliefs and personality structure. For example, crudely, authoritarian beliefs reflected an 'authoritarian character' which, in turn, was the product of particular psycho-sexual experiences.

This is a very complex subject which really has no place here. However, at some level 'sexual politics' does seem to me to be true, does describe something real. Some kinds of generalisations about your average British Movement thug's sexual/emotional capabilities and inclinations just are going to be true.

In this kind of framework, what would we expect from someone like Crozier, currently among the prominent exponents of the Soviet Union - source-of-all-terrorism line, and general apologist for US (and UK) support for some of the most obnoxious regimes in the "free world"?

Crozier's "hero", a NATO agent called Peter Lock (is Crozier telling us NATO has its own Intelligence service?) is an emotionless psychopath for whom "killing caused a sexual swelling"(p6). (Notice the beautiful prose!) Lock gets the first of several blow-jobs 4 pages into the book from a (female) Soviet agent who then dies in his bed, the victim of a delayed-action poison pill inserted in her anus by a KGB big-wig. (There is a good deal of interest in women's anal passages throughout the book.)

Further on, another of Lock's women gets gang-raped, tortured, and (of course) anally raped before Lock arrives on the scene to enact his revenge. He murders the six people involved after castrating three of them. Lock, in short, is a caricature of the sexual sadist, the macho 'action man' of every right-wing fantasy.

Crozier is an honoured, if apparently minor member of the coterie now gathered around the bloody foreign policies of America's resurgent right-wing. All of them, like Crozier, are apologists, directly or indirectly, for mass murder in the name of 'freedom' and 'democracy' in places like Chile, El Salvador and Guatemala.

It is, of course, possible that Crozier is a wonderful chap, tender-hearted with the best of them and not remotely like the the sadistic thug he has created. If so, why has he written this revolting trash?

Robin Ramsay
Kennedy assassination buffs - and I confess to being one in a very small way - can't resist books about the Kennedys even when they suspect there will be nothing, not a fragment, of interest about the assassination in them. The books by Parmet and Collier and Horowitz looked like being a couple of duds, but weren't quite that.

What most books about the Kennedy administration - rather than the Kennedy person/myth - seem to fail to do is convey any real sense of what an interesting and adventurous foreign policy Kennedy and his little band of Atlanticist buddies tried to run. Of course, when I write that, I mean: by the standards of the time. Kennedy, it should not be entirely forgotten, followed Eisenhower/Dulles.

Think of all those brave ventures designed to show the world the liberal-progressive (if anti-communist) face of American imperialism: the Alliance for Progress; treaties with the Soviets; and 'opening to the left in Italy'; the Peace Corps. Interesting moves. Futile in their apparent ambition to gild the lily, but, nonetheless, interesting. Kennedy was, indeed, a Cold War Warrior, but not just one.

Parmet's chronicle of the Kennedy presidency is pretty accurate but he fails to convey any size of the change from the Eisenhower/Dulles era. We tend to think of the Reagan administration as representing a big shift to the right. This isn't really accurate - not in the whole post-war period. All they've actually done is return to the rhetoric (mostly) and the behaviour (partly) of the pre-Kennedy era. Little of what has been said or done by the Reagan administration would have seemed that surprising coming from the mouth of John Foster Dulles. (Though Dulles might have said it more elegantly and looked less ridiculous doing it.)

Parmet, a historian, fails to convey that sense of history. His perspective is hampered somewhat by his role as one of the new defenders of the Warren Commission report on Kennedy's assassination. It's almost nostalgic to read Parmet seriously quoting Warren Commission lawyer Bellin's view that Jack Ruby's encounter with Oswald in the basement of the Dallas Police Station was just a "happenstance"..."that changed the face of history" (p349); or making this really convoluted defense of the Report: "There is still no tangible evidence that however flawed the Warren Commission report may have been, its conclusions were wrong." (p348) "Tangible evidence?" I dunno, like a confession maybe? The Report is "flawed" but not "wrong". So, half-wrong? If it is flawed, how can he know its conclusions are correct? Ah, yes; no "tangible evidence". Intellectual inquiry ceases while we wait for this "tangible" stuff.
Writing like this is so silly. How can an obviously intelligent human being like Parmet engage in such silly nonsense? Well, for one thing, he refers to 'Jack' much of the time. Yep, he's a fan. Welcome to hagiography country.

There is, however, one section (p334 onward) which seems to me to be both new and significant.

Parmet describes a hitherto unknown private visit to Vietnam's Diem by a personal friend of Kennedy's, Torbert MacDonald.

"MacDonald himself explained why Kennedy sent him. The President had begun to develop personal sources of information from FBI men who were bypassing J. Edgar Hoover and going directly to him. Some CIA people were following a similar route and avoiding the agency .... when he heard that Big Minh and his group were planning to assassinate Diem, he wanted to make a direct contact. He was hesitant about the embassy in Saigon because he could not trust his people there. So he called on Torby who ... told Diem "They're going to kill you. You've got to get out of there temporarily to seek sanctuary in the American Embassy". Diem refused.

Parmet just drops this into his section on Vietnam without comment and without any indication that he has the slightest idea of the significance of what he is telling us. Back channels to the CIA and FBI? Advance knowledge (from whom?) of the Diem assassination? These should ramify for years. Parmet's book will be remembered in years to come for this section, if for nothing else.

Collier and Horowitz (Cowitz for short) don't even bother trying to give an account of the Kennedy administration. Theirs is American history as Dynasty out-takes.

As a portrait of a patriarchy running amok it is pretty interesting, some of it, especially the final section on the Kennedy children, the sons and nephews of John and Robert. Cowitz call this 'The lost boys'. They aren't lost (except to the keepers of the flame), they're just buried by the accident of being 'a Kennedy'. Never before can a life of multiple drug use and unlimited access to women have seemed such a drag!

The strange thing is that this group of young men, all imprisoned by these myths, is, apparently, not remotely interested in the questions: Who killed my dad? Who killed my uncle? They are children/nephews of the two most famous assassinations in recent history, and they aren't even curious? On Cowitz's account, this is the case. Or is it just that Cowitz didn't ask them about the deaths?

This latter suggestion has a good chance of being true, in my opinion. Cowitz duck the entire assassination issue. Parmet might be said to display the courage of his own needs; Cowitz have no such excuse. Their evasion of the issue is calculated. Sirhan doesn't get a namecheck; Oswald just one. No view of the events of 1963 or 1968 is offered, bar a very faint inference proffered: that it was Oswald in 1963.

But Cowitz know it wasn't like that. They used to be among the senior staff at Ramparts magazine; and Ramparts has the distinction of being just about the only serious magazine on the American left which continued to take the assassination seriously all the way through to Watergate. Ramparts published Peter Dale Scott's
Dallas, Watergate and Beyond, one of the seminal essays on the subject. Cowitz know that it wasn't Oswald and Sirhan. This knowledge shows itself in the way they can't bring themselves to just hold their noses and state 'Oswald and Sirhan did it'. A sentence or two - who would notice? Instead we get "a man was waiting with a gun", or some such circumlocution.

Cowitz must find their knowledge of events such as this an embarrassment in their new roles as born-again rightwingers, revealed to the world in October's Encounter. "Casting our ballots for Ronald Reagan was indeed a way of saying goodbye to all that - the self-aggrandizing romance with corrupt Third Worldism; to the casual indulgence of Soviet totalitarianism; to the hypocritical and self-dramatising Anti-Americanism which is the New Left's bequest to mainstream politics."

As such confessions go, this one is quite interesting if unoriginal. Accusing the (old) New Left of naivety is easy enough. The world is complex; it takes a long time to read all the books. Almost by definition the young are going to appear naive.

The curious thing is that someone as sophisticated as Horowitz should produce a confession that is so over the top. Just because the New Left now appears naive seems a fairly thin reason to vote for Reagan, who was a dummy when Ramparts was on the go, and is now a dummy with pretty advanced senile dementia.

The new lesson according to Cowitz includes these:

"In Vietnam we waged a war against ourselves";

"The Ethiopian regime is propped up by 200,000 Cuban legionnaires";

"Thousands of Afghan children who have been taken to the Soviet Union to be "educated" will be returned to their native land as spies and quizlings."

The first is virtually unintelligible - and probably racist; the second and third are factoids of enormous proportions. No longer "indulging Soviet totalitarianism" is a fine thing. Why does it so often seem to mean turning off the critical faculties?

Robin Ramsay

Journals

The Third Decade

The Third Decade, "a journal of research on the John F. Kennedy assassination" keeps appearing with impressive, not to say stunning, frequency. 6 in a year so far, and that's 26 plus pages per issue.

With The Third Decade the Kennedy assassination researchers have finally got, as near as makes no difference, a fully-fledged academic journal. Its hard to know whether to be delighted that they've come so far despite the derision they have to put up with, or depressed that the more the assassination develops as a 'subject', the further we get from any real chance of political action on it.
No 5 includes a fascinating piece by Paul Hoch on the role of Army Intelligence and the Army Intelligence Reserve, fascinating meticulous work showing that the P.D. Scott/Hoch 'tendency' within the assassination buff world are really getting pretty close to making an irresistible case for this hypothesis.

No 6 is a particularly fine issue. It includes an excerpt from the memoirs of the veteran American journalist Fred J. Cook, on his early attempts to get his doubts about the Warren Commission into print, and three examples of the kind of micro-textual analysis which the serious JFK assassination researcher does so well.

Editor is Jerry Rose, State University College, Fredonia, New York 14063.

**Intelligence/Parapolitics**

We should have given a lot more attention to the Paris-based Intelligence/Parapolitics than we have to date. It really is wonderfully interesting, simply, and thoroughly done.

In./PP receives, translates and summarises parapolitical articles from all over the world. It also sells photocopies of the originals.

The August/September issue, for example, includes French accounts of a large, leaked French intelligence service report on Soviet operations in France, and Italian and French sources on the role of Francesco Pazienza in P2 et al.

This issue also includes a brief history of the journal and the organisation - ADI - which supports it. Founded in 1980, ADI has had "several well-known members of the French independent left or even the French socialist party " on its board. In./PP regularly displays its political independence by reporting the activities of the Soviet bloc intelligence services.

Subscriptions are $20 American per year. Send to ADI, 16 Rue des Ecoles, 75005 Paris.

**Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene**

We've now seen one copy of this, a bi-monthly newsletter/book review. If the June 1985 issue is typical, this is pretty dull stuff. The lead story is the recent case of 'Jane's' acquiring and printing three photographs taken from a US satellite, and the subsequent prosecution of the individual who supplied them. There are shorter pieces on the official reception of Carter Administration CIA Chief Admiral Stansfield Turner's recent book *Secrecy and Democracy: the CIA in transition*, the origins of the 'Enigma' machine used in WW2, and a series of assorted book reviews.

The fact that three of the reviewers are retired US intelligence officials tells you the stance of FILS: no secrets, no current (or even recent) operations are going to be revealed here. It's rather like Nigel West's new journal (reviewed L 9) but cheaper, bigger and, on the basis of having seen one of each, better.

Subscriptions are $25 for 6 and the publisher is University Publications of America, 44 North Market Street, Frederick, MD 21701, USA. In the absence of any other information to the contrary, subs should be sent, and cheques made payable, to them.
Letters

From JIM HOUGAN, Washington, USA.

(NB this letter was written between the reviews of Hougan's book Secret Agenda which appeared in Lobsters 8 and 9)

After reading No 8 I thought I'd share the following with you in re: Secret Agenda and, on another topic, Frank Terpil.

Throat

Secret Agenda is deliberately ambiguous on the subject of Deep Throat's identity. Basically, I conclude that if Throat was a prominent member of the Nixon Administration, well-known to the public at the time of the Watergate affair, then he can only have been General Alexander Haig. But there is no reason to assume that.

Throat could just as easily have been a comparative unknown - in which case, he was almost certainly someone whom Post reporter Bob Woodward met during his 65-70 tour of duty in the Navy. As Secret Agenda relates, that tour of duty saw Woodward joining an elite unit of the US Navy briefing officers, while at the same time presiding over the ultrasecret code-room of the Chief of Naval Operations (then Admiral Thomas Moorer) at the Pentagon. The extraordinary sensitivity of this post, according to others who have held it, made Woodward a member of "an old boys' network" whose influence in Washington is said to be profound. (others in the group include Senator Richard Lugar and Admiral Bobby Ray Inman.)

In Secret Agenda I suggest that Admiral Inman, later Deputy Director of the CIA, should be a leading candidate for Deep Throat. Without going further into my reasons for asserting that - this letter promises to be too long already - Admiral Inman's reaction to that report is of more than passing interest.

Within a day or two of the book's publication, Inman's staff called Random House to deny he was Throat, and to insist that it was defamatory to suggest that he should even be considered a candidate for that role. According to Inman's staff, the admiral said that he was not in Washington during the Watergate affair - but had, instead, been posted in Hawaii throughout the affair's duration.

It seemed then, that I had fucked up - and never more so than when Inman personally called the "Today Show" to repeat his denial and to complain that I had not checked my facts. The denial was broadcast to millions, and I wondered where I had gone wrong. Rechecking, I found that my source in re Inman's whereabouts was the "Flag Matters Office" at the Pentagon. According to that Office, Inman was transferred to Washington D.C in the summer of 1971; he began his service at the Pentagon in June 1972; and he was posted to Hawaii in December 1973.

All The President's Men by Bernstein and Woodward shows that the first Watergate-related conversation between Woodward and Throat occurred in mid-June 1972 - precisely when Inman moved to Washington's Fort McNair at the Pentagon; and that
the last conversation between the two men occurred during the first week in November 1973 - a few weeks before Inman's departure for Honolulu. What we have, then, is an exact concordance between Throat's whisperings to Woodward and Inman's tenure at the Pentagon during the Watergate affair. Which, of course, need not prove anything - unless one takes into consideration the alacrity with which Inman chose to deny the rather soft allegation of his candidacy for Deep Throat honours ... and, not least of all, the falsity of the evidence that Inman offered in support of that denial.

I telephoned Inman earlier this year to ask why he said what he did. His answer was that, upon learning of my suggestion that he might be Deep Throat, he had telephoned Bob Woodward to discuss the matter with him. According to Inman, he and Woodward agreed that he was not Deep Throat (1)

As for the admiral's false assertion about his tropical presence in Hawaii for the duration of the Watergate affair, Inman confessed that he has been "mistaken".

But his denial had been broadcast throughout the country, and I can only assume that it was believed. After all, one would think that the former Director of Naval Intelligence and the National Security Agency would know with some precision where he was when this country was undergoing its greatest political crisis of this century. Indeed, to think otherwise is ludicrous. And isn't it interesting to learn that Admiral Inman found it necessary to discuss the identity of Deep Throat with Bob Woodward - and then to conclude, apparently with a sigh of relief, that it was not he?

How the admiral reconciles all this, I have no idea. If he has told the truth as he knows it then he would seem to be a fool (which I doubt that he is). And if he has lied, then he has done so with a clumsiness that one can only wonder about the irony of his having chosen a career in intelligence".

My own conclusion about all this is that Inman panicked when Secret Agenda was published. I think that he was a very important source of Bob Woodward's throughout the critical first year of the Watergate affair. I suspect that he met Woodward in an underground garage on at least one occasion - and that this formed the basis of the literary character whom Woodward chose to call "Deep Throat".

In the light of the still unresolved "Moorer-Radford Affair", which saw Naval Officers at the Pentagon spying on Henry Kissinger and the White House, it would be interesting to know if Admiral Inman was Deep Throat - and, if he was, did he assume that role with or without the blessing of the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas Moorer.

Terpil

I haven't read the Magill stories about "Korkala, Terpil and Ireland" but I do know something of the matters discussed.

I met Frank Terpil a year before he became a fugitive. He was an admirer of Spooks (Hougan's previous book - eds.) and kidded about his own omission from its pages. I apologised to him for omitting from the rogue's gallery, and offered to make it up to him by conducting a series of tape-recorded interviews. This was done over a period of several months, on weekends, at his house in Mclean.
Later, when Frank flew the coop and became a fugitive, he took to calling me on
Sunday mornings from Damascus or Beirut - to chat mostly, and to ask how things
were going with his case. In the course of one of these conversations I persuaded him
to let me make a documentary film about him.

Whereupon a great many coded Telexes began to be sent until, finally, the "glass
samples" (me, the executive producer and the director) arrived in Damascus. I
introduced Frank to David Fanning and Anthony Thomas, and we began to plan for a
film of an hour's length. After four or five days in Syria, we returned to London and
the States to make final arrangements for filming in Beirut. It was on or about the
Fourth of July that we returned to the Middle East, and introduced the camera crew to
Terpil in Beirut.

A lot happened while we were there. We were staying in West Beirut at the Royal
Garden Hotel. The Parti Populaire Syrien threatened to kill us - they thought we were
CIA or Mossad - but, more to the point, Marilyn and Donna Korkala arrived out of the
blue.

Donna Korkala seemed to begin nagging her husband even before she'd stepped onto
the tarmac at the airport. Within minutes she'd convinced her husband to bow out of
the film, and henpecked him into begging us not to use the film footage that we had
shot of his reunion with his wife at Beirut International.

A few days later Marilyn Terpil arrived - sending Terpil into a panic because, of
course, Marilyn was a woman scorned. Frank had fallen in love (while on bail in the
States) with an erstwhile cosmetician named Ruth - with whom he was living in
Beirut. Marilyn knew of the liaison and was determined to break either it or her
husband up.

What began as a spy-thriller, in other words, quickly degenerated into a domestic
comedy ("against the background of the war-torn Middle East"). I kept waiting for
John Cleese to show up and do the commentary.

It was a few months later, as we were editing what became "Confession of a
Dangerous Man", that Donna Korkala arranged through Marie McCarthy to have her
husband interviewed by Mike Wallace for the "Sixty Minutes" show. (I don't know
anything about McCarthy's involvement with the UN; my understanding is that she
had been a baby-sitter for a relative of Mike Wallace's - but perhaps that's incorrect.)
Terpil later told me that Donna was paid $10,000 for her role in arranging the
interview; he was upset because he didn't receive any of that money, despite the fact
that the alleged payment was contingent upon Terpil's appearance. (Korkala was rather
less notorious than Terpil, and so the latter seems to have had a greater "market value"
to the media.) Because Korkala insisted that his family needed the money, Terpil says
that he agreed to be interviewed by Wallace.

Which, in effect, scooped us - though the ever-apologetic Terpil was of the opinion
that it didn't matter much since he refused to say anything substantive in response to
Wallace's questions. And, indeed, the "Sixty Minutes" is embarrassing for that reason.
Terpil is almost completely non-committal, while Korkala is by turns brushed off and
patronised.

I'm proud of the fact that "Confessions of a Dangerous Man" received a national
Emmy as the best investigative documentary of 1982.

Which is nice .... but why am I telling you all this? I suppose it's to add a bit of perspective to the purplish account that Marie McCarthy and Gordon Thomas have provided. The idea that Korkala wanted to "discuss the case with the American people outside the confines of a courtroom" is a hoot. Korkala was nagged into peddling himself to the media for money - it was as simple as that (and probably just as complicated).

That Korkala and Terpil were subsequently kidnapped is a fact. Korkala was snatched by Syrian Intelligence officials (one of whom is listed in his telephone address book). It happened at the Summerland resort just south of Beirut, where Gary was working at a job teaching rich Lebanese kids to wind-surf. Frank was picked up a few hours later by the same men. At the time he was getting ready to open an Italian restaurant near the American embassy.

Anyway, both men were taken to Damascus, imprisoned and interrogated. According to an account that Frank later gave me, the Syrians wanted him and Korkala to sign confessions saying that their indictments were a hoax, and that they were actually in the employ of the CIA - having been sent to the Middle East to spy on the various factions there. Frank later told me that Korkala signed a document to that effect, while Frank himself continued to do so. Korkala, then, was released (and was arrested shortly thereafter on a visit to Spain.) Terpil languished for months in what he claims was "a dungeon". He felt that if he signed the confession, he'd be killed by the same people who had previously been protecting him.

When he was released he'd lost 50 pounds, had hair down to his shoulders, and beard. He called me from Beirut to say that he'd lost his tan. A few days later, the Israelis invaded, Frank donned a kaffiyeh, and was evacuated in the guise of a PLO fighter under the watchful eyes of the US marines.

As to the authenticity of Korkala's address-book, I have little doubt. The circumstances under which it was found are plausible: worried friends went to his apartment after he'd disappeared, and there it was. And contrary to what the Irish Special Branch has to say, the names in the book are quite interesting. If I recall rightly, there is a Turkish gentleman named Bayrak who is listed, and, also, a Damascene named Badr Faris. Is there not also a Mr Short?

As for Marie McCarthy, I think the best question to ask about her is not about her. That is: who is Gerritt and what does Gerritt do? So, too, you should know that the Wilner House Hotel in Beirut is (or was) no ordinary lodging, but a hangout (according to Terpil) for the PLO and the PLA.
Subscriptions

Subscription are for six issues.

- UK/Ireland subs - £3.50;
- US - $12.
- Other countries by negotiation.
- Institutional rates double those of individuals

Send cheques etc., Robin Ramsay,
17c Pearson Avenue,
Hull, HU5 2SX, UK.

Please make cheques payable to Steve Dorril.

The Lobster is printed and published by Voice, Unit 51, 260 Wincolmlee, Hull, UK.